Gerhard Grüßhaber

The 'German Spirit' in the Ottoman and Turkish Army, 1908-1938

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A History of Military Knowledge Transfer

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OLDENBOURG

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1 Introduction

The 'German Spirit'

At the beginning of my first visit to the Gallipoli peninsula in September 2009, the major World War One Ottoman battlefield in today's Republic of Turkey, I was hugged by an elderly Turkish participant of our tour group as soon as he realized that I was German. "Our ancestors once fought here together, we are brothers in arms!" he proudly exclaimed, hugging me yet again. Apart from the odd feeling of being applauded for being German in a (for me at that time) foreign country, this experience raised the question of why the military relationship between these two countries is still remembered. Soon, I began to wonder how it had affected the armies of both countries and whether this transfer of military knowledge might have also shaped the society as a whole.

Part of the German mindset between 1871 and 1914 was the "German Spirit" ("Deutscher Geist"), a nationalist construct of the Wilhelmine era. The use of attributive virtues and qualities was intended to contribute to the inner consolidation and to offer self-confidence to the young nation after the unification of the empire in 1871. Beyond the bourgeoisie those ideas were especially popular among the German military, resulting not least from its implied sense of mission. The "German Spirit" reached its peak in the "Spirit of 1914" and was also welcomed in the Ottoman Empire.[1] Several generations of Ottoman officers were inculcated with this nationalist ideology, resulting from their textbooks translated from German and their instructors who "were either Germans or [Ottomans] imbued with the German Spirit [Alman ruhuyla]."[2]

Even the German liberals ascribed this spirit an important role in German foreign policy. According to journalist Ernst Jäckh,

1 See the publication by Mehmed Enisi [Yalkı], *Alman Ruhu* [German Spirit] (Istanbul: Nefaset Matbaası, 1330/1914). Cf. Mustafa Gencer, *Jöntürk Modernizmi ve 'Alman ruhu': 1908–1918 Dönemi Türk-Alman İlişkileri ve Eğitim* [Young Turk Modernism and the 'German Spirit': German-Turkish Relations in the 1908–1918 Period and Education] (Istanbul: İletişim, 2003), 280.

2 Kâzım Karabekir, *Tarihte Almanlar ve Alman Ordusu* [The Germans in History and the German Army] (Istanbul: Emre Yayınları, 2001), 15.

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> "[...] Prussian generals revolutionize the Ottoman people through the Turkish army, not on purpose- by no means! – as bearer and transmitter of the German Spirit, which is not even suffocated by the Prussian drill."[3]

The author Paul Rohrbach did not advocate a direct German rule or colonization of the Ottoman lands, but "[...] the induction [Hineinleitung] of the German Spirit into the big national renewal process"[4] of the Ottoman Empire. These German intellectuals were aware that the 'German Spirit' was competing with the French cultural influence in the Ottoman state, especially during World War I. Therefore the Orientalist Carl Heinrich Becker highlighted the favorite military virtues inherent in the German mindset:

> "The German Spirit is not as amicable and impressive, but also not as absorbing as the French one. It is more serious and cumbersome, therefore discouraging and does not allure to superficiality but to educating thoroughness."[5]

Focus of the Study

I decided to focus my study not on the well-studied German military mission between 1882 and 1918, but rather on the contacts between German and Turkish military members that outlasted the official end of the alliance in 1918. The period of the study covers most of the "Young Turk Era"[6] between the 1908 revolution and the death of president Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1938. It is against this background that the activities of German military instructors in the Ottoman Empire/Turkey as well as the 'apprenticeship years' of Ottoman and Turkish officers in Germany before and after the First World War will be analyzed. This study focuses on the Ottoman land forces.[7]

According to the historian Hartmut Kaelble, transfer is defined as "adaptation of concepts, values, norms, attitudes and identities at the migration of per-

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3 Ernst Jäckh, *Der aufsteigende Halbmond: Beiträge zur türkischen Renaissance* (Berlin: Schöneberg, 1911), 31. Note the positive review of this book by a German officer, formerly in Ottoman service: [Karl] Imhoff, "Der aufsteigende Halbmond," *MWB* 90 (1911), cols. 2085–2086.

4 Paul Rohrbach, *Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt* (Düsseldorf, Leipzig: Karl Robert Langewiesche, 1912), 238.

5 Carl Heinrich Becker, *Das türkische Bildungsproblem* (Bonn: Friedrich Cohen, 1916), 27.

6 Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), 97–214.

7 For an overview of the German role in the Ottoman navy and air force until 1918 see: Bernd Langensiepen et al., *Halbmond und Kaiseradler: Goeben und Breslau am Bosporus, 1914–1918*, (Hamburg, Berlin, Bonn: Mittler, 1999); Hans Werner Neulen, *Die Adler des Kaisers im Orient 1915–1919. Unser Freund, der Feind* (Aachen: Helios, 2016).

sons and ideas between cultures and at the contact between cultures".[8] The receiving party picks out the fragments that seem useful and merges them with its own cultural tradition, thereby creating something new.[9] In this study, I define this process as appropriation. Part and parcel of these cultural transfers are irritations, insecurities, frustrations and disappointments, especially in the context of the unequal relations between the industrialized German middle power and the agrarian Ottoman multi-ethnic empire until 1918.[10] Regarding the transfer of military knowledge not all features of the sending side are applicable to the receiving socio-military culture.[11] A selective appropriation of knowledge, based on a grown mutual dependency is therefore assumed.[12] Especially during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II., "[a] wariness of Western encroachment of all kinds translated into a more combative approach to the West in general and a more selective appropriation of its institutions."[13]

The European military innovations were not entirely separable from the European culture. The material military hardware included immaterial cultural features, and thus it was an Ottoman illusion to appropriate the one without the other.[14] Sultan Abdülhamid II. (reg. 1876 – 1909) was aware of this fact when

8 Hartmut Kaelble, "Die interdisziplinären Debatten über Vergleich und Transfer," in Hartmut Kaelble and Jürgen Schriewer (eds.), *Vergleich und Transfer: Komparatistik in den Sozial-, Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2003), 472.

9 Christine Eisenberg, "Kulturtransfer als historischer Prozess: Ein Beitrag zur Komparatistik," in *Vergleich und Transfer: Komparatistik in den Sozial-, Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften*, ed. Hartmut Kaelble and Jürgen Schriewer (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2003), 399.

10 Eisenberg, "Kulturtransfer als historischer Prozess," 414; For the German-Ottoman case see Eberhard Demm, "Zwischen Kulturkonflikt und Akkulturation: Deutsche Offiziere im Osmanischen Reich," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 8 (2006), 691 – 715.

11 For the later period see Michael Eisenstadt and Kenneth M. Pollack, "Armies of Snow and Armies of Sand: The Impact of Soviet Military Doctrine on Arab Militaries," in *The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas*, ed. Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 63 – 92. It is interesting to note that the Soviet-Egyptian cooperation at the Suez channel fortification programme gave food for thought for Wallach's study; cf. Jehuda L. Wallach, *Anatomie einer Militärhilfe: Die preußisch-deutschen Militärmissionen in der Türkei, 1835 – 1919* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1976).

12 Malte Fuhrmann, "Zwei Völker in Waffen. Türkisch-deutsche Interdependenzen beim nation building," in: *Schnittstellen: Gesellschaft, Nation, Konflikt und Erinnerung in Südosteuropa. Festschrift für Holm Sundhaussen zum 65. Geburtstag*, ed. Ulf Brunnbauer et al. (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007), 231 – 244.

13 Benjamin C. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the late Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 9.

14 For this misinterpretation see David B. Ralston, *Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Techniques and Institutions into the Extra- European World, 1600 – 1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 177.

he commented on sending young Ottoman civilian and military students to Europe: "They remain only as long as it is necessary to take a brief look at the civilization of the West, to see what good there is to learn, and to report home. A short stay bears less dangers related to the harmful influence of the poison of the European civilization."[15] Eventually the appropriation of technology also led to a rapprochement to the German cultural fundament of the military power, especially after Abdülhamid's careful policy was no longer in charge. The 'poisonous' 'German Spirit' had a deep influence on the shaping of the Turkish officer corps. It is thus no exaggeration to say that for the Republican army after 1923 "the German military doctrine not only influenced the Turkish war strategy, [but also] the state of mind of the Turkish General Staff's officer corps, in other words, what kind of officer corps was aspired."[16]

This study will concentrate on the content and practices of the military knowledge transfer in order to better understand the impact and the limitations of the German-Ottoman/Turkish military cooperation. It should, however, be pointed out that the transfer between the German and the Ottoman Empire was not restricted to the late 19th and the early 20th century and the German military was not the sole role model for the Ottoman military.

German and Ottoman Military Transfer since the early Modern Age

In the early modern age, the armies of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation and the Ottomans often faced each other on the battlefield. These martial confrontations were accompanied by a continuous transfer of military related knowledge on both sides, as was also the case among the rivaling European powers.[17] The development of Ottoman firearms was clearly inspired by European models. On the tactical level the Ottoman troops also appropriated European practices, including the volley fire (first reported in 1605), and adapted them for their own conditions.[18] In the 16th century, for some of the West European spec-

15 Abdülhamid II, *Avant la Débâcle de la Turquie: Pensées et Souvenirs de l'Ex-Sultan Abdul-Hamid*, ed. Ali Merad (Paris: Publisud, 2007), 189.

16 Ümit Özdağ, *Ordu-Siyaset İlişkisi: Atatürk, İnönü Dönemleri* [Army-Politics Relations: The Atatürk and İnönü Periods] (Ankara: Gündoğan, 1991), 117.

17 Gültekin Yıldız, "Ottoman Military Organization (1800 – 1918)," in *The Encyclopedia of War*, ed. Gordon Martel, vol. 3 (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 1615.

18 Gábor Ágoston, "Firearms and Military Adaptation: The Ottomans and the European Military Revolution, 1450 – 1800," *Journal of World History* 25 – 1 (2014), 98.

tators, their adversary's army and leadership system was advantageous. The discipline of the Janissaries was seen as superior to the own marauding mercenary *Landsknecht* armies. [19] The European admiration for the Ottoman army's elite corps continued. In 1670 the Austrian General Montecuccoli even proposed to establish military schools across the entire Habsburg Empire similar to the Janissary training facilities.[20] He also argued for the implementation of the Ottoman supply system and for a reform of the own imperial cavalry to counter the light and mobile Ottoman *sipahi* riders.[21] In the ensuing period, the Austrian and later the German cavalry equipment also began to show many influences from the Ottoman horse and riders gear. The Hussar's uniform, with its *dolman* jackets decorated with breast lacing and the iconic *kalpak* fur cap, followed Ottoman uniform patterns. The name of the German *Ulan* lancers was even derived from the Ottoman term *oğlan*, i. e. the underage boys selected for service in the Janissary corps.[22] But also in terms of technical transfers, the confrontations of the Ottomans and the European powers were fruitful for the development of European military knowledge. The siege of Crete (1667–1669) and the deployment of the Ottoman *humbaracı* sappers inspired Vauban, the French fortress architect, in his treatises on siege and mine warfare. Mine warfare based on Ottoman principles was also applicable to the French and German army until 1914.[23]

Especially after the failed second siege of Vienna in 1683, the Ottoman army had lost its threatening character. By the end of the 17th century, the archenemy on the other side of the river Rhine had taken the place of the 'Turks', thus fulfilling mobilizing purposes. In many German principalities, the integration of military customs of the former archenemy of Christendom into their own military

19 On the own cultural critique and the praise for the Ottoman military discipline cf. Carl Göllner, *Die Türkenfrage in der öffentlichen Meinung Europas im 16. Jahrhundert* (Baden-Baden: Valentin Koerner, 1978), 291–298; Ralston, *Importing the European Army*, 44.

20 Hans Sturmberger, "Das Problem der Vorbildhaftigkeit des türkischen Staatswesens im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert und sein Einfluß auf den europäischen Absolutismus," in *XIIe Congrès International des Sciences Historiques*, ed. Comité International des Sciences Historiques, vol. 4 (Horn, Wien: Ferdinand Berger & Söhne, 1965), 206.

21 Philippe Roy, "L'Influence des Conflits entre les Armées Orientales et Européennes sur l'Art de la Guerre," in *Guerres et Paix en Europe Centrale aux Époques Moderne et Contemporaine: Mélanges d'Histoire des Relations Internationales offerts à Jean Bérenger*, ed. Daniel Tollet (Paris: Presses de l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 2003), 288–289.

22 Franz Gall, "Türkische Einflüsse auf das äußere Bild der kaiserlichen Armee," in *Österreich und die Türken*, ed. Landesarchiv Burgenland (Eisenstadt: Selbstverlag der Burgenländischen Landesregierung, 1972), 133–135; Walter Transfeldt, *Wort und Brauch in Heer und Flotte*, 9th ed. (Stuttgart: Spemann, 1986), 221.

23 Roy, "L'Influence des Conflits," 291–292.

and self-representative practices increased.[24] Since the beginning of the 18th century, the music detachments of most European armies appropriated elements of their enemy's marching music. Ottoman instruments were included and adapted to occidental tonality. The dominating elements of the so-called "Janissary music" (*Mehterhane)* as the jingle sticks and the horsetails were united with the ancient Roman *aquila* standard, generating the Jingling Johnny (*Schellenbaum*). In the imperial German army after 1871, the *Schellenbaum* was even crested by a stylized crescent in many regiments, a clear reference to its undeniable origins.[25]

The application of European military knowledge had become a necessity for the Ottoman state by the end of the 18th century. During the 'Long French century in Ottoman military reforms' (1735 – 1880), the Ottomans went through a "do-or-die-moment"[26] that could only be impeded by military reforms, in this case, by the employment of European instructors.

The 'Long French Century', 1730 – 1882

By means of military reforms, the government wanted to prevent further defeats on the battlefield and strengthen the central power. In the course of the 19th century, the latter gained importance against the various independence movements that emerged in the Ottoman periphery. One way to facilitate the modernization was to employ European instructors. French advisors especially were very active in various Ottoman military institutions. The French military mission reached its peak in the decade before and after the French Revolution. The strengthening of

24 Cf. Sturmberger, "Das Problem der Vorbildhaftigkeit," 205; Mathieu Lepetit, "Die Türken vor Wien," in *Deutsche Erinnerungsorte*, ed. Etienne François et al. vol. 1. (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2001), 402 – 403. For the appropriation of invented Ottoman Janissaries in German palace ceremonies see Holger Schuckelt "'Folget Das Türckische Serail': Das Wachsfigurenkabinett Augusts des Starken, Kammertürken und Türkenkammer am Dresdner Hof," in *Eine gute Figur machen: Kostüm und Fest am Dresdner Hof*, ed. Claudia Schnitzer et al. (Amsterdam, Dresden: Verlag der Kunst, 2000), 83.

25 Heinz Busch, *Vom Armeemarsch zum Großen Zapfenstreich: Ein Lexikon zur Geschichte der deutschen Militärmusik* (Bonn: Der Kurier, 2005), 87, 163; Transfeldt, *Wort und Brauch in Heer und Flotte*, 315 – 318. For the Bavarian army see Andreas Masel, "Zur Geschichte der Harmonie- und der Türkischen Musik im bayerischen Heer bis zum Jahr 1826," *Mit klingendem Spiel: Militärmusik einst und jetzt* 13 (1990), 185 – 217.

26 Virginia H. Aksan, *Ottoman Wars: An Empire Besieged, 1700 – 1870* (New York: Longman/Pearson, 2007), 7.

the Ottoman state and its army lay in France's political interest against the Russian expansive policy at the Ottoman periphery.[27]

Count de Bonneval was a former French officer and adventurer in Habsburg service during the Spanish war of Succession and the Austro- Ottoman war of 1716 – 1718. Despite his latter deployment, Bonneval converted to Islam and assisted as Ahmed Paşa the Ottoman army in the reorganization of the artillery corps from 1729 until his death in 1747. His work was continued by the Hungarian born French diplomat Baron François de Tott (Ferenc Tóth) during the Ottoman-Russian war (1768 – 1774). In addition to further modernization efforts in the artillery in 1773, Tott founded the imperial naval engineer school (*Mühendishane-i Berr-i Hümayun*) in the capital, the first Ottoman training facility based on modern European scientific methods. In the 1790s the French side even proposed to establish a modern Ottoman armament manufactory sector to supply the new established *Nizam-i Cedid* (*New Order)* troops, while more than 25 French military instructors and armament specialists worked in the Ottoman capital. Many features of the later German dominated period were already visible here, as the underlying idea of the contemporary (French revolutionary) spirit, the dominating language of the sending nation and the signature of a (not applied) French-Ottoman military alliance.[28] Altogether, these were but small reform efforts that failed to reach the majority of the Ottoman armed forces.[29] Besides the transfer of knowledge by those foreign instructors, the Ottoman military also began to appropriate European scientific and military methods by reading and translating the standard works in those fields. During the peak of Napoleonic power in 1804, the Ottoman *Mühendishane* library acquired more than a dozen French army in-

27 Cf. Fatih Yeşil, "Kara Kuvvetlerinde Avrupalı Danışmanlar" [European Advisors in the Army], in *Osmanlı Askerî Tarihi: Kara, Deniz ve Hava kuvvetleri 1792 – 1918*, ed. Gültekin Yıldız (Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2013), 80 – 85; Pascal W. Firges, "Gunners for the Sultan: French Revolutionary Efforts to modernize the Ottoman Military," in *Well-Connected Domains: Towards an Entangled Ottoman History*, ed. Pascal W. Firges et al. (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2014), 173.

28 Firges, "Gunners for the Sultan," 176, 178. On the Ottoman role during the Napoleonic wars cf. Pierre O. Juhel, "1813- Das Jahr eines Weltkriegs?," in *Blutige Romantik: 200 Jahre Befreiungskriege* ed. Militärhistorisches Museum der Bundeswehr, vol. 2 (Dresden: Sandstein, 2013), 42 – 43.

29 Virginia H. Aksan, "Breaking the Spell of the Baron de Tott: Refraining the Question of Military Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1760 – 1830," *International History Review* 14 (2002), 253 – 277; Tobias Heinzelmann, *Heiliger Kampf oder Landesverteidigung? Die Diskussion um die Einführung der allgemeinen Militärpflicht im Osmanischen Reich, 1826 – 1856* (Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 2004), 38.

struction manuals.[30] The establishment of an Ottoman Turkish vocabulary for the European works was a major task of these Ottoman translational efforts.[31] The next major step towards the foundation of a reliable European style army was the founding of the *Nizam-i Cedid* corps during the reign of Sultan Selim III. Born out of the circumstances of the defeat against Russia in 1774, this new unit was intended to replace the old fief based *timar* cavalry and the Janissaries as well as the irregular *levend* mercenary infantry corps. This new corps became the prototype of a conscript army. But it remained a small contingent, compared to the size of the regular Ottoman troops.[32] Many of the *Nizam* troops and officers fell victim to the May 1807 Janissary uprising, which delayed the reformation of the Ottoman army for nearly two decades. But the survivors of the 1807 purge provided the nucleus of a new army after 1826, when the old Janissary corps was finally disbanded in a bloody purge.[33]

The French role model continued during the first half of the 19th century, while also many advisors from other European countries joined the ranks of the foreign instructors in the Ottoman army. Those were not always the best representatives of their profession, as the Ottoman army also attracted many cashiered officers and adventurers with purely pecuniary interests.[34] Interrupted by the Franco-Ottoman war in Egypt and Palestine in 1798–1800, the Ottoman admiration for the French system persisted. Further steps included the establishment of the Ottoman military academy (*Mekteb-i Fünun-u Harbiye-yi Şahane*) in Maçka in 1834, based on the example of the French St. Cyr academy, and finally the participation on the side of France and Great Britain in the Crimean War. However, while taking into account the Ottoman preferences for the French and later the Prussian role model in the context of military reforms, one has to be aware that parts of those competing models were also the product of mutual transfers.[35] There was also the possibility of combining different European mili-

30 Kemal Beydilli, *Türk Bilim ve Matbaacılık Tarihinde Mühendishâne, Mühendishâne Matbaası ve Kütüphânesi, 1776–1826* [The School of Engineers, its Press and Library in the History of Turkish Knowledge and Press History, 1776–1826] (Istanbul: Eren, 1995), 281.

31 Ekmeleddin İhsanoglu, "Ottoman Science: The Last Episode in Islamic Scientific Tradition and the Beginning of European Scientific Tradition," in *Science, Technology and Learning in the Ottoman Empire: Western Influence, Local Institutions, and the Transfer of Knowledge*, ed. Ekmeleddin İhsanoglu (Aldershot, Burlington: Ashgate Varorum, 2004), III 42.

32 Stanford J. Shaw, "The Origins of Ottoman Military Reform: The Nizam-i Cedid Army of Sultan Selim III," *The Journal of Modern History* 37–3 (1965), 304.

33 Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 26 et seq.

34 Yeşil, "Kara Kuvvetlerinde Avrupalı Danışmanlar," 85–90.

35 Cf. the discussion on the introduction of the Prussian military disciplinary punishments in the 1780s in Isabelle Deflers, "Die Militärreformen des Comte von Saint- Germain oder der Zan-

tary 'schools' in the Ottoman setting. The 1846 conscription law with quota per district was a combination of the French lot drawing recruitment and the model of the Prussian Landwehr reserve formations.[36]

The 'Short German Century in Ottoman/Turkish Military Reform' (1880 – 1945/ 1960)

Already after the Seven Years' War the Prussian military system, which was received less enthusiastically in other German principalities,[37] had caught the interest of the Ottoman ambassador to Berlin. In a diplomatic report from 1764 he had contrasted King Frederick's leadership skills and victories with the unsuccessful Ottoman military commanders in subsequent campaigns.[38] With the deployment of Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder) to the Ottoman Empire between 1835 and 1839, the fundament was laid for further missions, as Moltke had managed to make a permanent impression on the Ottoman military leadership.[39] For the Ottomans, Prussia

kapfel zwischen ausländischen Vorbildern und nationalen Stereotypen," *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung* 42 – 3 (2015), 416 – 417, 420 – 421, and the Prussian reforms after 1806: Jakob Vogel: "Lernen vom Feind: Das Militär als Träger deutsch- französischen Kulturtransfers im 19. Jahrhundert," in *Vom Gegner lernen: Feindschaften und Kulturtransfers im Europa des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts*, ed. Martin Aust et al. (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2007), 95 – 113. After the 1871 defeat, the French army enforcedly turned towards some elements of the German military model. But those deliberations on reform did not adhere to a transformation of the French General Staff according to the Prussian model. The French socio-political environment was estimated to be incompatible with the influential position of the German General Staff. Cf. Allan Mitchell, *Victors and Vanquished. The German Influence on Army and Church in France after 1870* (Chapel Hill, London: University of North Carolina Press, 1984), 44, 84. Cf. also the references in Colmar von der Goltz' writings to French studies; Cf. Dallas D. Irvine, "The French Discovery of Clausewitz and Napoleon," *American Military Institute Journal* 4 (1940), 153.

36 Yıldız, "Ottoman Military Organization," 1620.

37 Even a Grecophile like Winckelmann preferred "better to be a circumcised Turk than a Prussian" ("[...] meglio farsi Turco circonciso che Prussiano") in light of the Prussian recruitment and disciplinary methods; Winckelmann in a letter to L. Usteri from Rome, 15 January 1763. Johann Joachim Winckelmann, *Briefe*. ed. Hans Diepolder et al. vol 2 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1954), 283. Cf. Carl Justi and Ludwig Curtius (eds.), *Winckelmann und seine Zeitgenossen*, vol. 2 (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1983), 207.

38 Virginia H. Aksan, "An Ottoman Portrait of Frederick the Great," in *Ottomans and Europeans: Contacts and Conflicts* (Istanbul: Isis, 2004), 74; Virginia H. Aksan, "The Ottoman Absence from the Battlefields of the Seven Years' War," in *The Seven Years' War. Global views*, ed. Mark H. Danley et al. (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2012), 165 – 190.

39 Jehuda L. Wallach, "Zur Moltke-Legende in der Türkei," in *Festschrift für Eberhard Kessel zum 75. Geburtstag*, ed. Eberhard Kessel et al. (Munich: Fink, 1982), 156 – 165.

and later the German Empire was an unsuspicious middle power in the sense that Germany had no imperial interests in the Middle East.[40] After the defeat in 1871, the French prestige diminished.[41] The unified German Empire had become an alternative to the balance Ottoman dependency on Great Britain and France for military assistance. Additionally, Prussian diplomats had taken on an intermediary role in the 1829 and especially the 1878 peace talks in Berlin.[42] Beyond that, the Prussian army had the nimbus of invincibility, after its share in the defeat of Napoleonic France in 1814 and its victory over the French Republic in 1871. For the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II, Prussia functioned as a role model, especially after the defeat against Russia in 1877/78. Until 1918 an intensified German-Ottoman exchange of military officials took place.

The German mission arrived in the Ottoman capital in 1882 on request of Sultan Abdülhamid II.[43] Its most influential member was Colmar von der Goltz, who led the mission between 1885 and 1895. He shaped the worldview of his fellow student officers and paved the way for the German-Ottoman alliance in 1914. Goltz managed to promote German as an equally important language of instruction, next to French. Nevertheless French remained the primary foreign language amongst majority of the Ottoman military students. Lessons in German required the presence of an Ottoman interpreter, an obstacle to the German-Ottoman/Turkish knowledge transfer until the Republican period. Consequently, German instructors, including Karl Auler (1854 – 1930), who were able to teach in French enjoyed popularity among their students, since they were not dependent on the rather unreliable Ottoman interpreters.[44]

But the theoretical approach and the restrictions related to practical fieldwork could not be overcome by Colmar von der Goltz. Regarding the abolishment of corporal punishment for military students, his most faithful follower

40 This changed slightly in the end of Chancellor Bismarck's term in the late 1880s, cf. Gregor Schöllgen, "Zwischen Abstinenz und Engagement: Bismarck und die orientalische Frage," in *Bismarck und seine Zeit*, ed. Johannes Kunisch (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1992), 155 – 169.
41 Klaus Kreiser, "Preußen und Osmanen: Wahrnehmungen und Begegnungen," in *Deutsch-türkische Begegnungen. Alman Türk Tesadüfleri. Festschrift für Kemal Beydilli*, ed. Hedda Reindl-Kiel et al. (Berlin: EB-Verlag, 2013), 204.
42 Wallach, *Anatomie einer Militärhilfe*, 17.
43 For this mission cf Yeşil, "Kara Kuvvetlerinde Avrupalı Danışmanlar," 91 – 97.
44 Ziya Yergök, *Tuğgeneral Ziya Yergök'ün Anıları: Harbiye'den Dersim'e 1890 – 1914; Askeri Öğrencilik, Erzurum, Erzincan ve Dersim* [The Memoirs of Brigadier General Ziya Yergök: From the Harbiye to Dersim, 1890 – 1914; The Time as a Military Student, Erzurum, Erzincan and Dersim] (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2006), 107. For Auler's personal file cf. HStAS M 430/2 Bü 48.

stated that "the name 'Goltz Paşa' had [...] bound and charmed [him]."[45] During his lectures at the war academy in Istanbul, Goltz introduced the Ottoman young officers to the German *Weltanschauung*. His major publication, *The Nation in Arms* (*Das Volk in Waffen*, 1883), is very illustrative in this regard. It was translated into Ottoman Turkish as early as 1884[46] and became a compulsory book in military schools.[47] In this book Goltz suggested that war would be inevitable for the Germans and that the 'nation' should be fully prepared for the coming war. Adding to that the military class (e. g. the officers) should have a privileged status in society. The young Ottoman officers embraced the concept of the 'nation in arms' because it both offered hope for the humiliated Ottoman state and was applicable to multi-ethnic empires.[48] The modern higher military training in the Ottoman army provided upward mobility for a marginal, but influential group of officers. Goltz also proposed the sending of able Ottoman officers to Germany for the purpose of military training, driven by the silent hope that those Ottoman officers would prefer the German model after their experience. In Germany they were exposed to the local military culture, a process that reached its peak during the Second Constitutional Period (1908 – 1918). After the defeat in 1918, the relations between Germany and Turkey flourished and found their expression in the continued employment of retired German officers as instructors in the Turkish military academy and sending Turkish military students to the German Reichswehr and Wehrmacht between 1925 and 1939. The Second World War brought about a Turkish reorientation towards the American military model, once the French and German ways of warfare had been devalued by the defeat in 1940 and 1945. However, officers influenced by German thought re-

45 Pertev Demirhan, *Generalfeldmarschall Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz: Das Lebensbild eines großen Soldaten: Aus meinen persönlichen Erinnerungen* (Göttingen: Göttinger Verlags-Anstalt, 1960), 16.

46 Colmar von der Goltz, *Millet-i Müsellaha: Asrimizin Usul ve Ahval-ı Askeriyesi* [The Nation in Arms: Our Contemporary Practice and Military Affairs], trans. Captain Mehmed Tahir (Istanbul: Matbaa-ı Ebuzziya 1301/1885).

47 Mehmed Sükrü Hanioğlu, *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902 – 1908* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Handan Nezir Akmeşe, *The Birth of Modern Turkey: The Ottoman Military and the March to World War One* (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 19 – 33. For Goltz' impact on Atatürk see also Mehmet Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 31 – 48.

48 Jörn Leonhard and Ulrike Hirschhausen, "Does the Empire strike back? The Model of the Nation in Arms as a Challenge for Multi-Ethnic Empires in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century," *Journal of Modern European History* 5 – 2 (2007), 194 – 221.

mained in high positions until the putsch of 1960- the end of the 'German short century'.[49]

Quod non est in actis: The Sources and the Memoir Problem

This history of military knowledge transfer does not assume a passive adoption of German military mindset by the 'taker' at the Bosporus. I want to provide evidence that both countries served each other as mutual role models from which Germany also benefited. In the study of these transfer processes, the ego-documents of the officers involved are of special importance. The problems of these self-narratives have to be considered.[50]

Of importance are the special conditions for the production of memory, especially for the wartime period. A subjective view, limited by the standpoint of the men involved, has to be implied: "How can we expect historical objectivity from people who participated in a huge war when even four people who have seen a traffic accident depict the incident in completely different manner?"[51]

49 Gencer Özcan, "Türkiye'de Cumhuriyet Dönemi Ordusunda Prusya Etkisi" [Prussian Influence on the Army in Turkey in the Republican Period] in *Türkiye'de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti*, ed. Evren Balta Paker et al. (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), 219 – 220. On the beginning of the 'American period' in the Turkish armed forces see Serhat Güvenç, "ABD Askeri Yardımı ve Türk Ordusunun Dönüşümü, 1942 – 1960" [US Military Aid and the Transformation of the Turkish Army, 1942 – 1960] in *Türkiye'de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti*, 255 – 284.

50 On the Ottoman military memoirs see Mehmet Beşikçi, "Askeri Tarihçiliğin Gayri Resmi Kaynakları: Asker Anıları ve Günlükleri" [Semiofficial Sources of Military History; Military Memoirs and Diaries] in *Osmanlı Askeri Tarihini Araştırmak: Yeni Kaynaklar, Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, ed. Şayin Cevat et al. (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2012), 91 – 104; Volker Depkat, "Ego-Dokumente als quellenkundliches Problem," in *Die Biographie in der Stadt- und Regionalgeschichte*, ed. Markus Stumpf (Münster: LWL Archivamt für Westfalen, 2011), 21 – 32.

51 İlhan Selçuk, *Yüzbaşı Selahattin'in Romanı [The Novel of Captain Selahattin]*, vol. 1 (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1973), 10. Cf. on subjectivity also Hülya Adak, "Identifying the 'Internal Tumors' of World War I: Talat Paşa'nın Hatiraları [Talat Pasa's Memoirs], or the Travels of a Unionist Apologia into history," in *Räume des Selbst: Selbstzeugnisforschung Transkulturell*, ed. Andreas Baehr et al. (Köln, Weimar, Vienna: Böhlau, 2007), 153 et seq. It should be noted here that the author of this study cannot be excluded from those considerations, as stated by a former instructor in Turkish service in his memoirs: "The trained historian also often perceives things from the personal point of view." Hilmar Ritter von Mittelberger, "Wanderer in vier Welten! Erinnerungen des Generals der Infanterie Hilmar Ritter von Mittelberger," vol. 1. Bay HStA IV HS 2708, 2.

This should not serve as an excuse but an incentive to evaluate those sources carefully, bearing in mind the conditions under which they were written.[52] Published memoirs were often part of a justification strategy riding roughshod over any undesired mention of their author's guilt and faults. For Admiral Paul Wülfing von Ditten, who served as a naval instructor in Turkey between 1933 and 1939, most of the German memoirs related to the war time period were "trimmed for a certain impression. In best case this results in a cozy description of its time and has some worth for people with time and leisure delving into the topic 100 years later."[53]

Some of those texts also contain references to the memoirs of other officers involved, also over language barriers. Many of the postwar publications used in this study must have been based on diaries, since it is impossible for the autobiographical memory to recall every detail. In the introduction to his memoirs, Wülfing von Ditten pleaded for the use of diaries and letters in order "to subsequently fill existing gaps."[54] But he counted on his readership, since in the case of false memories causing mistakes in the text, "other people would later on have the opportunity to comment on them."[55]

Unfortunately, the diaries of the officers involved in the transfer of military knowledge between both countries are not available for comparative analysis.[56] However, in many cases not everything noted in those daily records was worth or appropriate for publication. Omissions are therefore highly probable. Many memoirs were written and often published decades after the events they covered. This publication strategy might have also been influenced by the fear of undesirable juridical consequences, as in the case of General Ali İhsan Sabis. Under certain circumstances, it was even more dangerous to write about historical events and persons. General Hilmar Ritter von Mittelberger wrote his memoirs covering his service in Turkey between 1933 and 1939, which included unfavorable comparisons of Adolf Hitler and Enver Paşa only after 1945.[57] As living persons and the relatives of deceased commanders were not always a thankful reader-

52 I follow the material selection process as proposed by Peter Haslinger, "Diskurs, Sprache, Zeit und Identität: Ein Plädoyer für eine erweiterte Diskursgeschichte," *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 16 (2006), 49 – 66.

53 Paul Wülfing von Ditten, *Meine Lebenserinnerungen*, vol. 1, part 1 (1880 – 1919), BA-MA N 155/1, 4.

54 BA-MA N 155/1, 5.

55 BA-MA N 155/1, 6.

56 Except in the case of Heinrich von Hoff, who in 1916/17 regularly recorded his thoughts and used those war diaries for several post-war publications.

57 On Sabis and Mittelberger see the last chapter of this study.

ship, one needs to assume a considerable amount of self-censorship. So it is no surprise that German veterans who were familiar with the incidents and their participants struggled with Ottoman autobiographical postwar statements, as demonstrated in the case of the former naval minister, Cemal Paşa: "Fact and fancy are interwoven so densely [in his memoirs], that it is hard to differentiate the one from the other, even for experienced experts on this personality."[58] Turkish reactions to several German memoirs, as in the case of Otto Liman von Sanders, were not much different.

There are several limitations regarding the archival official sources used in this study. Most of the papers of the German military mission in Constantinople were taken back to Berlin in 1918.[59] Only the files of the German military attaché had been immured in the German consulate due to their sensitive character; these were eventually returned to Germany in June 1924.[60] However, most of these military documents covering the 1908 – 1918 Prussian contingents of the Imperial army and the postwar activities of German military instructors fell victim to a 1945 bomb raid on the German military archives in Potsdam.[61] As a result, detailed information about the German side is only available from documents found in the German Military Archives in Freiburg and the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin, from documents relating to members of other contingents of the imperial army until 1918 (for this study mainly Bavaria and Württemberg), for the 6th Ottoman army (1916 – 1918) from the digitized German files housed at the Russian Federal military archives (TSAMO)[62] and the rare remaining exchanges of military correspondence in the Turkish General Staff's Archive (ATASE) in Ankara.[63]

For the Ottoman and Turkish perspective discussed in this study, the access to archival resources has improved, whose restrictions in the past have limited

58 Letter to Otto von Lossow, 29 May 1922. Bay HStA IV HS 3158, n.p.

59 See the Reichsarchiv's overview of the files on Turkey, TSAMO 500 – 12519 – 435, 1– 5.

60 President of the German *Reichsarchiv* to the Minister of the Interior, 28 January 1924; German ambassador Nadolny to the German Foreign Ministry, 15 June 1924, AA-PA R 78548.

61 Information of the German Federal Archive's Military Archive section (BA-MA) to the author, 28 July 2014.

62 Available at http://tsamo.germandocsinrussia.org {Last accessed 24 November, 2017}

63 See also the overview by Hayrullah Gök and Mesut Uyar, "Birinci Dünya Savaşındaki Alman Askerî Yardım Heyetinin Bilinmeyen Bir Yönü: Bir Arşiv Yağmasının Hikayesi" [Unknown Aspects of the German Military Assistance Mission during the First World War: The Story of the Burning of an Archive], *Toplumsal Tarih* 14 – 83 (2000), 4 – 11.

the scope of many studies relating to military topics of this era.[64] While the ATASE files have been less comprehensive than expected, the Ottoman and Republican state archives contain many complementing files. Unfortunately, as access to the Turkish foreign ministry's archive is still denied, this study cannot cite the Ottoman military attachés reports from Berlin. Preparations for the launch of the proposed digital archive are still in progress.[65] Thus memoir literature and German and Ottoman military periodicals as well as printed military documents are beneficial when it comes to filling in the gaps that missing archival material cannot do.

Printed material was also not easily accessible, causing a time intensive research phase. In both countries the military press is scattered among several libraries. With regard to the German perspective, most of the German periodicals were available in the Bavarian state library. The Turkish case was much more difficult to handle. The Turkish military's book stocks covering the late Ottoman Empire and the early Republican period were transferred mainly to the National Library (Milli Kütüphane) in the early 1960s, where most of the periodicals remain accessible today. The digitized collections of rare documents containing works printed in the Ottoman Arab alphabet in the period from 1908 to 1928 at Marmara University (Istanbul), the municipal Atatürk Library (*Atatürk Kitaplığı*) in Istanbul, and the Özege Collection at the Atatürk University (Erzurum), were highly valuable to this study. Despite the use of a variety of previously undisclosed sources, not all the relevant material (e. g. military service regulations) could be accessed.

State of Research

Most studies of German-Ottoman military relations focus on the alliance during the First World War. The earliest publications on the German-Ottoman alliance were published by the *Reichsarchiv*, the interwar military archives in Germany. Their main intention was to regain the interpretive authority over wartime events

64 See for example Glen Wilfred Swanson, "Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the Defence of the Ottoman Empire: A Study of War and Revolution during the Young Turk period" (PhD diss., Indiana University, 1970), 321–322.

65 Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, "Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu'nun Elektronik Arşiv Projesi Tanıtım Konuşması, 16 Ocak 2015, Ankara" [Speech given on the presentation of the Electronic Archives Presentation by the Turkish Foreign Minister Cavuşoğlu, Ankara 16 January 2015] http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-mevlut-cavusoglu_nun-elektronik-arsiv-projesi-tanitim-konusmasi_-16-ocak-2015_-ankara.tr.mfa {Last acessed on 24 November 2017}

(on all fronts) that had been questioned by the victory powers. In his account of the German-Ottoman alliance, Carl Mühlmann concentrated mainly on strategic and operational history, using archival sources that went missing in 1945.[66] Moreover, he benefitted from his own experience in Ottoman service and the numerous questionnaires he had sent out to the German participants of the military mission. Nonetheless, the Ottoman perspective was absent in this account, most likely due to the author's inadequate language skills. Mühlmann's research had a clearly political and not a scientific aim, namely the hope for a new alliance with Republican Turkey in the beginning Second World War on the base of shared history. One of the first studies to use the growing number of Turkish memoirswas undertaken by James MacGarity.[67] With the opening of the wartime files of the Archives of the (West) German Foreign Ministry, previously unavailable to Mühlmann, Ulrich Trumpener was able to reveal the underlying diplomatic negotiations of the alliance.[68] Trumpener also proved that the ruling circle of the Committee for Union and Progress always remained at the helm despite the German General's decisional claims in warfare throughout the First World War.[69] Nevertheless, the use of unpublished personal narratives of the military personnel engaged in the war remained scarce until the groundbreaking study by Jehuda Wallach.[70] For the first time archival and published memoirs and the official narrative were brought into a balanced proportion. Wallach went into great detail at the cost of intermittently losing his focus. Wallach's extensive use of sources lacked a methodology. Nevertheless, in Wallach's, just like in Trumpeter's study, Ottoman sources have also been neglected. This changed slightly in Ortaylı's study of the German foreign policy towards the Ottoman Empire, first published in 1983.[71] However, Ottoman sources were also omitted in Hans-Werner Neulen's rather popular scientific monograph on the deployment of German troops at the Ottoman theaters of war. His work also sheds light on the cultural aspects of the German-Ottoman relationship, according to Neulen one of 'brothers in arms'.[72] But such one-sided views of the German- Ottoman

66 Carl Mühlmann, *Das deutsch-türkische Waffenbündnis im Weltkriege* (Berlin: Koehler, 1940).
67 James MacGarity, "Foreign Influence on the Ottoman Turkish Army, 1880 – 1918" (PhD diss., American University Washington D.C., 1968).
68 Ulrich Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire 1914 – 1918* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968).
69 Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire*, 71, 105.
70 Wallach, *Anatomie einer Militärhilfe*.
71 İlber Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Alman Nüfuzu* [*German Influence in the Ottoman Empire*], 10th ed. (Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2008), 101 – 123.
72 Hans Werner Neulen, *Feldgrau in Jerusalem: Das Levantekorps des kaiserlichen Deutschland*, 2nd ed. (Munich: Universitas, 2002), passim.

alliance, primarily from the German perspective, were not restricted to studies written in German. The restrictions of access to sources housed at the Archives of the Turkish General Staff until the mid-2000s has led to a scholarly overemphasis of operational military history. This is best illustrated by Erickson's monographs, which were mainly based on the official ATASE history studies.[73] Handan Nezir-Akmeşe found a convincing way out of this situation by including the Ottoman officer's prewar publications in her research.[74] She provided evidence for the deep orientation towards Germany in parts of the Ottoman military leadership and the intellectual "legacy" of Colmar von der Goltz. Matthias Römer added yet another aspect, namely, a comparison of the British naval and the German military mission before 1914. However, he based his study primarily on German sources.[75] This monolingual source basis was expanded in Moreau's study, which also considered the diplomatic views of contemporary Western powers.[76] Relying on a similarly broad selection of sources, Mustafa Aksakal focused on the reasons for the Ottoman decision for war in the summer of 1914. He was able to prove that a great number of Ottoman intellectuals favored an alliance with Germany and that the postwar blaming of a small group of leading Young Turks for the outcome of the war served self-defensive policies.[77] Christoph Reichmann undertook a more differentiating analysis of the German wartime view on the Ottoman ally, although he neglected the Ottoman and Turkish positions on that issue.[78]

The formation of the Ottoman youth organization during the First World War was provided by Sanem Yamak Ateş, who offered the first extensive study based on a broad selection of Ottoman sources. Consequently, she disregarded the view of the German ally and mistakenly adopted interpretations regarding the stay

73 Edward J. Erickson, *Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War*, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001).

74 Handan Nezir Akmeşe, *The Birth of Modern Turkey: The Ottoman Military and the March to World War I*. (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 64 – 86.

75 Matthias Römer, *Die deutsche und englische Militärhilfe für das Osmanische Reich, 1908 – 1914* (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2007).

76 Odile Moreau, *L'Empire Ottoman à l'Âge des Réformes. Les Hommes et les Idées du 'Nouvel Ordre' Militaire, 1826 – 1914* (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2007), 58 – 88.

77 Mustafa Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

78 Jan Christoph Reichmann, "'Tapfere Askers' und 'feige Araber'. Der osmanische Verbündete aus der Sicht deutscher Soldaten im Orient 1914 – 1918"(PhD diss., Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, 2009).

and sudden leave of Heinrich von Hoff.[79] In his dissertation on the Ottoman mobilization, Mehmet Beşikçi also analyzed the Ottoman youth organization. Beşikçi rated those efforts as a part of the total war, thenceforth also creating resistance among the Ottoman population.[80] The most extensive study dealing with this subject was written by Erol Akcan. He assesses the Ottoman youth organization as a purely military necessity and as an outcome of the German-Ottoman alliance. He manages to detect several wrong scientific views, whereas his monolingual selection of sources contributes to the inaccurate image of these youth organization as being unrelated to the emerging Turkish nationalism.[81] Despite these drawbacks, Akcan provides an outlook for the further development of plans for a state led youth organization in the early Republic of Turkey, which is also dealt by Yiğit Akın in his study on the role of sports in the Turkish nation state. Akın illustrates how the military and civilian authorities continued to adhere to old Ottoman policies, thereby serving the purpose of nation building during the interwar period.[82]

The mutual contacts between the Germans and former Ottomans have only recently become a topic of interest. Political-history approaches to the German-Turkish postwar relations are manifold.[83] While Koçak and Özgüldür[84] focused on a rather descriptive account of the military cooperation of the former allies, Wolf-Orland Naumann[85] gave a detailed analysis of the economic and military

79 Sanem Yamak Ateş, *Asker Evlatlar Yetiştirmek: II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi'nde Beden Terbiyesi, Askerî Talim ve Paramiliter Gençlik Örgütleri* [*Educating Child Soldiers: Physical Education, Military Education and Paramilitary Youth Organizations in the Second Constitutional Period*] (Istanbul: İletişim, 2012).

80 Mehmet Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower in the First World War: Between Voluntarism and Resistance* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 203 – 245.

81 Erol Akcan, *İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası'nın Paramiliter Gençlik Kuruluşları* [*The Paramilitary Youth Foundations by the Party for Union and Progress*] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2015).

82 Yiğit Akın, *Gürbüz ve Yavuz Evlatlar: Erken Cumhuriyet'te Beden Terbiyesi ve Spor* [*Healthy and Sturdy Children: Physical Education and Sport in the Early Republic*] (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 126 – 170.

83 Stefan Ihrig, *Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination* (Cambridge/ Mass., London: Belknap, 2014); Stefan Ihrig, *Justifying Genocide: Germany and the Armenians from Bismarck to Hitler* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016).

84 Cemil Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri 1923 – 1939: İki Dünya Savaşı Arasındaki Dönemde Siyasal, Kültürel, Askeri ve Ekonomik İlişkiler* [Turkish-German Relations 1923 – 1939: Political, Cultural, Military and Economic Relations between the two World Wars] (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1991); Yavuz Özgüldür, *Türk-Alman İliskileri, 1923 – 1945* [*Turkish-German Relations, 1923 – 1945*] (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basimevi, 1993).

85 Wolf-Orland Naumann, "Die politischen Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und der Türkei 1923 – 1935" (PhD diss., Humboldt- Universität Berlin, 1993).

exchange between both countries after 1923. In his thesis, Naumann showed the continuity in the German military assistance in instruction and in the hardware export in the national Turkish military modernization process. According to Naumann, this help implied the German intention to keep their former ally in dependency regarding the choice of alliances. The military periodicals of both countries were only analyzed with regard to correlating opinions in the armies of both countries so far. Hence Emre Sencer does not have a closer look at the German role model in the Turkish army and the slow Turkish alienation process in the 1930s.[86]

In the first cross-epochal study of German-Ottoman/Turkish relations, Guillemarre-Acet underlined the continuities in the relations of both countries.[87] The Turkish side turned towards a more selective appropriation of military knowledge in the Republican era, at a time when Germany had lost its position of dominance. The military transfer process between Germany and Turkey is one of the topics of Mangold-Will's habilitation work.[88] In her analysis of the German veteran's association of soldiers who had fought in Ottoman service, the legitimizing factor of the Turkish revision of the Sèvres treaty for the own struggle against Versailles became evident. The chapter on the renewal of military relations in the decade after 1923, which lacks Turkish archival sources, deals with the continued employment of German instructors in the Turkish army. While most of those instructors were German, the Turkish military command used the opportunity to study other European armies by sending its commissions and officers on short-term internships abroad.

In sum, a comprehensive account of Ottoman/Turkish-German military cooperation, focused on knowledge transfer and based on sources from both countries, remains a scholarly desideratum. This study aims to fill this gap by integrating sources that reflect the contributions and views of both sides involved.

86 Emre Sencer, *Order and Insecurity in Germany and Turkey: Military Cultures of the 1930s* (New York, Abindgon: Routledge, 2017).

87 Dorothée Guillemarre-Acet, *Impérialisme et Nationalisme: L'Allemagne, l'Empire Ottoman et la Turquie, 1908 – 1933* (Würzburg: Ergon, 2009).

88 Sabine Mangold-Will, *Begrenzte Freundschaft: Deutschland und die Türkei, 1918 – 1933* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2013), 269 – 287; 365 – 391.

The Young Turk Period, 1908–1938

The decades between the Young Turk revolution and the death of state founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk were an age of turbulent turmoil in the Ottoman lands and Turkey as well as in Germany alike.[89]

The 'Young Turks' were a heterogeneous group of young military students, clerks and state officials, founded in 1889 in opposition to the absolutist rule of Sultan Abdülhamid II. They wanted to reform and a renewal of power of the Ottoman state, including the reintroduction of the constitution and the parliament, both suspended by the Sultan in 1878. Their official name was 'Committee for Union and Progress' (İttihad ve Terakkı Cemiyeti, CUP). The officers among this group were especially convinced that they were the only group, which could modernize the empire. On 3 July 1908, those officers waged a coup d'état against Sultan Abdülhamid II, forcing the resignation of the government and the restitution of the constitution. The Sultan, who remained on the throne, was forced to resign in 1909 after a failed counter putsch, which led to great tensions within the military. So far, only a small proportion of the Ottoman officer corps had been recruited from the graduates of the military schools and academy. Most of the Ottoman officers were former sergeants and privates who had been promoted based on their proven loyalty and paternalist protection by their superiors and the sultan. Most of them were analphabets and unable to command larger forces. The professionalization of the military leadership was thus one reason why the Young Turk government resorted to German military instructors. The other was the poor state of the Ottoman army, which composed of untrained peasants supplied with an inadequate arsenal. Here, Germany provided substantial material and ideational support.

Regarding foreign threads, the territory of the late Ottoman Empire was the object of interest for the interfering interests of several foreign states. By exploiting those different interests, the Ottoman state, aside from the period between 1911 and 1913, managed to maintain the integrity of the empire until 1918. Notwithstanding, the Ottoman and later Turkish leadership, and not least the population of the empire, paid a high price for this policy.[90]

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89 See Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 97–191; Klaus Kreiser, "Die neue Türkei," in *Kleine Geschichte der Türkei*, ed. id./Christoph K. Neumann (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2006), 383–423.

90 For the generational experience of displacement and the resulting favor for radical solutions see Erik Jan Zürcher, "Demographic Engineering, State Building and the Army: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War," in *Comparing Empires: Encounters and Transfers in the Long Nineteenth Century*, ed. Jürgen Leonhard et al. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 530–544;

The Ottoman vulnerability in the defeats against Italy and the Balkan League between 1911 and 1913 had highlighted the need for a drastic military reform. However, time was short for the German military mission under General Otto Liman von Sanders, which was accepted by the Ottoman army in late 1913. Besides those developments the resources of the agrarian Ottoman state were limited, leaving no room for a build-up of arms in the scale of the Central European armies at that time. Germany, the 64 million state in the middle of Europe, with a peacetime force level of 761,000 soldiers between 1914 and 1918 was able to mobilize about 11 million men in total. By contrast, the peripheral Ottoman state – which also faced a war on several fronts with a population of 23 million people and a peacetime strength of 200,000 soldiers before 1914 was able to field around 3 million soldiers in total during the First World War.[91] Yet the conditions for the Ottoman conduct of war differed considerably from the German role model, which generated considerable friction in the German-Ottoman alliance, the latter signed on 2 August 1914. Thereafter, the German military mission was to play an important role in the conduct of Ottoman warfare. Thanks to the mobilization of all resources and the contributions of the German army, the Ottomans were able to deter an Allied invasion attempt in Çanakkale (Gallipoli), thus raising Ottoman confidence of winning this war. This being the case the Ottoman army faced serious setbacks at the others fronts, and an intermediate success against the British forces in Iraq dissipated quickly. Within the framework of its alliance obligations the Ottoman army also provided troops for the East European theaters of war, after the enemy pressure on the Ottoman mainland had levered in 1916. In the long term, the Central Powers could not cope with the enemy's superiority, and the final military collapse of the German and Ottoman forces came into effect nearly simultaneously.

Both countries shared the burden of the treaties of Versailles and Sèvres respectively. Whereas the Turkish nationalist movement under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was able to prevent the partition of the Anatolian mainland and force the victory powers to renegotiate the peace terms in Lausanne in 1923, in Germany the anger over partial occupation and heteronomy, also in military affairs, contributed to the growth of the political right. In those interwar years, the German-Ottoman military cooperation, interrupted by the outcome of the war, continued. Although the Turkish side had learned their lessons, and the German

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Erik Jan Zürcher, "The Balkan Wars and the Refugee Leadership of the early Turkish Republic," in *War and Nationalism: The Balkan Wars, 1912 – 1913 and Their Sociopolitical Implications*, ed. Hakan M. Yavuz and Isa Blumi (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2013), 665 – 678.

91 Bruno Thoss, "Truppenstärken," in *Enzyklopädie Erster Weltkrieg*, ed. G. Hirschfeld, G. Krumeich and I. Renz (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2009), 928.

contribution to the formation of the Turkish armed forces was much more limited after 1918. National Socialist rule, with its expansive foreign policy, eventually lead to estrangement of the Turkish political elite and to the Turkish neutrality during the Second World War.

Study Outline

In Chapter 2 the appropriation of the German mindset will be traced back to the German military mission between 1882 and 1895, in particular, to the instructions in the Ottoman military academy and to Colmar von der Goltz's influential book, *The Nation in Arms*. The side of the Ottoman/Turkish officers, besides its personal contact with German instructors, adapted military knowledge through the reading of German works and the official (partial) adoption of translated German service regulations. In addition, the Ottoman/Turkish officers sent to Germany for further training appropriated parts of the German *Weltanschauung* and the philosophy of history of their German 'brothers in arms'.[92] The German officers who served as instructors and observers during the Balkan Wars of 1912/13 pointed to the lessons of these conflicts for the coming war in Central Europe. The major point of concern for the German military observers was the poor performance of the Ottoman forces that had fought in accordance with German field regulations.[93] Especially during the First World War an institutional merge can be stated for both armies on the Ottoman theatre of war. Not only did German commanders join the leading Ottoman forces but also German organizational features were adopted. However, it should be underlined here that the German army was not the only role model for the Ottomans.[94]

These processes continued after 1918 through the activities of German instructors in Turkish military academies until 1938/39. Therefore this study includes the estates and memoirs of the officers previously neglected by research.

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92 Şefik Okday, *Der letzte Großwesir und seine preußischen Söhne* (Göttingen, Zürich: Muster-Schmidt, 1991); Ekrem Rüstü Akömer, "Aus dem Tagebuch eines Waffenbruders," in *Türken in Berlin 1871–1945: Eine Metropole in den Erinnerungen osmanischer und türkischer Zeitzeugen*, ed. Ingeborg Böer (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2002), 79–90.

93 Otto von Lossow, "Balkankrieg 1912/13. Berichte des bayerischen Oberstleutnants Otto von Lossow aus dem türkischen Krieg 1912/13," BayHStA IV GS 260; Hans Rohde, *Unsere Gefechtsvorschriften und der Balkankrieg* (Berlin: Eisenschmidt, 1915).

94 Römer, *Militärhilfe für das Osmanische Reich*, 146–148; Handan Nezir Akmeşe, "The Japanese Nation in Arms: A Role Model for Militarist Nationalism in the Ottoman Army, 1905–1915," in *The Islamic Middle East and Japan: Perceptions, Aspirations, and the Birth of Intra-Asian Modernity*, ed. Renée Worringer (Princeton: Wiener, 2007), 63–90.

Drawing on the aforementioned letters, diaries and military reports, the transnational[95] military networks that entered a mutual exchange will be considered in the analysis of the mutual knowledge transfer. In addition to these archival sources, the publications in contemporary military magazines reporting on activities and developments in other armies are of equal importance.

In this context, the question pertaining to the social consequences of this military knowledge transfer forms the thematic core of Chapter 3. Militarism was not seen as something negative in the German army at that time, despite its civilian critics. For contemporary German officers, the term had a positive connotation that was also accepted by Ottoman officers during their internships in Germany.[96] The Bavarian colonel Ludwig Schraudenbach retrospectively highlighted the benefits modernizing the garrison in Lebanese Baalbek for the Ottoman recruits: *"German 'militarism' truly has accomplished cultural work [Kulturarbeit] there [...]."*[97]

This 'cultural work' also extended to the civilian sphere, where the cooperation of the armies of both countries was especially visible in the field of paramilitary youth organizations.[98] This cooperation went far beyond a pure modernization of the Ottoman armed forces. During the First World War, the Ottoman counterpart of the German umbrella organization *Bund Jung- Deutschland* (BJD) established by Colmar von der Goltz in 1911, was founded with the assistance of German officer Heinrich von Hoff. These military trained young men were easily disposable and easy to mobilize for the front. Hoff had previously established the local BJD group in Stuttgart. During his time in Ottoman service in 1916/17 Hoff then applied his experiences in the military preparation of the male youth. Both the BJD and the *Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri* (OGD, Ottoman Youth Association) served the purpose of integrational militarism. This form of mobilization offered certain incentives to fit those young men, deprived of constraint, into the uniform.[99] Through the indoctrination of male youth, inner con-

95 I follow the term used in Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel, *Das Kaiserreich transnational: Deutschland in der Welt, 1871–1914* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004), 14.
96 Ǧaʿfar Al-ʿAskarī, *A Soldier's Story: From Ottoman Rule to Independent Iraq: The Memoirs of Jafar Pasha Al-Askar, 1885 1936*, ed. Wiliam Facey (London: Arabian, 2003), 32.
97 Ludwig Schraudenbach, *Muharebe: Der erlebte Roman eines deutschen Führers im osmanischen Heere 1916/17* (Munich: Drei Masken, 1925), 332.
98 Gerhard Grüßhaber, "Jung- Deutschland und die Jungtürken: Das Wirken des Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz (1843–1916) zwischen Spree und Bosporus, 1883–1935" (M.A. thesis, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, 2012).
99 Bernhard Kroener, "Integrationsmilitarismus," in *Kriegerische Gewalt und militärische Präsenz in der Neuzeit: Ausgewählte Schriften*, ed. Ralf Pröve et al. (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2008), 83–107.

flicts in both countries were to be bridged. In Germany, those tensions were of political nature, reaching new dimensions with the 'stab in the back legend' (Dolchstoßlegende) after 1918. In the late Ottoman Empire these tensions were caused by the Turkish national movement that led to ethnic tensions within the multi-national empire. In the Republic of Turkey, the official motto, "Every Turk is born as a soldier!" ("Her Türk asker doğar"), used by the state, became one of the founding myths of the young nation state. Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk] had thus used among other ideas Colmar von der Goltz concept of the 'nation in arms' and had it adapted for his own purposes.[100] Upon Turkish request, Carl Diem, a German sport functionary, former personal assistant to Colmar von der Goltz in the BJD (1911–1914) and pioneer of a German state controlled main youth organization, came to Ankara in 1933. Although Diem was reluctant about the German National Socialist movement, he reviewed the Turkish situation and wrote a study on the creation of a centralized youth organization that would prepare young people for military service and train them towards a life as obedient and physically active citizens.

The effects of this mindset are noticeable to this day in Turkey. In the current debates in Germany on the role of Turkish working migrants it is mostly forgotten, that also some of the (as I would call them) German 'guest workers in uniform' came to the Bosporus with rather problematic ideas. On those grounds there is a need for more research on the reception of the 'German Spirit' in the Turkish armed forces and its effect on the Turkish civil society. Indeed, the officer corps in both countries was a small but influential group of the society for the further development of their nations. Many of the presidents of republican Turkey were, at least to some extent, either in contact with German officers or had contact to German military knowledge at earlier stages of their careers.[101]

The continuities after 1918 are of importance in Chapter 4. Through the analysis of the postwar assessment of the Ottoman World War performance on the German side, the implications and possible lessons are shown. The state of Mustafa Kemal was but one role model for many conservative officers, since the Ger-

100 Hasan Ünder, "30'larin Ders Kitaplarından ve Kemalizm'in Kaynaklarından Biri: Milleti Müsellaha ve Medeni Bilgiler" [One of the 1930s Textbooks and the Sources of Kemalism: The Nation in Arms and the Civics Textbook] *Tarih ve Toplum* 192 (1999), 46–56.

101 The only execption is Celal Bayar, who had also worked in the Deutsche Orient Bank in the Ottoman Empire; cf. Camilla Dawletschin-Linder, *Diener seines Staates: Celal Bayar (1883–1986) und die Entwicklung der modernen Türkei* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2003). The last president in line was Fahri Korutürk, who during his time as a naval attaché in Berlin gave a presentation on the battle of Jütland back in Ankara; cf. Fahri Korutürk, *Skagerrak Deniz Muharebesi Hakkında Bir Konferans* [A Lecture on the Battle of Jutland] (Ankara: Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, 1937).

mans had not managed to break the Versailles Treaty with military force. But to what extent was the Turkish officer corps still under the influence of the 'German Spirit'? Was there a dependence upon the German model in Turkish military organization and training? What were the differences and lessons from the military alliance of 1914 – 1918 for the Turkish side? In order to answer these questions of organizational nature, mainly (semi-) official periodicals and autobiographical sources from both countries will be analyzed. After all, it was mostly the instructors of the German military mission and their former Ottoman military students, who took the mindset of the other side.

In addition to the similarities, the differences have to also be considered. How did the military representatives of the "barracked nation"[102] and the "military nation"[103] continue to find common ground in terms of a militarist spirit? Was there a need for national independence in military affairs on the Turkish side?

The ethnic heterogeneous society of the young Republic of Turkey demanded other measures by the armed forces than the Weimar Republic as the latter was divided by political conflicts. However, the dynamics resulting from the World War's 'storm of steel' had significant influence on the mindset in both armies, which led to leadership claim that intended to fill the gap left by the loss of reputation of the monarchy.

102 Ute Frevert, *Die kasernierte Nation: Militärdienst und Zivilgesellschaft in Deutschland* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2001).

103 Ayşe Gül Altınay, *The Myth of the Military-Nation: Militarism, Gender and Education in Turkey* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

2 The Peak of Knowledge Transfer in the Second Constitutional Period (1908–1918)

Chapter Outline

In the aftermath of the Young Turk revolution and the reinstatement of the constitution on 24 July 1908, the Ottoman officer corps dominated the politics of the empire for the following decade. Most of the officers among the former oppositional Committee for Union and Progress (CUP; İttihad ve Terakkı Cemiyeti) held the view that they were the only social group able to modernize and lead the multi-ethnic state. This attitude became especially evident after the deposition of Sultan Abdülhamid II on 27 April 1909.[1] The men of this movement with military background were to transform the late Ottoman state and the republican successor state until the beginning of multi-party rule.[2] According to the German emperor Wilhelm II, the Ottoman political circumstances after the revolution were to the advantage of German influence:

> "The revolution is not the work of 'Young Turks' from Paris or London, but of the army alone, in fact exclusively of the 'so-called German officers' educated in Germany. A purely military revolution. These officers are in control and they are entirely German in feeling."[3]

But were those men really that German minded as the German emperor had hoped for in his enthusiastic remark in 1908? Wasn't it rather the case that the German side needed to persuade their prospective ally of the superiority of the martial 'German Spirit' over the prestigious European competitors? Did the implementation of this spirit make sense in all cases or were there limitations? Of importance to the analysis of the military knowledge transfer in this chapter, is the question of what and how the Ottoman army appropriated elements of the German way of warfare and how the German military representatives acted in this transfer. Did the Ottoman side have confidence in the instruction solely by German advisors, or did they rather apply a mixture of direct and indirect appropriations, that is, by presenting their own reading of German sources to their

1 Cf. Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London: Routledge, 1993), 16–30.

2 Zürcher, *Turkey*, 97–137.

3 Final remark of Emperor Wilhelm II in a diplomatic memorandum regarding the Young Turk revolution, 14 August 1908. *GPDEK* vol. 25, part 2, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1927), 608 Nr. 8906; cf. John C. Röhl, *Wilhelm II.* Vol. 3: *Der Weg in den Abgrund 1900–1941* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2008), 743.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110554786-002

own troops? Did the German officers undergo a learning process and did the German army as a whole draw some conclusions out of its experience?

The reasons for the Ottoman preference for the German conduct of war will be analyzed first. Regarding the military missions for a better understanding of the German intentions and the host country's expectations a comparative analysis of the work of German instruction officers in the Chilean and the Ottoman army will be undertaken in the following chapter. The important role of the German military attaché Walter von Strempel for the promotion of the German military prestige will become evident in the analysis of his reports to Berlin. The Ottoman case will be analyzed in greater detail by exploring Colmar von der Goltz' counseling in the Ottoman army between 1908 and 1910. Thereafter, I will examine the practice of sending German military instructors to the Ottoman lands and the experiences of Ottoman soldiers during their education in Germany between 1910 and 1912. After reviewing the outcome of the Balkan Wars in 1912/13, the German military mission under Otto Liman von Sanders will be the focus of this chapter, followed by an analysis of mutual lessons of the German-Ottoman alliance during the First World War.

Ottoman Reasons for choosing the 'German Way of War'

The main elements of Prussian warfare since the late 17th century have included rapid attacks, a flexible form of command and control, and the use of the latest available armament technology. It also included the practice of keeping campaigns as short as possible, since the small kingdom was surrounded by potential adversaries. Decisive victory had to be sought in order to avoid fatiguing wars. This Prussian strategy and the victorious Prussian army emanating from the German unification wars became a dominating factor in the Imperial army, thereby conferring the 'Prussian military spirit' onto the formerly independent armies of the German kingdoms and smaller principalities.[4] Especially the training of officers had been synchronized, leading to the implementation of Prussian instructions all over Germany. Offensive mobile warfare and the will to annihilate the enemy's forces in encirclement battles gained eminent importance in the thinking of the German military leadership until 1914.[5] The Ottoman Empire

4 Rudolf Absolon, *Die Wehrmacht im Dritten Reich*, vol.1. 2nd ed. (Munich: Boldt im Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998), 3.

5 Robert Michael Citino, *The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), XI-XIV.

was in a similar geographical position and had already once faced a two-front war in 1877/78. For the Ottoman officer corps, the similarities of their military situation with the German case were evident. However, the Ottomans were not entirely correct in their assumptions. The German warfare was based on a well developed road and railway network and planned operations due to the Central European moderate climate formed the basis of the German grand strategy.[6] The lack of this prerequisite became evident in the Ottoman theaters of war between 1912 and 1918.

But why did the Ottoman side prefer the 'German way of war' and leave aside the French model that had served as the main source of inspiration since the 18th century? The German case was highly attractive to most of the Ottoman military leadership. This was especially valid for the work of the Prussian General Staff. The application of lessons from past campaigns

> "made Prussian reaction to the experience of war so much more rapid, rational, and thorough than anything other European armies were to achieve. [...] By 1871, therefore, the Prussians had twice demonstrated how to win a war against a great power in jig time. It had taken them just three weeks to defeat the Austrians and only six weeks to capture Napoleon III. It was impossible not to prefer such a model to the bumbling agony of the American Civil War or the year-long standstill at Sevastopol. Prussian military prestige rocketed accordingly."[7]

Besides its operational appeal, the German military played a political role in the society. What does therefore raise the question of what kind of military system the German side wanted to convey to the Ottoman lands, and in how far the Germanophile parts of the Ottoman officer corps willingly appropriated them. The emphasis of the military class within the German society was nothing to be overseen easily and it was also the target of considerable national criticism. Some features of Wilhelmine Germany's military could also be detected in the Ottoman and later Turkish armed forces:

> "[T]he army had become a state within the state, claiming the right to define what was, or was not, to the national interest and to dispense with those who did not agree with the definition [...], claimed immunity to the law that governed the rest of the nation and [...] a significant part of the officer corps looked upon civilian society with a mixture of contempt

6 Citino, *The German Way of War*, 2005, XV.

7 William Hardy McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 252–253.

> and hostility and regarded themselves as forming a castle guard to watch over their master's unruly subjects and see to it that they did their duty."[8]

It will be to show in this study that most of those features took root in the Ottoman military culture, and were to form the fundament of the Republican military's self-perception. It was mainly due to the political changes in the Ottoman political landscape after 1908 that the German military knowledge could spread and gain acceptance in the army and society. To better understand these developments, the following section will provide a comparative look at the German military mission in Chile at the same time.

German Instructors and their Global Activities

Manifold features of the German military mind were taken over by the Ottoman and later the Turkish armed forces between 1908 and 1938. This did not only relate to the military profession alone, but also to the role of the armed forces within society. The German military missions to South America had left a similar impact. At about the same time when the German mission began its work in the Ottoman Empire, German officers were also sent to several Latin American capitals to assist in the modernization of the local armed forces and to bind those countries to the interests of the German foreign policy in this region.[9] As in the case of the Ottoman Empire, the Prussian military system was held in high esteem after the unification wars. Germany had remained neutral towards Chile in the War of the Pacific (as in the Russian-Ottoman War), and a French mission in neighboring Peru (like in Greece) underlined the need for German advisors for the own armed forces. However, as in the Ottoman case, the Chilean military leadership did not import a 'superior' military system, but rather carefully appropriated selected features of the German warfare system.[10] In the Ottoman and the Latin American forces, it was a fair assumption that "[t]he same

8 Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640 – 1945*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 252.

9 Cf.: Warren Schiff, "The Influence of the German armed forces and war industry on Argentina, 1880 – 1914," *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 52 – 3 (1972), 436 – 455; Brian Loveman, *For la Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America* (Wilmington: SR Books, 1999), 68, 78.

10 Stefan Rinke, "Eine Pickelhaube macht noch keinen Preußen. Preußisch-deutsche Militärberater, 'Militärethos' und Modernisierung in Chile, 1886 – 1973," in *Preussen und Lateinamerika: Im Spannungsfeld von Kommerz, Macht und Kultur*, ed. Sandra Carreras et al. (Münster: Lit, 2004), 261 – 264.

country can entertain multiple conflicting or overlapping strategic cultures, with rival interpretations of past experience."[11]

With German aid the Chilean officer's corps became more professional and Prussian organizational standards were introduced. Furthermore, Chilean officers that had been trained for 2–3 years in Germany took up high positions after 1918. They formed the basis for continuing interest in German instructors in order to learn from the German war experience. But just like in the case of Turkey there existed national concepts, such as the idea of the 'born soldier' whose further development was fostered by general conscription. Furthermore, Chile like Republican Turkey, as agrarian states, used their armed forces for educational and disciplining purposes. Beyond practical measures, including the alphabetization and personal hygiene, the rural male population was indoctrinated in order to accept the rule of the nation state. In Anatolia and most countries of Latin America, the military often served as an internal policing force, suppressing any revolt against state authority.[12] One German officer even served in both countries. Hans von Kiesling auf Kieslingstein's contract with the Chilean army was annulled automatically with Germany's entry into the war. Kiesling was then posted in the Ottoman army in 1915, where he remained until the armistice in 1918. He took pride in his time in Chile, claiming after the war that he had managed to avoid that "Chile joined Germany's enemies."[13] Kieslings evaluations also support the idea that the German interests in Latin America and the Ottoman Empire were similar: to create a political influence, since the military was a political force along with tapping into the market for the good of the own armament industry. And not least, the German officers got the opportunity to broaden their horizon through foreign experience. With regard to the Ottoman case there is also the question of how far transfers of German military practices contributed to the growth of the local militarism after 1908. It will be shown in the following paragraph that this was not completely the case, since the Ottoman side appropriated mainly preselected features of the German military system. Among the most important sources for those transfers are the reports of the German military attaché Strempel. This important figure in the German-Ottoman military relations will be analyzed in detail.

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11 Patrick Porter, *Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western Eyes* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 74.

12 Rinke, "Eine Pickelhaube macht noch keinen Preußen," 269–274.

13 Bay HStA IV OP 11664, n.p. While serving in Goltz' staff in 1915/16, Kiesling also exchanged comparative thoughts on the work of the German reformers in the Ottoman, Chilean and Japanese armies with the old Field Marshal. See Hans von Kiesling, *Soldat in drei Weltteilen* (Leipzig: Grethlein, 1935), 428.

Mediator of the 'German Spirit': The Military Attaché Walter von Strempel

After the discontinuation of regular military-political reports by Colmar von der Goltz from the Ottoman capital in 1895, the German embassy was urged to post a permanent military attaché in the Ottoman capital. Through the analysis of Goltz' activities, the Ottoman military leadership came to the same conclusion.[14]

The tasks of the German military attachés had been outlined in the 1890s instructions. They had to stay in contact with officers of the foreign power and read the periodicals and the military press of their host nation. The German military attaches were also urged to take on the responsibility of a naval attaché, in case there was no such positions in the local German embassy. This was the case in the Ottoman capital until 1913. As part of their regular duties, they had to compile regular military reports that had to be sent directly to the German foreign office. This was a special precaution because these reports could also include political views, and politics were a sensitive topic for German officers. The military attachés did not report directly to their military superior, but the head of the German General Staff. The German foreign ministry then forwarded those reports to the German ministry of war.[15] Yet, those attachés had to keep out of local political affairs and monitor the developments of the foreign power's army and navy as well as their training, armament and military techniques. Consequently, the military reports often contained information on espionage and armament sales.[16] Unfortunately, as the diplomatic documents of the late Ottoman period are not yet available for research, this study of the German reports will provide a far reaching, but one-sided insight into the developments in the Ottoman army. This has to be kept in mind and Strempel's views should not be overrated.[17]

Major Walter von Strempel (1867–1935) served as the military attaché in the Ottoman capital between 1908 and 1913, one of the most crucial periods of the late Ottoman state. He followed the developments in the Ottoman army and

14 Gültekin Yildiz, "Osmanlı Dış Askerî İstihbaratında Formelleşme: Elçiliklerde Ataşemiliterliğin İhdası ve Osmanlı Askerî Ataşe Raporları" [The Formation of the Ottoman Foreign Military Intelligence: The Creation of the Military Attaché in the Embassies and the Ottoman Military Attché's Reports] *Hacettepe Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi* 17 (2012), 246–247.

15 Gerhard A. Ritter, *Die deutschen Militär-Attachés und das Auswärtige Amt: Aus den verbrannten Akten des Großen Generalstabes* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1959), 35.

16 Ritter, *Die deutschen Militär-Attachés,* 6.

17 The period of Strempel will be analyzed in detail here, since most of the reports for the 1913–1918 period (attachés Karl von Laffert, Erich von Leipzig, Otto von Lossow) and especially for the 1935–1944 period (attaché Hans Rohde) from the archives of the German Foreign Ministry (AA-PA) were destroyed in World War Two.

propagated the German role model in personal contacts with the Ottoman staff officers. Strempel soon realized that Germany had to find a kind of emotional connection, since the reform work of the German officers after the military mission under Colmar von der Goltz had also created discord in the Ottoman army. Parading German soldiers always left an impression on every Ottoman military visitor to Germany, like on the other side the German officers in Ottoman service were attired in the regular Friday prayer parades of the Sultan's life guard.[18] Strempel was of a similar mind and had the idea of inviting Ottoman officers to Berlin for the parade in autumn 1910. Strempel remarked:

> "The hours under the parade poplar would mean a road-to-Damascus experience for some of the Ottoman officers! [...] The bitter pill for many officers of doing now, for the first time in their life, systematic service due to their German instructors could become golden-colored by the impressions in Germany."[19]

Here Strempel made use of the apostle Paulus's conversion story. The latter had been the pagan Saulus before and had been proselytized by his encounter with the resurrected Jesus on his way to Damascus.[20] However, Strempel did not refer to the voice of the Messiah, but to the blaring Prussian marching music and the synchronic goose step of thousands of soldiers, which were to assist in the conversion of the reluctant Ottoman officers into fiery Germanophiles. Strempel proposed to make use of Colmar von der Goltz' prestige. Goltz, the veteran of the Ottoman-German military relations, should invite the Ottoman officers for the parade. In order to lure in the Ottoman guests, the German state was to cover railway expenses within German borders.[21] Strempel's proposal was eventually accepted and an Ottoman delegation of several officers watched the 1910 parade which concluded the autumn manoeuvres.

Strempel had calculated correctly. On 28 August 1910, Enver, the Ottoman military attaché in Germany, described his Damascene experience under the 'parade poplar' close to Königsberg: "Yesterday I watched a 33,000 men strong Ger-

18 Karl Auler noted the following on the Selamlık parades in 1910: "The deployment of the troops never failed to have an effect on the German fellow soldiers, and the military eyes rejoiced in the splendid human material which even is not chosen for the guard's corps in Constantinople especially." "Die Türkische Armee," undated, HStAS M660/051 Heft 5, 1.

19 Militär- Bericht Nr. 287, dated 28 May 1910: 3, AA-PA R 13360.

20 The Bible, Acts of the Apostles, Chapter 9.

21 Militär- Bericht Nr. 287, dated 28 May 1910, AA-PA R 13360, 4.

Figure 1: The Ottoman military attaché Enver (middle) watching the German 1909 autumn manoeuver

man corps' parade here. It was so excellent that it watered the people's mouth."[22]

Strempel stayed in his position until late 1913, when he was posted to the German military mission. However, this deployment was not to last very long, since he was transferred to the Western front after several arguments with Liman von Sanders.[23] Colmar von der Goltz would prove to be the most influential figure of the German-Ottoman military relations.

The Goltz Era: New Hope for the Ottoman Officer Corps

Colmar von der Goltz, "Golç Paşa" in Ottoman Turkish, had become a legendary figure in the Ottoman officer corps. He had taught the generation of Ottoman staff officers who would later educate the young officers that lead the 1908 revolution. With his unpretentious ways, Goltz had managed to be hard on the reform issues but soft on the persons he dealt with. He developed a new recruit-

22 Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Makedonya'dan Ortaasya'ya Enver Pasa* [Enver Pasha: From Macedonia to Central Asia] vol 2 (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1976), 212.

23 Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire*, 79; Wallach, *Anatomie einer Militärhilfe*, 145–147.

ment law based on the Prussian 1814 law[24] and contributed to the topographical survey of new maps of the capital and its surroundings. After the death of his predecessor in November 1885, Goltz rose to the head of the German military mission and now also occupied the advisory position for the reformation of the Ottoman General Staff. He introduced the model of the Prussian War Academy thereby replacing the former French based Ottoman higher military education system. It was, above all, Goltz's proposal to send preselected Ottoman officers for 2–3 years for specialized training at specific branches of the German army that deepened the connection to the German military system. Since the Goltz era, the Ottoman army solely relied on bolt-action rifles made in Germany.[25]

The Prussian instructor found enthusiastic followers of his ideas among the students of the war academy. These ideas had been expressed by the Prussian General in his 1883 treatise, *The Nation in Arms*. Goltz argued for war preparation by the whole German nation beginning with male youth. Military norms and practices were to become an everyday element of civil society. Goltz claimed that officers should enjoy the prestige of their position and have a leading role in society. Goltz' ideas became attractive to officers around the world. The numerous translations of his treatise are an eloquent testimony of this fact. Instructors at the Ottoman military academy recommended *The Nation in Arms* to their students. Most of the young Ottoman officers used it as *"a kind of bible, from where they drew hope for the resurgence of their nation."*[26] It is therefore no wonder that young officers of mostly Muslim origin read the book as if it had been written especifically for them. The Freudian misspelling or rather misreading of the Ottoman script in Goltz' book title as the *Nation of the Muslims* in an official 1945 military monograph on the history of the war school is quite telling.[27] Goltz offered a model for the potential homogeneous nation state; one that should be dominated by the Muslim share of the population.

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24 See Elke Hartmann, *Die Reichweite des Staates: Wehrpflicht und moderne Staatlichkeit im Osmanischen Reich 1869–1910* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2016), 111–143.

25 Carl Alexander Krethlow, *Generalfeldmarschall Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz Pascha: Eine Biographie* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2012), 125–138.

26 Klaus Kreiser, *Atatürk: Eine Biographie* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2008), 43.

27 The military historian mentioned Colmar von der Goltz as the author of a book under the same title, probably misreading the term *Müsellaha: "[...] Milleti Müslime [sic!] yazarı Golç Paşa"*. Anonymous, *Harp Okulu Tarihçesi, 1834–1945* [History of the War School, 1834–1945] (Istanbul: Harp Okulu Matbaası, n.d. [c. 1945]), 27. On the impact of Goltz on the Turkish Muslim militarist environment see also Fuat Dündar, *Modern Türkiye'nin Şifresi: İttihat ve Terakki'nin Etnisite Mühendis-liği, 1913–1918* [The Cypher of Modern Turkey: The Ethnical Engineering of the Comitee for Union and Progress, 1913–1918] (Istanbul: İletişim, 2008), 65–67.

After his return to Germany in 1895, Goltz continued to follow the developments in the Ottoman army, resorting to his regular exchange of letters with Ottoman officers, among them also Pertev [Demirhan]. In Germany, Goltz used mainly public journals and newspapers to reach a broader audience, a commonplace strategy of contemporary officers.[28] As early as the 1880s, Goltz had realized that Germany needed the Ottoman army more in a two-front war as an alliance with Germany would be of use for the Ottoman side.[29] Goltz therefore set himself the goal of keeping the German military and civilian readership up to date with the progress of the Ottoman military modernization process.

Goltz's rather benevolent view of the Ottoman private was expressed in several publications. The former Ottoman Pasha had to admit that the "joyfulness to serve [Dienstfreudigkeit]" and punctuality to which he was used to in Germany were not a given in the Ottoman army.[30] Bad news was not conveyed, carelessness was a commonplace during military operations, and the Ottoman officer's care for their soldiers was inexistent.

After the reinstatement of the Ottoman constitution on 24 July 1908, Goltz had a clear picture of the role of the officer corps in society that seemed to derive directly from his treatise *The Nation in Arms*. For Goltz, the Ottoman army was the only institution that could change the political crisis of the summer of 1908, since most of the military leaders had undergone modern education. The army had suffered in long 'colonial wars' with internal enemies in their distant possessions and could not prevent the loss of further provinces. Pursued by Sultan Abdülhamid's spies, they had had no other choice than to rise against this regime. In the future they were to return to their professions- a clear reference to the Prussian ideal of the apolitical soldier. The Ottoman troops had to be occupied with daily training as soon as possible. An army that trains hard from dusk till dawn does "*not think of revolts. [...] Politics [...] is not the soldier's business.*"[31] In addition, Goltz urged the Ottoman officials to draft non-Muslims for military service. This measure was "*an imperative of self-preservation*"[32] of the Ottoman Muslims, in its Social Darwinist terminology another clear reference to the

28 Markus Pöhlmann, "Das unentdeckte Land: Kriegsbild und Zukunftskrieg in deutschen Militärzeitschriften," in *Vor dem Sprung ins Dunkle: Die militärischen Debatten über den Krieg der Zukunft 1880–1914*, ed. Stig Förster (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2016), 29.

29 Krethlow, *Generalfeldmarschall Goltz*, 173.

30 Colmar von der Goltz, "Einiges vom türkischen Heere und seinen Soldaten," *Daheim* 16 (1903), 16.

31 Colmar von der Goltz, "Die verjüngte Türkei und ihre Armee," *Neue Freie Presse,* 9 August 1908, 1.

32 Goltz, "Die verjüngte Türkei und ihre Armee," 2.

ideas Goltz had laid out in his treatise 25 years earlier. His Ottoman readership was delighted by these ideas. An officer praised the article in the foreword to its translation in a military journal, elevating it as a mandatory reading "from the field marshal down to the first lieutenant."[33]

Goltz' Counseling, 1908–1910

In the autumn of 1908, the Germanophiles in the Ottoman army urged for a German military mission. For General Mahmud Muhtar, "the German army would be the best in the world and a reorganization of the Turkish army could only be successful according to this model."[34] At the top of the Ottoman wish list was the deployment of the former head of the military mission, Colmar von der Goltz, who was requested to write a report on the current state of the Ottoman land forces. Goltz had already reached retirement age and Emperor Wilhelm II had decided against making Goltz the new Imperial Chancellor. Already in 1905, the emperor had preferred Moltke the Younger over Goltz as the new head of the German General Staff.[35] The sixty-five year-old Inspector-General without active commanding duties was disposable in Germany. The German ambassador in London supported the sending of von der Goltz to counter British claims for a military mission. He wrote the following to the German foreign ministry on 29 September 1908: "Just with the Turkish army we can keep our influence and within it in turn most safely with Baron von der Goltz."[36] The military attaché Strempel added that the current restored parliamentary monarchy could only last another three and a half years. Accordingly, the conditions for the German army were clear:

> "Those 3,5 years by Goltz the fundament would be laid for the strengthening of German influence due to the sympathies of the army for German military affairs. Therefore take the opportunity, quickly and firmly, not with some instructors, but with an united military mission."[37]

33 Anonymous, "Golç Paşa ve Fuad Bey'in Mektubu," [Goltz Pasha and Fuad Bey's Letter] *Asker*, 1 September 1324/1908, 72.

34 Marschall von Bieberstein to Bülow, 4 September 1908. AA-PA R 13795, 54.

35 Krethlow, *Generalfeldmarschall Goltz*, 265–266.

36 Metternich to AA, 29 September 1908, AA- PA R 13253, n.p.

37 Militärbericht Nr. 172, 6; n.d. AA-PA R 13254.

The few German officers that had remained in the Ottoman capital after the revolution did not serve regularly and had no impact on the reformation of the Ottoman army. For Strempel, they were not qualified for a military mission, since they had not served in the German army for the last 8 to 25 years.[38] In the opinion of the German military attaché, the German army should promote advanced military education in Germany. Thereby those officers would have "cultivated further the love for their ruler and empire, esprit de corps, discipline and military knowledge after their return to Turkey."[39] The career of those Ottoman officers trained abroad had been cumbered under the old regime, but now at least eight German trained men had risen to influential positions. Strempel even envisioned the possibilities of an *"army within the army"*[40] that would consist of officers favoring Germany. Since the Ottoman officers in the capital saw themselves as the saviors of the nation and aspired political power, German influence on this group was seen as especially crucial.[41] Though, still an official German military mission was not requested officially since many Ottoman CUP officers feared the charismatic influence of Colmar von der Goltz.[42] Between 1909 and 1912, the Ottoman army hired only a group of several dozen, independently from one another acting German instructors. It became evident that the Ottoman side favored limited German assistance, since not all officers in influential positions were Germanophiles.

In autumn 1908, von der Goltz came to the Ottoman capital, but did not stay for long. In Constantinople, he gathered first hand information that he immediately passed on to the German General Staff and the Foreign Ministry in his reports. For the German military attaché, Goltz's first visit was a success, yet the long-term outcome of the military reform was doubtful. Strempel feared that the Ottoman indifference could resurface, since "able foreign officers tinkered with the Turkish army for 150 years, without any lasting success."[43] A major setback followed shortly after the internal unrest within the Ottoman army. In May 1909, a conservative group in the army had staged a coup in the capital to reintroduce the absolutist rule of Abdülhamid and abolish the parliamentary system. It had been countered by troops loyal to the CUP from Saloniki and resulted in a

38 Militärbericht Nr. 172, 4; n.d. AA-PA R 13254.

39 Militärbericht Nr. 105, 3; dated 5 August 1908. AA-PA R 13359.

40 Militärbericht Nr. 115, 5; dated 17 August 1908. AA-PA R 13359.

41 Cf. the report on the gathering in the Istanbul Taşkışla barracks in *Osmanischer Lloyd*, 6 February 1909.

42 Krethlow, *Generalfeldmarschall Goltz*, 341.

43 Militärbericht Nr. 238: 6, n.d. AA-PA R 13255.

veritable fight between the two fractions.[44] Goltz second visit in July/August 1909 was no easy task against the backdrop of such turmoil. Despite denials by the German media in the Ottoman capital,[45] the mission of the German baron was highly sensitive and the Goltz decided to wear civilian clothing. But he did not keep silent about his actions.

Goltz promotes the Ottoman Case

Goltz continued to write on the modernization process of the Ottoman forces, also by publishing slightly modified drafts of his earlier articles.[46] In his analysis, the German Baron was more far-sighted than most of his contemporaries, predicting the orientation of the Ottoman state towards Western Europe in the future.[47] The Ottoman authorities reacted positively to von der Goltz' articles and most of his contributions were immediately translated to Ottoman Turkish.[48] Goltz never became tired of insisting that the Ottoman military reforms and the purchase of new armament were to serve the regional stability rather than the coming of a new war. Most of the Ottoman soldiers were not properly trained for modern warfare, especially in the use of the Mauser rifles:

> "What would one say of an army department that would hand out a rifle to their soldiers in the case of mobilization, which they had never held in their hands before and from which they would fire the first shot on the battlefield."[49]

Goltz did not exaggerate with this statement. As a matter of fact, most of the rural Ottoman reserve formations had no clue how to load their bolt action rifles, since they were used to older muzzleloaders from their basic training many years ago. As remembered by one Ottoman officer, the decade long storing away of modern equipment by the fearful Sultan Abdülhamid II combined with the

44 Zürcher, *Turkey*, 100 – 103.

45 Anonymous, "Der 'politische Charakter' der Mission Goltz," *Osmanischer Lloyd* 28 July 1909; see also Krethlow, *Generalfeldmarschall Goltz*, 342.

46 Colmar von der Goltz, "Die verjüngte Türkei und ihre Armee," *Vierteljahreshefte für Truppenführung und Heereskunde* 6 – 1 (1909), 1 – 27.

47 Krethlow, *Generalfeldmarschall Goltz*, 329.

48 Ottoman Embassy in Vienna to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, 8 April 1909 regarding the article by Goltz in the *Neue Freie Presse* on 3 April 1909. BOA HR.SYS.D 200 Gö 37 Fon 1.

49 Colmar von der Goltz, "Die Wahrheit über die türkischen Kriegsrüstungen," *Der Tag*, 20 February 1910.

slow reforms after 1909 were to have fatal consequences on the battlefields of Western Thrace in the autumn of 1912:

> "Most of the men were conscripts who had never undergone modern training, and some of them did not even know to load a rifle properly. Rifles were handed out in the field directly from their packing crates. I even saw some soldiers trying to load bullets down the muzzle of the gun!"[50]

To overcome such difficulties was an enormous task that would take more time than initially envisioned by the German military advisors. Goltz's regular visits at least had the advantage that the "absolutely extraordinary admiration for their old mentor [von der Goltz] was refreshed again."[51] However, Goltz' visits also had a practical outcome with regard to his evaluation of the first big scale maneuvers in the Ottoman army since 1878. Goltz underlined that the repeated maneuvers on corps level in October 1910 were more successful than expected. The appearance of several Cholera cases did not hinder the old general in continuing with the scheduled programme. The Ottoman officer Behiç [Erkin] remembered this incident. When the Ottoman officers carefully asked to postpone the maneuver due to several cases of Cholera, Goltz reprimanded them: "Should such a situation occur in war, does the war end then?"[52] While the overall state of the Ottoman infantry was good, supply and communications were lacking. The conditions of these branches had to be improved accordingly for a better performance of the army.[53] However it should be noted that Goltz did not observe a maneuver by the Ottoman reserve army, but one by the regular infantry with proper training. Nonetheless, the final parade in the presence of Sultan Mehmed VI Reşad left a deep impression on the Ottoman officers: "In my life I had not seen so many soldiers assembled in one place."[54] Finally the experiences of this maneuver were also laid out in an official review. After the examination of the maneuver, the author Captain Nazım called for more discipline in the army: "Even the firing of a manoeuver cartridge for pleasure is a crime. [...]

50 Al-Askari, *A soldier's Story*, 39 – 40.
51 Militärbericht Nr. 245, dated 25 January 1910, n.p. AA-PA R 13310.
52 Behiç Erkin, *Hâtırat, 1876 – 1958* [Memoirs, 1876 – 1958], ed. Ali Birinci, (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 2010), 100.
53 Erkin, *Hâtırat*, 235 – 236.
54 Erkin, *Hâtırat*, 100.

We have to work [since] every day and night a war, a catastrophe can happen."[55] These were to prove prophetic words.

But Goltz also tried to persuade the officers of Ottoman General Staff with reasonable arguments to implement aspects of the 'German Spirit' in their daily routine. Here, he benefited from his pleasant, grandfatherly appearance. Goltz took part in the meetings of the Ottoman military council.[56] In one of these gatherings, the Ottoman minister of war was called out. Goltz used this opportunity and his standing with the assembled elite of the Ottoman military leadership to point to an imminent problem with the working morale in the war ministry. When Goltz's plea to remove the Ottoman capital[57] failed, he rephrased his idea in a more diplomatic way:

> "Goltz Pasha [said]: 'Move the Ottoman capital from Istanbul to Anatolia, to Konya, for example, since Istanbul is not a place of work and sufficient activity. Nature wanted to establish paradise on earth and chose Istanbul.' In this moment, a servant entered and told [General] Nazım Pasha (the later minister of war and supreme commander in the Balkan Wars): 'Somebody came and wants to see you' and Nazım left the meeting. Goltz Pasha proceeded: 'Of course you want to live this paradisiacal life. This Bosphorus, this Çamlıca [hill], those [Prince] Islands, they increase one's pleasure. Your houses are in one of the corners of this paradise. You come to the office and you barely work until noon. Your coffee is delicious, your cigarettes are excellent. Since you had a long way of course you will have a coffee and a cigarette. Meanwhile guests start to make their visits. You are the world's kindest, most friendly and hospitable people. Of course you will welcome your guests and offer something. Coffee, cigarettes, pleasant chats, and then you look- the steamboat departure time has come! In between one or two papers, maybe signed [by you] without reading them, you arise and leave.' Didn't Nazım Pasha enter the room again in the very same moment saying 'My excellency [Goltz], I beg your pardon, to reach the steamboat for Sarıyer I have to leave'? Goltz Pasha could not endure it, leaned back in his chair and burst into laughter for several minutes."[58]

This incident indicates that there was a big difference in conceptions of duty between German military practice and the realities of the Ottoman military admin-

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55 Erkan-i Harbiye Ummumiye Birinci Şubesi Memur Yüzbaşı Topcanlı Nazım, *Osmanli Ordusu'nun 1326 Rumeli Manevralarına Hakkında Mütalaat* [*Evaluation regarding the 1326/1910 Rumeli Maneuvers of the Ottoman Army*] (Istanbul: n.p., 1327/1911), 16.

56 For Goltz attending the Asker Şurası cf. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket Paşa*, 98.

57 The following anecdote has a similar diction as one of Goltz' repeatedly 'cetero censeo' about the removal of the Ottoman capital his article "Stärke und Schwäche des türkischen Reiches," *Deutsche Rundschau* 93 (1897), 114–116.

58 Hasan Cemil Çambel, "Milli Hastalığımız: Tenbellik" [Our National Malady: Laziness] *Dünya Gazetesi* 5 April 1960, quoted in Hasan Cemil Çambel, *Makaleler Hatıralar* [*Essays, Memoirs*] (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1964), 102.

istration. Thus an individual consultant like Colmar von der Goltz, who stayed only twice for several weeks in Constantinople, was not sufficient to push forward the reform process of the Ottoman army. The situation was complicated in 1909 by the resignation of several long serving German instructors from the days of Sultan Abdülhamid. It is for these very reasons that a new generation of German instructors was employed to reform the Ottoman army.

German Instructors in Ottoman Service, 1909 – 1912

Between 1909 and the beginning of the First Balkan War in 1912, more than 30 German officers served as instructors in the Ottoman army. Many of them held commanding positions in the newly founded model regiments and at military training facilities all over the empire, where they taught German military standards to their Ottoman students in uniform.

Young and middle-aged officers with several years of experience in commanding military units of the battalion or regiment level, or with teaching experience in one of the German military training facilities were preferred as instructors. Despite such preferences, most of these men had never served abroad before, which appeared to be a problem in terms of adaptive challenges. At this time there had been an immense interest for positions in the Ottoman army among adventurous, frustrated or purely monetarily oriented German officers. In most of the cases the applicants did not fulfill the requirements of the German General Staff and the periodical *Deutsches Offizierblatt* (DOB) published an informative article clarifying the reality in the Ottoman army. German officers were not eligible for service in the Ottoman capital alone, they could also be sent to peripheral garrisons, in which case the Germans had no interpreter at hand. Often the Germans were to serve under the command of much younger Ottoman superiors as the army purged itself of senior followers of the deposed previous regime. The double income in the Ottoman army was adjusted in accordance with the high living costs as a foreigner in the Ottoman lands.[59] Despite all these daunting conditions, the German General Staff was able to recruit a sufficient number of active German officers for the Ottoman military authorities. Most of these officers remained in Ottoman service until the First Balkan War.

In the years after the 1908 revolution the activities of German advisors were not coordinated, an omission that was eventually rectified by the conditions of

59 Anonymous, No title, *DOB* 40 (1910), 827.

the German military mission in late 1913.[60] As one of the last remaining instructors from the days of the old regime, Karl Imhoff remained in Ottoman service until the end of 1910. In articles for the *Militär- Wochenblatt*, he provided insight into the beginnings of the reforms in the Ottoman army for a German military audience.[61]

Within the Ottoman officer corps there had been a debate whether the German General Staff's model was suitable for the Ottoman military system. Ali İhsan [Sabis] gave an introduction to the history and the qualification measures in the German army, before he came to his conclusion. Since the conditions were different, any attempt to copy the German General Staff would "like any imitation, [...] not produce an outcome that would resemble the one in Germany", therefore, "any nation" (hereby the author indirectly referred to the Ottoman state) had to take measures of its own to establish a functioning organization.[62]

However, in order to establish such an organization, first the prerequisites had to be fulfilled. As the army was dominated by officers without any modern education, the training of officers with academic background had to be enlarged. After the deposition of Sultan Abdülhamid in 1909, the Ottoman military academy was moved to the Yıldız palace. The new premises, with their wide gardens, could easily accommodate the growing number of students.[63] With Goltz's second advisory visit in 1910, the Bavarian officer Otto von Lossow[64] was posted to the Ottoman academy as tactics instructor. Instruction was only interrupted by the First Balkan War in October 1912, when the senior students were sent to the Çatalca front.[65]

There was also an intensified training in the branch of arms specific facilities. The former commander of the cavalry model regiment in the third army corps in Erzincan, Colonel Franz Bopp (1860 – 1928),[66] also gave courses at the

60 Goltz' proposal to employ an authoritative German General for this position was rejected. German Imperial Chancellor to Emperor Wilhelm II, 30 May 1909. AA-PA R 13254.

61 [Karl] Imhoff, "Kavallerie-Uebungsritte in der Türkei," *MWB* 11 (1909), cols. 228 – 231 and 35 (1909): cols. 782 – 784; [Karl] Imhoff, "Das neue türkische Militärpensionsgesetz," *MWB* 143 (1909), cols. 3244 – 3248 and 155 (1909), 3540 – 3542.

62 Ali İhsan [Sabis]: "Almanya'da Erkan-ı Harb Zabitleri Nasıl Yetiştiriliyor ve Büyük Kumandalara Nasıl İhzar Ediliyor" [How General Staff Officers are trained and how High Commanders are prepared in Germany], *Ordu ve Donanma* 1 – 5 (30 Haziran 1328/13 July 1912), 192.

63 Muharrem Mazlum İskora, *Harp Akademileri Tarihçesi 1846 – 1965* [The History of the War Academy, 1846 – 1945] vol. 1. 2nd ed. (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1966), 45.

64 Bay HStA IV OP 44185.

65 Anonymous, *Harp Okulu Tarihçesi*, 36.

66 HStA Stgt M430/2 Bü 197.

Ottoman cavalry school in the capital. These courses focused on the need to maintain discipline and order within the units and improve the standards of training and horse care.[67]

The previously neglected practical education was intensified after 1909. Future staff officers had to serve for two years in an active regiment to counterbalance their former theoretical education.[68] New training facilities were also built for the other ranks. For the recruitment of qualified NCOs from the first to the sixth Ottoman army corps, one model regiment each for the infantry, cavalry and artillery were established. Here preselected privates were trained for one year for their promotion to the rank of corporal. In addition, six NCO schools were established in order to broaden and deepen the knowledge of corporals and sergeants. Most of these schools were led by a German instruction officer. Special attention was also given to an improved life fire training of the active troops, which had been neglected under the rule of Abdülhamid II. Under the command of Colonel von Byern, a school for infantry shooting was opened in Soğanlı close to Maltepe, east of the Ottoman capital.[69] This facility became an innovative training ground for future developments in the Ottoman infantry. It followed German standards.[70] In some of the regulations translated into Ottoman Turkish in Maltepe, the semantic proximity to the German original was evident.[71] In some regards, the facility in the hills above Maltepe even surpassed the German role model. Here, more than 600 soldiers could exercise with live ammunition simultaneously on parallel shooting ranges.[72]

Nevertheless, there were also limitations to the transferability of Prussian military education methods in direct contact between German officers and Ottoman recruits. Those encounters had not always beneficial outcomes. Colonel Si-

67 See the September 1912 publication of selected courses in: [Franz] Bopp, *Süvari: Pas Cavalier, Cavalerie*. Trans. Mahmud Hakkı (Istanbul: Nefaset Matbaası, 1328/1912).

68 Akmeşe, *The Birth of Modern Turkey*, 118.

69 Anonymous,"Die Infanterieschulen in der osmanischen Armee," *Osmanischer Lloyd*, 23 February 1912.

70 See the advertisement for Maltepe staff member Yussuf Paşalı Tahsin's translation of the German machine gun regulation in *Mecmua-ı Fünun-u Askeriye* 21 – 10 (1327/1911).

71 See the wordly translation of the German instructor's sentence "Of how many parts is the carbine 98 composed?" as "Mauzer tüfeği başlıca kaç parçadır?" in the Ottoman infantry soldier's instruction manual's question- response section; Ahmed Ali, *Piyade Efrâd Dersleri Nr. 3: Küçük Çaplı Mauzer Tüfeği ve Usûl-u Tathir* [Rifleman Instructions No. 3: The Mauser Big Bore Rifle and its Cleaning Procedure], 2nd ed. (Istanbul: Mekteb-i Harbiye Matbaası, 1326/1910), 2. On the History of the Ottoman and Turkish Mauser bolt action rifles see Robert D. Ball, *Mauser Military Rifles of the World*, 5th ed. (Iola: Krause Publicatons, 2011), 374 – 389.

72 Anonymous, "Das gefechtsmäßige Schießen bei Maltepe," *Osmanischer Lloyd*, 11 July 1912.

gismund von Schlichting, instructor in the 5th infantry regiment in the Yıldız barracks, used to correct the body posture of the Ottoman soldiers with his riding crop. After several of those physical assaults an Albanian native Ottoman soldier could no longer bear this humiliating treatment and shot the German drill instructor from close distance with his service rifle.[73] In this particular case, the conditions of the extended Ottoman military recruiting practices[74] and the insensitivity inherent in the German military's educational principles[75] had fatal consequences. However, it was to be the only incident of this kind in the course of the entire German-Ottoman military cooperation.

The hiring of German instructors was only one side of the renewed Ottoman-German military cooperation. The acceptance of German military knowledge was also paved by the sending of Ottoman officers to Germany.

Ottoman Officers in Germany, 1908–1918

For the German side the sending of Ottoman officers to Germany was a crucial part of military cooperation. It can be argued that this aspect of military cooperation had the deepest impact, especially on the Ottoman side. It had been a proposal of the first German military mission back in 1883 to select able Ottoman young officers for a three-year's internship in the German army. This might also have been due to the fact that, since the beginning of the Tanzımat era, most of the Ottoman officers were sent to Paris or Vienna. By this measure Germany as a place to study was to be promoted.

The salary was to be paid by the Ottoman side. In return, the German side paid for a six-month German course, training at one of the war schools and organized postings to the diverse garrisons and the German General Staff. Sultan Abdülhamid took care that his men reported to Istanbul on a monthly basis, explicitly avoiding non-military i. e. mainly political topics.[76] Since 1890, the Sultan

73 See the detailed accounts in Ambassador Marschall to AA, 28 March 1911. AA-PA R 13255; Anonymous, "Die preußische Militärtragödie in Konstantinopel," *Schwäbische Tagwacht*, 1 April 1911, HStA Stgt M 1/3 Bd. 794; Anonymous, "Die Ermordung des Oberleutnants von Schlichting," *Osmanischer Lloyd*, 29 March 1911.

74 There was considerable resistance against this measure by the formerly exempted Albanian population; Römer, *Militärhilfe für das Osmanische Reich*, 69–70.

75 See the letter of Foreign Minister Kiderlen-Wächter to Jenisch, 12 April 1910. AA-PA R 13255.

76 Mehmet Cebeci, *Die deutsch-türkischen Beziehungen in der Epoche Abdülhamids II. (1876–1908): Die Rolle Deutschlands in der türkischen Außenpolitik unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Bulgarischen, Ägyptischen und Armenischen Frage* (Marburg: Tectum, 2010), 357–359.

urged the German side to accept only older officers, which could be used as authoritative instructors in the Ottoman war academy upon their return. One of them was Ahmed İzzet [Furgaç] (1864 – 1937), who was sent to Germany in the same year. Ahmed İzzet mentioned in his memoirs that he tried to combine the ideas of both sides, "seeking a rapprochement by mixing and combining as much as possible in my mind."[77] This remark was a direct reference to the challenging appropriation process, which many Ottoman officers underwent during and after their training in Germany.

The sending of Ottoman officers continued after the 1908 July revolution. From then on, the reports became more detailed, since the officers were urged to give more insight on their service abroad in the new 1908 regulation for officers of all army branches that were to be sent to Europe. Here too the conditions, the payment and the resulting promotions after the successful training period were regulated.[78] Paragraph 13 of this regulation dealt with the special case of Germany whereby priority was given to officers from the first three Ottoman armies,[79] proof of the urgency of the desired modernization of the Ottoman army. These officers were to be posted as instructors in the model regiments and the Ottoman higher military educational facilities. Officers returning from Germany were to become the future army's leadership, as the German Colonel Karl Auler noted: "Among the officers especially those abound who had General von der Goltz Pasha as a teacher or who had enjoyed their training in the German army. They are the elite of the army, are familiar with the modern principles of warfare and are first and foremost destined for leadership in the army."[80]

After the deposition of Abdülhamid, many officers who had received their training in Germany around the turn of the century made their career during the Second Constitutional period, including Salih Hulusi [Kezrak], Ali Rıza, Mahmud Muhtar [Katırcıoğlu] and Pertev [Demirhan].[81]

Unfortunately, on both the Ottoman as well as the German side, archival evidence is limited on detailed information about these officers' time in Germany. The German side carefully supervised the selection and numerical limitation

77 Ahmed İzzet Furgaç, *Feryadım* [My Lamentation] (Istanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1992), 9. Akmeşe, *The Birth of Modern Turkey*, 25.

78 Cf. the service regulation of the Ottoman General Staff: Erkan-i Harbiye Ummumiye, *Avrupa'ya Tahsile Gidecek Zabıtana Ait Talimat* [Instructions for Officers going to Europe for Educational Purposes] (Istanbul: Daire-i Askeriye Matbaası, 1326/1909).

79 *Avrupa'ya Tahsile Gidecek Zabıtana Ait Talimat*, 4.

80 Auler, "Die Türkische Armee," HStA Stuttgart M660 – 051 Heft 5.

81 Cebeci, *Die deutsch-türkischen Beziehungen*, 368, 371.

of the program. But there were also financial limits of the Ottoman army, as Strempel noted:

> "[T]he financial situation of Turkey does not allow to send so many officers to Germany in order to awake the understanding of the character of a modern army that might become common knowledge of all [officers]. Most probably with such a flood by Turkish officers in Germany no one's interest would be served."[82]

Therefore here also arises the question if this training was seen as appropriate, or if there were concerns. There seem to have been some problems, since the German ambassador Wangenheim noted in 1912:

> "According to my non-authoritative laymen's opinion, rather than training Turkish officers and rank and files [in the Ottoman Empire, G.G.] according to German field regulations, it is important that talented Turkish officers will be trained as instructors here with us, in order to transfer the German lessons [Lehren] into the Turkish Spirit [türkischen Geist] and make them understandable to their subordinates."[83]

In the following it will become evident that this transfer of German lessons to the "Turkish Spirit" was easier said than done, although it exactly served the idea proposed by Wangenheim. As a result, time spent in Germany offered the Ottomans a wide range of knowledge that could be applied in the Ottoman army.

The German Way of Soldiering in the Eyes of the Ottoman Officers

The German army's prestige had created great impression on the Ottoman soldiers even before they had arrived in the German garrisons. Nearly every Ottoman officer suffered a cultural shock, coming from an agrarian state into a country at the height of its industrialization. Writing about his time in Karlsruhe, Cafer al-Askari noted noted that he was overwhelmed by unknown impressions: "German efficiency, earnestness and industry made an immediate impact upon us. [...] I was found [sic] myself in a military environment in total contrast to what I had been used to in the Ottoman army. Everything was new to me."[84]

82 Militärbericht Nr 287, dated 28 May 1910, 2–3. AA-PA R 13360.
83 Wangenheim to AA, 28 August 1912: n.p. AA-PA R 13256.
84 Al-Askari, *A Soldier's Story*, 29–30.

Back home most of the Ottoman officers had not even known the everyday life of their soldiers.[85] Therefore the German way of educating the drafted men from all layers of society made an impression on the Ottoman officers. After his maneuver visit of the Prussian contingent in Alsace-Lorraine in 1901, colonel Pertev commented on the approach of General Haeseler:

> "He even asked the men where Turkey was located, and what the name of its capital was. [...] Often they had the point of view of a small child and did have no clue of the simplest terms. What they answered in geography, history and military science they had learned in their barely four months training."[86]

In Pertev's opinion, the army was the "first and best education establishment of the German nation [Volk]."[87] The idea of the army as the school of the nation became an Ottoman ideal that was not fully put into practice until 1918.[88] But not every Ottoman officer who had served in Germany left detailed notes on his impressions. Ekrem Rüştü [Akömer] served with the 3rd Guard Uhlans Regiment from December 1911 until he was called back in October 1912. He only kept a dairy of his daily routine lacking any personal remarks, focusing on his horse riding lessons for the German recruits, horseback hunts and nightlife activities.[89] The longest report available, which gives insight into the impressions of Ottoman officers in the antebellum German army, was published by Lieutenant Mustafa. He had done an internship with the Grenadier Regiment King Friedrich Wilhelm II (1st Silesian) No. 10 in Schweidnitz (Świdnica). During his three months in Silesia in the summer of 1912, he witnessed many things that seemed to have been noteworthy for the Ottoman military readership. The Ottoman General Staff had approved the publication of Mustafa's report in the journal's special summer vol-

85 Yücel Yanikdağ, "Educating the Peasants: The Ottoman Army and Enlisted Men in Uniform," *Middle Eastern Studies,* 40 – 6 (2004), 92 – 108.

86 Pertev [Demirhan], *Unter Graf von Haeseler: Persönliche Erinnerungen* (Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1904), 28 – 29.

87 Pertev, *Unter Graf von Haeseler*, 28 – 29.

88 Cf. the 1915 statement in an Ottoman military periodical: "The German field regulation prescribes: 'In addition to the physical and military training the worth of a soldier is conditioned by moral and mental powers.' Herein lays the big task of the German officer, who becomes a second schoolmaster for the [enlisted] man. [...] And I can add that those are the same principles, that are instilled in our army and navy by the German military and naval mission seriously and forcefully, and [...] which [...] are seeked to be executed by Enver Pasha to eliminate the recent setbacks." Mehmed Zeki: "Siegen!," *Die Nationalverteidigung*, 1 October 1915, 116 – 117.

89 Cf. Akömer, "Aus den Tagebüchern eines Waffenbruders," 79 – 89.

ume (August to October) in 1913, when the Balkan War had ceded and the negotiations on the sending of a new German military mission were proceeding.[90]

German Daily Routine Service in Ottoman View

Mustafa's report focused on the training of the newly drawn Prussian recruits. The deficiencies in this field had become evident on the Ottoman side after the 1908 revolution. The respective remarks in Colonel Otto von Lossow's reports will serve as the comparative angle for this survey. Mustafa was astonished that the German NCOs (*Feldwebel* ranked sergeants) had a high degree of responsibility during the basic training. For him it was surprising that the officers were not involved in daily routine training.[91] It was a similar admiration as in the case of Cafer Al-Askari, who had highlighted the tasks of the German company sergeant major (*Kompaniefeldwebel/baş gedikli*; the so called "Spieß"):

> "The sergeant-major was the key figure in the German Army company. He was responsible for the implementation of all orders, instructions and directives issued by the company commander. He also ran the company office with great efficiency according to the commanding officer's requirements. In the German Army, the NCOs were the repository of its core values of discipline, efficiency and a good turn-out."[92]

The inspection of recruits at the end of the three months basic training and the distribution of a brand new number one uniform kit (*Erste Garnitur*) for parades and special occasions and an used number two uniform kit for daily use (*Zweite Garnitur*) was something new for the Ottoman lieutenant.[93] Mustafa described the close-order drill of his Silesian company in great detail, mentioning all the commands: "The commander appreciated the platoons passing by in good order saying 'Gut' or valued them 'Şleht'."[94] Interestingly, Mustafa did not use German vocabulary in Latin script in the text, translating most of the German terms into Ottoman (phonetic) Turkish. He thereby appealed to a broader read-

90 Mustafa, "Alman Ordu'da Müşahedatım" [What I witnessed in the German Army], *Mecmua-yi Fünun-u Askeriye* 6, 7, 8 (1329/1913). This sort of admiration for the German army also continued after 1914. Cf. in this regard the listing of similar German military institutions and virtues in Karabekir, *Tarihte Almanlar ve Alman Ordusu*, 221–227. Karabekir expressed his high esteem after a military tour in Germany during the First World War.

91 Karabekir, *Tarihte Almanlar ve Alman Ordusu*, 314.

92 Al-Askari, *A Soldier's Story*, 32.

93 Mustafa, "Alman Ordu'da Müşahedatım," 325.

94 Mustafa, "Alman Ordu'da Müşahedatım," 328.

ership among the officers, also to those, who had no knowledge of the German language. In those days, the German command language was not easily accessible, the first bilingual command language book was published during the First World War.[95]

For the Ottoman guest the military punishment was of equal interest as the professional German weapon care of the service rifles by the company's armory NCOs. The soldiers were ordered to keep their weapons and uniforms clean.[96] Furthermore, officers' training had caught the Ottoman Lieutenant's interest. In his eyes, it was remarkable that the officers at the beginning of their career had to serve as regular soldiers. Before this step they had been prepared carefully in the cadet corps for their future duties.[97] Yet they were strict regarding the tidiness of the soldiers' rooms and finding a dusty corner during inspections could have unpleasant consequences for its inhabitants.[98] On the field the soldiers had to estimate distances and read maps. Mentioning such abilities had a clear purpose, since it was a defiance in the Ottoman army that had become evident during the Balkan Wars.[99] Attack trainings against artillery and machine gun positions and the training of intersecting fire against the enemy were also noteworthy parts of the training.[100] Lieutenant Mustafa also highlighted telephone connections as being standard in every German unit. In the Ottoman army, modern radio and telephone technology imported from Germany had not been of much use in field units in the Balkan wars. The operators had not received sufficient training and the General Staff had not ordered specific hours for sending and receiving messages. As a consequence, the fleeing Ottoman troops even left behind their radio carriages while rushing back towards the Çatalca line in October 1912.[101]

The Ottoman military trainees were mostly impressed and astonished by the Germans strict emphasis on punctuality in the units. Here, the officers took care that their soldiers obeyed every order to the minute. This was reasonable for Mustafa: "Indeed they are right. Because an officer or a soldier who is not

95 Wely Bey Bolland, *Türkisch für Offiziere und Mannschaften: Gespräche, Wörtersammlung und Grammatik zum Selbstunterricht; Mit einem Anhang: Gespräche mit Verwundeten und Kranken* (Stuttgart: Violet, 1917).

96 Mustafa, "Alman Ordu'da Müşahedatım," 336–338.

97 Mustafa, "Alman Ordu'da Müşahedatım," 343.

98 Mustafa, "Alman Ordu'da Müşahedatım," 346.

99 Mustafa, "Alman Ordu'da Müşahedatım," 349.

100 Mustafa, "Alman Ordu'da Müşahedatım," 352–354.

101 Ibid. 383–384; cf. Otto von Lossow, "Berichte des bayerischen Oberstleutnant Otto von Lossow aus dem türkischen Krieg 1912/13," Bay HStA IV GS 260, 1.

used to move on time [by peacetime training; G.G.] will by no means leave and work on time in war."[102] The phrase 'time is money' was also valid in the army. The execution of orders had to exactly follow the time schedule given as, in infantry attacks, every minute counts and any delay costs lives.

But for Mustafa, this German way of carrying out duties seemed incomprehensible. This becomes evident in the following sentence, in which he describes one of the regular officer's gatherings in the regimental casino: "[T]he Germans attach extraordinary and intense importance to the hours and minutes. [...] First of all, the Germans know their duties. After that they want to have a good time. After eight to ten hours of being busy, they dance, drinking wine until 2, 3 o'clock until they lose control." The very next morning, these Germans are back on duty at 07:10 am. What is even more astonishing is that in Germany, such behavior was not only related to the military alone: "By no means do they neglect a duty. This is not only the case in the army, the whole German nation [millet] moves to the minute [...]."[103]

For this very purpose, every German square had one or several public clocks. This was not the case in the Ottoman Empire. In Mustafa's country of origin, several forms of time measurement existed simultaneously. The local *alaturka* time conflicted with the European standard time. It took the Ottoman military many years to have their recruits "coordinated [sic] like a mechanical clock."[104] The European mean time was introduced slowly by the Ottoman authorities. The public clock towers erected during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II in bigger cities were insufficient to have a deep impact on the whole Ottoman society. But the need for a full adoption of the European standard time had become a military necessity that finally led to its adoption in May 1912, followed by the abolishment of older forms of the calendar in late 1916.[105]

This paragraph of Mustafa's report regarding the impressions of German punctuality and work ethics was by far the most personal one. Mustafa's view was confirmed in the words of the German navy Lieutenant Karl Dönitz, who served on the S.M.S. Goeben/Yavuz in 1914:

102 Mustafa, "Alman Ordu'da Müşahedatım," 386.

103 Mustafa, "Alman Ordu'da Müşahedatım," 387.

104 Quoted after Avner Wishnitzer, *Reading Clocks, ala Turka: Time and Society in the late Ottoman Empire* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2015), 91.

105 For German influence on the Ottoman debate see Wishnitzer, *Reading Clocks, ala Turka,* 87–92.

> "No individualistic spirit prevailed in our home, but the spirit of Prussian sense of community. For me, subordination was something natural when I became a soldier and officer. By upbringing I was convicted that the fulfillment of my duties ranged on the first place."[106]

The Ottoman requirement for this type of German military and civilian culture had become evident in the Ottoman military command performance during the Balkan Wars.[107] It is not surprising that Mustafa mentioned the detailed and proper preparations for every move.[108] Mustafa's interest was also caught by the burial of a soldier who had died on 28 August 1912. During a 45 km march in the hot August sun, a recruit had passed away from the consequences of a heat stroke. For the Ottoman Lieutenant, however, such marches were necessary and he emphasized the official German view of the necessities of the coming war. During the burial ceremony, three days after the soldier's death, delegations from each company paid their last respect to the deceased soldier, in the accompaniment of regimental music. Mustafa was surprised by the carefully prepared funeral service for a common soldier, during which even the commander of the Grenadier Regiment No.10 gave a short eulogy.[109] This incident formed the end of his report on his time with the German army which was in many paragraphs praising, but also influenced by incredulous amazement. Some of Lieutenant Mustafa's observations were also shared by Cafer Al- Askari, who served in the 1st Badonian Life Grenadier Regiment No. 109 in Karlsruhe from 1910 to 1912. Al-Askari's more personal impressions reveal that the author had noted them down later, when he had had time to reflect about his stay in Germany. He continued to be impressed in retrospect: "What really astounded me about the Germans was their meticulous attention to detail. There was a certain [sic] thoroughness carried out to the point of perfection in everything they did."[110]

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106 Quoted after Gotthard Breit, *Das Staats- und Gesellschaftsbild deutscher Generale beider Weltkriege im Spiegel ihrer Memoiren* (Boppard: Harald Boldt, 1973), 18.

107 Lossow in early 1913: "The slow way of giving orders, the lacking sense for the value of time among the Turkish General Staff (deficient practical troops experience- the people have no idea that the troops also require some time for the preparations to march) are one of the reasons for failure." BayHStA IV GS 260, 8.

108 Mustafa, "Alman Ordu'da Müşahedatım," 395; cf. Lossow's half sarcastic remark at Ergene from 27 October 1912: "The same evening I wrote a report and an exact sketch with the subscription of the troop schedule into detail. Here the [Ottoman] corps [commanders] did not feel hurt in any way, if one – according to German terms – did intervene in their authority of command. On the contrary, they are grateful if they find an exact plan and if one spares them the burden of thinking, if possible." BayHStA IV GS 260, 22.

109 Mustafa, "Alman Ordu'da Müşahedatım," 400 – 401.

110 Al-Askari, *A Soldier's Story*, 30.

The common room in the barracks was the German officers' mess, the casino, where unmarried officers had their meals. In the opinion of Lieutenant Mustafa, this institution was like a family.[111] The casino was a place to solve small issues of daily service via unofficial channels. It was also a place for regular gatherings. It is in this context that the garrison commander assembled his men to "imbue [durchdringen] them with uniform spirit."[112] The casino was thus an important place for indoctrination and the formation of team spirit amongst the officers as well as a popular venue for wild and convivial drinking revelries.

The effects of the indoctrination of the German officers and Ottoman stagers are visible in Al-Askaris memoirs. In the criticism by a contemporary German author, the casino was a place of reactionary mindset for the officer corps:

> "Conservative mindset is mostly seen as self-evident here. With the military they understand less of politics, but there is the prejudice that [...] the Social Democrats are severe criminals. [...] Here [in the Casino the officer] learns that a 'decent human' in Prussia is conservative, since all of the gentlemen accepted in the casino are more or less conservative."[113]

It was, therefore, not surprising that Cafer Al-Askari, who later joined the 'subversive' Arab rebellion against the Ottoman state, supported the view of the Social Democrat movement as "subversive activities". It was part of the officer's duties to "protect the army from the contagion of such dangerous political doctrines." For Al-Askari, exhausting regular field exercises were necessary to "fatigue the troops" in order to prevent their preoccupation with socialist ideas.[114]

Appropriation between Assimilation and Self-Denial

During their time in Germany, some of the Ottoman officers began to appropriate parts of the worldview of their surrounding. They even accepted humiliating situations and claimed that their German superiors had a point in behaving that way. İsmail Hakkı [Okday], son of the Ottoman foreign minister Ahmed Tevfik, had

111 Mustafa, "Alman Ordu'da Müşahedatım," 390 – 393.

112 Friedrich von Bernhardi quoted after Breit, *Gesellschaftsbild*, 29.

113 Lothar Engelbert- Schücking, "Der Einfluß des Reserve- Offizierskorps auf die politische Gesinnung in Preußen," in *Die Reaktion in der inneren Verwaltung Preußens* (Berlin: n.p., 1908), 28 – 29.

114 Al-Askari, *A Soldier's Story*, 32.

served in the 2nd Guard Dragoon's Regiment 'Empress Alexandra of Russia' in Berlin from 1908 to 1910. His commander, Major von Koch, had a dislike for the Ottoman officer. During the day he was "absolutely harsh and violent" and only approachable after service hours.[115] When on 24 January 1910, İsmail Hakkı's squadron lined up at minus 28 degrees Celcius at 6 a.m. the Ottoman stager started trembling and shaking on his whole body. This reaction was immediately spotted by his merciless commander, resulting in a reprimand by von Koch:

> "'You should know that in this world only drunkards, dogs and prostitutes tremble. An officer wearing the glorious uniform of Prussia never trembles!' After that [incident] I have seen that in fact drunkards, dogs and prostitutes who, wearing silk clothes, walk around and look for clients in Berlin's Friedrichstraße trembled and I have to admit that Major von Koch was right."[116]

Here we can clearly see that İsmail Hakkı took the worldview of a Prussian officer for granted. He did not question Koch's statement, even though the comparison to alcoholics, an animal considered impure in Islam and the scantily dressed prostitutes actually were inacceptable insults for an Ottoman officer. Moreover, he added this incident to his published memoirs, presenting it as something normal. In the eyes of the German officers, İsmail Hakkı was loyal to Germany, "absolutely German educated, has served in the 2nd Guard Dragoons regiment and, for example, talks only German to his brother, Major in the General Staff Ali Nuri."[117]

In the eyes of his Ottoman fellow officers, İsmail Hakkı was too Germanized. His failure to gain mastery of the Turkish language and the slightly arrogant behavior added to his unpopular status, whereas with his cosmopolitan and "German education" he rather resembled a field marshal.[118] It is precisely this mindset that was also of concern to German politicians criticizing the government for the role of the German military instructors in the Ottoman army. According to the Social Democrat Eduard David, they "had brought – I do not want to talk of military technology – a certain spirit into the Turkish officer corps, the spirit of the 'elegant Guard's officer'."[119]

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115 İsmail Hakkı Okday, *Yanya'dan Ankara'ya* [From Yanya to Ankara] (Istanbul: Sebil Yayınevi, 1975), 31.

116 Okday, *Yanya'dan Ankara'ya*, 32–33 and Anonymous, *Türken in Berlin*, 60–61.

117 German military deputy Constantinople Major Gienanth to the German Ministry of War: "Thronwechsel", 6 July 1918. BA-MA RM 3/2965, 266.

118 Cf the mentioning of Okday as a fictional character in Selçuk, *Yüzbaşı Selahattin'in Romanı*, vol.1, 229.

119 *Reichstagsprotokolle*, vol. 286, 1912/14,4, 76th session, 3 December 1912, 2514.

Other Ottoman officers who had been to Germany had similar embarrassing encounters. Al-Askari chose a rather indirect way of criticizing a beer night with the German officers: "But to me, the officers' behavior that night demonstrated their essential good nature and friendliness on a personal level."[120] These recollections show that Euro- and Germanocentric views of the Imperialist age about the religion of Islam and the Turks as such underpinned the relationship of the Ottoman stagers and their German hosts. It was not only those views that had an influence on further Ottoman-German military cooperation. German officers interested in the development of the post revolutionary Ottoman Empire could find ludicrous statements in the Orientalist literature on the state of religion, such as this one:

> "With the Turks instead of Islam there is naught. Head and heart are empty. Just an empty conceit for world power, a dream of wading in blood and of rough carnal indulgence is filling those brains. This is not enough."[121]

Such prejudices also infiltrated mutual relations and poisoned the basis for daily and long-term cooperation. On a personal level, Ottoman officers seem to have faced prejudices and vilification by German officers, as in the case of Ali İhsan [Sabis], who served in the 1st Nassauian Field Artillery Regiment No. 27 'Orange' in Mainz. It should be noted here that this sort of arrogance was not restricted to Germany alone as Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk] had a similar experience when wearing the characteristic *kalpak* headgear during a maneuver visit in France in 1910.[122]

The German side even considered reducing the number of Ottomans serving in Germany, since there were also other nations interested in sending their officers to Germany. All of these foreign officers needed supervision, which was a burden to their German superiors. On the eve of the Balkan Wars, the German General staff and the Foreign Ministry agreed to reduce the numbers of the Ottoman officers that were to be accepted for intense training in Germany. 'Sensitive matters' were to be kept confidential as before.[123]

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120 Al-Askari, *A Soldier's Story*, 67. Other Muslim Ottoman officers also developed an appetite for beer and got used to its regular consumption; cf. Okday, *Yanya'dan Ankara'ya*, 34.

121 Martin Hartmann, *Der Islam: Geschichte-Glaube-Recht; Ein Handbuch* (Leipzig: Haupt, 1909), 186.

122 Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Çankaya: Atatürk'ün Doğumundan Ölümüne Kadar* [*Atatürk from his Birth to his Death*] (Istanbul: Pozitif, 2012), 74.

123 The Ministry of War to the Foreign Ministry, 7 May 1912; BA-L R 901/ 82820 Akten betreffend die Erlaubnis für Türken zum Eintritt in diesseitige Militär- Erziehungs- und Lehranstalten, sowie zur Dienstleistung bzw. Information bei diesseitigen Truppenteilen und der kaiserlichen

Ultimately, sending Ottoman officers to Germany was one cornerstone of a successful development towards an alliance and paved the way for the transfer of German military knowledge. Ways of holding cities and fortresses in the war of 1912 was ascribed to the German training of the respective commanding Ottoman officers: "From which source did the four aforementioned officers drain their capabilities and their valor?"[124] On the other hand, many negative aspects that were to challenge the alliance during the First World War were already visible during the prewar period. Nonetheless, the training of young Ottoman military cadres in Germany for more than four decades had a big impact on the Ottoman army and later the armed forces of the Turkish Republic. Those military leaders carried on the message they had internalized during their time in Germany to the next generation of Ottoman officers, as recollected by a Republican general about his years at the Istanbul war school:

> "They had adopted the pompous attitudes of the German generals and upon their return to their native country they acted like the German generals. Our instructor, the blessed Hasan Rıza Pasha who defended İskodra [in the Balkan Wars], emulated General Haeseler at every opportunity, imitated his movements, posture and walk."[125]

From this example, it is evident that having served in Germany was not a guarantee for an unchallenged status. This was especially the case when it came to active field service outside the lecture room. Here the annual maneuvers offered some opportunities to test the abilities of the older commanders, which had had attended a German military school. Disappointments were not uncommon. Mustafa Kemal critisized openly about Ali Rıza Paşa (1860 – 1932) in front of all officers on the deficits in the conduct of operations during the Cumalı maneuvers in August 1909. In a private letter he highlighted that he had actually expected more from a general who had served in the German army: "However, if this Pasha who has worked in Germany also does not master the art of leadership what will the others do? The division commanders have no clue about their duties!"[126]

Marine vom Mai 1912 bis Dezember 1916, n.p. Cf. Al- Askaris statement that he had to leave the instruction room when sensitive matters were taught; Al-Askari, *A Soldier's Story*, 31.

124 With an emphasis on their German education referring to Mehmed Şükrü Paşa, Mehmed Esad [Bülkat], Zeki [Kılıçoğlu] and Hassan Rıza in Mehmed Zeki, "Die Lehren des türkisch-balkanischen Krieges," *Die Nationalverteidigung* 15 December 1912/1 January 1913, 2.

125 Asım Gündüz, *Hatıralarım* [*My Memoirs*], ed. İhsan Ilgar (Istanbul: Kervan Kitapçılık, 1973), 20.

126 Atay, *Çankaya*, 69.

On the eve of the Balkan Wars, the German-Ottoman military cooperation was tightened but questioned by parts of the Ottoman military leadership. This is why further defeat could damage German prestige which is evident in the statement of the German ambassador in late August 1912:

> "As long as the army plays the leading role, Germany is in an advantageous position in contrast to the countries competing with it. According to the Turkish notion, there exists a comradeship in arms between the Turkish and the German army. Still, the majority of the Turkish officers place their trust in the absolute superiority of our military skills."[127]

The Balkan Wars, 1912/13: Testing Ground for the 'German Spirit'

The Balkan Wars were the last larger conflict in Europe before World War One and in this regard they served as a testing ground for the confirmation of the European nation's military doctrines.[128] Officially, the major European powers remained neutral. In fact, however, some of them supported a faction in the war. Germany assisted the Ottoman army and so did the French military mission in the Greek armed forces. Bulgaria, the strongest adversary of the Ottoman forces, was backed by the Russian government.[129]

In terms of armament and training, to some extent the Balkan League member's armies and the Ottoman troops were representative for the contemporary European military state of warfare. This also raised the interest of all nations involved and resulted in the sending of numerous European military observers.

The Ottomans were taken by surprise in this conflict. Their army was in the midst of a reform and not fully fit for service. The reserve troops (redif) were untrained and poorly equipped. The campaigns exposed the neglect for military af-

127 Wangenheim to AA, 28 August 1912; AA-PA R 13255, n.p.

128 Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War* (London, New York: Routledge, 2000). For the German evaluations see Markus Pöhlmann, "Between Manchuria and the Marne: The German Army and its Perception of the Military Conflicts of 1911–1914," in *The Wars before the Great War: Conflict and International Politics before the Outbreak of the First World War*, ed. Dominik Geppert et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 204–229.

129 Olivier Lahai, "La Mission Militaire Française en Grèce sous le Commandement du General Paul Eydoux (1911–1914)," in *Les Relations Militaires Franco-Grecques: De la Restauration à la Seconde Guerre Mondiale*, ed. Rémy Porte and Abdil Bicer (Vincennes: Service Historique de la Défense, 2007), 67–81; Ronald Bobroff, "Behind the Balkan Wars: Russian Policy toward Bulgaria and the Turkish Straits, 1912–13," *The Russian Review* 59–1 (2000), 76–95.

fairs under the rule of Abdülhamid II. The prohibition of live fire training and maneuvers in the field had left traces, which could not be overcome easily by improved instruction in the model regiments and one single infantry shooting school. Thus the military deficiencies, which had been noticed by Colmar von der Goltz after the maneuvers in 1909 and 1910, became evident. In the last decades, the Ottoman army had fought mainly against outgunned adversaries during the suppression of internal uprisings in the Ottoman provinces. Accordingly, the Ottoman forces were not prepared for warfare against a fully mobilized army, let alone against a modern and well equipped alliance.[130]

Germany's political interests in this conflict included the defense of its sphere of influence, the maintenance of the status quo of the Ottoman state and the prevention of a full-scale war in Europe. It is for this purpose that the German high command made use of its military instructors. During the Balkan wars, 24 German officers served in the Ottoman field army, mainly in the area opposing the Bulgarian army. Due to Germany's official neutrality, the German government employed a legal trick. The German officers had to take leave from the German army and forgo their citizenship. They became Ottoman subjects and joined the Ottoman army for the duration of the war with a guaranteed return to German service after the end of hostilities.[131] The expectations of the German high command were clear. Officers granted leave were to gain experience and write detailed reports about their activities, which are the main source for this paragraph. These officers were keen to study modern warfare in practice, since German military theory had not been tested on the battlefield after 1871.[132]

The outcome of the first battles in October 1912 lowered German expectations. After a failed hasty offensive in Eastern Thrace Ottoman troops rushed back to the Çatalca line. However the desire to take the offensive was not criticized by the German officers (since it fit well into German prewar doctrine), but its poor preparation was reproached.[133]

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130 Feroze Yasamee, "Armies Defeated Before They Took the Field? The Ottoman Mobilisation of October 1912," in *War and Nationalism*, 251–271.

131 Ulrich Trumpener, "German Military Involvement in the First Balkan War," in *East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars*, ed. Bela K. Kiraly et al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 349.

132 Michael Unger, *Die bayerischen Militärbeziehungen zur Türkei vor und im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2003), 37.

133 Otto von Lossow, "Die Ereignisse bei der türkischen Armee in Thracien," Bay HStA GS 260/2: 6. On the respective doctrine see Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," *International Security* 9–1 (1984), 59.

In addition to the poorly prepared campaign, most of the reserve troops had not received sufficient training. The smaller portion of active units could not compensate the deficits caused by these untrained troops.[134] Ottoman officers also admitted that the Ottoman military administration had not been prepared to field such an army which became evident in many details. For instance, most of the troop commanders had problems to communicate with their men, who "[...] were unable to understand instructions as they came from remote parts of Anatolia and spoke their own dialects."[135]

For German observers, the Ottoman military had a leadership problem. Bavarian Captain Franz Carl Endres (1878–1954) served in the Ottoman army headquarters in the Hadımköy train station (today on the western outskirts of Istanbul). In the station building and in stabled train coaches operations in the Çatalca line were commanded and a potential defense of the Gallipoli peninsula was prepared.[136] It was a new situation for Endres as he had joined Ottoman service on the eve of the war. His acclimation period fell at the time of general mobilization in the Ottoman capital. The distinguished theoretician from the Bavarian war academy was suddenly confronted with the realities of warfare.[137] Endres complained about the inefficient course of Ottoman General Staff work and the reluctance of Ottoman officers to take responsibility. In this regard, his criticism resembled Colmar von der Goltz' diplomatic remarks two years before the war:

> "All action in this Army High Command is also not remotely comparable to the one in a German [High Command]. The officers of the General Staff merely do kind of a higher level of paper work. [...] The working hours of the staff ranged from 10 a.m. to 2 a.m. without a break. They also ate in the office!! It was absolutely irrelevant whether the military situation was serious or totally calm. The five of us were sitting in a small, quiet room. In addition, everybody negotiated loudly with the subordinates called in and numerous visitors came every day, which had to be entertained with tea and cigarettes. On this occasion they [the Ottoman officers, G.G.] had political discussions. For someone not used to this way of leading military operations, working under these circumstances was quite hard.

134 G. von Hochwächter, *Mit den Türken in der Front im Stabe Mahmud Muhtar Paschas: Mein Kriegstagebuch über Kirk Kilisse, Lüle Burgas und Cataldza*, 5th ed. (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1913), 18–34.

135 Al-Askari, *A Soldier's Story*, 39.

136 Franz Carl Endres, "Bericht des kaiserlich Ottomanischen Majors Franz Endres über seine Teilnahme am Balkankrieg 1913," Bay HStA IV GS 257, 1–6.

137 Simon Schaerer, "Franz Carl Endres (1878–1954): Kaiserlich-osmanischer Major, Pazifist, Journalist, Schriftsteller," in *Pazifistische Offiziere in Deutschland*, ed. Wolfram Wette (Bremen: Donat, 1999), 232.

> [...] [And] it was not astonishing that misunderstandings occurred daily, orders were not or not timely given etc."[138]

The politicization of the Ottoman officer corps was also seen as one of the biggest hindrances for military sucess on the battlefield. Cafer Al-Askari complained about Enver Pasha, who was solely interested in his own political career "spending most of his time in political intrigues with the leaders of the CUP in an endeavor to overturn the government and replace it with one of purely Unionist composition."[139] Those political developments behind the front were to have an impact on the further development of the German-Ottoman relations on the eve of the First World War. As a protest against the fall of Edirne, Enver Pasha and several of his CUP followers on raided the Sublime Porte and killed the Ottoman minister of war, Nazım Pasha, on 23 January 1913. This veritable putsch during war brought Enver Pasha and the leading members of the CUP to power.[140]

Meanwhile, the army struggled to hold the lines in the field. The troops received reinforcements from other Ottoman army corps, whose advance to the front had taken weeks due to the bad road conditions. In the front, sanitary conditions were mostly inadequate, and diseases spread among the Ottoman troops. Soldiers' neglect of basic personal hygiene caused infections.[141] In addition, Ottoman officers were disinterested in the adequate supply of their rank and files with enough food. Endres was told by an Ottoman staff officer that "the Turkish soldier does not need more than a small crumb of bread."[142]

Some of the German officers supported the harsh punishment methods of the Ottoman officers in case of disobedience. The Bavarian cavalry Captain, Count Johann Kaspar von Preysing-Lichtenegg-Moos, was known for violent behavior towards his subalterns in three cases, which had been penalized by disciplinary measures. Count Preysing was infamous for his "lively temperament."[143] It is, therefore, not surprising that he was delighted by the punishment method of the Ottoman General Mahmud Muhtar, who "heavily beat up a military doctor and several deserted soldiers with a riding crop; a necessary measure that [...] visibly elated Preysing."[144]

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138 Schaerer, "Franz Carl Endres," 9.

139 Al-Askari, *A Soldier's Story*, 44.

140 Akmeşe, *The Birth of Modern Turkey*, 133–135.

141 Otto von Lossow, "Berichte des bayerischen Oberstleutnants Otto von Lossow aus dem türkischen Krieg 1912/13," Bay HStA IV GS 260,18.

142 Endres, "Teilnahme am Balkankrieg," 19.

143 See the entries in Preysing's personal file, Bay HStA IV OP 46397.

144 Hochwächter, *Mit den Türken in der Front*, 93.

Although the majority of the German officers serving with the Ottoman army were disgusted by the professional approach of the Ottoman military leadership, they saw the need for a fundamental reform of the Ottoman army, state and society:

> "Apart from the very young General Staff officers, who to some degree have a visible German education, the Turkish General Staff officers are the bane of their army. The majority is without any sense of duty, without understanding and as a consequence of indescribable conceit, without contact to the troops among whom they are rightly unpopular. [...] But these are deficits that cannot be removed by German reformers, because they run deeper than that. They have their roots in the vitiation of the so-called educated class, in their lack of social and ethic sensibility. Yes, one can say in their upbringing, in the status of the woman, in the religion etc., in short, plenty of things that cannot be influenced by the German reformers. [...] Turkey has no leading elements, neither in the state as a whole nor in the army. [...] A reform that is effective has to embrace the whole people [Volk]. The reform can only emanate from an almighty personality and will, besides that its results then still would be questionable, take years of hard work."[145]

As Colonel Otto von Lossow commanded a Reserve Division at the Northern part of the Çatalca front, he had more contact with the ordinary rank troops than Franz Endres although he came to similar conclusions, with a slight European sense of superiority:

> "The only positive military feature these people bring to the army is their born sense for subordination and authority. All the other military features have to be inculcated in the people through a long and careful training in peacetime. Certainly, with the benevolence of the people, well-done training in peacetime would finally lead to quite good results."[146]

However, Lossow was also aware that the German instructors could not carry out the patriotic indoctrination. This was the exclusive sphere of the Ottoman officers and they understood how to cheer up their fellow troops after the first weeks of the campaign:

> "The speech by Colonel Ragıb Bey, the cheers for H.M. the Sultan, the orderly, compact big concentration of troops being unusual before for the soldier in this war had an extraordi-

145 Endres, "Teilnahme am Balkankrieg," 10, 32. Cf. for a similar opinion on the state of the Ottoman armed forces by a German navy captain in Gerhard Grüßhaber, "Und das hat unter deutscher Flagge die Loreley getan: Die Evakuierung Abdülhamids II. aus Saloniki an Bord der S.M.S. Loreley, Oktober 1912," in *Die Bagdadbahn: Ein Umriss deutsch-türkischer Beziehungen; Gesammelte Beiträge*, ed. M. Florian Hertsch and Mutlu Er (Hamburg: Kovac, 2016), 149.
146 Otto von Lossow, "Geschichte der Denizli- Division," 20 January 1913, 4. Bay HStA IV GS 260.

> nary effect on officers and soldiers alike. The natural gloom of the retreat changed at once. [...] From this moment on, I had my troops under control. Discipline, order and military prowess were growing with each day."[147]

Nonetheless, the German officers pleaded to send a full-scale military mission to entirely reform the Ottoman army. The German mission was to have far reaching rights and assert a type of a protectorate over the Ottoman High Command. In this regard, the Germans diplomacts were not to shy away from blackmailing the Ottoman government: "Either you take the German mission as we intend to give it to you, or we will leave you high and dry."[148]

For Otto von Lossow, the Ottoman 'rebirth' with the help of Germany was only possible thanks to a change in power in the Ottoman state. An authoritarian leader had to turn the whole state inside out. Here Lossow expanded the ideas of Captain Endres:

> "It is possible- should the country be fortunate enough to get a Sultan, who (like Frederick the Great or Peter the Great) would take the fate of the country into his hands with an iron fist, who would raise a new generation with the help of one, but just one great power, who would educate the people by reforms in all areas of public life to duty, order, work, honesty and truth."[149]

With the outbreak of the Second Balkan War in June 1913, the Ottoman army was able to regain the border city Edirne, which "restored something of its military pride."[150] The unexpected success helped raise the self-confidence among the Ottoman officer, also for those who were already German minded:

> "The Bulgarians are fleeing and chasing them, within three days our army has covered a distance of more than 100 kilometers. This is a fantastic performance as in the Berlin war academy they had told us, that an army can cover a distance of 20 kilometers a day at most, and an army corps only 25 kilometers."[151]

After the end of the Second Balkan War in August 1913, Ottoman officers began to evaluate the reasons for defeat.[152] The war's outcome had been a severe blow

147 Lossow, "Geschichte der Denizli- Division," 36.
148 Endres, "Teilnahme am Balkankrieg," 33.
149 Otto von Lossow, Secret report from Darboğaz Tahufuzhane, 2 April 1913, 24. Bay HStA IV HS 1571.
150 Al-Askari, *A Soldier's Story*, 47.
151 Ali Nuri [Okday] to his wife Edibe, 16 July 1913. Quoted after Okday, *Der letzte Grosswesir und seine preussischen Söhne*, 54.
152 Akmeşe, *TheBirth of Modern Turkey*, 124 – 131.

to the army's prestige. Colmar von der Goltz' essays were translated and circulated among the officers of the Ottoman army, in the hope of preventing a similar debacle during a potential next campaign.[153] The same fear was also virulent among the German officers as the outcome of a war in Central Europe was also uncertain. The officers in the Ottoman army, therefore, used the opportunity to give a summary of their observations.

German lessons from the Balkan Wars

In their reports, German advisors not only made suggestions for the improvement of the Ottoman army, but also used this conflict as a testing ground for the own German field service regulations.[154] Lossow predicted high infantry losses in a future conflict, since the enemy's artillery observers immediately reported any attack formations. The own infantry had to advance in small groups but keep its distance from the neighboring group. Decisive victory in battle had to be sought within one day otherwise the troops would fatigue and become dulled under enemy shelling.[155] The morale of the troops deserved eminent attention because the chance of mental breakdown were also high in the German army. This view was also shared by Lieutenant Hans Rohde (1884–1954).[156] German officers disagreed with the French press, which ascribed the poor performance of the Ottoman artillery to the inferior German ordnance. This argument was invalid because Ottoman opponents also had used Krupp canons in this conflict. However, both sides had showed big deficits and the advantage of firing from covered positions became evident.[157] These and other evaluations were not received enthusiastically by everyone. In an article for the daily *Der Tag*, Colmar

153 Colmar von der Goltz, *Der jungen Türkei Niederlage und die Möglichkeit ihrer Wiedererhebung* (Berlin: Peatel, 1913). See the Ottoman translation of Goltz' articles: Colmar von der Goltz, *Genç Türkiye'nin Hezimeti ve İmkan-ı İtilası* [The Debacle of Young Turkey and the Possibility of its Reascension], trans. H. Cevdet (Istanbul: Kader Matbaası, 1329/1913); see also the collection of articles by Goltz and Karl Imhoff in *Osmanlılar Muharebelerini Nasıl Kaybettiler? Şimdi Nasıl Telafi ve Terakki Edebilirler? Fon der Golç ve İmhof Paşaların Mütaleatı* [How Did The Ottomans Lose Their Wars? How Can They Pay Back and Progress Now? The Enquiries of Goltz and Imhoff Pasha], ed. Adil Nami (Istanbul: Sancakiyan Matbaası, 1331/1915).

154 Cf. also Pöhlmann, "Between Manchuria and the Marne," 216–228.

155 Otto von Lossow, "Kriegserfahrungen Infanterie. Geheim!," 3 February 1913, 4–7, 20. Bay HStA HS 1571.

156 Rohde, *Unsere Gefechtsvorschriften und der Balkankrieg*, 20–21. Between 1936 and 1944 Rohde served as German military attaché in the German embassy in Ankara.

157 Rohde, *Unsere Gefechtsvorschriften*, 55–58.

von der Goltz argued that most of the internal and in some cases also public discourse conveyed a wrong picture of this conflict. For Goltz, the considerations of those officers were not transferable to the conditions of warfare in Central Europe.[158] Nonetheless, an internal military report about the cavalry had an impact on the future makeup of the German mounted troops. The Balkan Wars had coincided with the domestic political debate regarding an increase of the German army's active size. Members of parliament actively followed the publications of the German participants. Colonel Dietrich Veit had served as an instructor with the Istanbul cavalry model regiment. After his participation in the Balkan Wars, Veit published several articles based on his internal memorandum.[159] Most of his considerations as to the use of the smaller Anatolian horse within the German cavalry were not applicable. But his plea for an expansion of the active cavalry regiments found an attentive ear among the deputies. The National Liberal and reserve officer, Ernst Bassermann, referred to Veit's newspaper articles to underline the need for at least three more cavalry regiments. Veit had argued that the inadequate size of the Bulgarian cavalry had prevented a chase and encirclement of the withdrawing Ottoman troops. Thereby the Ottoman army had been able to assemble and regroup in the defensive Çatalca position, which had finally decided the war. Bassermann concluded:

> "[T]he evaluations of a man who commanded a cavalry corps on the Turkish side in a distinguished position in the last war are remarkable and, with other arguments, support the case that it is right to provide the [funding for the] three cavalry regiments, which had been cancelled earlier."[160]

The majority in parliament followed Bassermann's plea in the following session. Veit's conclusions had a direct effect on the German armament debate. However, the campaign in France one year later proved that the age of the cavalry had come to an end. Instead of three regiments, the German army would have required at least three cavalry divisions in order to decide the war at this early stage.[161] The fate of the other German memoranda proposals was similar. Due to the outbreak of the First World War in the following year, the reports were outdated given the developments on the European battlefields. However, the prediction regarding the need for total mobilization, the tendency towards longer cam-

158 Colmar von der Goltz, "Einige Balkan- Kriegserfahrungen," *Der Tag*, 12 November 1913.
159 [Dietrich] Veit, "Aus dem Balkankriege 1912," Undated. Bay HStA IV GS 259; see also Veit, "Kavalleristische Erfahrungen aus dem Balkankriege," *MWB* 20 (1913), cols. 419 – 422.
160 172nd session of 28 June 1913, *Reichstagsprotokolle* 1912 volume 14 – 8, 5906 rigth column.
161 Simon-Eberhard, "Drei Kavalleriedivisionen 1914 zu wenig aufgestellt," *DOB* 15 (1925), 117.

paigns as well as the need of combined arms warfare between the army, navy and the nascent air force, were established. However, most of those considerations based on the experience on the Ottoman battlefields were generally not transferable to the Central European fronts.[162]

In the Ottoman state the dramatic territorial losses of the Balkan Wars paved the way for the full implementation of Colmar von der Goltz' concept of the 'nation in arms'. In addition, the idea of a pre-military education of male youth gained ground and was to become an intense field of German-Ottoman/Turkish cooperation for the next decades.[163] As for the German diplomacy and military, the need to send a military mission to the Ottoman Empire had become evident. Time was pressing since there were also other competitors in the field.

The French versus the German Way of War, 1908–1914

Like in the civil sphere also in the Ottoman military the French language dominated the scene. The German officers serving in the Ottoman army had to resort to their marginal knowledge of the French language or rely on an interpreter.[164] The German instructors were also aware of the strong Francophile followers among the Young Turk movement. Colmar von der Goltz stated in 1910:

> "The ideal of the young Turkish Beys are the boulevards of Paris. [...] Their spirit is nurtured by books of French origin or translated into French, their phantasy is nurtured by French novels. The more serious fraction, who is represented mostly in the armed forces, has turned to the German culture, but they are a minority."[165]

Ottoman officers also received training in the French army, which was a thorn in the side of the German ministry of war. The German military attaché put the mind of his Berlin superiors at ease. Strempel valued the Ottoman officers

162 Pöhlmann, "Between Manchuria and the Marne," 229.

163 Eyal Ginio, *The Ottoman Culture of Defeat: The Balkan Wars and their Aftermath* (London: Hurst & Company, 2016), 173.

164 Klaus Kreiser, "Le Rôle de la Langue Française en Turquie et la Politique Culturelle Allemande au Début du XXe Siècle," in *L'Empire Ottoman, la République de Turquie et la France: Contributions à l'Occassion du Quatre-Cent Cinquantième Anniversaire des Premières Relations Permanentes entre la France et la Turquie*, ed. Hamit Batu and Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont (Paris, Istanbul: Isis Press, 1986), 411–412.

165 Colmar von der Goltz, "Bericht des Generaloberst Freiherrn von der Goltz über seinen Aufenthalt in der Türkei im Oktober und November 1910," 18 December 1910, 9 et seq. BA-MA N737/31, Nr. 62.

going to France for not being the "most talented" ones. In the Ottoman army of the future it would be "a quite different recommendation to know the German field regulations and the German language as returning to Ottoman service with previously accumulated knowledge of the French language."[166]

Already under the rule of Sultan Abdülhamid II, French Gendarmerie instructors had dominated in the reform of the Ottoman Jandarma troops in Macedonia. This project continued in the Second Constitutional Period.[167] During the opening campaign of the First Balkan War, the Ottoman supreme commander, General Nazım, had followed the French model of the forced offensive, which he had acquired during his studies in St. Cyr, the French war academy.[168]

The German army carefully monitored its sphere of influence in the Ottoman army. The fear of growing French influence was evident in the evaluation of the invitation of Ottoman officers to the 1910 maneuvers in France. Military attaché Strempel confessed that the Ottomans favored parts of the French military knowledge as "the Turkish cavalry wouldn't find a better role model than the French light cavalry" and would benefit from the French language, which was much more common among Ottoman officers.[169] There were also attempts in the Ottoman military press to promote the French military system[170] and the French military attaché in the Ottoman capital critically monitored the activities of the German military instructors.[171] Thus German diplomats refrained from acts that could be interpreted as provocative. When the German instructor Schlichting was killed in 1911, the German state paid his widow's pension. The Istanbul embassy thereby hoped to prevent protests among Francophile Ottoman circles against obligations resulting from a fatal mistake by a German instructor.[172]

However, despite such power struggles, most Ottoman officers had a rather pragmatic view. They were more interested in the appropriation of partially se-

166 Militär- Bericht Nr. 204, dated 7 July1909: 1. AA-PA R 13359.

167 See the introduction in Auguste Sarrou, *Le Capitaine Sarrou: Un Officier Français au Service de l'Empire Ottoman; Dix Ans de Séjour en Turquie, ou la Réorganisation de la Gendarmerie Ottomane 1904 – 1914* (Istanbul: Editions Isis, 2002), 30 – 46.

168 Hall, *Balkan Wars*, 24.

169 Militär- Bericht Nr. 300, dated 20 June 1910, 2. AA-PA R 13311.

170 M.W.-L. George, "Le Soldat Français: Le Meilleur Guerrier de l'Europe," *Die Nationalverteidigung* 1 – 19/20 (15 January 1912), 380 – 381.

171 For those reports see Loubna Lamrhari, "L'Obsession Allemande dans la Production du Savoir Militaire Français sur l'Armée Ottomane et Turque (1883 – 1933)," in *Turcs et Français: Une Histoire Culturelle, 1860 – 1960*, ed. Güne İksel et al. (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2014), 156 – 157.

172 Kiderlen-Wächter to Jenisch, 12 April 1910, AA- PA R 13255.

lected concepts than in imitating one single role model.[173] In a reaction to the Bulgarian declaration of full independence from Ottoman rule in 1908, an Ottoman officer noted that the Ottoman state had to take the same measures as the defeated France in 1871 to regain its strength. However, they were inclined to seek out other sources of inspiration for the national resurgence: "We have to be orderly [intizamperver] as the Germans, sobre [itidal] as the English, hard-working [gayrettar] as the Japanese!"[174]

Beyond these idealist debates, there was also a stalwart interest in the French and German armament industry on the Ottoman market. The situation was advantageous since French banks were the biggest creditors of the Ottoman state, which was often close to bankruptcy.[175] In 1910 the German ambassador complained about the strong French impact on Ottoman interior politics:

> "In Morocco one talked about 'pénétration pacifique', in Persia the motto was to 'protect the merchant routes', in Turkey, France finally appeared as 'tuteur de l'épargne française'. Those are fine words. The practical aim is always the same: to secure political or economical guardianship over a single power or a group of powers to the effect that the German rival, with its inconvenient economic expansion forces, is pushed aside."[176]

Nonetheless, the German domination of arms sales on the eve of World War I was never endangered. German manufacturers could even extend their lead in exports to the Ottoman army.[177] Colmar von der Goltz stated the reasons for this dominant position quite openly:

> "There is no doubt that if Sultan Abdülhamid in 1882 had sent a French instead of a German military mission to Constantinople, the extensive armament orders would not have been placed in Germany, but in France."[178]

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173 See the analysis of Ahmed Rıza's reading of Colmar von der Goltz' 'nation in arms' concept in Erdal Kaynar, "Les Jeunes Turcs et l'Allemagne avant 1908," *Turcica* 38 (2006), 315 – 319.

174 Ahmed Naci, "Bulgaristan'ın İlan-ı İstiklalı Haberi Üzerine" [About the Annunciation of Bulgaria's Declaration of Independence] *Asker* (1324/1908), 491.

175 For an overview, especially regarding the Franco-German rivalry during the Baghdad railway project, see L. Bruce Fulton, "France and the End of the Ottoman Empire," in *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Marian Kent (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 141 – 161.

176 Ambassdor Marschall to AA: "Die französisch-türkischen Anleiheverhandlungen," 8 November 1910, 10. AA- PA R 13313.

177 Naci Yorulmaz, *Arming the Sultan: German Arms Trade and Personal Diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire before World War I* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014), 230 – 250.

178 Colmar von der Goltz, "Militär-Missionen in fremden Staaten," *Der Tag*, 27 November 1913.

Nevertheless, things were quite different regarding the Ottoman political system. In 1908 the Ottoman state had reintroduced the constitutional monarchy. In the multiethnic empire, this system still lacked acceptance and was not a common practice among the Ottoman political leadership. The Ottoman military attaché to Paris, Ali Fethi [Okyar], had followed the sessions of the French national assembly with great interest. Upon his return, the Ottoman military attaché saw things clearer and had to admit that the contemporary Ottoman political elite lacked qualified men that were able to lead the country.[179] From the German diplomatic view, this was seen similarly, but always with an anti-parliamentary undertone. Due to its multiethnic composition, the German ambassador rated the parliamentary system as unsuitable for the Ottoman Empire. The absolutist rule of Abdülhamid had not brought the people closer to political maturity. Comparing the French model favoured by the Young Turks, he noted:

> "Here a republic, there a monarchy bound to the caliphate. In France, a homogeneous nationality with a very distinct patriotic feeling. In Turkey, a mingle-mangle of nationalities [Völkerschaften], who are fighting each other and therefore are unable to come together for a common political idea. [...] The existing situation [...] opens the floodgates to a coup d'état."[180]

For ambassador Metternich, the system of short-lived governments was an established tradition in France, whereas the Ottoman political fractions had to learn the rules of the game under foreign pressure. This made the minister of war Mahmud Şevket the perfect cast for this political situation:

> "He is used to talk to the chamber in the tone of military commandos. Any backtalk is impossible there. [...] At the moment there is only one authority in this empire: This is the army. Without it today, Turkey would be ready to fall prey to the fate of Persia."[181]

Many German officers in the Wilhemine era had disrespect for the *Reichstag* assembly. Colmar von der Goltz, the most prominent figure of the German-Ottoman relations, had nothing but disgust for the parliamentary system.[182] An Ottoman officer trained and socialized in the German military environment had to be fa-

179 Fethi Okyar, *Üç Devir'de Bir Adam* [A Man in Three Eras] (Istanbul: Tercüman Yayınları, 1980), 124, 146.

180 Ambassador to AA, "Parlament, Ministerkrisen und allgemeine Lage in der Türkei," 13 May 1911, 74 – 75, 77. AA-PA R 13797.

181 AA-PA R 13797, 82, 93. The German Minister of War, Erich Falkenhayn, fostered a similar voice tone, see the session on the Zabern affair in *Reichstagsprotokolle* from 3 December 1913, vol. 14, 9, 6158 – 6161.

182 Krethlow, *Generalfeldmarschall Goltz*, 131, 387.

miliar with this mindset. Enver, the former Ottoman military attaché to Berlin, was not averse to an authoritarian rule, which he admitted in a letter to a German friend on the eve of the First Balkan War:

> "As a soldier, I believe in the absolutism of the army and a governmental system in a moderate constitution like yours. One has to crush all the mediocre heads that want to share political power. A Frenchman [Gustave le Bon; G.G.] has said it very well: 'Before the republic, we had one despot in France, now hundreds of them because all the deputies want to make it clear that they themselves are in power.' [...] To control the power of the state, I believe in the need for a parliament, however, for the maintenance of interior peace, one has to be harsher than [the Roman emperor] Nero. [...] One has to treat enemies very harshly, otherwise this crisis will end badly."[183]

In this regard, Enver Pasha followed the Young Turk *Zeitgeist*, which favored an authoritarian rule over the people.[184] According to these ideas, it was only a logical step that the Ottoman army and the CUP seized power in January 1913. From what has been said so far, Germany had managed to dominate not only in the field of military, but also political affairs. The danger of the French competitor gaining ground in the Ottoman lands was warded off successfully. Now Germany had to expand its military lead between Bosphorus and Baghdad.

From Çatalca to Çanakkale: All the Otto's men, July 1913 – August 1914

Already before the Ottoman defeat in the Balkan Wars, Emperor Wilhelm II had favored a more active German policy in the Ottoman Empire. After the 1908 revolution for the emperor Bismarck's reluctance to risk Pomeranian soldier's bones soon was to be "an interesting historical reminiscence", and in 1912 he was convinced that "the Oriental Question has to be solved with iron and blood."[185] Part of the solution was to send a German military mission. After the disastrous outcome of the Balkan Wars, the Ottoman military command had accepted the idea of a military mission although the proposal had caused serious resistance from the Russian diplomats. As a form of compromise, the head of the German mili-

183 Mehmed Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Kendi Mektuplarında Enver Paşa* [*Enver Pasha in His Own Letters*] (Istanbul: Der Yayınevi, 1989), 174.
184 Hanioğlu, *Atatürk*, 44 – 45.
185 Quoted after Röhl, *Wilhelm II.*, vol. 3, 124, 937.

tary mission was to have no power of command over the First Ottoman army, which was deployed in the defense of the straits.[186]

Colmar von der Goltz supported the idea of a military mission but warned that this was not to be the sole fundament of Ottoman success in future battles. The Ottoman army had to internalize the German doctrine and adapt it to its own standards. The new military mission was thus to only send the most qualified officers in order to accelerate the reform process, as well as to put them under unified command.[187] The German ambassador was of a similar opinion. For the newly appointed Wangenheim, this was a wonderful opportunity to exert political influence:

> "No [Ottoman] government hostile to Germany would stay in power when the army is controlled by us. [...] Also, the entrustment of Germany with the reform of the [civil] education sector offers opportunities to us that are currently not quantifiable to imbue the Turkish people with the German Spirit [...]."[188]

The negotiations prolonged due to the resistance from Russian diplomats, who feared German control over the straits. It was eventually agreed that the German head of the military mission was to have no command over the Ottoman 1st army.[189] As the head of the military mission, military attaché Strempel was also under consideration but only briefly as he had no experience in commanding divisions. Colmar von der Goltz was also taken into account but his extensive network among the Ottoman military and political circles was regarded as a hindrance to an independent conduct of reforms.[190] Instead of posting an insider, a commanding general was selected:

> "Liman von Sanders makes an elegant military appearance, has eloquent manners and is versatile and well-educated. He has been a member of the General Staff for many years and has served in different deployments with great success."[191]

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186 For an overview of the lengthy negotiations see Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914*, 79 – 83.

187 Goltz, "Militär-Missionen in fremden Staaten".

188 "[...] das türkische Volk mit deutschem Geiste zu durchdringen [...]," Wangenheim to AA, 26 April 1913; *GPDEK* vol 38, 1926, 200.

189 For the negotiation process see Robert J. Kerner, "The Mission of Liman von Sanders," *The Slavonic Review* 6 – 16 (1927), 12 – 27; 6 – 17 (1927), 344 – 363; 6 – 18 (1928), 543 – 560; 7 – 19 (1928), 90 – 112.

190 Römer, *Militärhilfe für das Osmanische Reich*, 75.

191 Head of the military cabinet General Lyncker to Wangenheim, 30 June 1913. AA- PA R 13256.

In contrast to these assessments, Otto Liman von Sanders (1855 – 1929) was nothing but a military 'leftover' with quite a character, as his German and Ottoman staff members were soon to discover. Together with Liman and nine other German staff officers, he was sent to the Ottoman capital in December 1913. This time, the number of experienced senior officers was higher; more than forty officers were hired prior to the spring of 1914. Their main goal was to prepare the Ottoman army for the next conflict, if possible, at the side of the German army. Liman von Sanders was promoted Inspector-General of the Ottoman army. In the followings months he and his staff proceeded with military reforms. Just like before German officers were posted as commanders of the model regiments, in addition to also being given influential positions in the Ottoman ministry of war and in the General Staff. However, the German military mission kept its distance from the German embassy and reported directly to the German General Staff. It was thereby free from political control.[192] In the following years, the mission was the target of much criticism from the German embassy, the German military attaché in particular.[193] However, the dualism of German military and political representations remained intact until 1918.

One of the biggest shortcomings of the Ottoman warfare had been the failure of full-scale mobilization. In this field, the Prussian staff officer Otto von Feldmann (1873 – 1945), who had previously served in the railway department of the German General Staff, was posted by Enver to the first department of the Ottoman General Staff, following a short teaching obligation in the war academy. Here Feldmann and his assistant İsmet [İnönü] provided an overview of the dislocation of all Ottoman units with their current state of manpower and equipment after the Second Balkan War. Feldmann contrived to adapt to the Ottoman way of communication and convinced the Ottoman Quartermaster-General to support his work for a more economic provision of the Ottoman garrisons. Thanks to his kind behavior, he also mastered the problems of preparing for mobilization.[194] At the same time, as part of a joint effort the German officers employed at the Ottoman General Staff also prepared a new service regulation (*Hidemat-ı Erkânıharbiye Talimatnamesi*). It was rated positively in the Turkish

192 Römer, *Militärhilfe für das Osmanische Reich*, 86.

193 Especially Otto von Lossow, an enemy of Liman von Sanders, stated in 1916 that "the military mission in its current form with all the special rights of the mission's head cannot continue to exist after the war." Quoted after Gotthard Jäschke, "Die Deutsch-Türkische Militärkonvention vom 18.10.1917," *Die Welt des Islam* 10 – 3/4 (1966), 196.

194 Otto von Feldmann, *Türkei, Weimar, Hitler: Lebenserinnerungen eines preußischen Offiziers und deutschnationalen Politikers*, ed. Peter von Feldmann (Borsdorf: Edition Winterwork, 2013), 60 – 62.

military's 1944 official history of the General Staff, since the regulation had brought an advantageous "German scent" ("Almanlık kokusu") to Ottoman daily service. Especially the paragraph about the office hours was written quite in the sense of Colmar von der Goltz' criticism: "The aim is not to sit [idly, G.G.] for hours in the offices [...] but to comply with the duties" of a staff officer.[195]

Reform efforts were also undertaken in other branches of the army. Württemberg Colonel Fritz von Lauffer (1863 – 1941) led the Ottoman officer cavalry school in Haydarpaşa from March 1914 until the beginning of the war. Among Lauffer's main tasks were the introduction of higher standards in horse care and bringing riding lessons to German standards. After initial difficulties, together with the Bavarian Major Otto Welsch, Lauffer managed to raise the equestrian level of his horsemen. Like Otto von Feldmann, Lauffer found a way to communicate with his Ottoman staff and to impress Ottoman officers and privates alike, especially by punishing horses for misbehavior:

> "We battered him [the horse] until we were breathless and were replaced by some student horsemen who had approached us in the meantime. [...] [E]specially the extensive beating of the little tyrant had impressed my fellow [Ottoman] horsemen more than any of the corrections [applied to the other horses] [...]."[196]

In this case, violence against horses served as a common language. Lauffer stated after the war that he had learned many things during his time in Haydarpaşa and had used those experiences in his post-war activities as a riding instructor.[197]

Other reforms produced rather mixes results. In late December 1913, Major Ulrich Back (1864 – 1947) was appointed commander of the Ottoman military

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195 Muharrem Mazlum İskora, *Türk Ordusu Kurmaylık (Erkânıharbiye) Tarihçesi* [History of the Turkish General Staff], Ankara: Harp Akademisi Matbaası, 1944, 37, 40.

196 Fritz Lauffer, "Erinnerungen an meine Kommandeurzeit bei der türkischen Kavallerieschule in Haidar Pascha im Jahre 1914," *Nachrichtenblatt Offizier-Verein Dragoner-Regiment 'König'* 15 (1936), 11 – 18, 16. Cf. HStAS M660/ 024 Nr 13.

197 "I made beneficial use of the experiences from Turkey in the training of rural riding clubs and later in the SA cavalry." Lauffer, "Erinnerungen an meine Kommandeurzeit," 18. See also his handbook for the NSDAP horse riding associations published under the title *Die Ausbildung des Reiters in den SA- und SS-Reiterscharen sowie auf den Reit- und Fahrschulen* (Stuttgart: self published, 1934). He was promoted to the rank of *SA Standartenführer* (colonel) and in 1933 "was able to provide for the Führer 6000 trained young horse riders with their horses [which joined the] SA cavalry." Archival index book introduction to Lauffer's file, 12 October 1940: II. HStAS M660/ 024. See also the biographical overview in Wilhelm Braun and A.R. Marsani, "Oberstleutnant a.D. Lauffer," in *Berühmte Reiter erzählen: Ein Buch vom deutschen Reitertum mit 78 Bildern*, vol. 1, ed. Wilhelm Braun et al. (Berlin: Wilhelm Limpert, 1941), 78 – 97.

academy. Back introduced a fast track training programme for senior candidates in order to compensate the losses of the Balkan Wars. They were posted to units as second lieutenants immediately after graduation. Back also ordered to send the cadets from the last grades in military high schools to the military academy. This emergency program also included special fast track classes for junior infantry and cavalry officers for the artillery and engineer branches. The army was thereby provided with a sufficient number of officers to stay functional during the first campaigns after a renewed mobilization. This also had as consequence that many young officers were given responsible positions.[198] Back's decision had consequences for the German-Ottoman alliance. During the First World War, most of the Ottoman officers were much younger than the same-ranking German officers, often resulting in perpetual envy and malevolence among the two allies. With the mounting danger of war, the military academy finally closed on 30 July 1914 with the graduation of the last fast track class of senior officers, followed by the hasty graduation of the last class of the first year junior officers. During the war, numerous special officer-training facilities all over the empire fulfilled the task of the academy, which was not to reopen until 1 April 1923.[199]

Several military reforms were to have a social impact in the following decades. In addition to the intensified staff officer-training programme, the officer training camps set up across the empire were reopened after the interruption by the 1912/1913 war. They were complemented by corporal training camps in order to strengthen the Ottoman NCO corps and to relieve the Ottoman officers from daily routine tasks.[200] The instruction in these training camps went far beyond a purely military purpose. Military service had a clear disciplinary purpose for the rank and files in Germany.[201] In 1910 an anonymous German author argued that the Ottoman officer and especially the longer serving NCOs should be used in the civilian administration after their service in the army:

> "[T]hey know how to act at the right time and in the right manner, without being influenced by harmful and bureaucratic traditions. What is most important for the recovery of the [Ottoman] administration is action, energetic and systematic action. [...] For Turkey, the cultural meaning of militarism cannot be valued high enough. [...] [Militarism] is juvenescent and renovating and it leads the state back to the principle that once had made it [the Ottoman state] great."[202]

198 Anonymous, *Harp Okulu Tarihçesi*, 38.
199 Anonymous, *Harp Okulu Tarihçesi*, 38, 48.
200 H.R., "Das heutige Militärbildungswesen der Türkei," *MWB* 138 (1913), cols. 1337–1338.
201 Schacht, "Die Mitgift des Reservisten," *MWB* 49 (1911), 1123.
202 *Osmanischer Lloyd*, 25 September 1910.

These ideas were quite to the liking of the Ottoman military leadership. After the traumatic defeat in the empire's western territories, measures were taken to reform the Ottoman military's chain of command. The level of training for sergeants was increased in order to facilitate their contribution to the instruction of recruits:

> "There has to be a noticeable distinction between NCO and rank and files, one that does not incidentally exclude comradery. The relationship should be like between older and younger brothers. One should not forget that, unfortunately, the majority of our soldiers are uneducated and are comparable to big children. [...] The career of a subaltern has to include [financial] security for life, and the corporal must be able to count on receiving a civilian position that supports him and his family after having served several years in the army. We find this [system] in Germany, France, Italy, England, in short, in all European countries [...]."[203]

General Ali Nushet argued that this system of NCO training should also be applied in the Ottoman army subsequently. The envisioned reforms were in effect, especially after full-scale mobilization. Due to the wartime acceleration of the modernization of NCO training, Mehmed Zeki noted the following in an editorial:

> "The great successes of the German army [are] partially owed to the non-commissioned officer corps of our ally. [...] Thanks to the hard work of our instructors, the Turkish corporal today is the copy of his brother in arms and ally. [...] It is understood that those people are aware that after some years their future in the civil service is secured and thereupon they can start a family, bestowing on them the same patriotic education that they had received."[204]

Even though this statement served propagandistic purposes and therefore was exaggerated, the outcome of this policy was to become visible during the republican era, when former corporals and low ranking officers became schoolteachers after having served in the armed forces.[205]

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203 General Mehmed Ali Nushet Paşa, "Die Stellung der Unteroffiziere in unserer Armee," *Die Nationalverteidigung*, 15 November/1 December 1912, 2.

204 Mehmed Zeki, "Das Korps der Unteroffiziere," *Die Nationalverteidigung*, 1 May1915, 40.

205 Cf. Barak Salmoni, "The 'Teacher's Army' and its Miniature Republican Society. Educator's Traits and School Dynamics in Turkish Pedagogical Prescriptions, 1923 – 1950," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 21 – 1 (2001), 61 – 72.

Reluctant Allies and Disappointed Expectations, July to November 1914

The political developments of 1914 left no time for thorough reforms in the Ottoman forces, which had been conceptualized as a ten-year program by Colmar von der Goltz before the July crisis.[206] With the rise of tensions in July 1914, the Ottoman military and political leaders, recalling the rejected alliance by Great Britain the year before, turned towards Germany. It is beyond the scope of this study to further evaluate the considerations of the Ottoman leadership at this point.[207] It should be mentioned, however, that the Ottoman state feared a similar fate as other contemporary victims of the European imperialist and expansionist policy.[208] An alliance with the Central Powers seemed to be the best alternative to secure the existence of the empire. Neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary were altruist knights in shining armor,[209] and Italy, their reluctant ally, had settled hostilities with the Ottoman state over the occupation of Libya on the eve of the Balkan Wars.

It was not only Italy which urged the German General Staff to guarantee Ottoman support in the early phase of the war. As was later the case with the Ottoman army, Germany had arranged operations with the Italian General Staff. The Italian army was thought to defend the southern flank and fight France from the Alps, so that the Austro-Hungarian army could have concentrated on the Russian deployment. With regard to the use of Italian troops on the West front, the general staff of both countries agreed upon putting the Italian contingent under German command.[210] However, Italy remained neutral and eventually joined the

206 Colmar von der Goltz, "Die Türkei im zweiten Jahre ihrer Wiedererhebung," *Asiatisches Jahrbuch* (1914), 9.

207 Feroz A.K. Yasamee, "Ottoman Empire," in *Decisions for War, 1914*, ed. Keith Wilson (London: UCL Press, 1995), 229 – 268; Mesut Uyar, "Ottoman Strategy and War Aims during the First World War," in *The Purpose of the First World War. War Aims and Military Strategies*, ed. Holger Afflerbach (Berlin: DeGruyter, 2015), 164 – 167; Mustafa Aksakal, "The Ottoman Empire," in *Empires at War, 1911 – 1923*, ed. Robert Gerwarth et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 17 – 33; Alexandre Toumarkine: "Fritz Fischer and the Ottoman Empire: Illusions on the Bosphorus?," in *Bid for World Power? New Research on the Outbreak of the First World War*, ed. Andreas Gestrich et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 289 – 309.

208 Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914*, 40.

209 For Germany's territorial interests in Anatolia see Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914*, 67. For the Dual monarchy's claims see Francis Roy Bridge, "Tarde Venientibus Ossa. Austro-Hungarian Colonial Aspirations in Asia Minor 1913 – 14," *Middle Eastern Studies* 6 – 3 (1970), 319 – 330.

210 Michael Palumbo, "German-Italian Military Relations on the Eve of World War I," *Central European History* 12 – 4 (1979), 344.

war on the side of the Triple Entente in May 1915, as due to its long and vulnerable coastline, it could have faced its own Gallipoli.[211] The German strategy relied on a replacement for the reluctant ally already in the autumn of 1914. The Ottoman theater of war relieved the German and Austrian fronts and became a testing ground for modern warfare for both allies. It should be noted that the German contributions to the Ottoman war efforts did not have any devastating effects on the German army and were quite bearable compared to the losses at other fronts.[212]

By signing the alliance treaty with Germany on 2 August 1914, Ottoman mobilization began. Priority was given to the defense against a Russian attack, however, the Ottoman Empire remained neutral to prevent a Russian preemptive strike on Ottoman territory.

Liman von Sanders assured the German high command that the Ottoman army would be able to field 120,000 men within the first month of war against Russia.[213] This proved to be a highly optimistic estimation, since the losses of the Balkan Wars were not yet overcome yet.[214] Thus the Ottoman delay in opening hostilities with Russia eased the deployment of the Ottoman forces. With the reinforcement of the Ottoman fleet by the two German battleships, Breslau and Goeben, the Ottoman self-esteem rose. The shelling of Russian Black Sea ports by those two German vessels on 29 October 1914 led the Ottoman state to join the war.

Regarding the inner cohesion of the alliance, Colmar von der Goltz remained a crucial figure of Ottoman admiration of Germany. This was also the case after the German campaign in the West had failed, quite contrary to Germany's boasting before the war. Meanwhile, the former leading figure of the German-Ottoman relations, Colmar von der Goltz, had become an old man.[215]

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211 Holger Afflerbach, "Italy's Decision not to go to War in 1914," in *The Serbs and the First World War 1914–1918*, ed. Dragoljub R. Živojinović (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 2015), 175–186.

212 For a one-sided German account see Karl-Heinz Hildebrandt, "Das Osmanische Reich: Deutschlands Vietnam im Ersten Weltkrieg?," *Alte Kameraden* 43–7/8 (1995), 13–17.

213 Ulrich Trumpener, "Liman von Sanders and the German-Ottoman Alliance," *Journal of Contemporary History* 1–4 (1966), 182.

214 Uyar, *Ottoman Strategy and War Aims*, 169–171.

215 Krethlow, *Generalfeldmarschall Goltz*, 277. Very much in the sense of Goltz' own dictum on the Russian General Count Nikolay Kamensky (1776–1811): "Once [...] he had been a distinguished commander. However, now he was an antediluvian and whimsical man in his seventies, neither physically nor mentally able to command a big army [...]." Colmar von der Goltz, *Von Jena bis Preußisch Eylau: Des alten preußischen Heeres Schmach und Ehrenrettung, Eine kriegsgeschichtliche Studie* (Berlin: Mittler, 1907), 89. Even Enver rated Goltz as being overaged; cf. Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire*, 89.

For his German fellow officers, he was only posted to the Ottoman army in December 1914 because of old sentimentalities. He was accused of sugarcoating negative military situations and being economical with the truth, which earned him the nicknamed of a "storytelling fairy lady".[216] In 1915 the German emperor's aide de camp even accused him of having lied about the state of Ottoman reinforcements to the Gallipoli peninsula: "The troops of Turkey which have been brought from Anatolia do not even have rifles!!! Oh Goltz! How you have misreported!"[217] Otto Liman von Sanders had a dislike for the old Field Marshal and refused to talk to him. For the head of the German military mission, Goltz was a theoretician, unable to command armies: "Goltz Pasha is an instructor. Teaching is one thing, commandership is another. How can I teach Goltz Pasha commanding [skills] at this age – he is over 70?"[218] So it is no wonder that most German officers had an open dislike for the "drivel of an old man."[219] Goltz was eventually sent to the Iraq front to avoid further conflicts with Liman.[220] However, the latter was also a source of many conflicts among the German military personnel in Ottoman service[221] and Enver, the Ottoman supreme commander. One of the sources of dispute between the two men were Liman's continuously direct reports to the German high command as Enver insisted of reporting to the Ottoman ministry of war first.[222]

After the defeat in the battle of Sarıkamış[223] in late 1914, the following year was to become the most successful during the German-Ottoman alliance. The battle of Çanakkale was to have an impact on the military thinking of both countries after the war.

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216 Trumpener, "Suez, Baku, Gallipoli," 35; Krethlow, *Generalfeldmarschall Goltz*, 443.

217 Holger Afflerbach, *Kaiser Wilhelm II. als Oberster Kriegsherr im Ersten Weltkrieg: Quellen aus der militärischen Umgebung des Kaisers; 1914 – 1918* (Munich, Oldenbourg, 2005), 806.

218 Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci Adam, 1884 – 1938* [*The Second Man (İsmet İnönü), 1884 – 1938*], vol 1, 14th ed. (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2011), 89.

219 Okday, *Der letzte Großwesir und seine preußischen Söhne*, 62.

220 Trumpener, *German-Ottoman Alliance*, 85.

221 See Otto von Feldmann's demission after quarrels with his difficult superior; cf. Feldmann, *Türkei, Weimar, Hitler*, 73 – 75.

222 Letter of Enver to Liman, 7 December 1916. ATASE-BDH K 1800 Gö 315 Fi 1 – 11. Cf. for this dispute also Reichmann, *Tapfere Asker*, 356 – 359.

223 Cf. Feldmann, *Türkei, Weimar, Hitler*, 76 – 79. Otto von Feldmann was fortunate that he only lost one foot in the cold, whereas the Ottoman forces lost two thirds of their combat strength of around 118,000 men. Mesut Uyar and Edward J. Erickson, *A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Atatürk* (Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International, 2009), 248.

From Gallipoli to Galicia: the static warfare experience

The most endangered region of the Ottoman Empire was the capital with its nearby East Thracian region and the Gallipoli peninsula. A Russian invasion seemed feasible especially at the Black Sea coast.[224] The Russian and the Bulgarian armies had reached the Çatalca line both in 1877/78 and in 1912/13. Thus the protection of the capital deserved special attention.

In addition, an attack on the straits from the Mediterranean Sea also lay within the range of possibility. During the war with Italy in April 1911, a small Italian flotilla had tried to force the entrance to the straits. Neither the Ottoman shore batteries nor the Italian fleet could claim a major hit of the enemy boats or positions. The Ottoman fortresses on the Asian and European shores remained mainly intact; just one Italian grenade had penetrated the ceiling of a casemate. Finally the Ottoman defense had succeeded in laying a minefield south of Kilitbahir and Çanakkale, just in time to prevent the passage of the Italian raiders to the Sea of Marmara.[225]

For the Ottoman navy, this weak point had to be defended in future wars. For this purpose, already before the war, the naval artillery school had added the study of recent naval operations against shore targets to the curriculum.[226] Similar studies were conducted in Germany; albeit they were of a rather theoretical approach.[227] During a visit to the fifth continent, the German navy had gathered first hand intelligence about the potential adversaries of the Ottoman defenders in Galipoli.[228]

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224 Cf. the detailed account of a Russian surprise attack from the Black Sea, followed by an immediate occupation of the Ottoman capital in case of war by a German navy captain: Alfred Stenzel, *Der kürzeste Weg nach Konstantinopel: Ein Beispiel für das Zusammenwirken von Flotte und Heer* (Kiel: Paul Toeche, 1894).

225 Cf. the report oft he German naval attaché Wossidlo to emperor Wilhelm II, "Militärpolitischer Bericht über die Beschießung der Dardanellen am 13. April 1912," dated 17 May 1912. BA-MA RM 5/1580, 182 et seq.

226 Mümtaz, *Ba-emr-i Sami Bahriye Topçu Mektebinde Kaymakam Mümtaz Bey tarafından Çin-Japon ve İspanya-Amerika Muharebesi hakkında verilen Konferans* [Lecture given in the Naval Artillery School about the Chinese-Japanese and Spanish-American War by Lieutenant Colonel Mümtaz Bey by the Highest Order] (Istanbul: Matbaa-ı Amire, 1327/1911).

227 Bracht, "Ueber die Verteidigung von Küstenbefestigungen und Häfen auf Grund der Kriegserfahrungen in Ostasien," *MWB* 110 (1908), cols. 2575–2579 and ibid. 111 (1908), cols. 2603–2607 and ibid. 113 (1908), cols. 2669–2674.

228 Cf. the detailed report on the state of the armed forces in New Zealand in "Militärpolitischer Bericht der S.M.S. Cormoran aus Apia," 1 February 1913, 117–127. BA- MA RM 3/303; For the Australian army see "Militärpolitischer Bericht der S.M.S. Cormoran aus Sydney," 5 April 1913,

The ordnance of Ottoman coastal defense consisted mainly of outdated heavy Krupp guns in open positions and was hopelessly outgunned by contemporary ship artillery.[229] Lieutenant Hans Rohde, who had been deployed to the Ottoman defenses on Gallipoli, came to a more optimistic conclusion. He lauded the Ottoman defense against the Bulgarian thread during the Balkan Wars. Rohde estimated the possibility of an attack on the straits as very high and unwittingly gave a quite accurate forecast of the attack of 18 March 1915.[230] Rohde did not envision a big scale landing assault on the peninsula itself in order to support the breakthrough of the fleet. An operation on that scale had been refused by the Balkan Alliance in 1912 since the Ottoman army had to be taken by surprise to guarantee the success of such a campaign.[231] The German military mission had used the time before the mobilization well. Many of the severe deficiencies in the defense of the shores had been remedied. Nevertheless, the supply of heavy guns with sufficient ammunition was the Achilles heel of the whole defense. Due to the neutrality of Romania, military railway freight could not pass through the Balkan route and in late 1914 the battle for Serbia still continued.

During the Balkan Wars, the German officers had criticized the insufficient Ottoman trenches, which were not deep enough to offer enough protection for the riflemen. The often hastily excavated earth banked up in front of the trench revealed one's position to the enemy. Furthermore, the barbed wire defenses in front of the positions were so poorly constructed that they could be easily opened by advancing enemy troops.[232] These technical shortcomings were overcome by the building of the Dardanelles defenses.

After the failure of the Allied naval attack on 18 March 1915, the enemy had not dared to attack again, thereby giving the Ottoman engineers enough time to prepare sufficient positions across the peninsula's shores. Up to now it had solely been a naval operation reliant on the use of mines and heavy shore artillery although the Ottoman high command was aware that this was to change soon.

411412. BA-MA RM 3036; Cf. the wartime report by Polster, "Die australischen Hilfstruppen im Dienste Englands," *MWB* 237/38 (1915), cols. 5587–5590.

229 Strantz, "Die Verteidigung der Dardanellen," *Überall* 14–9 (1912), 636–637.

230 Hans Rohde, *Operationen an den Dardanellen im Balkankriege 1912/13* (Berlin: R. Eisenschmidt, 1914), 92–97.

231 Holger Afflerbach, "'Only 1 Per Cent of our Strength.' German Military Command in the Gallipoli Campaign and the Impact of Ottoman Alliance on German Strategy," in *Gallipoli: A Ridge Too Far*, ed. Ashley Ekins (Wollombi: Exisle Publishing, 2013), 181.

232 Cf. Hochwächter, *Mit den Türken in der Front*, plate 11; Endres, "Bericht des kaiserlich Ottomanischen Majors Franz Endres über seine Teilnahme am Balkankrieg 1913," Bay HStA IV GS 257, attachment no. 4.

The Ottoman defense was ready when the Franco-British invasion began on 24 April.

The battle for the Çanakkale peninsula was a prime example of combined arms warfare. The battle proved an instructive experience for all combat parties involved.[233] This was especially the case for the more than 3000 German soldiers that saw action during the campaign. When the invaders forces' advance had come to a halt soon after the landings and the situation began to resemble the stalemate on the Western front, German mine warfare specialists were called in. Mine warfare was a military technology well known to the Ottoman armies of the past. During the campaigns of the 16th and the 18th centuries, the Ottoman army had made extensive use of underground mine warfare. Thereafter, by the increasingly defensive military situation of the Ottoman state, this type of warfare had passed into oblivion. Now the Ottoman army was to benefit from the German experience derived from the Japanese role model and the German application at the Western front since late 1914.[234] The German army "dominated mining during 1914 to 1915 and continued to maintain supremacy against France throughout the war."[235] However, this referred to the divisional level, whereas the techniques of the British army were superior at the level of small-scale tactics.

The principle of mine warfare was simple and had only slightly changed since its use by the Ottoman forces in the early modern period. By digging underground tunnels, the engineer squad carefully approached the enemy positions, where they placed explosives in order to blow up the enemy positions by remote ignition. The blast mostly killed the enemy troops in this area and created a gap within the enemy lines, which was to be filled by the own infantry waiting in the rear. Such tactics "were a symptom of the deadlock rather than the key to unlock it."[236] Although they did not solve the general problem of the stalemate, they were applied for several months during 1915 on the Gallipoli peninsula. Yet the Ottoman army had to follow the British lead to prevent a breakthrough; a point where the German specialists were asked for support.

In Gallipoli, Germany deployed engineer privates, which were to collaborate with the Ottoman digging squads. One of these German specialists was Adolf

233 Zafer Toprak, "Çanakkale'de Kara, Deniz ve Hava Gücü Koordinasyonu" [The coordination of army, navy and airforce in Çanakkale] *Toplumsal Tarih* 111 (2003), 84–93.
234 Simon Jones, *Underground Warfare, 1914–1918* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2010), 17.
235 Jones, *Underground Warfare*, 253.
236 Jones, *Underground Warfare*, 92.

Horaczek, a private 1st class and a carpenter by profession.[237] After more than eight months of mine warfare on the Western front, he volunteered for deployment to the Ottoman theater of war and served in Gallipoli in July and August 1915. The hot climate and unfamiliar food took their toll, since the German contingent had no time for acclimatization.[238] Though suffering from affected health, German engineers did their best to support the Ottoman defense. The bloody lessons learned on the French battlefields were to pay off at this time: "We had gained rich experience for the later battles underneath the earth in Gallipoli."[239] Horaczek admired the common Ottoman soldier, who bore the hard life in the trenches and the sparse supply without complaining. He was also impressed with the Ottoman field fortifications, which seemed to be familiar since "[...] the Turkish trenches [...] often totally resembled the German trenches [...]."[240] The training of Ottoman engineers progressed, even though the communication was troublesome. Both sides knew no other language than their native tongue and rarely were they assisted by bilingual Ottoman officers. Only one to two German engineers supported the mining activities in each Ottomon regiment. The Ottomans had to be on the watch since the British forces made extensive use of tunnels in no man's land in order to begin sudden opening attacks and conducted active counter mining operations.[241] Ottoman soldiers were thus "docile students."[242] Together, the allies could deliver painful blows to their enemies:

> "The first detonation I witnessed in Gallipoli was an event for the Turks. The charge comprised of two tons of dynamite. [...] The earth shook; the air was full of soil, stones, wood and human bodies. A thousand voices shouted 'Allah!' blended into the bluster."[243]

Horaczek and other German engineers also instructed their Ottoman fellow soldiers in trench warfare. Not only the evading techniques against approaching

237 Adolf Horaczek, *Als deutscher Soldat 1914/18 von der Westfront an die Osmanische Front: Erlebnisse eines deutschen Pioniers im Grabenkampf des I. Weltkriegs und an der Osmanischen Front von den Argonnen bis Bagdad*, ed. Gunther Adolf Horaczek (Berlin: epubli, 2014), 33–84.
238 See the detailed report in E. Hiltmann, "Mit den Maschinengewehren der Mittelmeerdivision an der Front auf Gallipoli," in *Vor 20 Jahren. Zweite Folge: Von den Dardanellen zum Sues. Mit Marineärzten im Weltkrieg durch die Türkei*, ed. Schriftleitung der Deutschen Medizinischen Wochenschrift (Leipzig: Georg Thieme, 1935), 112–125.
239 Horaczek, *Von der Westfront an die Osmanische Front*, 28.
240 Horaczek, *Von der Westfront an die Osmanische Front*, 44.
241 Jones, *Underground Warfare*, 190–199.
242 Horaczek, *Von der Westfront an die Osmanische Front*, 45.
243 Horaczek, *Von der Westfront an die Osmanische Front*, 52.

hand grenades, but also the maintenance of one's own positions was of importance: "[...] [W]e also had to show the Turks where to mount barbed wire obstacles in endangered areas, where to put cheval-de-frise barricades and by the use of sandbags and fascines to make the shelled trench combat-ready again."[244]

Horaczek learned to connive at the misconduct of Ottoman soldiers, who ate the allotted candles made of suet out of hunger, or who could not keep silent while digging. Occasionally he also had to resort to violent measures against disobedient Ottoman soldiers, which hardly came as a surprise given the language problem. Though Horaczek rated the Ottoman efforts very highly, he referred to the German share in the operations when he concluded that the "German Spirit has prevailed over mass and matter!"[245]

After the withdrawal of the Entente forces in early 1916, the use of German mine warfare techniques in the Ottoman armed forces continued. For this purpose, a German engineer captain held a series of lectures about his experience in Gallipoli.[246] In his presentations, Müller concentrated on the 1916 German field regulation on mine warfare.[247] For the German second lieutenant, the Ottoman forces had been quite unprepared for mine warfare in the beginning of the campaign, and the British forces had been able to make use of their superiority in this field. The Ottoman forces were limited to defensive measures in the beginning. Here Müller underlined the need to attack the enemy galleries in an early stage before they could reach their own trenches.[248] This being the case, the own forces also had to go on the offensive in order to destroy enemy lines. On this basis Müller gave an instruction for the construction of counter galleries to keep them safe and stable until it would be time to light the fuse.[249] Müller high-

244 Horaczek, *Von der Westfront an die Osmanische Front*, 48.

245 Horaczek, *Von der Westfront an die Osmanische Front*, 74 – 75. This statement can be read as a reference to the memoirs of the German General Kannengießer: "Physical powers crowed over physical ones, the Spirit over the matter. This is the lesson of the combat of Gallipoli!" Hans Kannengießer, *Gallipoli: Bedeutung und Verlauf der Kämpfe 1915* (Berlin: Schlieffen, 1927), 229.

246 Müller, *Çanakkale Harbinde Lağım Muharebesine Dair Elde Edilen Tecârib: Çanakkale Muharebesine İştirak Eden Alman Lağımcı Bölüğü Zabitanından Mülazım-ı Evvel Müller'in Maltepe İstihkam Talimgahında Verdiği Konferans Tercümesidir* [Experiences made regarding the Mining Combat in the Battle of Çanakkale: Translation of the Lecture given in the Maltepe Engineering Training Facility by Second Lieutenant Müller, from the officers of the German Mining Units which participated in the Battle of Çanakkale], ed. Karagâh-i Umumi On İkinci Mevki-i Müstahkeme Şubesi (Dersaadet [Istanbul]: Matbaa-ı Askeri, 1332/1916).

247 Kriegsministerium, *Vorschriften für den Stellungskrieg aller Waffen,* part 2: *Minenkrieg* (Berlin: Reichsdruckerei, 1916).

248 Müller, *Çanakkale Harbinde*, 5.

249 Müller, *Çanakkale Harbinde*, 9 – 15.

lighted the need to keep silent and regularly listen to enemy digging activities, a reasonable suggestion if we recall Adolf Horaczek's complaints.[250] In his conclusion, Müller was much more reluctant than Horaczek to insist on a German dominant role during those operations. Müller acknowledged the high number of casualties on the Ottomon side during underground warfare.[251]

However, the transfer of mine warfare techniques was to have no longer lasting impact on Ottoman tactics, since it failed to deliver the anticipated results for the belligerent parties: "Military mining was expanded by mass mobilization and technology to a scale and intensity which was without precedent but, at the moment of its zenith, it had become obsolete."[252]

This stalemate continued for nearly two more years on the Western front. It is, therefore, true that to a certain extent, the Ottoman army had remedied the mistakes of the past and used the time after the defeat in 1913 well. The victory in 1916 strengthened the Ottoman self-confidence. The inner cohesion of the Ottoman army was quite different from the one during the Balkan Wars.[253]

The German share in the preparation and during the battle should not be underestimated.[254] The Ottoman army provided the manpower for the defense of their territory, and their German ally contributed with modern warfare methods in order to sustain victory. War was not yet over and the heaviest battles only lay ahead.

Ottoman troops in Storm of Steel: The impact of contemporary warfare, 1916 – 18

The danger of an invasion of Ottoman territory had diminished in the aftermath of the Gallipoli campaign. Following a display of Ottoman strength, the German General Staff withdrew its objections against the use of Ottoman forces in other

250 Cf. the general comment: "In his appearance the Turk is a child who always has to chatter." Horaczek, *Von der Westfront an die Osmanische Front*, 68; Müller, *Çanakkale Harbinde*, 12; cf. the respective paragraph 'Horchdienst' in Kriegsministerium, *Minenkrieg*, 25 – 29.

251 Müller, *Çanakkale Harbinde*, 16.

252 Jones, *Underground Warfare*, 254.

253 Uyar and Erickson, *A Military History of the Ottomans*, 261.

254 Edward J. Erickson, "Lessons Learned from the Balkan Wars," in *War and Nationalism*, ed. Hakan M. Yavuz, XV-XXI, XVII-XVIII. The Ottoman army lost around 68000 men, 530 of them were Germans fighting in Ottoman uniform. The losses of the Entente and Commonwealth troops are calculated as 47000. All numbers refer to killed and missing soldiers. Edward J. Erickson, "Strength against Weakness: Ottoman Military Effectiveness at Gallipoli, 1915," *The Journal of Military History* 65 – 4 (2001), 1009.

theaters of war. Backed by levered national pride, Enver Pasha, the Ottoman commander in chief, had offered to foster the German and Austro-Hungarian armies on the East and South Eastern Europe fronts. Altogether more than 100,000 Ottoman soldiers were to fight in Macedonia, Romania and in the Galicia region in Southern Poland/Western Ukraine until the end of the war. On the contrary, throughout the war only about 25,000 German troops were deployed for the campaigns at the Ottoman fronts.[255]

Since at the Galicia front it was highly probable that the Ottoman forces might fight in a similar war as in Gallipoli, the necessary preparations were made. The Ottoman military attaché in Berlin sent a report to the Ottoman ministry of war about the German experience of trench warfare at the West front since 1914. As a basis for this report, as in the case of engineer second lieutenant Müller, the Ottoman military attaché partially must have used the newest German field service regulation issued on 20 June 1916.[256] The topic of artillery fire figured prominently in the report from Berlin. The need for such considerations became evident by taking a closer look at the Ottoman campaign in Galicia, where the Ottoman troops were under heavy Russian shelling.[257] In June and July 1916, they lost more than 33,000 men, half of the death toll of the whole Gallipoli campaign.[258] Nevertheless, the Ottoman army also benefitted from the participation in this campaign. The medical treatment and supply was much better than it had been on Gallipoli, since the German and Austrian railway based military logistics corps supported the Ottoman army.

The Ottoman troops enhanced their capabilities when it came to improved protection against enemy fire on the battlefield. Yazman mentioned the application of German experience from the Western front:

> "At that point the Germans showed us on the field engineering training ground especially the 'Fuchsloch', which means 'Fox hole', hidden positions in the shape of a pit to which they attached importance. The General Staff of our [Ottoman] corps immediately asked

255 Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire*, 66; Veli Yılmaz, *Birincinci Dünya Harbi'nde Türk-Alman İttifakı ve Askerî Yardımlar* [*The Turkish-German Alliance and Military Assistance in the First World War*], (Istanbul: Cem Ofset, 1993), 235.

256 Cf. Kriegsministerium, *Vorschriften für den Stellungskrieg für alle Waffen. vol.1: Stellungsbau* (Berlin: Reichsdruckerei, 1916); for the untitled Ottoman military attaché's report dated 27 October 1332/1916 see ATASE K14 D67.

257 M. Şevki Yazman, *Kumandanım Galiçya Ne Yana Düşer? Mehmetçik Avrupa'da: M. Şevki Yazman'ın Anıları* [My Commander, Where is Galiciya? The Little Mehmets in Europe: The Memoirs of M. Şevki Yazman], ed. Kansu Şarman. 3rd ed. (Istanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2011), 81–86.

258 Uyar and Erickson, *A Military History of the Ottomans*, 264–265.

> what we had experienced and learned in this regard and gave the order 'to build those underground shelters in necessary numbers to protect the soldiers from artillery fire.'"[259]

Thanks to those shelters, which in some cases measured between 15 to 20 meters under the surface, the Ottoman forces could survive long-lasting Russian bombardment and reduce their losses.[260] The Ottoman army also used deployment to this theater of war to enhance their own artillery firing techniques. The poor state of the Ottoman artillery after the Balkan Wars improved slowly. In the opinion of Otto Posseldt, instructor with the Ottoman field artillery since 1909, the Ottoman ordnance operating crews had fought well. For Posseldt, shortage of ammunition had prevented the Ottoman artillery forces from defending Kırk Kilise.[261] Without knowing, Posseldt mentioned a general military development that was to become the most severe of problems for the artillery branches of European armies in autumn 1914, namely, a miscalculation of ammunition stocks for a long campaign in the age of massive artillery battles.[262] For Posseldt, the Prussian Major Tupschoewski had been the driving force behind the improvement of the Ottoman field artillery. In 1911, through the formation of the artillery model regiment, a certain standard had been maintained, mainly thanks to daily drills with the Krupp ordnance. Besides the low supply stocks, Posseldt blamed the ineptitude of many higher commanders in the tactical use of artillery units for the poor performance during the Balkan campaigns. The quality of the Ottoman ammunition (of German origin) and abiding by the German field manuals had contributed to the Ottoman defensive supports. The latter finally found their expression in successful defense of the Çatalça line, where Tupschoewski's model regiment fought scattered across Ottoman lines.[263] However, one should note that the German artillery field regulation was not free from wrong assumptions. With the beginning of the war, of all the impractical prewar evaluations in the German military press solely the 'hidden' firing position proved to be feasible.[264] The German-Ottoman military cooperation in the

259 Yazman, *Kumandanım Galiçya Ne Yana Düşer*, 146–147.

260 As was the case during the Russian Kerensky offensive in June/July 1917; Yazman, *Kumandanım Galiçya Ne Yana Düşer*, 221.

261 P. [osseldt], "Die türkische Feldartillerie," *MWB* 155 (1913), 3507. The source of his article was an anonymous Ottoman artillery officer.

262 Hans Linnenkohl, *Vom Einzelschuss zur Feuerwalze: Der Wettlauf zwischen Technik und Taktik im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Koblenz: Bernhard & Graefe, 1996), 157.

263 P. [osseldt], "Die türkische Feldartillerie," cols. 3507–3508.

264 Cf. Linnenkohl, *Vom Einzelschuss zur Feuerwalze*, 145–149. See also the respective paragraphs in the reports of the German officers from the Balkan War, for example Rohde, *Unsere Gefechtsvorschriften und der Balkankrieg*, 51–90.

field of artillery reform was put to the test in Gallipoli where the Ottoman artillery could only provide erratic fire support for its own infantry. The severe losses of the last war and the dependency on German supply due to the lack of an Ottoman ordnance industry became painfully apparent for the rest of the war.[265]

The experience acquired during the Gallipoli campaign was also further evaluated in the Ottoman artillery crops, leading to the distribution of artillery guidelines by the German Major General Hugo Wehrle (1866 – 1949), published in 1916.[266] In this booklet, Wehrle described the wartime developments regarding the use of the field artillery on the contemporary battlefield, including the defense of entrenched artillery positions, safe storage of ammunition or withdrawal maneuvers. For his specialist audience with command of the German language, Wehrle also provided the German terms in Latin script to ease the classification of the written explanations. Wehrle seems to have actively promoted the distribution of this booklet.[267] One of the biggest innovations was not to be made in the artillery, but within the Ottoman infantry thanks to German assistance.

The Empire strikes back: The Ottoman Stormtroopers, 1917 – 18

The German army had developed the Stormtrooper tactics out of the need to force decisions on the Western front. The concept was also conferred to the Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian ally,[268] and eventually also to the Ottoman infantry forces. The system, based on Russian developments for a specialized infantry, had been discussed in the German army already before the war.[269] Nonetheless,

265 Edward J. Erickson, "Ottoman Artillery in the First World War," in *King of Battle: Artillery in World War I*, ed. Sanders Marble (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 180 – 185.

266 Wehrle, *Almanyadaki Tecrübelere Nazaran Topçunun İstihdamı Hakkında Mütalaat* [A Study of the German experience in the Deployment of the Artillery] (Istanbul: Matbaa-ı Askeriye, 1332/1916).

267 Cf. the cable by Wehrle from the Istanbul headquarters to Colonel Kretzschmar in Mossul 6th army, regarding sending of 100 copies of the aforementioned booklet, 3 July 1917. TSAMO 500 – 12519 – 449, 290.

268 Mario Christian Ortner, *Die k.u.k. Sturmtruppen 1916 – 1918: Elitesoldaten der Monarchie* (Wien: Stöhr, 1998), 14 – 22.

269 One of the first evaluations was published by the later head of the German military mission; Otto Liman von Sanders, *Aufklärung und Sicherung vor der Front durch Kavallerie, selbständige Patrouillen der Infanterie, Jagdkommandos und reitende Infanterie* (Berlin: Schröder, 1904).

those considerations only dealt with the possibilities of enhanced reconnaissance abilities within the infantry. During the first year of World War One, these evaluations were revisited, when the stalemate at the Western front forced the European belligerents to review their infantry tactics.[270] The first German field regulation regarding the use of the specialized assault battalions *(Sturmbataillone)* was published in 1915. Thereafter, the concept continued to be improved in accordance with the newest experience. As a result, Germany's allies were to apply a state-of-the-art tactic; but they also adapted its inherent inadequacies. The German assault trooper doctrine became a fully developed concept just by early 1918.[271]

The principle was as follows: carefully selected volunteer soldiers (mainly from the corps of engineers) were trained in specialized small-scale attacks against enemy positions. The assault squads were to move slowly over the shelled no-mans land, creep up on the enemy trench and, if possible, take it by surprise. They received special equipment for this purpose, such as wire cutters, portable light machine guns, flame throwers, daggers, bulletproof protective shields, high capacity clips for the officer's pistols and, during the last phase of the war within the German forces, even the first submachine guns. Characteristic of the stormtrooper's gear were the hand grenade pouches made out of sandbags that were mounted to the leather webbing. The equipment was complimented by the use of the M 1916 steel helmet. Especially the latter two items were also adapted within the Ottoman army.

Not only the Austro-Hungarian assault troopers[272] but also the Ottoman army adopted the concept. Enver Pasha gave the order to recruit an Ottoman storm trooper battalion before the beginning of July 1917, which was to be carried out under the supervision of the Inspectorate General of the Ottoman engineer corps.[273] This is why the preparations for the deployment of an Ottoman assault trooper unit began in May 1917. The Ottoman teaching staff was to undergo a special boot camp on the aforementioned Maltepe training grounds, after an introducory course in Dublany close to Lemberg in the Ukraine for the unit's cadre. This cadre was to comprise 23 officers, 35 NCOs and 16 privates. Beginning on 1 July 1917 the unit was to be combined with preselected soldiers from other units to the 'Constantinople Assault Battalion' under the command of a certain Şükri Efendi, who was undergoing special training in Berlin at that time. The

270 Ralf Raths, *Vom Massensturm zur Stoßtrupptaktik: Die deutsche Landkriegtaktik im Spiegel von Dienstvorschriften und Publizistik 1906 bis 1918* (Freiburg: Rombach, 2009), 163–170.
271 Anthony Saunders, *Trench Warfare, 1850–1950* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2010), 182.
272 Ortner, *Die k.u.k. Sturmtruppen*, 19, 22.
273 ATASE-BDH K1449 D9 Fi2a.

order stressed that only "especially well, strong, agile people"[274] were to be preferred for that purpose. On these grounds, the Ottoman headquarters requested 16 light Erhardt type mine throwers (7.58 cm leMW) for the future fire protection of the assault trooper's battalion, following the German model. General Ludendorff approved the export of the ordnance material, including 1000 pieces of ammunition.[275]

Though the first part of the unit's establishment was the worst part, not least because the Ottoman army suffered shortages in the third year of the conflict. The German Inspector General of the Ottoman engineers, Major General Paul Langenstraß, complained in a report about the shortages of equipment in Maltepe. Most of the assault trooper recruits had no shoes and "exercised bare foot.[276] Their uniforms were mere rags, and most of the men were over 45 years old. Langenstraß demanded that

> "For this purpose the best resources have to be selected if the Sturmbataillon shall serve its purpose. If possible, volunteers. Special provisions, possibly even extra pay (like in Germany), since those people deserve special consideration because these men, as part of their future assignment, will intrude into enemy positions as an assault detachment."[277]

In addition, the German instructors and the Ottoman cadre troops from Dublany had not yet arrived in Maltepe. Enver agreed to find more appropriate men, who were able to bare the physical strains of this task. Despite initial difficulties, the training began and the unit's combat effectiveness improved. The Ottoman recruits were trained in the use of the small flamethrowers (M1912 KleiF) although this technology was still in its infancy. The load was consumed with one long burst, and already one or two bullets could blow up the tank and kill the flamethrower trooper. It was, nevertheless, an effective weapon to break the morale of the enemy and to decoy them into withdraw or surrender in face of the approaching flames.[278] The Ottoman soldiers designated this brutal weapon as "hellfire machine" ("cehennem ateşi makinası").[279] Besides the activities in Maltepe,

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274 German translation of the order of the Ottoman Ministry of War, 4 May 1333/1917; supplement to the order of 18 April 1333/1917. ATASE BDH K1499 D9 K2.

275 Reqest of the Ottoman Headqaurters to the German Supreme Army Command (Oberste Heeresleitung), 19 May 1917. ATASE BDH K1499 D9 Gö2 Fi 1.

276 Inspector-General of the Ottoman engineers to Constantinople army arsenal, 9 July 1917. ATASE BDH K1499 D9 Gö2 Fi4.

277 ATASE BDH K1499-Gö9-D2-Fi4.

278 Saunders, *Trench Warfare 1850 – 1950*, 152.

279 The official term was "*alev makinası*"; cf. Thomas Wictor, *Flamethrower Troops of World War I: The Central and Allied powers* (Atglen: Schiffer, 2010), 65.

Stormtrooper training was also conducted in Galicia and Palestine behind the front lines. In Galicia, the Germans were also accompanied in their training by the Austro-Hungarian Stormtrooper units.[280] The Ottoman stormtroopers achieved several victories and on 5 May 1918 one unit was even mentioned in the Ottoman official communiqué for their success against a British cavalry unit.[281]

There was a different approach in the Ottoman army with regard to the adoption of a steel helmet. The need to issue steel helmets for frontline troops exposed to artillery bombardment had been stated earlier in an Ottoman propaganda periodical. It discussed the German M16 model. [282] Although this helmet had serious disadvantages. The ventilation holes let in cold air in winter and the metal could cause thermal damage to the skin in cold and hot weather alike. Moreover, there were acoustic problems because the helmet's shape, which covered the ears, disturbed hearing. Soldiers in the field were forced to shout out their orders and could be spotted immediately by the enemy forces.[283] The German helmet was not the first choice for assault squads, even though it offered adequate protection. On these grounds, the Ottoman army ordered peakless helmets from Germany, whose neck and ear guards had been removed with a grinder.[284] These helmets were the best choice for the tasks carried out by the assault units. After 1918, some of the Ottoman helmets remained with the sultan's army and were later transferred to the republican forces, after which most of them were stored. The shape of the helmet served to underline the image of the republican military's elite, just like in the 1936 war school graduate book.[285]

280 Wictor, *Flamethrower Troops of World War I*, 66 – 68.

281 ATASE-BDH K1499 D9 Gö15 Fi1.

282 Ahmed Refik [Altınay]: "Osmanlı Miğferleri ve Harb-i Hâzır" [The Ottoman Helmets and the current War], *Harb Mecmuası* 18 – 2 (1333/1917), 279.

283 Cf. the retrospective view of a veteran on the M16 model: Anonymous, "Ist der Stahlhelm zweckmäßig?," *MWB* 116 – 11 (1931/32), cols. 431 – 432.

284 See Chris Flaherty, "WW1 Ottoman Turkish Steel Helmets," *The Armourer Militaria Magazine* 104 (2011), 36 – 38. It might just be a coincidence and no retransfer, but rather purely utilitarian thinking, which led to issuing exactly the same type of helmet to the new deployed German paratroopers in 1935. For a drawing of the peakless M35 model see Ludwig Baer, *Vom Stahlhelm zum Gefechtshelm: Eine Entwicklungsgeschichte von 1915 bis 1993,* vol.1 (Neu-Anspach: self published, 1994), 442.

285 Cf. the stylized Stormtrooper in Anonymous: *1936 Harp Okulu Hatırası; Birinci Talebe Bölüğü* [*War School Memoir Book, First Company (i.e. Infantry) Section*] (No place: no publisher, [c. 1936]); copy in author's posession. In the 1920s, the French *Adrian* helmet was introduced as the standard steel helmet of the army, though some of the German origin helmets seem to have survived in the infantry branch; cf. Figure 4.



Figure 2: Late Ottoman Stormtrooper on a drawing from a German source



Figure 3: Turkish infantryman with sawed off German M1916 helmet, demonstrating an indirect aiming position for the French origin Hotchkiss M1922 light machine gun

The training in Maltepe continued until the end of the war. In the summer of 1918, the Germans requested two more training officers from Germany.[286] No sources could be found about the use of the Stormtroopers in the war against Greece although it is highly probable that some of the veterans from those units also joined the nationalist forces and made use of their experience. The German knowledge was also preserved within the other national armed forces on Turkish soil at that time. The last German field regulation for assault units was translated into Turkish and published in several editions by the Sultan's army.[287]

286 Liaison officer Yıldırım to Constantinople Assault Training Commando, 21 May 1918. ATASE BDH K1499 D9 Gö2 Fi19.

287 Rıfat, "Hücum Taburları Teşkilatı" [The Organization of the Assault Troops] *Mecmua-yi Fünun-u Askeriye* 5 (1335/1919), 177–180 and 6 (1335/1919), 187–204; Anonymous: *Hücum Kıtaatının Talim ve Terbiyesi* [Training and Education of the Assault Unit] (Istanbul: Erkan-ı Harbiye Matbaası, 1336/1920); Sedad, *Hücum Talim ve Terbiyesi* [Training and Education of Assault (Techniques)]. (Dersaadet [Istanbul]: Matbaa-ı Askeriye, 1338/1922).

The Watch at the Bosphorus: German Soldiers in the Ottoman Capital

In Istanbul, for administrative and training purposes (as in the case of the aforementioned assault troops), the German military mission had grown from 70 officers in 1914 to several thousand German soldiers of all ranks during the war. The German army supported the Ottoman armed forces on all levels. When occupying commanding posts, German officers worked under the supervision of an Ottoman superior.[288]

The daily life of the German NCOs and privates between 1916 and 1918 is well documented in the preserved daily and weekly Istanbul garrison orders. They record early signs of conflict between the two Allies, resulting from public misbehavior of German soldiers. Especially the German rank and files had to be admonished for disobedient behavior in public. Excessive alcohol consumption, the disregard to abstain from visiting prostitutes and violation of the arrival to the barracks until the 9 p.m. curfew (or a combination of all three) kept the German military police busy.[289] Moreover, military discipline had to be maintained by strict measures. In order to prevent the creation of racketeering networks, criminal incidents such as the unauthorized sale of German military property by German soldiers to Ottoman sellers resulted in the regular replacement of members of the Istanbul garrison.[290]

Regarding the discovery of a foreign eating culture the deployment to Ottoman service offered many opportunities for the German soldiers. At a time before the age of mass tourism, most of these Germans were abroad for the first time in their life. As the majority of soldiers had no command of foreign languages, the exploration of the ally's capital city was restricted to culinary enjoyment. Officially, the soldiers were ordered to eat in the German garrisons' canteens. The German military catering establishments served mainly German dishes relying on the ingredients that were available on the Ottoman market. Since German sol-

288 An overview can be found in Carl Mühlmann, *Das deutsch-türkische Waffenbündnis im Weltkriege* (Leipzig: Koehler & Amelang, 1940), 318–326. Cf. also Reichmann, *Tapfere Asker*, 333–345.

289 Out of consideration for the ally and quite contrary to the German practice at other fronts, the German medical service of the military administration did not maintain a military brothel for German soldiers in Istanbul. Cf. Klaus Wolf, *Gallipoli 1915: Das deutsch-türkische Militärbündnis im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Sulzbach, Bonn: Report, 2008), 65; Lutz Sauerteig, "Sexualität," in *Enzyklopädie Erster Weltkrieg*, 837.

290 Wolf, *Gallipoli 1915*, 66. See also the German Constantinople Garrison order No. 174, dated 16 May 1918. Bay HStA IV HS 2254.

diers were not used to the local Ottoman germs and bacteria, the Military Mission's command tried to reduce the risk of food poisoning. Only some Ottoman specialties were advisable for consumption:

> "Carefully prepared yoghurt (if it is made from boiled milk) is unproblematic and is a valuable, intestinal cleansing food. Ayran is recommended as a good refreshment when it is made from good yoghurt and boiled or filtrated water [...]."[291]

It is on these grounds that the curiosity of the German soldiers for other delicacies of Ottoman cuisine was generated. Yet the German medical service warned the German troops not to eat outside the military canteens, since salad was perishable and processed meat (like the *sucuk* sausages and the *köfte* meatballs) were allegedly flavored with savory spice to cover the taste of the spoiled meat.[292] But those warnings did not derogate the soldiers' interest in their ally's food. Even the German Military Mission's periodical ran a lengthy article on the rotating *döner* skewer, at those days a fascinating new delicacy for the Germans available everywhere on the streets of the capital.[293] The author gave a detailed account of the preparation of the meat, since many of the German readers seemed to have been distrustful after the warnings of their military doctors. The "Dönerspieß" was heated by wood coal and was referred to as the "Turkish national roast" ("der türkische Nationalbraten"). To increase the desirability for this particular dish among the German readership, the served meal was described as *"meat schnitzel"*.[294]

Alcohol was also a favored medium of distraction from the occasionally boring daily routine at the back office. Beer was imported from Germany and sold in the German military mess hall *(Soldatenheim)*. The local Bomonti brewery also enjoyed great popularity among the German soldiers.[295] Officially, it was forbidden and even dangerous to drink *rakı* spirits in restaurants, since *rakı* was adulterated in some cases with cheap industrial alcohol due to wartime shortages of

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291 "Sanitäre Vorschriften für militärische Verpflegungsbetriebe und Soldatenheime," 23 August 1917. Bay HStA IV HS 2254.

292 Garrison order No.116: "Gesundheitliche Verhaltungsmaßregeln," 25 August 1917. Bay HStA IV HS 2254.

293 Otto Lotthammer, "Türkische Küche," *Am Bosporus* 35 (27 June 1918).

294 Lotthammer, "Türkische Küche".

295 On the local breweries cf. Malte Fuhrmann, "Beer, the Drink of a changing World. Beer Consumption and Production on the shores of the Aegean in the 19th Century," *Turcica* 45 (2014), 95–100. The newly built *Soldatenheim* was located in today's İstiklal Caddesi No.51. Wolf, *Gallipoli 1915*, 70.

grapes.[296] The high percentage alcohol was in abundance, yet German soldiers were not accustomed to the Ottoman habit of eating cold starters followed by several plates with small hot dishes alongside grape spirits. The German military police, which patrolled the restaurants and bars of Pera in uniform and cilivian clothing, had to often remove the passed out drankards from such establishments.

Whereas the *döner* was not available back home in Germany during the lifetime of the majority of German veterans,[297] most of them paid homage to the Ottoman spirits in their gatherings by raising the *rakı* glasses after the war.[298] It should also be noted that the time in the Ottoman lands also raised the intellectual interest in the history and culture of the ally. In the case of Franz Babinger this experience even had a share in the choice of the academic field.[299]

Challenges to Coalition Warfare

Due to the rapidly increasing numbers of German military personnel in Ottoman service after 1914, a careful selection of suitable soldiers for deployment to the Ottoman army was beyond the realms of possibility. In times of total mobilization the choice of appropriate officers was limited. This situation contributed to the growing tensions with the Ottoman officers and soldiers, further deepening the alienation process of the allies.[300]

There was also a type of intra-German alliance, which often became visible in memoirs about the war. Just like Germany had tried to dominate the alliance, so did the Prussian contingent within the German Imperial army. South German officers especially had a dislike for this policy. Colonel Gerold von Gleich from Württemberg was not encouraged when he saw the real conditions of service

296 See the warning in Garrison Order No. 46, dated 18 January 1917. Bay HStA IV HS 2254.
297 Cf. Eberhard Seidel, *Aufgespießt: Wie der Döner über die Deutschen kam* (Hamburg: Rotbuch, 1996), especially p. 52 et seq. with a similarly enthusiastic description as the one by Otto Lotthammer more than half a century before.
298 Cf. Mangold-Will, *Begrenzte Freundschaft*, 279.
299 After his service in the Ottoman army, Franz Babinger became the founder of the chair of Turkish Studies at the Ludwig Maximilians University in Munich, cf. Gerhard Grimm, "Franz Babinger, 1891–1967: Ein lebensgeschichtlicher Essay," *Die Welt des Islams* 38–3 (1998), 307–312. For other cases see Oliver Stein, "Kulturelle Begegnungen mit dem Orient: Deutsche Offiziere im Osmanischen Reich während des Ersten Weltkriegs," in *Playing Lawrence on the other Side: Die Expedition Klein und das deutsch-osmanische Bündnis im Ersten Weltkrieg*, ed. Veit Veltzke (Berlin: Nicolai, 2014), 79.
300 See an overview in Neulen, *Feldgrau in Jerusalem*, 181–190.

after his arrival in the Ottoman Empire: "In reality they had given me the 'waste' which no Prussian officer at my age and with my rank would ever have volunteered to take over."[301] We can therefore argue that most of the South German officers suffered from an inferiority complex due to Prussian dominance. In a similar vein, the Bavarian volunteer Count Preysing saw the need to praise the Prussian military in his report:

> "In terms of faithfulness and reliability, the traditional Bavarian soldier [i.e. from the 'heartlands' of Bavaria] is not outreached by his Prussian mate. Also, diligence and officiousness in the work of the [Bavarian] regiments does not lag behind that of other contingents. What is missing [in Bavaria] is the military spirit that imbues everyone in Prussia [...]."[302]

We thus cannot talk of a homogeneous German officer corps in the Ottoman service. The Bavarian General Kreß concluded that the Prussian officers were to blame for German clashes with the Ottoman officers, "especially since unfortunately it is not possible for our brisk and laddish North German brothers to gain sympathy abroad."[303]

However, this behavior was not confined to the Prussian officers. After his experience in Galicia, an anonymous German officer wrote about the frictions with the Ottoman ally, arguing that both Prussians and Bavarians often had an arrogant appearance towards foreign cultures. This led to a feeling of superiority, accompanied by a know-it-all and pompous mentality: "Unfortunately for one such gentleman who knows how to do it right, there are nine others of the aforementioned type, which see their destiny in hindering the German-Turkish relations."[304]

Though the tension between the German and Ottoman side continued and even reached a climax, when troops of both armies came close to start fighting against each other in late 1918. In one case, Ottoman commanders were even close to court martialing a disobedient German officer. In April 1917, the Bavarian Major Ludwig Schraudenbach withdrew the Ottoman troops under his command at the Caucasus front without any orders from his superior General Ali İhsan [Sabis]. Schraudenbach was court martialed, which lead to the interference of

301 Gerold von Gleich, "Feldzug in der Türkei 1916," Ludwigsburg 1916. HStA Stuttgart M 660/010 Nr 157: 13.

302 Preysing, "Erfahrungen aus dem Balkankrieg 1912/13," n.p. Bay HStA IV GS 259.

303 [Friedrich] Kress von Kressenstein, "Meine Mission im Kaukasus," 1943, 15. BHStA IV HS 2227.

304 Bompatoppo, "Türkenspiegel: Streiflichter aus einer Lern- und Lehrzeit," *Die Grenzboten* 76 (1917), 205.

Liman von Sanders. The head of the German military mission claimed that Ali İhsan had not properly followed the tactical courses during his time in the German army. This remark and the whole case caused quite a stir in the military relations of both countries.[305] Ali İhsan eventually terminated the investigations. Yet he openly told Schraudenbach: "If a Turkish officer had been in your position, I would have had him shot immediately."[306]

As for the instruction of Ottoman troops, already in 1914, Karl Imhoff advised against strictly imposing the German model in every field. In the Ottoman case some measures would take years to succeed and would require careful work rooted in cultural sensitivity. All instructions in military classes "[...] have to be looked at from the Turkish point of view, before one tries to harshly enforce the German approach."[307] This advice was not heeded by every German officer who had been sent to the Ottoman Empire prior to 1918, causing severe strain on the alliance. One major source of dispute was the direct leadership of Ottoman units by German officers. Due to the growing national pride, especially among the ethnic Turkish officers, an Ottoman colonel told a German major:

> "I value the Germans officers extremely highly. We need them as general staff officers, as counselors with the highest leadership and as instructors. In contrast, it is not a good thing when German officers take command of Turkish troops. The officer corps is quite different, the ranks and files are not as disciplined, this all leads to difficulties."[308]

German propaganda also contributed to wrong expectations on the German side. Newspaper articles and pamphlets of all kind conveyed a false image of the state of the Ottoman ally. One of the most active authors in this field was the journalist Ernst Jäckh,[309] an object of hate among many German officers. The Württemberg Colonel Gerold von Gleich mocked the wartime situation in his memoirs:

> "[Turkey's] population was one of the most noble and most intelligent on earth. More than that, they were besotted with us, the Germans. The Turks were endlessly grateful that we had chosen them as allies, and that we came in large numbers to help them personally and to teach them. Upon his arrival, the young German Lieutenant thought that the excel-

305 Wallach, *Anatomie einer Militärhilfe*, 228 – 229.

306 Ali İhsan Sabis, *Harb Hatıralarım* [*My War Memoirs*], vol. 4 (Istanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1991), 124.

307 [Karl] Imhoff, "Notizen über deutsche Militärmissionen in der Türkei," *MWB* 4 (1914), col. 76.

308 Report of Major Raith to Bopp, 17 May 1916. HStAS M 660/010, 78.

309 On this remarkable figure of the German-Ottoman relations see the disssertation by Sevil Özçalık: *Promoting an Alliance, Furthering Nationalism: Ernst Jäckh and Ahmed Emin in the Time of the First World War* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, forthcoming).

> lent Turks would burst into a true cheer of joy, full of greedy expectations for the admirable things that he would teach them. Yes he would jolt them into action, where they had shortcomings. And now the disappointment! In Constantinople he was issued printed instructions: he had to be considerate, had to be careful with his critique etc. And the even bigger surprise in daily contact with the Turks themselves: only aversion and distrust, nothing less than ingratitude and no aspiration to learn from the Germans, but big-headed hubris, more than one can imagine. And on top all of those things, awkward silence had to be kept. In letters home, the Turks were only described as in the books of the honorable Mister Jäckh, which were simply canonized [kanonisirt]. Our censorship regulated with the greatest anxiety that no unfavorable news from home reached us in Turkey."[310]

In this context, it needs to be pointed out that the German side did indeed learn from mistakes during the first years of the war. German soldiers who had a military criminal record were excluded: "[U]nder no circumstances [applicants] who were convicted for insulting or physically maltreating other soldiers [are allowed to enter Ottoman service]. The Turks can not bear excitement, cursing etc."[311] For the supervision of the Ottoman labor battalions along the Taurus railway construction sites, only senior German sergeants were recruited, who had enough life experience to endure this kind of service.[312] According to Gerold von Gleich, exactly this careful pre-selection was absolutely imperative: "Especially the lower ranks whom we send to the Orient are acting absolutely provocative there and contribute considerably to our unpopularity abroad."[313]

Going back to what had been stated before regarding the quarrels between the staff officers of the alliance, it would be wrong to overstate these difficulties. Similar problems were also inherent in the cooperation between the German and Austrian military. One could even state that those were ineluctable concomitants of any coalition warfare. Like in the case of the Ottoman army, the German High Command also requested Austrian troops for the use on other fronts, albeit in much smaller numbers.[314] Regarding the general performance of the multiethnic imperial forces, in the Ottoman and Austrian case, members of the German General Staff made derogative remarks, even though the failure of the unrealistic German war plan in 1914 had contributed to the fatiguing stalemate. The German

310 Gleich: "Feldzug in der Türkei 1916," 31.

311 Königlich Bayerischer Militär-Bevollmächtigter Berlin to Bavarian Ministry of War, Munich: "Übertritt in türkische Dienste," 26 February 1916. BayHStA IV MKr 1958, n.p.

312 Deputy General Command 1st Bavarian Army Corps to Bavarian Minister of War: "Aufsichtspersonal für türkische Arbeiterbataillone," 26 April 1916. Bay HStA IV MKr 1954 Nr. 66936.

313 Gleich, "Feldzug in der Türkei," 57.

314 Wolfgang Etschmann, "Österreich-Ungarn zwischen Engagement und Zurückhaltung: K. u.k. Truppen an der Westfront," in *Kriegsende 1918: Ereignis, Wirkung, Nachwirkung.*, ed. Jörg Duppler and Gerhard P. Groß (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999), 97–105.

military saw itself as a *primus inter pares* among the Central Powers. The sense of inferiority was common between Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman officers alike, when they looked at their accomplishments, which were never to fully satisfy the German ally. As a result from its allies' shortcomings, the German High Command also tried to impose the German military organizational structure on its allies, a measure which emanated from the German side.[315] Though the German speaking military elite led the Austro-Hungarian army and the Ottoman army had many Germanophile officers in its ranks, the military cultures of both armies differed from the German model. Accordingly, the postwar discourse in the three countries about the World War I alliance showed surprising similarities.[316]

Nevertheless, one should not forget that some of the outcomes of coalition warfare were also related to the special conditions of warfare in the Ottoman environment.

Askari and Asker: The Ottoman Empire and Colonial Warfare

From the point of view of the majority of German officers, the Ottoman lands were comparable to a colonial theater of war during the First World War.[317] The fronts were far from Central Europe and the front lines were often not as clearly defined as in the Ottoman Arab provinces. There was no permanent telegraph and wireless communication available, which was particularly valid for supply routes. As a result, some fundamentals of the 'German way of war' could barely be implemented.[318]

Local culture differed considerably from anything the German soldiers were accustomed to. German officers posted to remote provinces had more freedom in their decisions than their fellow comrades on the Western front because the German High Command was far away in the Ottoman lands. This was not the case

315 Günther Kronenbitter, "Von Schweinehunden und Waffenbrüdern: Der Koalitionskrieg der Mittelmächte 1914/15 zwischen Sachzwang und Ressentiment," in *Die vergessene Front: Der Osten 1914/15; Ereignis, Wirkung, Nachwirkung*. ed. Gerhard P. Groß (Munich: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2006), 137. For the wording of the German convention see: Jäschke, "Deutsch-Türkische Militärkonvention".

316 Günther Kronenbitter, "Waffenbrüder. Der Koalitionskrieg der Mittelmächte 1914 – 1918 und das Selbstbild zweier Militäreliten," in *Mythen und Legenden in der Geschichte*., ed. Volker Dotterweich (Munich: Ernst Vögel, 2004), 181 – 186.

317 Cf. for the following considerations Tanja Bührer, "Peripherien," in *Der Erste Weltkrieg 1914 1918. Der deutsche Aufmarsch in ein kriegerisches Jahrhundert*. ed. Markus Pöhlmann (Munich: Bucher, 2014), 267 – 274.

318 For the problem with the *Auftragstaktik* see Wallach, *Anatomie einer Militärhilfe*, 217.

with their Ottoman allies, which were more bound to their chain of command. However, this also had clearly disadvantages, since it often caused clashes among the officers of the alliance.[319] The German members of the military mission had sworn an oath to the Kaiser, but served in the Sultan's army on the basis of a private contract with the Ottoman state.

Many Germans rated the Ottoman fronts as an 'inferior' theatre of war.[320] In the perception of most German officers, the 'real' war took place in Central Europe. The German consul in Damascus, Löytved-Hardegg, complained about the German officers' behavior in Syria. From the consul's view, those men had been chosen wrongly:

> "A lot of the gentlemen that are sent here have served in Africa in the colonies, with the erroneous assumption that those men would adapt to the local affairs faster. In fact this has not been the case with most of them because they were used to consort like lords with slaves, and they also wanted to apply those consort customs here."[321]

This led to tensions with the Ottoman officers and the local civil population. Löytved-Hardegg pleaded for the application of British lessons from Egypt. The German direct way of communication would result in Ottoman passive resistance. Only a small number of Germans was skilled enough to connive at those problems and work for the better. In reference to his British source for Löytved-Hardegg "the German officer [...] must be a man of high character" and should possess the following requirements:

> "sufficient elasticity of mind to be able to apply, under circumstances which are strange to him, the knowledge which he has acquired elsewhere. He must be in possession of sound judgment in order to enable him to distinguish between abuses, which should be at once reformed, and those, which it will be wise to tolerate, at all events for a time. He must be versatile, and quick to adapt any local feature of the administration to suit his reforming purposes."[322]

This wartime transfer of knowledge of colonial practices from the British to the German side is highly remarkable. It is even more interesting to note that the Ottoman state had intended something similar before the war. In early 1912, the Ottoman army had requested to send several of their officers to the military depart-

319 Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire*, 72–73.

320 Especially in the case of General Falkenhayn; Holger Afflerbach, *Falkenhayn: Politisches Denken und Handeln im Kaiserreich* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1994), 471.

321 Naval attaché Humann to the Reichs-Marine-Amt, 15 December 1916; BA-MA RM3/ 2964, 174.

322 Evelyn Baring Earl of Cromer, *Modern Egypt* (New York: Macmillan, 1908), 280 et seq.

ment of the German Imperial Colonial Office. The Ottoman army was interested in the deployment of a capable specialized force, which could suppress local riots far away from the center of the empire. However, the German Colonial Office denied the request since it did not have the capacity to take care of the Ottoman guests.[323] Though we can state that the Ottoman army was not hesitant to show interest in the organization of a military force that had committed acts of genocide in German South-West Africa (today's Namibia).[324]

Nevertheless, we can only speculate whether there was a "global cultural transfer of modern ethnical violence policy" between Imperial Germany and the late Ottoman Empire.[325] The extent to which German officers played a role in the "Young Turk [...] active imitation of Western 'cleansing' strategies"[326] in the annihilation of Non-Muslim Ottoman citizens during the First World War has already been studied.[327] On the one hand, German complicity by supporting deportation measures or keeping silent about the issue during and even after the war is evident. On the other hand, however, the German role in this particular issue during the war is difficult to trace. There is only a small amount of evidences in German memoirs and official documents, not to mention the nearly total silence in the memoirs of Ottoman/Turkish officers and the official archival sources. This study is thus unable to answer the question whether there was a transfer of genocidal practices by the German officers serving in the Ottoman army between 1914 and 1918.

323 Answer of the German Ministry of War to the Foreign Ministry: "Anträge auf Zulassung von osmanischen Offizieren zum Dienst im Reichskolonialamt in der Abteilung Militärangelegenheiten," 5 February 1912. BA-L R 901/ 29042.

324 For the denial of this crime in Wilhelmine Germany see Elisa von Joeden-Forgey, "Hidden in Plain Sight: Atrocity Concealment in German Political Culture before the First World War," in *Hidden Genocides: Power, Knowledge, Memory*, ed. Alexander Laban Hinton et al. (New Brunswick, New Jersey, London: Rutgers University Press, 2014), 52–67.

325 Michael Schwartz, *Ethnische 'Säuberungen' in der Modern: Globale Wechselwirkungen nationalistischer und rassistischer Gewaltpolitik im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2013), 200.

326 Schwartz, *Ethnische 'Säuberungen' in der Moderne*, 200.

327 Christoph Dinkel, "German Officers and the Armenian Genocide," *Armenian Review* 44–1 (1991), 77–133; Vahakn N. Dadrian, *German Responsibility in the Armenian Genocide: A Review of the Historical Evidence of German Complicity* (Watertown: Blue Crane Books, 1996), 125–145.

Till Armistice do us part: The End, 1918

In addition to the darkest hours of the German-Ottoman alliance in the last phase of the war, the strategic situation of the Central Powers became hopeless. At the Iraq and Palestine fronts in 1917, the Ottoman army suffered several defeats by the superior British forces. The German assistance corps, the *Yıldırım* army group F, could not change the defensive situation. Its commanding general, Erich von Falkenhayn, ignored the fact that the Ottoman forces were no longer able to conduct any offensive operations. Falkenhayn believed in defeating the British forces with his German units, supported by the battle-tested Ottoman troops transferred from Galicia to Palestine for this purpose. Many Ottoman soldiers evaded service by deserting their units during redeployment through Anatolia. In addition, the Ottoman officer corps was outraged by the fact that 53 out of 64 officers on Falkenhayn's staff were German.[328]

Therefore General Mustafa Kemal, at this time member of Falkenhayn's staff, complained about this unbearable situation in a report to the Grand Vezier. The Ottoman forces in Palestine were understrength, and the majority of the soldiers were either below the age of 20 or over 45 years old. Henceforth no more soldiers were to be deployed outside the Ottoman Empire. This was an indirect critique of sending of Ottoman soldiers to eastern and southeast European theaters of war since 1916, which he also repeated on several occasions after the war. Falkenhayn was not interested in the fate of the Ottoman state. Mustafa Kemal accused the Germans of having made preparations for the colonization of Ottoman territory by weakening the Ottoman army. Mustafa Kemal concluded: "And for this purpose General Falkenhayn will employ the gold on our account and the last Turkish blood brought from Anatolia."[329]

Mustafa Kemal resigned, since the Ottoman leadership was not interested in changing anything and thereby provoking the German ally in this critical situation. The assumptions of the Ottoman General proved correct and in November 1917 the front collapsed during the battle of Gaza. By decision of the German High Command, Falkenhayn was replaced by Liman von Sanders in February

328 Afflerbach, *Falkenhayn*, 474–476.

329 Mustafa Kemal's report, dated 20 September 1333/1917 in *Atatürk'ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri, 1917–1938* [Atatürk's Notes, Telegrams and Declarations, 1917–1938], ed. Türk İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü, vol 4 (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basimevi, 1954), 7. For a similar view on German war aims by the last Austrian Prime Minister Heinrich Lammasch see Stefan Zweig, *Die Welt von gestern: Erinnerungen eines Europäers*. 2nd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1982): 298. Lammasch was harshly criticized for this position; cf. Heinrich Friedjung, "Die Gegner des Bündnisses mit Deutschland," *Neue Freie Presse*, 17 March 1918, 2.

1918.[330] Though at that time the Ottoman forces had been weakened further by Enver Pasha's dreams of a conquest in the Caucasus, which seemed to be possible after the treaty of Brest-Litowsk with Russia in March 1918. Enver's plans coincided with General Luddendorff's idea to seize Baku before the Ottomans could do so. Both plans have to be seen as megalomaniac, since this operation bound troops that would have been of better use at the collapsing Western European and Syrian fronts. In this regard we can even state that both commanders in chief, Enver Pasha and General Ludendorff, were brothers in the 'German Spirit' of strategic overestimation of their own capabilities.[331] Thereafter the two allies even came to the brink of war. A daily order of a Bavarian regiment requested the soldiers that, if Ottoman soldiers would resist disarmament, "[...] they have to be shot or stabbed. Under no circumstances a Bavarian rifleman may draw the short end of the straw."[332]

Though this conflict in the Caucasus was averted by the withdrawal of the German forces, the situation at the other fronts worsened. In September 1918 the Ottoman front in Syria finally broke down and the Ottoman army, including the last remaining German troops had to withdraw to the North.[333] In October 1918 one power after the other had to cease-fire and capitulate, thereby leaving the alliance.[334] The war was over but the planning for the next one had just begun.

330 Afflerbach, *Falkenhayn*, 482.

331 For the operation see: Winfried Baumgart, "Das 'Kaspi-Unternehmen': Größenwahn Ludendorffs oder Routineplanung des deutschen Generalstabs? Erster Teil: Ein kritischer Rückblick auf die deutsche militärische Intervention im Kaukasus am Ende des Ersten Weltkriegs," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 36 (1970), 115 – 118; Erickson and Uyar, *A Military History of the Ottomans*, 271.

332 Daily order, 23 June 1918, Bay HStA IV Jäger-Regiment 15, vol. 9. For a complete list of the Bavarian units in the Caucasus campaign see Mühlmann, *Das deutsch-türkische Waffenbündnis im Weltkriege*, 322. For this incident see also Richard J. Lundström, "Cross Against Crescent: The 'Unknown' War Between Germany and Turkey in the Caucasus, 1918," *Der Angriff: A Journal of World War I Military History* 22 (1983), 8 – 16.

333 Erickson and Uyar, *A Military History of the Ottomans*, 270 – 271.

334 For an overview of the events see: Karel Pichlík, "Der militärische Zusammenbruch der Mittelmächte im Jahre 1918," in *Die Auflösung des Habsburgerreichs: Zusammenbruch und Neuorientierung im Donauraum*, ed. R. G. Plaschka and K. Mack (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1970), 249 – 265.

Conclusions

The decade after the Young Turk revolution was characterized by a tremendous increase of German assistance for the Ottoman army. In order to preserve the existence of the prospective ally, Germany committed itself to the recovery of the Ottoman military strength. Nevertheless, the comparison with the Chilean example demonstrates that the Ottoman army had quite different expectations regarding the choice of German military knowledge. In the Ottoman case, the army mainly served the pacification and the stabilization of internal rule, whereas the use of military force as an instrument of foreign policy was of secondary importance. Thanks to the use of the German military attaché and General von der Goltz, the German army was able to restore its dominating role within the Ottoman army, which also paid off with regard to Ottoman armament orders from Germany instead of the French competitor. Furthermore, sending Ottoman officers to Germany was to be the most important cornerstone of the German-Ottoman collaboration. In the German military environment, Ottoman officers understood the necessity for a reform of the Ottoman army following the German role model, though some elements of the German military culture were rejected. In some cases, Ottoman officers even adapted German military habits.

In the choice for the head of the military mission, the German side made no good decision although it helped raise the level of the Ottoman military capacities. However, it has to be stated that most of the training, the choice of tactical measures and the conduct of operations remained within Ottoman responsibility. The Ottoman army made sure it stayed in command of its forces as during the First World War especially, the German military mission tried to extend its influence. Thus one of the problems of coalition warfare between 1914 and 1918 was the struggle for the German decisive role over Ottoman strategy. As in the case of the Balkan Wars, Germany provided assistance in the defense of the Ottoman territory. Yet this help was to have a price in the form of Ottoman commitment to the war against Russia. By orienting itself around the 'German way of war', the Ottoman leadership was also imitating the principal fault of the German warfare, namely, the neglect of the logistic and economic consequences of a multiform conflict.[335]

In all these campaigns, both allies collected plenty of experiences, which were evaluated after the war, a topic that will be dealt with in more attention

335 Erickson and Uyar, *A Military History of the Ottomans*, 278; Gerhard Paul Groß, *Mythos und Wirklichkeit: Geschichte des operativen Denkens im deutschen Heer von Moltke d. Ä. bis Heusinger* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2012), 103.

in the last chapter. This chapter will examine the question of the Turkish appraisal for the alliance. Last but not least, the "period of profound transgenerational German influence"[336] also extended to the mobilization of youth. In preparation for total war, the military and civilian experts of both countries were to collaborate extensively.

336 Erickson and Uyar, *A Military History of the Ottomans*, 175.

3 German-Ottoman/Turkish Cooperation in the Mobilization of Youth: The Case of Heinrich von Hoff (1916–17) and Carl Diem (1933)

Introduction and Definitions

Since the early modern age, underaged boys had served more or less voluntarily in the armed forces as drummers, fifers, and servants or in the navy as ship's boys.[1] But those junior servicemen had been rare exceptions. The situation changed with the emergence of modern mass armies based on conscription.

In the following chapter, I will analyze state-funded military instruction of boys aged 12 to 20 in paramilitary youth associations in (Imperial) Germany, the late Ottoman Empire and the early Republic of Turkey. Initially, the focus is on the developments in Germany, which had its roots in Great Britain and France. The appropriation of the German model during the First World War shall be analyzed in the second paragraph of this first part of the present chapter, to the extent that it is traceable in the ego-documents and writings of the German officer Heinrich von Hoff.[2] What were the causes and aims of those youth associations, and what were the similarities and differences in both countries?

The designation 'paramilitary' will be used here in order to describe the character of these associations and their training of young men prior to military service. In this regard, 'militarism' is defined as the exorbitant dominance of the armed forces within a state. Military norms are transferred to the civil society. Indoctrinating the young men with militant nationalism generates a soldierly spirit and behavior.[3] This definition goes beyond Mehmed Beşikçis more general understanding of militarism.[4] In his definition Beşikçi also neglected the role of the civilian players in

1 Morag Josephine Grant, "Die Kindersoldaten von gestern: Vorbemerkungen zu einer Geschichte von Kindern als Militärmusiker im 19. Jahrhundert," in *Militärmusik zwischen Nutzen und Missbrauch*, ed. Michael Schramm (Bonn: Militärmusikdienst der Bundeswehr, 2011), 174–187.

2 On the cooperation of Hoff and his Ottoman civil counterpart see Selim Sırrı [Tarcan] also Sevil Özçalık and Gerhard Grüßhaber, "'Frank, Fresh, Frish, Free' at the Bosphorus? Selim Sırrı and the German Model of Youth Mobilization in the late Ottoman State, 1908–1918," *Middle East Critique* 24–4 (2015), 375–388.

3 Michael Geyer and Werner Conze, "Militarismus," in *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, ed. Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck, vol 4 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1978), 1.

4 Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower*, 6.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110554786-003

the field of paramilitary youth education. Franz Carl Endres, a former Bavarian staff officer who had served in the Ottoman army from 1910 to1915, after the war regarded militarism as the "state of mind of the non-military."[5] The best example of this definition is the Ottoman gymnastics instructor Selim Sırrı, a former officer and the right hand of Heinrich von Hoff in 1916/17. He was also the Turkish pioneer of paramilitary education ofyouth after 1918.

In the focus of the second part of this chapter are the proceedings by German and Turkish military and civilian authorities in the field of a state-led organization of the youth. The former German *Bund Jungdeutschland* official Carl Diem had been the personal (civil) assistant of Colmar von der Goltz in the league before the war. During his wartime deployment as a Lieutenant on the Western front in 1916, he wrote the first proposals for a compulsory paramilitary youth organization. Parallel to his civil career as a sports official, Diem continued to propose similar ideas to the German army leadership in the early 1930s. He was eventually invited to Turkey in 1933 and 1937 to write two memoranda on the establishment of a Turkish nation-wide youth organization. A comparative view of the life and early career of Carl Diem and Selim Sırrı [Tarcan] will form the introduction to the second part of this chapter. Diem's activities provide evidence that the organization of youth, as envisioned by Goltz and further developed by Hoff and his Ottoman assistants, easily transitioned from being under the control of the military to that of leading political groups in the respective countries ruled by a single-party. However, all those thoughts had their roots in the education system of the German Empire.

Children Education in Wilhelmine Germany and the Military Mind

Authoritarian education of children in the early 20th century was common across all social classes of the German society. Children were to be educated following the virtues that were also incorporated in the 'German Spirit'. Diligence, duty fulfilment and obedience without contradiction were seen as ideal, and beating children for educative purposes was a normal practice.[6]

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5 In Endres words: "*Militarismus ist die Geistesverfassung des Nichtmilitärs*"*;* Franz Carl Endres, "Soziologische Struktur und ihr entsprechende Ideologien des deutschen Offizierskorps vor dem Weltkriege," *Archiv für Sozialpolitik und Sozialwissenschaft* 58 (1928), 282.

6 Christa Berg, "Familie, Kindheit Jugend," in *Handbuch der deutschen Bildungsgeschichte vol. 4, 1870 – 1918*, ed. Christa Berg (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1991), 112; Adolf Matthias, *Wie erziehen*

The German state had gained the educational monopoly over all of its underaged subjects thorugh the introduction of compulsory schooling in the course of the 19th century. Based on earlier efforts to implement *student's battalions*[7] and the experiences with the arduous French resistance in the war of 1870/71 the German colonel Colmar von der Goltz proposed military instruction in the middle schools. Goltz wanted to use the opportunity to secure the mobilization of the future German soldiers by starting in the classroom.[8] It was part of the German answer to the French concept of the *levée en masse*. The latter had become evident in the use of French militia deployed under the presidency of Léon Gambetta during the last phase of the Franco- Prussian war in 1871. According to Colmar von der Goltz, Germany had to respectively prepare its future generations to field as many trained troops as possible. Goltz advocated his ideas in his military bestseller, *The Nation in Arms* (1883), in which he sketched out the image of the dawning age of total war. Everyone in the society was to be ready for the coming war. Hence for Goltz, the preparation and indoctrination should begin as early as possible. For the veteran of two wars, the advantages of the youth were quite clear, when he inhumanely stated that:

> "It is only the young that depart from life without pangs. [...] They advance into battle with joy and lightheartedness, and both of these are necessary for the bloody work. [...] [W]e must by example, by word, and by pen, continuously work towards this end, so that loyalty towards the Emperor, passionate love for the fatherland, determination not to shrink from hard trials, and self-denial and self-sacrifice may wax mightier and mightier in our hearts and those of our children."[9]

But the time had not yet come for putting these ideas into practice. This was Goltz' aim after his retirement in 1911, when the social framework in Wilhelmine Germany had changed in his favor.

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wir unsern Sohn Benjamin? Ein Buch für deutsche Väter und Mütter, 7th ed. (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1910).

7 For this concept cf. Anonymous, *"Jugendwehr,"* in *Brockhaus' Konversations-Lexikon*, vol. 9, 14th ed. (Berlin, Wien: F.A. Brockhaus, 1902), 1023.

8 Colmar von der Goltz, *Leon Gambetta und seine Armeen* (Berlin: Schneider, 1877), 294 et seq.

9 Colmar von der Goltz, *The Nation in Arms*, trans. Philip Arthur Ashworth (London: W.H. Allen, 1887), 17, 391.

The Beginning of the Boy Scout Movement

Basing on his experience with the military use of local underaged boys in South Africa in 1899, the British General Baden-Powell had published his major work *Scouting for Boys*.[10] The movement spread across the world within a few years and had a dramatic impact on the further development of the German and the beginning Ottoman paramilitary youth organizations.

Baden-Powell had a clearly military view. But he combined the submission under the will of the group leader with virtues also valid for the civilian sphere, an escape from the industrialized urban reality and the utopia of a class-free group.[11] His concept fitted perfectly in the global Western *Zeitgeist* of this era, driven by Social Darwinist fears of the downfall of societies showing any sings of weakness.

In Germany, Alexander Lion, a military doctor who had previously served in the colonies, translated the book.[12] Lion added his own ideas, especially in the field of hygiene. According to him, youth should not waste its strength on the excessive consumption of alcohol, tobacco and other inappropriate behaviour. Instead of "young half fledged youngsters filling the pubs, shouting out loud disgusting songs"[13], young men should join a local Boy Scout or paramilitary *Wehrkraft* group and enjoy nature.[14] It was not an issue for Lion to use a British concept for the German environment, since it served the German armament efforts.[15] Lion even suggested that he had come to similar conclusions as Baden-Powell during his service in the German colony in today's Namibia:

10 Robert Stephenson Smyth Baden-Powell, *Scouting for Boys: A Handbook for Instruction in Good Citizenship* (London: C. Arthur Pearson, 1908).

11 James Riordan, "Baden- Powell: Hero or Villain?," in *Sport and Education in History: Proceedings of the 8th ISHPES Congress 2003*, ed. Gigliola Gori and Thierry Terret (Sankt Augustin: Academie, 2005), 128 et seq.

12 For the colonial link cf. Jeff Bowersox, "Bamberg: Die kolonialen Wurzeln der Pfadfinder," in *Kolonialismus hierzulande: Eine Spurensuche in Deutschland*, ed. U. van der Heyden et al. (Erfurt: Sutton, 2013), 240 – 245.

13 Alexander Lion, *Die Pfadfinder-und Wehrkraftbewegung und ihre Ursachen* (Munich: Gmelin, 1913), 6.

14 On the contemporary environment cf. John Alexander Williams, "Ecstasies of the Young: Sexuality, the Youth Movement, and Moral Panic in Germany on the Eve of the First World War," *Central European History* 34 – 2 (2001), 163 – 189.

15 Lion, *Die Pfadfinder-und Wehrkraftbewegung*, 17.

> "The idea was born in German Southwest Africa [...] to make the German youth healthy and strong, willing to make sacrifices and ready to help [...] [and] also to give willingly the last blood drop for the magnitude and the honor of the fatherland."[16]

Soon, a German Boy Scout movement and its more paramilitary version, the *Wehrkraft* movement, grew. These groups were a grass-root movement that organized among the urban middle and upper class boys and were often led by teachers or young military officers in their leisure time. It was clear that the state monitored those groups with favour and distrust at the same time, since there already existed a more independent movement (*Wandervogel, Bündische Jugend*) and a Social Democrat workers youth outside the control of the state. With the 1908 Imperial law on associations, the state had issued a ban on the admission of members under the age of 18 into political associations.[17] The authorities were aware that such movements had to be countered by a state-sponsored youth association. In 1910 the emperor Wilhelm II stated in a side note of a report about such state organizations in other European countries: "Finally something like that has to be done [in Germany] also, otherwise all boys will be contaminated with socialism."[18]

The Bund Jungdeutschland (BJD)

In 1910 there were many reasons for why the idea of a central youth organization under state control was popular. In addition to the interior factors mentioned above, there existed no school for the apprentices between the middle school and their military service. This increased fears among conservatives that the youth could no longer be indoctrinated.[19] The beginning of the crisis of German foreign policy that climaxed in the Agadir incident in 1911 and the Balkan Wars in 1912/13 had a direct impact on the German armament policy.[20] For Colmar von

16 Lion, *Die Pfadfinder-und Wehrkraftbewegung*, 15 et seq.

17 Cf. Heinrich Muth, "Jugendpflege und Politik: Zur Jugend- und Innenpolitik des Kaiserreichs," *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 12 (1961), 597–619.

18 Quoted after Markus Ingenlath, *Mentale Aufrüstung: Militarisierungstendenzen in Frankreich und Deutschland vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg* (Frankfurt: Campus, 1998), 124.

19 Cf. Georg Kerschensteiner, "Zwischen Schule und Waffendienst," in *Wehrkraft durch Erziehung*, ed. Emil von Schenckendorff et al. (Leipzig: R. Voigtländer, 1904), 239–255; Klaus Saul, "Der Kampf um die Jugend zwischen Volksschule und Kaserne: Ein Beitrag zur 'Jugendpflege' im Wilhelminischen Reich 1890–1914," *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* 1 (1971), 97–143.

20 Stig Förster, *Der doppelte Militarismus: Die deutsche Heeresrüstungspolitik zwischen Status-Quo-Sicherung und Aggression, 1890–1913* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1985), 187.

der Goltz, the German fear of defenselessness in the face of the Entente forces led to claims that military service should last two rather than three years. Shorter service would make available a higher number of trained troops.[21] Those young men were to receive some training before they were old enough to serve in the armed forces. This was not a specific German idea at that time.[22] In Britain, Boy Scouting and similar associations enjoyed the support of the military.[23] Since the defeat of 1904/05 the Russian government funded the activities of patriotic youth organizations offering a pre-military training.[24]

In his last years prior to his retirement, Colmar von der Goltz campaigned for the foundation of a nation-wide youth organization. The restless field marshal could count on the support of the highest state officials. The Bund Jungdeutschland (Young Germany League, BJD) was founded in Berlin under the chairmanship of Goltz in November 1911. The BJD was able to establish local branches in many cities. In addition, several influential organizations joined the BJD with the guarantee that they would keep their organizational independence. Among those members were the national German Boy Scouts association, most of the nation-wide *Wehrkraft* movement, the German Football Association (DFB) and several other sport associations. The BJD officials pretended that the care for physical exercises was to be the main goal of the league.[25] In the beginning it seemed to be a win-win situation for both sides. The member organizations profited from the discounts on train tickets and the various opportunities of the cooperation with the army, including group accommodation in barracks free of charge. Eventually the BJD gained influence on more than 750,000 boys all over Germany and used this opportunity mainly in terms of the unification of the militarized education of youth and the inculcation of patriotic spirit.

However, after a promising start in November 1911, the number of participant dropped very quickly. Consequently, BJD officials started to promote 'battlefield

21 Cf. Muth, *Jugendpflege und Politik*, 609.

22 Geoffrey Best, "The Militarization of European Society, 1870 – 1914," in *The Militarization of the Western World* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989), 13 – 44.

23 The later adversary of the German and Ottoman forces in the Ottoman Arab provinces, Thomas Edward Lawrence, at that time too old for the Boy Scout movement, joined the paramilitary Oxford University Officers Training Corps in 1908. This was a volunteer institution for the training of future leadership personnel among the students. Cf. Jeremy Wilson, *Lawrence of Arabia* (New York: Atheneum, 1990), 52.

24 Kurt Schneider, "100 Jahre nach Napoleon: Rußlands gefeierte Kriegserfahrung," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 49 – 1 (2001), 52.

25 Werner Bethge, "Bund Jungdeutschland (BJD), 1911 – 1923," in *Lexikon zur Parteiengeschichte: Die bürgerlichen und kleinbürgerlichen Parteien und Verbände in Deutschland, 1789 – 1945*, ed. Dieter Fricke et al., vol. 1 (Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut, 1983), 330 – 347.

Figure 4: Jungdeutschland group on the march, c. 1913

tourism' in order to attract the male youth to BJD meetings. In the military periodical *Militär-Wochenblatt* an anonymous regiment commander mentioned a decreasing interest for the BJD activities in a south German small town.[26] Through the announcement of a battlefield tour in Wörth (Frœschwiller-Wœrth) in the summer of 1912, the officer could once again attract more participants. The interested young boys only could participate after they had joined the preparatory weekly gatherings throughout the spring of 1912 that included a series of a military history lectures on the battle of Wörth in 1870. It was suggested by the anonymous author that these courses be based on the battlefield guidebook by Rudolf Mohr.[27] Within short time the number of participants in these BJD gatherings had doubled and the young boys had attended the class with enthusiasm. The anonymous author proposed the stimulation of the juvenile enthusiasm for patriotic indoctrination by the use of the 1870/71 war events as one of the best methods to attract youth. Indeed, he did not mention the possible hidden resistance of some of those boys resulting from the South German experience in the Napoleonic Wars and in 1866, when the Southern principalities had been the enemies of Prussia. German military history lectures in the BJD had to be selected carefully according to the local conditions.

The military garrison commanders also tried to incorporate the BJD formations into patriotic events. In Freiburg, even before the foundation of the BJD,

26 Anonymous, "Jungdeutschland," *MWB* 106 (1912), cols. 2426 – 2427.

27 Rudolf Mohr, *Die Schlacht bei Wörth: Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Kunz'schen Schriften und der neuesten französischen Veröffentlichungen: Ein Führer über das Schlachtfeld* (Gießen: Roth, 1908).

the local *Jugendwehr* branch participated in a mustering of the troops. They were mostly pupils from secondary schools, among them also vocational and commercial school students. Parents also attended the regular evening talk sessions on patriotic topics, thereby tightening the aspired connection between the military and the local population's middle class even further. It is through such events that the education of a "joyful, healthy, national and eager to defend youth" would be guaranteed.[28]

In every public speech, Colmar von der Goltz claimed that the BJD's primary aim was not militarily, but rather "borne by the one spirit, to make our today's youth [...] defensive against the enemy, strong against the seductions of today's world and capable for the practical life of the single person and of the collectivity". Germany was to have a generation that would "obey willingly and stand sentry fearless bearing the old German saying in heart: *Much foe, much honor.*"[29] In a similar vein, General Jung pleaded for sports, exercise in the field, and the education towards subordination to the orders given by superiors. The boys were to learn self-sacrifice, but for this purpose no entirely military style field exercises were to be applied.[30] Furthermore, the instructors were to concentrate on the training of small-scale units. This concept can also be seen as the preliminary model of the storm trooper forces that were established in the German army after 1915.[31] According to Jung, the collaboration of officers on a regular basis would create groups that would "go through hell and high water" for their leaders.[32] Jung concluded that it would be of no importance if those officers held their classes in sport clubs, catholic or protestant Boy Scout associations or at the local branches of the BJD.[33]

The German military was very well aware of the critique their efforts might provoke. In the German military encyclopedia entry on the BJD, the abstinence from openly political agitation was emphasized: "Any political activity remains excluded; education in male deed [Erziehung zu männlicher Tat] remains the target."[34] However, the BJD was far from being an apolitical organization. The activ-

28 Von Graevenitz, "Die Freiburger Jugendwehr," *MWB* 26 (1912), col. 573.

29 Von Frobel, "Der erste Führerkursus des Jungdeutschland-Bundes," *MWB* 149 (1912), cols. 3401 et seq.

30 Generalmajor z.D. Jung, "Der Jungdeutschland-Bund und die Mitarbeit der Armee und Marine in diesem Bunde," *MWB* 37 (1914), col. 778.

31 Krethlow, *Generalfeldmarschall Goltz*, 507.

32 Jung, "Der Jungdeutschland-Bund," col 779.

33 Jung, "Der Jungdeutschland-Bund," col. 780.

34 Anonymous, "Jungdeutschland," in *Handbuch für Heer und Flotte*, vol. 5, ed. Georg von Alten and Hans von Albert (Berlin: Bong, 1914), 206.

ities of Colonel Heinrich von Hoff (1878 – 1941) are illustrative in this regard. Hoff served in the ministry of war in the Kingdom of Württemberg. After the foundation of the BJD, he became the liaison officer between the Württemberg contingent of the German army and the local BJD association in Stuttgart. He rose to one of the most active and influential military officials in the BJD through his publishing activities. According to Hoff, the task of the BJD was quite clear:

> "[...] [T]hat in this league a truly German [kerndeutsch] people will be educated, a people with strong arms and strong mind, ready for tremendous performance, capable of great deeds, never discouraged, insurmountable in battle and filled with loyalty and belief, with a sense of honor and of duty, with adoration for the great fatherland!"[35]

Hoff used his position in the ministry to support the activities of the BJD.[36] But he was also an influential publisher. In his introduction to the BJD handbook, Hoff outlined his understanding of the league's purposes. He claimed that the association would serve the whole society by educating a strong youth even though he admitted that the army would have the most to gain. In the neighboring European countries, state authorities had also started to prepare their youth physically and morally for the inevitable war. The German youth was to be ready for military service already at the age of 12. The BJD should also contribute to overcome the class contradictions and help to unite the German nation against the perceived foreign thread.[37] In this regard, the BJD contributed to the imagination of the ethnically homogenous nation, as expressed by the head of the BJD local branch in Hameln. The young members of the BJD were to get used to the idea of "discovering the national comrade in the playfellow."[38] As a means of achieving this aim, the rather casual and voluntary character of the local BJD branches was to be replaced by a mandatory German-wide organization in the future. In his conceptual study published prior to his departure to the Ottoman Empire, Hoff stated that "[A] certain compulsion has to be inserted in that

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35 Heinrich von Hoff, *Jungdeutschland: Lichtbildervortrag im Auftrag der Leitung des BJD Stuttgart*, n.d. [c. 1913], 26 et seq. HStAS M660 – 115.

36 Hoff to Württemberg Minister of War Marchthaler regarding the BJD, 12 December 1912, HStAS M1 – 3 Bü 667, 9 – 10. See also Hoff's report on the BJD meeting in Stuttgart in June 1914; Heinrich von Hoff, "Bilder von der großen Tagung Jungdeutschlands in Stuttgart," in *Jungdeutschland- Post*, 1 July 1914, 193 – 194.

37 Heinrich von Hoff, *Jungdeutschland-Taschenbuch* (Stuttgart, Berlin, Leipzig: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1913), 3 – 13.

38 "[...] in dem Spielgenossen auch den Volksgenossen zu erkennen." Quoted after Reinhard Höhn, *Sozialismus und Heer. vol. 3: Der Kampf des Heeres gegen die Sozialdemokratie* (Bad Harzburg: Verlag für Wissenschaft, Wirtschaft und Technik, 1969), 562.

age, when the soul of the youth is fermenting the most, when this soul has to fight out the most struggles with itself and the surrounding world."[39]

The activities of the BJD also caught the interest of foreign experts. The French military attaché in Berlin dedicated one of his reports to the activities of the BJD under the guidance of Colmar von der Goltz. For Maurice Pellé, the BJD was focused on "l'education physique de la jeunesse, sa preparation au service militaire, et l'education morale, religieuse, politique (dans le sens de la lutte contre le socialisme)."[40] Pellé claimed that the role model for the Germans were the French *bataillons scolaires*, thereby intentionally not mentioning the British role model. But for the French attaché, the German way of organizing such a centralized, military-led association would be "impossible d'acclimater chez nous."[41] Evidently, a militarized youth association such as the BJD was unthinkable in the French political environment. Other foreign military spectators were also impressed by the German way of organizing the youth movement. An Ottoman witness of a Boy Scout parade in 1911 in Hamburg enthusiastically reported that the young boys and their soldierly appeal were "the cornerstones of the German army."[42]

Resistance to the BJD

The fiercest resistance came from the German left, whose youth was not allowed to organize along the lines of the BJD after the Imperial ban on underaged membership in political associations in 1908. There were several incidents prior to

39 Heinrich von Hoff, *Jugendwehr und Zukunftsheer: Ein Rückblick und ein Ausblick* (Oldenburg: Stalling, 1915), 49.

40 Maurice Pellé, Report no 395 "Jugendbewegung, foundation de la Ligue Jung-Deutschland (Jeune Allemagne)," 24 December 1911, in *La Guerre Ne Tardera Pas: Correspondance de Maurice Pellé, Attaché Militaire de France à Berlin de 1909 à 1912*, ed. Jean-Noël Grandhomme et al. (Paris: Armand Colin, 2014), 79.

41 Pellé, *La Guerre Ne Tardera Pas*, 82.

42 "Alman ordusunun temel taşları"; A. Şükrü, "Keşşaf Yoldaşlığı: Boy Scout," *İdman* 1 (15 Mayis 1329/28 May 1913), 5–8. Cf. Yaşar Tolga Cora, "Asker-Vatandaşlar ve Kahraman Erkekler: Balkan Savaşları ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı Dönemlerinde Beden Terbiyesi Aracılığıyla İdeal Erkekliğin Kurgulanması" [Citizen-Soldiers and Heroic Men: The Construction of Ideal Masculinity during the Balkan Wars and World War I], in *Erkek Millet- Asker Millet: Türkiye'de Militarism, Milliyetçilik, Erkek(lik)ler*, ed. Nurseli Yeşim Sünbüloğlu (Istanbul: İletişim, 2013), 58.

1914 when young Social Democrats tried to disrupt BJD meetings and harassed BJD members of the same age.[43]

The *Wandervogel* movement also distrusted the BJD's intentions. The way of playing war in the BJD activities could weaken obedience, since the war itself would no longer be taken seriously. Moreover, young people would later also need another pedagogic concept as conscripts. The instructions of officers who were used to the parade-ground voice were counterproductive. This was seen as one of the greatest weaknesses of the BJD, while other associations such as the Boy Scouts and the *Wandervogel* had developed age-based special trainings.[44]

A more direct critique came from the liberal educational reformers. The BJD and the Bavarian *Wehrkraft* movement were seen as a militarized movement that modeled after the British Boy Scouts. The inconspicuous nationalist indoctrination was seen as critical since in the talks given on military history, contemporary pacifist ideas were refuted.[45] For the *Wandervogel* followers, the BJD had clearly political aims, that is, to "educate a pan-German- militarist minded generation".[46] The BJD was accused of misusing the concept of love of one's country and the ruling dynasty as if those were the BJD member's favorite "football club [...] [:] A blind enthusiasm is systematically bred which can then be used by the leaders [Führer] for whatever means."[47] The BJD mainly made use of chauvinistic phrases and slogans whose empty content would be understood by the more mature boys sooner or later. For Wyneken, the BJD officials were clearly a minority in Germany albeit a loud one. The BJD's weak point was that it had not been initiated by youth. In contrast to the *Wandervogel* groups, it was an artificial institution founded from above with borrowings from the military culture. Thus according to Wyneken the BJD was the perfect supplement to the German authoritarian school system, aiming at the subordination of the masses and evoking herd instinct instead of bravery.

43 Report of Goltz to Emperor Wilhelm II, 25 November 1913; cf. Saul, *Der Kampf umd die Jugend*, 139 et seq.

44 E.M. Schuberth, "Kriegsspiele," *Der Vortrupp* 1–11 (1912), 328–333.

45 Hans Reichenbach, "Die Militarisierung der deutschen Jugend: I. Der Tatbestand," *Die freie Schulgemeinde* 3–4 (1913), 101.

46 Gustav Wyneken, "Die Militarisierung der deutschen Jugend: II. Deutung und Werdung," *Die freie Schulgemeinde* 3–4 (1913), 111.

47 Wyneken, "Die Militarisierung der deutschen Jugend: II.," 112.

The Ottoman Youth Movement before the Deployment of Hoff, 1910 – 1916

An increasing number of West European trends found their way into the Ottoman Empire since the Young Turk revolution in 1908. Among them was also the Boy Scout movement that had been adopted by teachers in the Ottoman capital in 1910 under the term *keşşaflık*. Those groups mainly consisted of boys from the urban higher classes.[48] This was eased by the post-revolutionary Ottoman law on associations in 1909 that, for the first time, allowed the foundation of apolitical youth clubs.[49]

The political situation of the empire remained critical also after the events of 1908/09. As a reaction to foreign threat and the perceived internal enemies, Nationalist Turkish groups started to focus on the mobilization of the Muslim youth.[50] The problem of the Ottoman army was obvious: a vast Empire had to be defended by a limited number of Muslim men eligible for military service.[51] The introduction of general conscription for Non-Muslims in 1909 only brought short relief, since many of those new recruits proved unreliable in the Balkan Wars.[52] The performance of Muslim troops in 1912/13 also failed to fulfill the expectations of the Ottoman military high command. Whole units fleeing the battlefield in panic, regardless of their ethnic or religious affiliation, had a devastating effect, especially on the morale of the Muslim part of the Ottoman society at home.[53]

After the defeat in the Balkan Wars, the organization of youth associations became more military oriented.[54] Due to their seize of power in January 1913,

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48 Zafer Toprak, "II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde Paramiliter Gençlik Örgütleri" [Paramilitary Youth Organizations in the Second Constitutional Period], in *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 2 (Istanbul: İletişim, 1985), 531.

49 Zafer Toprak, "1909 Cemiyetler Kanunu" [The 1909 Law on Associations], in *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 1 (Istanbul: İletişim, 1985), 205 – 208.

50 Ginio, *The Ottoman Culture of Defeat*, 171 – 175. For the Ottoman educational discours before the revolution see Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, 224 – 235.

51 Cf. Colmar von der Goltz, "Stärke und Schwäche des türkischen Reiches," *Deutsche Rundschau* 93 (1897), 118.

52 Cf. Hartmann, *Die Reichweite des Staates*.

53 Funda Selçuk Şirin, "The Traumatic Legacy of the Balkan Wars for Turkish Intellectuals," in *War and Nationalism*, ed. Hakan M. Yavuz et al., 679 – 703.

54 For the latest research on the *Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri* see Akcan, *İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası'nın*; Mehmet Beşikçi, "Militarizm, Topyekün Savaş ve Gençliğin Seferber Edilmesi: Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Paramiliter Dernekler" [Militarism, Total War and Mobilizing the Youth: Paramilitary Associations in the Ottoman Empire in the First World War], *Tarih*

the military gained influence on the Ottoman civil government. In the same year, as a new civilian initiative the *Turkish Power Association (Türk Güç Derneği, TGD)* had been founded by the nationalist Turkish Hearths (Türk Ocakları) association.[55] Consequently, also the Ottoman Boy Scouts in the capital started to focus more on paramilitary training by the employment of the Belgian citizen Harold Parfitt. He supported the Ottoman efforts in scouting between spring and September 1914. But Parfitts intentions were clear since for him the Ottoman Boy Scouts were "a school which prepares boys as devoted slaves to the army."[56]

The main difficulty of organizing the youth movement was the inadequate Ottoman school system. Outside of the urban centers, most of the children did not even receive primary education. This led to an average analphabet rate of more than 90 per cent.[57] In the eyes of Colmar von der Goltz, these challenges were to be overcome.[58] In a report written during his stay in Constantinople in 1910, Goltz underlined that the Ottoman state should not simply copy Western models of youth organizations and education. In terms of the education of youth in a military spirit, first of all the teachers had to be prepared better for their profession. Retired officers should also be hired as assistant teachers. In Goltz's view, the main task was to "inspire a patriotic and soldierly spirit in the youth, to fill it with joy for the glory and magnitude of Turkey and to give it a healthy physical education that prepares it for a military profession."[59] Selim Sırrı, a former officer and inspector of physical education in the Ottoman ministry of education since 1911 had already started to work in this field. In the last year of his military career, in an article for the military journal *Asker*, he proposed to strengthen sports in Ottoman society. Selim Sırrı was keen on revive the old European saying "strong as a Turk", most likely to counter the pejorative Eurocentric view of the 'sick man of Europe'.[60]

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ve Toplum 8 (2009), 55. See also Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower*, 203 – 245; Ateş, *Asker Evlatlar Yetiştirmek*.

55 Füsun Üstel, *İmparatorluktan Ulus-Devlete Türk Milliyetçiliği: Türk Ocakları, 1912 – 1931* [Turkish Nationalism from Empire to Nation-State: The Turkish Hearths, 1912 – 1931] (Istanbul: İletişim, 1997), 64.

56 Quoted after Akmeşe, *The Birth of Modern Turkey*, 170.

57 Cf. the estimated average numbers in François Georgeon, "Lire et Écrire à la Fin de l'Empire Ottoman: Quelques Remarques Introductives," *Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée* 75 – 1 (1995), 171.

58 Regarding the German role in the modernization of the Ottoman educational system, Goltz sided with contemporary German Orientalists. Cf. Becker, *Das türkische Bildungsproblem*, 27.

59 BA-MA N737/ V. 10, 57.

60 "Türk gibi kuvvetli"; Selim Sırrı: "Hayat Harekettir!" [Life is Movement!], *Asker*, 11 July 1324/ 1908, 198.

In his work Selim Sırrı applied the 'nation in arms' concept by Colmar von der Goltz.[61] However, the ambitious Ottoman sports functionary had studied Swedish gymnastics at its source in Stockholm in 1909, and was also impressed by the Hungarian public gymnastic displays in Budapest in the summer of 1914.[62] Selim Sırrı was not a follower of German methods in all regards, since he personally favoured Swedish gymnastics. Selim Sırrı and the influential sports teacher Ali Faik [Üstünidman] argued on this issue. After his return from Sweden, Selim Sırrı had made a gymnastics performance for the students in the *Mekteb-i Sultani* (today's Galatasaray high school) sports hall, the work place of Ali Faik. Selim Sırrı finished his gymnastics presentation with German Turnen exercises, thereby proving his ability to do both styles. Thereafter, he declared that most countries in the world had turned towards the Swedish model and that the Ottoman sportsmen should also do so. Ali Faik, with his Wilhelmine handlebar moustache, completely disagreed with this view and, in the presence of Selim Sırrı, appealed to his students' male pride:

> "Swedish gymnastics is for women. Shake your hand, your arm; where is the gymnastic? Gymnastics without the apparatus is not possible. We worked out our biceps solely with German Turnen. Please stop it. Spare us your snot [sümüğünü], withdraw from your gymnastics..."[63]

Selim Sırrı's views were already questioned before the First World War. Meanwhile, due to the dramatic outcome of the Balkan Wars, the *Turkish Power Association* had been coopted by the Ministry of War and transformed into the *Ottoman Strength Association (Osmanlı Güç Derneği)* on 27 May 1914.[64] In the first months of the war, the Ottoman Empire remained neutral. Nonetheless, Ottoman interest in the German way of mobilizing the youth was growing.[65]

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61 Cora, "Constructing and Mobilizing the Nation," 50.

62 Cora, "Constructing and Mobilizing the Nation," 62.

63 Suat Aray, *Bir Galatasaraylının Hatıraları: Mektebi Sultani'de Saltanat'tan Cumhuriyet'e* [The Memoirs of a Galatasaray Member: From Sultanate to Republic in the Royal School], (Ankara: İnkilap Kitabevi, n.d. [c. 1959]), 80. For this controversy see also Doğan Yıldız, *Türk Spor Tarihi* [*Turkish Sport History*], (Istanbul: Eko Matbaası, 1979), 331.

64 Ateş, *Asker Evlatlar Yetiştirmek*, 295 – 342.

65 Cf. the pictures of two German boys, one of them in BJD garment, in the periodical of the Ottoman Naval League with the description "*The fundament of victory: Two German volunteers, one of them 14, the other 15 years old,*" *Donanma Mecmuası* 5 – 23 (1330/1914), 358.

Jungdeutschland in the Ottoman Lands: Heinrich von Hoff, 1916 – 1917

Heinrich von Hoff had served one year as a battalion commander on the Western front. Being used to back office work in the Württemberg ministry of war, his health was affected by a life in the trenches, resulting in a cardiac disease. He became unfit for front service and was posted back to Stuttgart.[66] At this time, the Ottoman ministry of war requested a German specialist for the reorganization of *Osmanlı Güç Derneği*.

Not only qualified through his publications but also immediately available, Hoff was posted to the Ottoman army.[67] Goltz wished Hoff that he would "find as at home, also here the best ways to sow a nucleus for a stalwart seed for the future." Goltz also expressed his "doubts about a fast and pleasant success; you will need a lot of patience."[68] For Goltz, the reorganization and modernization of the Ottoman state was a long-term project of the military and civilian sphere alike. But Hoff who had no experience serving abroad, let alone any knowledge of the special Ottoman wartime conditions, seemed not to have been fully aware of this time-consuming work. Hoff's posture was kept a secret for a long time. His name was neither mentioned in the 1940 list of German officers who had served in the Ottoman and Turkish army, nor in the wartime British handbook on the Ottoman army.[69]

After Hoffs arrival in the Ottoman capital on 17 April 1916, in replacement of *Osmanlı Güç Derneği,* the Ottoman Youth Association (*Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri*, OGD) was founded. Hoff was received on 2 February 1916 by the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed V Reşad together with the Constantinople representative for the house of Württemberg, Karl von Urach.[70] Urach introduced Hoff "as a liaison officer, highly estimated by Field marshal von der Goltz and successfully entrusted

66 Hoff's personal file, HStAS M 430 Bü 893: n.p.

67 This was not the first time that Goltz recommended Hoff. In mid-July 1914 Goltz had requested Hoff for the projected Jungdeutschland association's pressboard in Berlin. However, due to the war, those plans became obsolete two weeks later. Goltz to the Württemberg Minister of War Marchthaler, 16 July 1914. HStA Stgt M 1/3 Bü 54, 11–12.

68 Letter Goltz to Hoff, 8 March 1916. HStAS M 660/ 115 Nr. 35.

69 Anonymous, *Deutsche Offiziere in der Türkei*, (N.p., 1941). The British Handbook was not up to date and still listed Harold Parfitt as the head of the Ottoman Youth organization; *1916 Handbook of the Turkish Army*, ed. British General Staff (London: Imperial War Museum, 1996), 120.

70 BOA İ. MBH. Do 19 Gö 43.

with the organization of the Württemberg Jugendwehr, who would dedicate himself to the same deeds in Turkey."[71]

The Württemberg representative was not the only person that was familiar to Hoff from Stuttgart. The vice head of the Ottoman General Staff, Friedrich Bronsart von Schellendorf, had been the former commander of the Grenadier Regiment 'Queen Olga' (1st Württembergian) No.119 from 1912 to the end of 1913.[72] Hoff thus already had an important contact outside the Ottoman authorities, which was important for his work since he was not a member of the official German military mission in the Ottoman capital.

The collaboration between von Hoff and Selim Sırrı seemed fruitful in the beginning. Hoff analyzed the status of OGD and wrote a proposal of a preliminary law regarding its coercive organization.[73] Hoff's ideas were thereafter put into practice immediately on 24 April 1916. Older boys eligible for service could be forced to join the OGD gatherings and training, but gained advantage from their previous OGD membership when they entered the regular army. Younger boys were also coerced into joining OHD gatherings, in practice often through the use of local police forces.

The best documentation of the institutionalized cooperation of the German and the Ottoman side was the OGD periodical that contained articles by Hoff and his staff of Ottoman officers. For this reason, it deserves closer analysis with regard to the knowledge that was transferred to the Ottoman lands. Beyond overview articles on comprehensive topics related to the war, the training and teaching of boys made up a large part of their content.[74] In addition to the military authorities, many governors and local state representatives subscribed to the *OGD Mecmuası*.[75] It was also read by teachers from small town and rural areas. As a way of promoting the periodical, Hoff and his staff also made use of the official channels of the Ottoman civil authorities in order generate enthusiasm for the organization and spread its ideas to every corner of the empire.[76] As one of the periodical's figureheads, Heinrich von Hoff's articles usually figured

71 Karl von Urach, "Tätigkeit im Osmanischen Reich, 1915–17," HStA Stuttgart GU 120 BÜ 108, n.p.

72 [Karl] Imhoff, "Notizen über deutsche Militärmissionen in der Türkei, " 70.

73 Cf. Hoff's notes in HStA Stgt M660/115 Nr. 5, 1–38, Anonymous, *Genç Dernekleri Hakkında Kanun-ı Muvakkat ve Talimatname* [Provisional Law and Guidelines regarding the Youth Association], (Istanbul: Matbaa-ı Askeriye, 1332/1916). Cf. Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower*, 236.

74 Ateş, *Asker Evlatlar Yetiştirmek*, 405.

75 Cf. letter from Asım Bey to Hoff, 15 November 1917. HStA Stgt M660/115 Nr. 55.

76 On the distribution see BOA DH.UMVM. Do 150 Gö 41 and BOA MF. MKT. Do 1224 Gö 96.

Figure 5: Heinrich von Hoff (center), Selim Sırrı (right) and their Ottoman staff in 1916.

on the first pages of every issue. The German expert continuously urged for the creation of a strong generation. By preparing youth for military service, "the army is brought into being in the right way."[77] Boys should be trained prior to their military service in order to shorten the military basic training and become available for front duties earlier. Physical exercises and marches made up a large part of OGD activities. Part of this programme should also include practical training such as the throwing of stones into the distance. In Hoff's view, this exercise had a clear purpose. Should the boy not master such an easy task, as a soldier, "he will never throw the hand grenade in a right way and will not hit the target."[78] Exercises with a clear military character, including firearms instruction for older boys in the Dinç section in cooperation with the local Ottoman Gendarmerie, became part of the OGD's curriculum.[79] Hoff repeatedly highlighted

77 Hoff, "Bazı Umumi Terbiye Meselelerine Dair" [On some General Training Problems], *OGDM* 1–1 (1 September 1333/1917), 13.

78 Hoff, "Genç Derneklerinde Talimlerin Harb-ı Hazırdaki Kiymeti: Alman Dinçleri Hidmet-i Askeriyeye Nasil Hazirlaniyorlar?" [The Value of Training in Youth Associations in the Present War: How do the German *Dinç* Sections Prepare for Military Service?], *OGDM* 1–5 (1 Kanun-u Sani 1334/1918), 10. Cf. a previous similar article focussing on throwing hand grenades in an issue of the BJD periodical which also contained an article by Hoff. Anonymous, "Von der Wichtigkeit des Wehrturnens," *Jungdeutschland- Post*, 1 August 1916, 309 – 310.

79 Akcan, *İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası'nın*, 241.

the German example of the BJD and expressed that "we hope our loyal allies would imitate the good things that they had observed on us."[80] For this purpose, Hoff selected several chapters from his BJD handbook (1913) for publication in the OGD periodical after his return to Germany.[81] Besides those practice-oriented texts, some of his articles also clearly featured Social Darwinist ideas. Hoff argued that youth had to be instructed in a way that victory or defeat was to decide on the existence of the Ottoman nation. Great things could be expected from Ottoman youth strengthened by this experience. During war, youth should replace the losses at the front, and it should be prepared mentally and physically for the post-war period in order to make the Ottoman nation insurmountable in future conflicts. In achieving this goal, the Ottomans could count on the assistance of their German ally: "The Ottomans know that they have in the Germans, their allies, a real friend and that they will find an honest and primary support in any necessary matter."[82]

As to the question of choosing leaders for young people, Hoff followed the German pre-war discourse. Young Ottoman officers were preferred as leaders of the local OGD groups, especially in the *Dinç* section comprised of older members between the ages of 17 and 20. Not only would the boys get used to the orders of superiors but those officers would also gain leadership skills. The officer was to become a father figure for his *Dinç* group. All the officers were to receive special training prior to their deployment, also including special courses during their time at military school.[83] Hoff also made use of his experiences as a front commander in France (1914 – 1915), where he had witnessed the positive outcome of the former BJD membership among young soldiers. Hoff claimed that they had been prepared for the battlefield during their time in the BJD. But the truth content of those two articles is dubious, since they also might have been fabricated

80 Hoff, "Genç Derneklerinde Terbiye-i Bedeniye: Almanya'da Terbiye-i Bedeniye" [Physical Training in the Youth Associations: Physical Education in Germany], *OGDM* 1 – 4 (1 Kanun-u Evvel 1333/ 1917), 2.

81 Hoff, "Alman Genç Dernekleri Cep Kitabından: Genç Derneklerinde Arazi Tatbikatından; İki Kıtanın Karşılıklı Arazı Oyunları" [From the Handbook of the Young Germany Association: From the Field Exercises of Youth Association; Games of two Opposing Teams], *OGDM* 1 – 11 (1 Temmuz 1334/ 1918), 4 – 7; for the German original cf. Hoff, *Jungdeutschland- Taschenbuch*, 74 et seq.

82 Hoff, "Gençlik ve Harb" [Youth and War], *OGDM* 1 – 6 (1 Şubat 1334/1918), 2.

83 Hoff, "Genç Derneklerinde Dinçlerin Talim ve Terbiyesi: Zabıt, Gençlerin Mürebbisi Olarak" [Training and Education in the Dinç Section of the OGD: The Officer as the Tutor of the Youth], *OGDM* 1 – 7 (1 Mart 1334/1918), 1 – 2. Cf. for the prewar discussion in Germany Hermann Giehrl, "Offizier und Jugendbewegung," *Vierteljahreshefte für Truppenführung und Heereskunde* 11 – 2 (1914): 287 – 304.

for propaganda purposes.[84] The coverage of volunteers, also within the OGD, was often exaggerated.[85] To further support propaganda efforts, Hoff also ordered a pre-war propaganda movie by the BJD from Germany that was screened twice in the Ottoman Empire.[86]

Regarding the numbers of underaged volunteers, it remains unclear how many of the OGD members tried to join the army before they were of military age. Many underaged volunteers in Germany, some of them members of the BJD, tried to gain entry in 1914, but most of them were rejected. They remained a small minority. It was only in the last year of the war that underaged boys were drafted when the age group of 1901 was called up.[87] In a similar vein, the recruitment age in the Ottoman army dropped from 20 in 1914 to the age of 18 in the subsequent year.[88] This was followed by an increased drafting of underaged boys until the end of the war although the numbers were unreliable since most of the recruits did not know their exact date of birth.[89] However, the use of underaged soldiers in Ottoman service was not a mass phenomenon.[90] It would, therefore, be wrong to postulate the same enthusiasm for war in the Otto-

84 Hoff, "Genç Derneklerinde Fedarkarlık: Alman Siperlerine Ait Hakiki Bir Vaka" [Self-Sacrifice In The Youth Associations: A Real Case From The German Trenches], *OGDM* 1–7 (1 Mart 1334/ 1918), 9–10 and Hoff, "Genç Derneklerinde Müsahebat: Harb Tecrübeleri" [Lectures for the Youth Associations: War Experiences], *OGDM* 1–8 (1 Nisan 1334), 5–6. See in this regard his slightly imaginary August 1914 propagnda article on the physical 'benefits' of the BJD for young German volunteers; Hoff: "Freiweillige vor!," *Jungdeutschland- Post* 1 August1914, 246–247.

85 See the case of Gürbüz Derneği's activities in İzmit, where a growth-restricted middle school pupil was allowed to join the association since he could not volunteer the army in 1912 and in 1914. Anonymous, "Kahraman Türk Yaveri/ Ein türkischer Held," *Die Nationalverteidigung*, 1 June 1916, 252.

86 After a first screening in the capital it was sent to Beirut; BOA Maarif Nezareti Mektubi Kalemi Defterleri [=MF. MKT.] Do 1223 Gö 24. The name of the respective film remains unclear. It could be "Jungdeutschland bei der Geländeübung" (produced in December 1912), that is currently preserved in the German Federal Archive's Film Archives (BA Filmarchiv; no signature). For the movie see also Akcan, *İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası'nın*, 262.

87 Andreas Gestrich, "Jugend und Krieg: Kriegsverarbeitung bei Jugendlichen in und nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg," in *Das Andere wahrnehmen: Beiträge zur europäischen Geschichte; August Nitschke zum 65. Geburtstag gewidmet*, ed. Martin Kintzinger and Johannes Zahlten (Köln, Weimar, Wien: Böhlau, 1991), 637.

88 Akcan, *İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası'nın*, 215, 291.

89 Patrick Bartsch, "Kinder im Krieg. Fiktion, Ideologie und Realität eines Motivs in der türkischen Literatur am Beispiel der Kurzgeschichte Bir Çocuk: Aleko von Ömer Seyfeddin," in *Bamberger Orientstudien*, vol. 1. ed. Lale Behzade et al. (Bamberg: University of Bamberg Press, 2014), 58.

90 Bartsch, "Kinder im Krieg," 60.

man lands as in Germany among boys and young men alike.[91] It should also be noted that the cult of the religiously charged martyrdom and the promised otherworldly rewards were not a particular specialty of Ottoman propaganda.[92] Indeed, daily routine of young boys in wartime Germany and the Ottoman Empire was far from heroic. For the duration of the war, the previously regular OGD and BJD gatherings ceased, their instructors were drafted and the boys simply had to work. In rural areas, many of them had to assist in farming and male handcraft was needed in time of total mobilization.[93]

The Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri between Appropriation and Originality

The OGD can be seen as a definite appropriation of the German BJD in the Ottoman context.[94] In the Ottoman Ministry of War, the German officer Heinrich von Hoff and Selim Sırrı and their staff worked on devising a programme of paramilitary education of 12–17 year-old boys based on the German example. Hoffs contributions to the OGDM are a strong indicator for this transfer. However, there were also limitations. Hoff was already confronted with several difficulties in summer 1916. The financial situation of the Ottoman state did not permit any generous funding for the local OGD groups in the empire.[95] Furthermore, the Ottoman administration could not provide reliable statistical data regarding the number of boys aged 12–17 in the Ottoman territory. Hoff pointed out this problem in an article[96] and the responsible department in the Ministry of the Interior

91 This is also indicated by Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower*, 215.

92 For its use in the Ottoman youth organizations cf. Cora, "Asker-Vatandaşlar ve Kahraman Erkekler," 65. For ideas on "Jungdeutschland's heavenly realm", i. e. the phantasy of a kind of military paradise where the fallen young soldiers who had sacrificed themselves were greeted by Frederick the Great and other prominent German commanders see Otto von Gottberg, "Der Krieg," in *Scherls Jungdeutschland- Jahrbuch* (Berlin: August Scherl, 1914), 398–401; especially the military '*Walhalla*' picture on p. 401.

93 Klaus Saul, "Jugend im Schatten des Krieges. Vormilitärische Ausbildung- Kriegswirtschaftlicher Einsatz- Schulalltag in Deutschland 1914–1918," *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* 2 (1983), 91–184, for the Ottoman case see Ateş, *Asker Evlatlar Yetiştirmek*, 434; Akcan, *İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası'nın*, 295.

94 Cf. Ateş, *Asker Evlatlar Yetiştirmek*, 29.

95 In 1917 in the official records there were more than 706 local groups throughout the empire, where around a quarter of a million boys aging 12–18 were organized. Zafer Toprak, "İttihad ve Terakki'nin Paramiliter Gençlik Örgütleri" [The Paramilitary Youth Organizations of the Committee of Union and Progress], *Bogaziçi Üniversitesi Beseri Bilimler Dergisi* 7 (1979), 113.

96 Hoff, "Nüfusun istatistiği" [Population Statistics], *OGDM* 1–3 (1 Teşrin-i Sani 1333/1917), 8–9.

tried to prepare this information in the summer of 1917. Nonetheless, the unreliability of those numbers remained a weak point until the end of the OGD,[97] since "Ottoman officialdom was frequently just as concerned with producing quantitative as qualitative results."[98]

In the first months of his stay in Constantinople, Hoff tried to adapt to the situation and get used to the new environment. In his first report to the Württemberg minister of war, he mentioned the severe conditions of war that the Ottoman state was exposed to since 1911. On the topic of his and the work of the German military mission, he admitted that

> "Many a [German] forgets the influence that religion, climate and Oriental custom have to have and that a people [Volk] can not change innerly overnight than it used to be since long ago. Shaking the head in impatience [...] only leads to failure. [...] Initially my occupation extended to the creation of a general youth organization; soon the practical implementation of the same will lead me to long journeys to inner Asia Minor."[99]

In the same report Hoff also mentioned the rather preparatory character of OGD training, as was the case with the BJD in Germany, and the benefits of leadership experience among officers and NCOs.[100] It was absolutely essential to Hoff that the Ottoman school system be improved. He highlighted this fact when evaluating his experiences in the Ottoman lands:

> "For the Turkish land [Türkenland] that was short of schools, the Genç Dernekleri were nothing else than a common elementary school in its simplest form for the whole male youth with the lowest expenditures in teaching material and costs."[101]

However, the alphabetization of the Ottoman or rather, in Hoff's opinion, the Turkish part of the male population was not the focus of his work. In another article based on his diaries and published after his return to Germany during the war, Hoff elaborated on his idea of the primary education that those Muslim boys needed and ways of achieving it. He started with the situation, as it was when he came to the Ottoman lands, initially focusing on the small number of schools in urban areas:

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97 BOA DH.UMVM. Do 148 Gö 53.

98 Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, 122.

99 Hoff to Marchthaler, Konstantinopel 29 March 1916. HStA Stgt M 660/027, 1–5.

100 HStA Stgt M 660/027, 6.

101 Hoff, "Die osmanische Jugendorganisation," *Deutsche Kultur in der Welt: Von der Goltz Gedächtnisheft* 3/4 (1917), 129.

> "[...] [T]he creation of a type of Boy Scout groups had been without relevance for the extensive task of the common strengthening of the youth. Unfortunately, at schools in Turkey, the harmonic education of the body of the youth has been of second importance so far, even though the extremely stalwart inspector of gymnastics, Selim Sırrı Bey, had struggled for years to educate a body of useful gymnastics instructors."[102]

Thus the OGD had to be established as a nationwide organization in order to raise the level of physical fitness and the preparation for the future deployment of young boys on the fronts. For Hoff, the German model had to be adapted to the local customs:

> "The main idea was the common elevation of people's power [Volkskraft] and thereby also of military power [Wehrkraft]. Through Turnen and free-standing exercises according to the German and the Swedish system common earlier in the country, through applied exercise in the field such as running, jumping, climbing [...] by surveillance, orientation, giving a status report [...] body and spirit are fostered, order and subordination are taught. [...] However, the Quran offers plenty of pillars for the main instructions in the youth association. I put stress on the cooperation with the highest theological position of the Sheik-ül-Islam as well as of the Qadis (the highest clergymen in the provinces) and all hocas [the local village Imams, G.G.], and there I received a warm welcome and comments such as 'What you want to put into practice now the prophet has wanted from the beginning. [...]'"[103]

The religious aspect of mobilizing the youth had been something new for Hoff because in Germany, the church and many Christian Boy Scout groups had opposed the BJD after its foundation in 1911.[104] In the Ottoman lands, Hoff made use of the religious affiliation of the rural population since it was the main group identity. In terms of nationalism in the German sense, Hoff could not have succeeded in the Ottoman state. From his reference to the support of Ottoman Muslim imams it also becomes clear that Hoff was mainly focused on Muslim youth. Erol Akcan's doubts whether the OGD were exclusionist in its choice of members or even followed a (Turkish) nationalist route therefore can be disproved.[105] In the Ottoman Boy Scout movement, already in May 1914 the groups

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102 Hoff, "Die osmanische Jugendorganisation," 125.

103 Hoff, "Die osmanische Jugendorganisation," 127.

104 Saul, "Der Kampf um die Jugend zwischen Volksschule und Kaserne," 115.

105 For this 'presumption of innocence' of the OGD movement see Akcan, *İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası'nın*, 282–283. However there were clear references to the Turkishness of its members in its publications, see Sabri Yetkin, "İttihat ve Terakki'nin Paramiliter Gençlik Örgütleri: Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri ve Bunların Yayın Organlarındaki Milliyetçi Söylemler" [The Paramilitary Organizations of the Committee for Union and Progress: Nationalist Discourses in the Publications of the OGD], in *Tarih ve Milliyetcilik: Birinci Ulusal Tarih Kongresi; Bildiriler.* Ed. Mersin Üniver-

Figure 6: The Eskişehir Gürbüz Derneği on the march, accompanied by an adult instructor with a captured British Enfield rifle; July 25, 1918.

were ordered to speak Turkish only, and in June 1914 Armenian boys were excluded from membership. It therefore didn't come as a surprise that later on most of the OGD members were Muslim boys.[106] It should also be noted that BJD groups wore a 'colonial dress'. Uniform shirts and trousers were khaki colored and not field grey as those in the army. The members of the BJD wore the 'southwester', the hat of the German overseas colonial army.[107] The OGD, clad in khaki uniforms and wearing the *kabalak* headgear of the regular army, must have therefore had an integrating message to the Muslim population in Anatolia, even though it was not communicated openly in the OGD periodical. Hoff implied this unifying spirit, when he mentioned the "awakening of the

sitesi (Mersin: n.p., 1997), 423–424. For the appropriation of German nationalist ideas into the Ottoman worldview cf. ibid. 427–428.

106 Cora, "Asker-Vatandaşlar ve Kahraman Erkekler," 61, 64; Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower*, 221.

107 Concerning this matter we also have point to the fact that the BJD conveyed the "*ideological message of physical fitness and a duty to the 'race'.*" Robert Gordon, "The Rise of the Bushman Penis: Germans, Genitalia and Genocide," *African Studies* 57–1 (1998), 31.

sense of community"[108] within the OGD groups. The OGD were founded after the persecution and expulsion of the Armenian population and at a time when ten thousands of Muslim *muhacır* refugee families from the formerly Ottoman Balkan provinces had settled in Anatolia.[109] We thus definitely have to see the appropriated 'German Spirit' in this context, since for Hoff, the OGD "[...] like our German one [the BJD] follows willingly the leader [Führer], who knows how to understand and lead them correctly."[110]

Hoff's Return and the End of the Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri

Despite all these success stories, there were also developments that were not mentioned in Hoff's later publications about the OGD. On a personal level, there were many civilian and military actors who interfered with Hoff's efforts. The minister of education was a strong opponent of the OGD plans and feared a "militarization of the youth".[111] However, Hoff had a strong intercessor in the Ottoman Ministry of War. The German vice head of the Ottoman General staff, Friedrich Bronsart von Schellendorf, supported Hoffs pleas in his regular meetings with Enver.[112] But the quarrels continued, nevertheless. Hoff, who as an officer was used to unquestioned obedience, complained in a semi-offensive speech in the Kadıköy branch of the nationalist *Türk Ocağı* in September 1916:

> "Should Turkey follow my instructions, she will then make progress with her youth, but if everyone who is inexperienced is making a different proposal and always something new is being started, then there will never be any success. [There will only be success] if Turkey listens to our lessons, reads our writings, educates the youth along the line of the Genç Der-

108 Hoff, "Die osmanische Jugendorganisation," 128. Hoff was aware of the nationalist Turkish spirit; see his diary entry entitled "Die Türkei den Türken!" [Turkey for the Turks!], 20 December 1916. HStA Stgt M660/115 Nr. 2, 11–18.

109 On the settlement policy of Muslim refugees see Fuat Dündar, *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanları İskân Politikası, 1913–1918* [The Muslim Settlement Policy of the Committee for Union and Progress, 1913–1918] (Istanbul: İletişim, 2001). See especially ibid. 198–201 on the cancellation of the early 1914 Muslim refugee's exemption from military service during the war. On the activities of the OGD (mistakenly referred to as the "*Osmanlı Dinç Cemiyeti*") in those areas see Dündar, *Modern Türkiye'nin Şifresi*, 67–68 and Zürcher, "Demographic Engineering, State Building and the Army," 538–540.

110 Hoff, "Die osmanische Jugendorganisation," 130.

111 Hoff's letter to Bronsart, 14 May 1916. HStA Stgt M660–115 Nr. 55.

112 Bronsart's reply to Hoff, 14 May 1916. HStA Stgt M660–115 Nr. 55.

> nekleri. [...] If one believes to know better, then one should not have let me come from Germany."[113]

At this time the head of the German-Ottoman project had already decided to leave. Selim Sırrı, his right hand, also faced opposition to his work. In a letter to Hoff, Selim Sırrı stated the following:

> "I know that I have enemies, but I can assure you that I do not have those enemies because of cooperating with you. Those enemies persecuted me long before your arrival to Turkey with their ill will. The one who strives for an ideal will always find such opponents on his way. I am used to fighting and I am not willing to retreat from the enemy at anytime, even if my family and my wealth are threatened. Therefore, it is impossible for me to follow your well-intentioned advice and to secede from you."[114]

Selim Sırrı's policies had evidently caused severe resistance, as indicated in the aforementioned disagreement with Ali Faik [Üstünidman] regarding the issue of gymnastics versus Turnen. It is thus not quite surprising that Selim Sırrı did not mention his cooperation with Hoff in his memoirs (1946). These omissions can be seen as a clear negation of any German influence on his work.[115] Like in pre-war Germany, there was also open resistance to the OGD. In 1918 some mothers wanted their boys to be released from service, since they feared that they might be sent to the front even though they were underaged.[116] Unfortunately, due to wartime censorship, more critical Ottoman sources on this issue are rare.

There were also differences between Hoff and Selim Sırrı regarding the sports agenda of the OGD. Hoff was against the introduction of gymnastic sport events in the OGD as he wanted to focus more on paramilitary exercise. When Selim Sırrı held the first Ottoman public gymnastics feast (*İdman Bayramı*) in Kadıköy on 1 May 1917, Hoff left in anger. However, the Ottoman General Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk] was impressed by the acrobatic show of the military cadets and OGD members. This competition became a regular institution in the Republican calendar after 1923.[117]

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113 Article in the newspaper *Tesvir-ı Efkar*, 13 September 1332/1916; quoted after the translation of Hoff's aide-de-champ in HStAS M 660 – 115 Nr. 33, 2, 6.

114 Selim Sırrı to Hoff, 16 May 1917; HStA Stgt M660 – 115.

115 Selim Sırrı Tarcan: *Hatıralarım* [*My Memoirs*], (Istanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1946); Akcan, *İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası'nın*, 8.

116 Akcan, *İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası'nın*, 286.

117 Mehmet Ö. Alkan, "Osmanlı İdman Bayramı'ndan Atatürk'ü Anma, Gençlik ve Spor Bayramı'na" [From the Ottoman Physical Exercise Feast to the Atatürk Commemoration, Youth and Sports Day], *Toplumsal Tarih* 211 (2011), 33.

After the death of his mentor Goltz in April 1916, Hoff lost a strong supporter of his ideas.[118] Hoff also suffered from regular fever attacks, since his body was not fully accustomed to tropical diseases.[119] A first request to be called back to Germany due to health issues and the fear of career disadvantages because of his service in a remote theater of war was declined by his superior Marchthaler after a formal objection by Bronsart von Schellendorf. In his answer to Hoff, Marchthaler tried to encourage him, noting: "[H]old out at your post and secure the continuity of your creation [i.e. the OGD], which is also of high importance for Germany. You do not have to be afraid for your future military [career]."[120]

Hoff was eventually called back to Stuttgart in August 1917 for further deployment at the Western front.[121] Assumptions that Hoff left the Ottoman Empire due to dissent with Ottoman representatives are wrong.[122] In a letter to Enver, Hoff even offered "to accomplish [the OGD project] under the circumstances of peace" after the war and regretted being called back to Stuttgart.[123] The German specialist also seems to have enjoyed the atmosphere in the Ottoman capital. He showed considerable interest in the culture of his environment and stayed in contact with his personal assistant, Asım Bey.[124]

Hoff continued to write articles for the OGD periodical until late 1918, only to be interrupted when his obligations as a field commander on the Western front no longer allowed him to spare time for writing monthly articles.[125] Hoff's efforts were finally officially acknowledged, when the German and the Ottoman government agreed in the very first paragraph of their 1917 Military Convention: "[Physical] strengthening of youth and military education (Jugendwehr) shall be introduced and carried out in both countries following similar principles."[126]

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118 See on this incident Hoff's report on the Goltz funeral ceremony in the Ottoman capital; Heinrich von Hoff, "Die Beisetzung unseres Feldmarschalls," *Jungdeutschland-Post*, 1 August 1916, 1–2.

119 Hoff's Report No. 4 to Marchthaler, 14 August 1917, 2. HStA Stgt M660/115 Nr. 55.

120 Marchthaler letter to Hoff, 29 October 1916. HStA Stgt M660/115 Nr. 55.

121 For a summary of the events see Hoff's diary entry at the beginning of November 1917. HStA Stgt M660/115 Nr. 4, 34 et seqq.

122 Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower*, 241.

123 Undated copy of Hoff's letter to Enver Paşa. HStA Stgt M660–115 Nr. 39.

124 See his notes on the Muslim call for prayer, HStA Stgt M660/115 Nr. 3 following page 70; the list of Turkish names in HStA Stgt M660/115 Nr. 4, 60 and the letters HStA Stgt M660/115 Nr. 55.

125 Cf the letter of Asım Bey to the Württemberg Ministry of War and the first draft of Hoff's answer to Marchthaler forwarded to colonel Asım Bey, 7 July 1918. HStA Stgt M660–115 Nr. 4, n.p. Akcan, *İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası'nın*, 226 also mentions the further dedication of Hoff to the OGD project in 1917/1918.

126 Jäschke, "Deutsch-Türkische Militärkonvention," 198. Cf. also Akcan, *İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası'nın*, 225.

Even though the OGD continued to exist, the organization nearly ceased to have any relevance after the armistice in late 1918. The activities of the association came to an end with the last issue of the OGD periodical in July 1920.[127]

Outlook

Both the *Bund Jungdeutschland* and the *Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri* were typical creations of their time. With their main goal of educating well-trained and mentally indoctrinated young men for the army, they also served the militarization of their respective countries. Since those young men would spread the incululated ideology among their families after their military service, the whole society was affected. Many of the BJD members that were not drafted during the war served in the *Freikorps* volunteer units after 1918.[128] Some of these radicalized young men also started following extreme right-wing groups, as in the case of Baldur von Schirach, a former BJD member and later head of the Hitler Youth (HJ).[129] And many of Hoff's older students who had joined the OGD later fought in the Turkish war of independence from 1919 to 1922.[130] In the subsequent decade, the Republican government did not initially pursue the concept of a nation-wide youth organization. In the 1920s, the volunteer Boy Scouts were the only youth organization, while the state focused on the extension of the school system and the introduction of coeducational compulsory military instruction in the classroom. However, both the Bund Jungdeutschland and the Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri were to have an impact on the further development of Germany and Turkey, as is evidenced by the activities of Selim Sırrı and Carl Diem in the 1920s.

127 Akcan, *İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası'nın*, 314.

128 Cf. Emil Gumbel, *Vier Jahre Politischer Mord* (Berlin: Verlag der Neuen Gesellschaft, 1922), 129. The author Gustav Regler described an encounter in January 1919 in Berlin with one of those underage former BJD members, who tried to recruit Regler for his Freikorps with the words: "[I am] Jung Deutschland. In the Tiergarten I shot ten of those [...] red pigs, of course all of them had Jewish noses!" Quoted after Fred Grimm, *Wir wollen eine andere Welt. Jugend in Deutschland 1900 – 2010: Eine private Geschichte aus Tagebüchern, Briefen, Dokumenten* (Berlin: Tolkemitt bei Zweitausendeins, 2010), 95.

129 Krethlow, *Generalfeldmarschall Goltz*, 416.

130 According to Hoff's co-founder of the Stuttgart BJD branch Thumm in *Jungdeutschland: Monatsschrift des Landesverbandes Württemberg Jungdeutschland* (August 1933), n.p.

Jungdeutschland reloaded? Carl Diem in Turkey, 1933/1937

Heinrich von Hoff was not the only German youth instructor who worked in Anatolia during the Young Turk period. Following a recovery period after the war decade and the foundation of its own institutions, the Turkish state invited another German instructor in 1933. This section of the chapter examines the continuity in the cooperation of experts in the field of the mobilizatory use of sports and a nation-wide youth organization. A strong 'German Spirit' is striking especially during the early Republic of Turkey in the 1930s.

During this time sport was generally seen as a "panacea for social ills and as a tool to increase national power."[131] In the Young Turk period between 1908 and the late 1930s, one can observe how sport spread to the urban society by being made mandatory at schools and in the army. Those were no extracurricular activities, as they had existed for centuries, including the Ottoman *güreş* wrestling. Sport began to serve national political aims since the Second Constitutional period (1908 – 1918), especially after the Balkan Wars. Issues of health care, Social Darwinist reasoning and a strong Westernization discourse were underlying those efforts. In fact, the useful disciplinary features of sport were the most favored outcomes of the programme by leaders of the Committee for Union and Progress.[132]

In many regards, the life and activities of Selim Sırrı bear many similarities to his German counterpart Carl Diem. A comparative view of the two sport functionaries will give a better understanding of how and why the German militarized form of sports and youth mobilization was appropriated in the Late Ottoman and early Republican sport movement.

Carl Diem: A 'German Selim Sırrı'?

Beyond their love of sports, they managed to accommodate themselves to the ruling regimes, regardless of who was in power. Carl Diem (1882 – 1962) and Selim Sırrı (1874 – 1957) preserved their positions during the monarchy and in the postwar period by adopting an opportunistic approach and siding with the new elite.

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131 Barbara J. Keys, *Globalizing Sport National Rivalry and International Community in the 1930s* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 18.

132 For the affiliation of Selim Sırrı belonged to this group, cf. Mevlüt Celebi, "Selim Sırrı Tarcan'in Jön Türklüğü" [Selim Sırrı Tarcan's Young Turkishness], *Tarih ve Toplum* 40 – 236 (2003), 77 – 85.

Carl Diem was born in 1882 in Würzburg. In 1887 the family moved to Berlin due to economical reasons. Selim Sırrı's family also had to leave their hometown in Thessaly and settle in the capital Istanbul due to the Ottoman defeat in 1878.[133] Diem attended the French high school in Berlin and Selim Sırrı was accepted to the Galatasaray French high school in Constantinople.[134] Young Carl was not a gifted schoolboy, but he learned French, which proved useful for his later career in the French dominated International Olympic Committee (IOC). He began a traineeship as an account clerk in different companies after his graduation in 1899, acquiring basic organizational skills. In the same year, his father, an unsuccessful tradesman, emigrated to the United States leaving behind the family. Selim Sırrı was only two years old when his father, a military officer, got killed in action in Montenegro.[135]

In his spare time, the young Diem joined sport clubs, where he soon discovered his love for athletic disciplines. In those years, the German sports movement was in the fledgling stages. Most clubs and their regulations were preliminary and superficial and did not fulfill the needs of a genuinely professional club. As a result, Carl Diem dedicated himself to the development of the sport movement, which later became his life-long passion. The young Diem did not prefer *Turnen*, but he became an enthusiastic runner since it was a discipline that was free of charge.[136] Selim Sırrı enjoyed gymnastics lessons in Galatasaray, though in contrast to Diem, he continued his higher education at a military engineering school, subsequently serving as a military engineer with gymnastic teaching obligations from 1896 to 1909.

In Berlin, Diem founded his first sports club and was one of the founding members of the Berlin Athletics clubs association. His activities were interrupted by military service in 1904/1905, a time that gave Diem's worldview another perspective. Diem enjoyed his service looking back to the parades and marching byes that he later compared to the sport mass deployments in the same way that Selim Sırrı did.[137] However, Diem had a mission, also within the army. In the early 20th century, many German officers from aristocratic backgrounds had regarded sport as useless and not useful to the military but only serving

133 Tarcan, *Hatıralarım*, 5.

134 Frank Becker, *Den Sport gestalten: Carl Diems Leben, 1882–1962*. Vol. 1: *Kaiserreich* (Duisburg: Universitätsverlag Rhein- Ruhr, 2009), 15; Tarcan, *Hatıralarım*, 5.

135 Tarcan, *Hatıralarım*, 6.

136 Becker, *Carl Diems Leben, vol. 1*, 33.

137 Becker, *Carl Diems Leben, vol. 1*, 69; Cora, "Constructing and Mobilizing the Nation," 62.

to trigger job among the detested masses.[138] By organizing a march with backpacks, Diem and his friends could persuade the army leadership that soldiers that trained through sport activities had more endurance than those that trained in a more traditional way. Thereby Diem also contributed to eliciting army support for physicals activities.[139] Athletics and physical exercises strengthened the psychological resistance and also had the advantage of including autonomous contests in small groups. This was one of the models for future war favoured by some officers already before 1914.[140] These ideas were put into military practice during the First World War.[141] In addition, for both Diem and Selim Sırrı, the interpretation of contemporary conflicts also contributed to reorienting of sports towards military issues.

Diem and the Purpose of Sport: Militarization

The outcome of the Russo-Japanese war in 1904/05 had influenced the mentality of many military and civilian authors, among them also Colmar von der Goltz and several Ottoman officers.[142] For Diem, Japanese victory in 1904/05 had been the outcome of the better trained Japanese soldiers. This view was confirmed by Diem's experience during his military service in the same year, when he experienced the advantages of a trained body during exercise. Diem propagated the voluntary backpack marching on the weekends to prepare young men for military service and their tasks in future conflicts, also mentioning the interests of the Germans as a 'nation in arms', using the popular slogan of Colmar von der Goltz'. [143] Like Selim Sırrı after the Balkan War, during the war,

138 Cf. Peter Tauber "'Je härter Sport und Spiel, umso besser ersetzen sie uns den Krieg.' Sport als Erziehungsmittel und Teil der militärischen Ausbildung der Reichswehr der Weimarer Republik," in *'Mens Sana in Corpore Sano': Gymnastik, Turnen, Spiel und Sport als Gegenstand der Bildungspolitik vom 18. bis zum 21. Jahrhundert*. ed. Michael Krüger (Hamburg: Czwalina, 2008), 80.
139 Becker, *Carl Diems Leben, vol. 1*, 70.
140 Tauber, "Je härter Sport und Spiel," 81 et seq.
141 Becker, *Carl Diems Leben, vol. 1*, 119; cf. Raths, *Vom Massensturm zur Stoßtrupptaktik*, 32 et seq.
142 Cf. Krethlow, *Generalfeldmarschall Goltz*, 286 et seq.; Renée Worringer, *Ottomans Imagining Japan: East, Middle East, and Non-Western Modernity at the Turn of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 43–78.
143 Diem's 1908 reference quoted after Becker, *Carl Diems Leben, vol. 1*, 72.

Diem also came to the conclusion that the 'nation in arms' would be a proper solution to the challenges faced by their nations.[144]

According to Becker, Diem can be seen as a sympathizer of a 'synthetic militarism'[145] and an unreflected conservativism.[146] Apart from his career as a sport official, Diem (like Selim Sırrı) also started working for different sport magazines and newspapers, which only enlarged the influence of his ideas on those active in such circles. In 1908, parallel to the beginning Boy Scout movement, Diem was elected as the head of the private German Central authority for Sport (*Deutsche Zentralbehörde für Sport*), a centralized organization devoted to the standardization of sports associations in the entire German Empire. Diem was also appointed to the executive committee of the Bund Jungdeutschland (BJD) in 1911 and worked as an editor for the *Jungdeutschland-Post*.[147]

He was in close contact with Colmar von der Goltz and assisted the old field marshal as an aide de camp and driver during several journeys throughout Germany. Diem benefitted from the support of the German military, not least in financial regards. In the BJD, Diem contributed to winning politically undetermined young men for national and conservative ideas, therefore propagating (like Selim Sırrı) that nations which would not care for a militarized education were doomed to decline.[148] In these years Diem must have also met Heinrich von Hoff, most likely at least once during the last BJD meeting in Stuttgart prior to the war in May 1914.[149]

It is interesting to note that Diem hid his commitment to the BJD after 1945,[150] just like Selim Sırrı excluded his years in the *Osmanli Genç Dernekleri* in his 1946 memoirs.[151] On these ground we can state that it is likely that both men were embarrassed or at least inconvenienced by their earlier participation

144 For Selim Sırrı's 1915 statement regarding the 'nation in arms' see Akmeşe, *The Birth of Modern Turkey*, 168; Carl Diem, "Sport und Vaterland" (1915), reprinted in *Olympische Flamme vol 3: Organisation und Praxis*, ed. Carl Diem (Berlin: Deutscher Archiv-Verlag, 1942), 1618.

145 Becker, *Carl Diems Leben, vol. 1*, 73.

146 Becker, *Carl Diems Leben, vol. 1*, 74.

147 Becker, *Carl Diems Leben, vol. 1*, 135, 155.

148 Becker, *Carl Diems Leben, vol. 1*, 129; cf. Selim Sirri in *Tedrisat Mecmuası* 5–1 (Mart 1331/1915), 15.

149 Both men were speakers at the very same conference; see the itinerary in *Pädagogisches Archiv: Monatsschrift für Erziehung, Unterricht und Wissenschaft* 56 (1914), 314.

150 Becker, *Carl Diems Leben, vol. 1*, 130.

151 Tarcan, *Hatıralarım*.

in the militarization of youth. During the 1912 Olympic Games in Sweden[152], Carl Diem was highly impressed, especially by the Swedish state funding of sports in the *Centralinstitutet*, the very same institution that had hosted Selim Sırrı between 1908 and 1910.[153] Diem wanted similar state funding in Germany to improve the success of the nation's athletes. Similarly to Selim Sırrı, in March 1913, Carl Diem became the general secretary for the 1916 Olympic Games at the national German Imperial Committee for the Olympic Games (Deutscher Reichsausschuss für die Olympischen Spiele). Selim Sırrı was among the founding members of the Ottoman Olympic Association (*Milli Olimpiyat Cemiyeti*) in 1908 and was the secretary general until 1914. Both men were at the beginning of their careers, while the older Selim Sırrı had already achieved a higher function due to his work at the Ministry of Education.[154]

In 1913 Diem initiated the *Deutsches Sportabzeichen*, an insignia awarded for versatile performances in different sport disciplines such as jumping, running and ball throw.[155] Diem preferred athletics, although he always wanted to win the support of the *Turner* movement for his aims. Selim Sırrı followed a similar path, advocating for more sport, especially for his favored Swedish gymnastics in the Ottoman public sphere after the Balkan Wars. Diem organized big sport events, during which he enjoyed the aesthetics of the mass performance. Selim Sırrı had similar impressions during the 1914 Prague sport festival. Both men knew how those elements could serve mobilisatory goals.[156]

Towards a Militant Spirit, 1914 – 1918

Diem joined the German army as a volunteer in an Infantry regiment in August 1914. Given his enthusiasm for sports, he was fit for duty. He took part in the Belgium campaign and published his diary in the propagandistic *Jungdeutschland* yearbook in 1915. There he gave insight into the brutal warfare in Belgium during

152 Carl Diem and Selim Sırrı were both in Stockholm as official representatives of their national Olympic associations. Cf. Erik Bergvall, *The Fifth Olympiad: The Official Report of the Olympic Games of Stockholm 1912* (Stockholm: Wahlstrom & Widstrand, 1913), 3, 962.

153 Ansgar Molzberger, *Die Olympischen Spiele 1912 in Stockholm: Zwischen Patriotismus und Internationalität* (Sankt Augustin: Academie-Verlag, 2012), 204.

154 For the career of the Ottoman sportsman see Altuğ İstanbulluoğlu, *Türkiye Milli Olimpiyat Komitesi 100. Yılı* [*100 Years of the Turkish Olympic Committee*], (Istanbul: Türkiye Milli Olimpiyat Komitesi, 2008), 15 – 17.

155 It is still awarded today by the German Olympic Sports Association. See http://www.deutsches-sportabzeichen.de {Last Acessed on 24 November 2017}

156 Becker, *Carl Diems Leben, vol. 1*, 182; Cora, "Constructing and mobilizing the nation," 62.

the first weeks of the German campaign, calling the Belgian Franctireurs a "cowardly riff-raff"[157] that deserved to be executed and have their homes destroyed. Diem witnessed German acts of violence against Belgian civilians, but he also stated that his unit had not overreacted during this campaign. He was more focused on heroic acts, like the death of a young lieutenant running ahead of his men, "laughing as always [...] until the bullets hit him."[158] But there was also gleaming evidence of fear. When he got hit by a bullet on 6 September 1914 and was lying on the ground, bleeding and waiting for the stretcher-bearers, his only thought was "Can I ever dedicate myself to my beloved rowing with my interleaved breast muscle?"[159] His only fear was not to be able to do sports again. Diem recovered and was promoted to first lieutenant. He then served in positions close to the frontline as a junior staff officer until the end of the war. Here in the division headquarters he used his prewar experience and further developed his organizational skills that proved of use when he organized much bigger sports events after the war.[160]

Diem used his free time to prepare several proposals and publications, some of them focusing on the military use of sport. In his 1916 memorandum to the German Minister of War, Diem advocated for the physical education of every German man prior to military service. The instruction was to be compulsory but the individual choice of a discipline should be guaranteed. Diem proposed that the BJD or another local state authority should supervise the execution of this law, that aimed at "the audacity of the youngling" and "an education in the patriotic sense to love for the country, sense of sacrifice, subordination (discipline)".[161] Those young men, just like in the Ottoman case, were educated to become obedient citizens, who were physically and mentally ready to die for their nation. These thoughts were similar to Selim Sırrı's reference to the founder of the German Turner movement: "Each young patriot who wishes the welfare and rise of the fatherland [vatan] should strengthen his own body through physical exercises. Nation, fatherland and gymnastics are three words that cannot be separated from each other."[162]

157 *Scherls Jungdeutschland- Buch* (1915), 260.
158 *Scherls Jungdeutschland- Buch* (1915), 267.
159 *Scherls Jungdeutschland- Buch* (1915), 271–272.
160 Becker, *Carl Diems Leben, vol. 1*, 227.
161 Diem, *Olympische Flamme*. vol 3, 1122.
162 Selim Sırrı, *Alman Cimnastikleri ve Yan* [German Gymnastics and Jahn] (Istanbul: Selanik Matbaası, 1329/1913), 18. Cf. Özçalık and Grüßhaber, "'Frank, Fresh, Frish, Free' at the Bosphorus?," 9.

Despite all efforts, the plans of Diem and Selim Sırrı to establish the OGD and the BJD as an umbrella paramilitary organization offering regular sport exercises failed in both countries. Nonetheless, both men resumed their wartime agenda in their postwar successor states.

Back to Civil Life: Selim Sırrı 1918–1927

In the Republic of Turkey, Selim Sırrı continued his civil career as well as his activities as an author. In November 1923 he was elected president of the Turkish National Olympic Committee.[163] His enthusiasm for paramilitary education of the young generation was still evident. Yet his position was not undisputed in the Republican era. During a Boy Scout gathering in Istanbul's Makrıköy district in 1923, he felt urged to publicly explain that scouting and being a soldier were two different things:

> "We are not trying to make soldiers out of young Boy Scouts but men. Our organization truly resembles the military organization, however nothing could be farther from us than a mentality of making soldiering a game."[164]

Selim Sırrı claimed that the Boy Scout movement would prepare boys for the army of the republic and ease the work of the latter. He referred to the *Regiments Scolaires* which had a long tradition in France. Distancing himself from the German wartime ally, the former co-organizer of the OGD reiterated the ideas of Heinrich von Hoff without mentioning his name. In those years, once censorship was no longer in effect, the wartime resistance against the policies of the CUP with the assistance of Heinrich von Hoff became visible. A Boy Scout leader complained about the work of Hoff who had emphasized soldiering in the OGD, without paying attention to the real needs of the young boys. Ottoman youth had become a toy in the hands of Hoff and his staff, even using force by calling in the Gendarmerie to pick up reluctant teenage boys for exercises. This led to resistance among the Boy Scout groups.[165]

In the Turkish Ministry of War, the OGD was also not held in high esteem. In a 1923 article in the main military periodical, Heinrich von Hoff's name was not

163 İstanbulluoğlu, *Türkiye Milli Olimpiyat Komitesi'nin*, 20.

164 Anonymous, "Makrıköy Keşşaflarının And Merasimi" [Swearing Ceremony of the Makrıköy Boy Scouts], *Keşşāf* 1–4 (26 May 1339/1923), 5.

165 Anonymous, "Türk İzciliğin İnkişafı Tarihi" [History of the Development of the Turkish Boy Scouts], *Türk İzciler Birligi* 2 (1925), 22–23.

mentioned, however, the need for such an organization for the Republic was stressed yet again. The author valued the OGD's main contribution to the military efforts and saw in them a good opportunity to find talented young leaders among the local population. The OGD had educated "quite a few reserve officers"[166] and had served as good military preparation for the other participants. In the prospective organization, field training should not be neglected, since the infantry had been one of the most important units of the last wars before and after 1918. The Turkish state was to focus on setting up shooting ranges for the older youth and was to follow the French and Polish models (that had been described in the same publication by other authors).[167] In this regard, the German role model was no longer seen as superior, however, the old designations of *Gürbüz* and *Dinç* for the younger and older boys' sections was adopted from OGD's terminology.

With close links to Social Darwinism and the experiences of defeat and occupation, the Turkish Republican government saw sport as an essential means for modernization. But similarly to the OGD, this emphasis on sports also served the nation building in a society shaped by war, forced migration and genocide. In the official sport organizations after 1923, there was a high influence of former military officers on the civilian sports movement. As previously mentioned, the National Olympic Committee was headed by Selim Sırrı Tarcan (1923 – 1927), followed by the civilian Galatasaray sport club founder, Ali Sami Yen (1927 – 1930). Parallel to his duty as Turkish ambassador in Berlin, the former General Kemalettin Sami was head of the Turkish Olympic committee (1930 – 1933) and was assisted by Ekrem Rüştü Akömer, a former officer trained in Germany from 1910 to 1912 as the General secretary (1930 – 1936).[168] Those networks of German speaking men and Germanophiles might also explain why the Turkish state invited several German sport instructors, among them also Carl Diem.[169]

Selim Sırrı participated in the discourse on the foundation of a proposed new Republican youth organization in October 1925. This debate began back

166 Ahmed Sedat: "Memleketimizde Gençlerin Askerî Talim ve Terbiyesi," [Military Education and Training of the Youth in our Country], in *Orduda İlim ve İrfan ve Gençliğin Askerliğe İhzarı Usulleri* (Dersaadet [Istanbul]: Matbaa-yı Askeriye, 1339/1923), 79. This article by Ahmed Sedat was a special print from *Mecmua-yı Askeriye* 50 (1339).

167 Ahmed Sedat, "Memleketimizde Gençlerin," 80 – 81.

168 Cf. the list on page 9 in "Türkiye Milli Olimpiyat Komitesi Tarihçesi" [History of the Turkish National Olympic Committee]. www.olimpiyatkomitesi.org.tr/Upload/Menu/121771_tarihce.pdf {Last Acessed on 24 November 2017}

169 For the work of the other instructors see Mangold-Will, *Begrenzte Freundschaft*, 429, 432.

in 1923[170] and may have been fuelled by the Kurdish uprising in the Diyarbakır province in the spring of 1925 and the fear of the Turkish authorities to lose control over the country. In a proposal to the office of the Prime Minister, Fevzi [Çakmak], the head of the General Staff, suggested a state led youth supported by army officers for teenage boys prior to their military service. Based on the 1923 article, Fevzi Pasha referred to similar organizations in France and Poland, thereby repeating the silence on the Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri. However, Fevzi also named the proposed association "Genç Dernekleri", a reference to the well-known predecessor organization.[171] The head of the General Staff had envisioned the introduction of volunteer military instruction courses for 16 – 18 year-old boys in state high schools. Those courses were to be based on the curricula of military high schools, starting with the future elite of the nation. Thus the Turkish General Staff pleaded for a militarized version of the youth organization, an idea that was countered by Selim Sırrı, who was the head of the department for physical education in the Turkish Ministry of Education since 1924. Selim Sırrı wanted a youth organization bound to the schools.[172] Here the children would strengthen their body and mind through mandatory sport and ethics classes (*ahlak*), since theoretical military instructions would only lead to an attempt to imitate soldiering. For Selim Sırrı, military knowledge should be restricted solely to military service.[173] However, this debate did not come to an end after the delivery of the reports of Fevzi and Selim Sırrı.

Selim Sırrı's views seem to have been based on his experiences during the First World War, when he had realized that the idea of a militarized youth organization was inefficient and only led to resistance. It also possible that the official at the Ministry of Education failed to elicit respect and support for his opposition from the Turkish army. This became clear in another case. In 1926 Selim Sırrı complained openly about the gradual professionalization of Turkish sport associations, arguing that they would destroy the amateur spirit. Thereafter, he was harshly criticized by a representative of the Military Sports Organization (*Askerî Spor Teşkilatı*), eventually leading to Selim Sırrı's de facto resignation from the presidency of the National Olympic Committee.[174] Afterwards, Selim Sırrı with-

170 Akcan, *İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası'nın*, 314 – 315.

171 Mustafa Balcıoğlu, "Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Gençliğin Savaşa Hazırlanması ile ilgili İki Belge İki Görüş" [Two Documents and Two Views on Preparing Youth for War in the First Years of the Republic], *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi* 5 – 20 (1997), 467.

172 Balcıoğlu, "Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında," 471.

173 Balcıoğlu, "Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında," 473.

174 İstanbulluoğlu, *Türkiye Milli Olimpiyat Komitesi'nin*, 24.

drew from the Turkish debate about the organization ofyouth. Nevertheless, he still showed considerable interest in developments in this field, particularly in foreign countries ruled by authoritarianism.[175]

Towards a National Turkish Youth Organization, 1927 – 1932

In 1928 the Ministry of Education was granted the power to regulate the membership and the new admission of members in the volunteer Boy Scouts organizations.[176] Most of those local associations were bound to state schools led by teachers.[177] In addition, a compulsory military instruction course (*Askerlik Dersi*) was introduced in 1926 for all boys and girls in secondary school.[178] Course books contained striking references to German military ideas.[179]

The Turkish army partially lost its influence in the debate that was now dominated by civil authorities. The outcome of the ongoing debate was, on the one side, the proposal of a Revolutionary Youth Association (*İnkılâp Gençleri Derneği*) by the Ministry of Education, oriented towards instilling Kemalist principles in schooled youth. On the other hand, there was the Greywolves organizaton (*Bozkurt Teşkilatı*) proposed by the General Staff, targeting also those children that had no school in their place of residence.[180] Obviously, the latter proposal served a rather nationalist and political aim, intending to increase the influence of the Ministry of Defence on the organization. This could have been one of the

175 See his ideas on Mussolini's youth organizations; Selim Sırrı: "İtalya'da Halk ve Gençlik Teşkilatı" [The People's and Youth Organization in Italy], *Ülkü* (April 1933), 241 – 243 and on the Romanian one in Selim Sırrı Tarcan, "Romanya'daki Gençlik Teşkilatı" [The Youth Organization in Romania], *Beden Terbiyesi ve Spor* 1 – 5 (1939), 1 – 2.

176 Law number 1246, *T.C. Resmi Gazete* (21 May 1928), 174. See also Akcan, *İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası'nın*, 317.

177 See the album issued by the Ministry of Education which depicts Boy Scout groups in boys' secondary schools in Trabzon, Eskişehir, Kastamonu and Erzuru; Maarif Vekaleti, *Maarif Albümü* [Education Album] (Ankara: Maarif Vekaleti, 1928), 63 – 64.

178 Hasan Ünder, "Goltz, Milleti Müsellaha ve Kemalizmdeki Spartan Öğeler" [Goltz, The Nation in Arms and Kemalist Spartan Elements], *Tarih ve Toplum* 206 (2001), 52.

179 See the use of an illustrations in the Turkish schoolbooks based on a German illustration from a military periodical. In the Turkish book, published by an active general, an attacking group of soldiers following their officer was only slightly adapted to Turkish military uniform standards, and bore the caption "Infantry soldiers", cf. Cemal Tahir, *Askerliğe Hazırlık Dersleri* [Military Service Preparation Classes], vol. 1 (Istanbul: Harbiye Mektebi Matbaası, 1925), 10. The German original reads: "The leader [Führer] is the role model for his men. His attitude and example is sweeping the troops along to sacrificing deeds." *Kriegskunst* 2 (1925), 184.

180 Akcan, *İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası'nın*, 317 – 318.

probable reasons for the refusal by the government. Furthermore, budgetary problems might have also played a role, as in the case of the rejection of the Ministry of Education's plan.

On these grounds, both of the proposed organizations sought the creation of a national identity thus making the ideas of Carl Diem more applicable.[181]

Carl Diem in the Weimar Republic, 1918 – 1933

After the German defeat in November 1918, most of the activities of the BJD and other paramilitary youth associations had come to a preliminary standstill. In accordance with paragraph 177 of the Versailles Treaty, the German state was no longer to fund such groups. In the aftermath of the war, there was also plenty of time for the analysis of wartime mistakes, like in the Turkish case. The BJD continued to exist as a private association until 1933. Its chairman, Wüllenweber, declared in 1923 that it had been wrong to merge all the German paramilitary youth organizations into larger local organized compulsory youth companies during the First World War. By forcing young people into youth companies, the authorities had chosen the wrong path:

> "Today one can say that it would have been better to have left alone the youth in their clubs and associations [...] The state should have rather restricted itself to [...] slightly push them to join existing clubs which offered physical exercise of all kind. Then the adolescent would have had a free choice, it would have been an appropriate preparatory training for soldiering for the youthful nature. Because the adolescent is not yet a soldier."[182]

Carl Diem continued his plea for a militarized sports movement in the Weimar Republic. One leitmotif in Diems work after 1918 was the will to prevent a second defeat in a future war. For him, sports served the character building, since avoiding the struggles of life was against the 'German Spirit'.[183] Underlying his ideas was a belief in the education of a strong, arduous and healthy generation fit for serving the nation. This was a common *Zeitgeist* element in many countries in

181 Akcan, *İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası'nın*, 319 – 320.

182 Quoted after Werner Kindt, *Dokumentation der Jugendbewegung, vol. 2: Die Wandervogelzeit* (Düsseldorf, Köln: Diederichs, 1968), 799.

183 Yiğit Akın, *Gürbüz ve Yavuz Evlatlar. Erken Cumhuriyet'te Beden Terbiyesi ve Spor* [Strong and Healthy Children: Physical Education and Sports in the Early Republic], (Istanbul: İletişim, 2004), 131.

interwar Europe.[184] The underlying basic thought was a better preparation of the youth for the requirements of the age of total war and its unification by sport experience in order to become insurmountable.[185] This idea had won many supporters also outside the nationalist circles of the Weimar Republic.

Diem's most sustainable contribution after the war was the Imperial youth competitions (*Reichsjugendwettkämpfe*), an annual compulsory athletic competition in all primary, secondary and higher schools. Most of the exercises were inspired by Olympic disciplines, but several, including the throwing of small balls had clearly military roots. The aim of these games was to facilitate an approach of German children and young people to sports in a playful, less performance-oriented way.[186] Carl Diem also proposed closer cooperation of army and sport clubs in Germany in 1926. He believed that Germany, a 'nation in arms', should also become a "nation in physical exercise".[187] Gymnastics and football should become part of everyday life, an idea also proposed by Selim Sırrı for the Turkish armed forces.[188] Consequently, Carl Diem also submitted a proposal to the German parliament regarding Diem's cetero censeo, the daily physical exercises class in school.[189] Even though he argued that his plea was essential "for the existence and the power of the nation"[190] budgetary restrictions after the hyperinflation in 1923 made his project illusionary.

In the early 1920s, Carl Diem began to advocate for the introduction of sports as an academic field of study, also in order to train sport teachers for schools. Diem became one of the founding members of the German academy for Physical Exercises (Deutsche Hochschule für Leibesübungen) in 1921. For Diem, the devel-

184 For justification purposes, German military periodicals often pointed to the injustice that in Germany such programmes could not be supported by the state. Cf. Anonymous, "Militärische Jugendausbildung in Amerika und England," *Kriegskunst* 1–2 (1924), 90 – 94; Anonymous, "Militärische Jugenderziehung in Frankreich, Polen und der Tschecho-Slowakei," *Kriegskunst* 1–2 (1924), 570 – 575.

185 Ralf Schäfer, *Militarismus, Nationalismus, Antisemitismus: Carl Diem und die Politisierung des bürgerlichen Sports im Kaiserreich* (Berlin: Metropol, 2011), 421.

186 The compulsory character of the games is still visible in the successor event in today's Germany; "Durchführung der Bundesjugendspiele." https://www.bundesjugendspiele.de/downloads/KMK/KMK_Beschluss_Fassung_v_12_09_2013.pdf {Last Acessed on 24 November 2017}

187 Tauber, "Je härter Sport und Spiel," 87–88.

188 Selim Sırrı, *Ordu'da ve Mektepler'de Futbol* [*Football in the Army and in Schools*] (Istanbul: Şems Matbaası, undated).

189 Carl Diem and Eugen Matthias, *Die tägliche Turnstunde: Bedeutung, Vermehrung und Erneuerung der Leibesübungen im Dienste der Gesamterziehung* (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1923).

190 Carl Diem's memorandum for the parliamentary commission for the advancement of physical exercises (1926), reprinted in *Olympische Flamme* vol 3, 1136.

opment of the individual through sports was essential. Due to his wartime experience, he was also driven by social Darwinist convictions, namely, that only the best-trained people could survive the struggle of life.[191] In the late 1920s, Diem continued to cooperate with the German army, requesting that the *Reichswehr* Ministry support his 'daily physical exercise class' campaign.[192] General Schleicher had sent a memorandum in this regard to the government already on 18 October 1930. Schleicher pointed to social hygienic measures as a means of strengthening public health, educating the youth to obedience and the training of future military reserves, since the size of the army was restricted by the Versailles Treaty. The General also mentioned the daily gymnastics lesson in school, a clear reference to Diem's ideas. The memorandum of the army also contained other fields of paramilitary 'sport' activities, such as shooting, hiking, horse riding, gliding and athletics.[193] It is thus safe to say that the German army envisioned a revival of the *Bund Jungdeutschland*. This time, the new volunteer out-of-school organization should also include younger members in the paramilitary associations of political right-wing groups such as the Stahlhelm and the National Socialist Sturmabteilung (SA). In times of economic crisis, the German army wanted to have young men occupied in order to prevent their political radicalization. This being the case, the plans to create a nationwide "Board for the Physical Training of the Youth" (Reichskuratorium für Leibesertüchtigung) failed due to civilian opposition from the Ministry of the Interior, similarly to the case of the Turkish General Staff's "Greywolves" proposal.[194] Nonethelss, the chosen direction was clear when Hindenburg stated in a decree on 12 September 1932 that "The strengthening [Stählung] of the body, the education of the youth for order and discipline, comradeship and the readiness to make sacrifices for the community are tasks the state has a duty to attend to."[195]

191 Cf. Noyan Dinçkal, "'Sport ist die körperliche und seelische Selbsthygiene des arbeitenden Volkes': Arbeit, Leibesübungen und Rationalisierungskultur in der Weimarer Republik," *Body Politics* 1–1 (2013), 71–97.

192 Diem's letter to the Reichswehr Ministry, 4 February 1931. Reprinted in *Olympische Flamme* vol. 3, 1233–1234.

193 Johannes Hürter, *Wilhelm Groener: Reichswehrminister am Ende der Weimarer Republik, 1928–1932* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2009), 147.

194 For details of the military vision of the Reichswehr see also Michael Geyer, "Der zur Organisation erhobene Burgfrieden," in *Militär und Militarismus in der Weimarer Republik*, ed. Klaus-Jürgen Müller et al. (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1978), 50–51.

195 As stated in a newspaper article in Heinrich von Hoff's papers, HStA Stgt HStA Stuttgart M 660/ 115 Bü 26. Hoff had retired from active military service and resigned from his BJD positions in the 1920s. He subsequently joined right-wing officers and small arms associations. Martin

However, the National Socialists refused to participate in any of the state youth projects. Hitler's rise to power in January 1933 eventually put an end to Carl Diem's and the Reichswehr's dreams about a paramilitary youth organization under the leadership of the armed forces.[196]

Ankara Calling: Reasons for Inviting Carl Diem to Turkey

For the Turkish government, the early 1930s were also a time for reviewing the institutions and steps that had been undertaken to reform the country. Part of those efforts had also been the promotion of the sports movement and the attempt at organizing the youth. As it becomes evident from the aforementioned developments, older projects such as the *Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri* had not been efficient enough and were repudiated. The idea of a "Revolutionary Youth" was no coincidence, since the Turkish state was under internal pressure by opponents of the new regime. Many Muslim migrants from the Balkans had participated in the Menemen uprising in the İzmir province in 1930.[197] Most of them had been excluded from the state's educational system and its Kemalist messages. In this regard a nation-wide youth organization for the indoctrination of future generations was seen as an urgent necessity. Among the Turkish role models in this issue were not only democratic West European countries (as shown above), but rather, especially in the late 1930s, authoritarian regimes of the time: Mussolini's Italy, Stalin's Soviet Union and Hitler's Germany. That is why by the request for Carl Diem, the Turkish government did not express a preference for the National Socialist movement. Diem was invited to Turkey in 1932 before the National Socialists came to power.[198] In fact, the Turkish state was interested in modern German sports culture, including its nationalist and militarist features that were to support the formation of the young nation's militant identity.[199]

Ulmer, *Antisemitismus in Stuttgart 18711933: Studien zum öffentlichen Diskurs und Alltag* (Berlin: Metropol, 2011), 283.

196 Henning Köhler, *Arbeitsdienst in Deutschland: Pläne und Verwirklichungsformen bis zur Einführung der Arbeitsdienstpflicht im Jahre 1935* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1967), 216 – 226.

197 Umut Azak, "A Reaction to Authoritarian Modernization in Turkey: The Menemen Incident and the Creation and Contestation of a Myth, 1930 – 31," in *The State and the Subaltern: Modernization, Society and the State in Turkey and Iran*, ed. Touraj Atabaki (London: Tauris, 2007), 149 – 150.

198 Mangold-Will, *Begrenzte Freundschaft*, 430.

199 Akın, *Gürbüz ve Yavuz Evlatlar*, 139 – 141.

Carl Diem had been recommended to the Turkish government by Kemaleddin Sami, the head of the Turkish National Olympic Committee and ambassador in Germany.[200] Diem's journey was organized by former soldier and member of the Turkish National Assembly, Hasan Cemil [Çambel] (1879 – 1967). Between 1902 and 1904, he had received his staff officer training in Germany and had served as a military attaché in the Ottoman embassy in Berlin in 1913/14.[201] Çambel mentioned in his memoirs that during his internship in the German army, Colmar von der Goltz had ordered him to walk from his German classes to a restaurant every day at lunchtime. In Goltz' opinion, he would be prepared for exhausting duty in the active regimental service. For Çambel, the German affinity with sports was something absolutely desirable for contemporary Turkey. His fellow countrymen had been used to an unhurried lifestyle and in Çambel's view also had deserved the label 'sick man of Europe' in Ottoman times.[202] Regarding the physical and moral education of the future generation, the deeply Germanophile[203] Çambel gave a public speech in 1932 on this matter, addressed mainly to members of the Republican People's Party. The speech expressed deep uncertainty about a possible success of the Kemalist revolutionary ideals after the Menemen incident, the failed experiment to establish a second political party and the resurgence of the Kurdish rebellion in the Eastern provinces. In the introduction to his speech, he admitted that "sport, physical cultivation and physical perfection are no amateur's task, rather a duty for every adolescent."[204] In order to create a genuine national culture, it was legitimate to adapt ideas from other countries, since this had always been the case throughout history.[205] Therefore it is no coincidence that Hasan Cemil supported the employment of Carl Diem in Turkey in order to draft a report on the national sport organization. On behalf of the CHF general secretary, Recep [Peker], Hasan Cemil officially invited Carl Diem to Turkey, stating in the postscriptum of the letter: "I

200 Alexandra Schäfer-Borrmann, *Vom 'Waffenbruder' zum 'türkisch-deutschen Faktotum': Ekrem Rüştü Akömer (1892 – 1984), eine bemerkenswerte Randfigur der Geschichte* (Würzburg: Ergon, 1998), 93.

201 *TBMM Albümü* [Album of the Turkish Grand National Assembly], ed. T.C. Büyük Millet Meclisi, vol. 1 (Ankara: TBMM, 2010), 313.

202 Çambel, "Milli Hastalığımız: Tenbellik," 101.

203 See his translation of Johann Gottlieb Fichte's proto-nationalist German speeches, Hasan Cemil, *Fihte ve Fihte'nin Hitabeleri* [*Fichte and Fichte's Speeches*], (N.p.: Türk Ocakları Merkez Hayatı Matbaası, 1928).

204 Hasan Cemil, *Türk Gençliği Nasıl Yetiştirmelidir? Konferans* [*How has the Turkish Youth to be Educated? A Lecture*] (Ankara: Hakimiyeti Milliye Matbaası, 1932), 21.

205 Hasan Cemil, *Türk Gençliği Nasıl Yetiştirmelidir?*, 23.

am trustful that no one else other than you is the right man to take over the practical implementation of the plan."[206]

In Hoff's Footsteps: Diem in Anatolia, September/October 1933

Carl Diem had never been to Turkey and never done any research other than on antique Greece. He was unfamiliar with the political, economic and social conditions in the Kemalist state. In contrast to Heinrich von Hoff, Diem was quite humble from the very beginning. In his reply to the invitation, he declared that "[e]ven though I studied [...] the glorious history of your country diligently [...] I did not gain an overview of how to study the organization of physical exercise in today's Turkey, you know this issue much better."[207] He wanted to begin with a brief inspection of the existing sport facilities in schools and private clubs, the work of the Boy Scouts and other groups, as well as sport instruction in army and navy. Diem also hinted at his interest in a sightseeing tour of the ancient Greek sites in Western Anatolia during his visit.[208] In addition to this personal interest, the invitation of the Turkish state came at the right time for Diem. The National Socialist government had taken measures to gain control of the formerly independent sport organizations and had criticized Diem personally.[209] Diem was about to lose his influential position in the *Gleichschaltung* process and, therefore, preferred to stay abroad until things had settled down.

Due to delays caused by the Turkish bureaucracy, Diem and his wife arrived in Istanbul by train on 4 September 1933. He was assisted by a local interpreter, Ekrem Rüştü [Akömer], a Germanophile and former officer who, like Hüseyin Rahmi, had served in Germany from 1910 to 1912, and was headed for a civil career as a sports official in the late 1920s.[210] Diem's diary was full of admiration for the young republic. Following a conversation with his Turkish assistants, he noted several racial remarks about the defence of the Gallipoli peninsula in 1915:

206 Hasan Cemil's invitation letter to Carl Diem, 24 May 1933. BCA 490 100 K1116 D75 Sıra 2 Sayfa 74.

207 Carl Diem to Hasan Cemil, 2 June 1933. BCA F490 100 K1116 D75 Sıra 2 Sayfa 33.

208 BCA F490 100 K1116 D75 Sıra 2 Sayfa 33.

209 Becker, *Carl Diems Leben, vol. 3, 34*, 61.

210 Schäfer-Borrmann, *Ekrem Rüştü Akömer*, 95.

> "Behold the conserved power of the east, the Anatolian farmer, with the consistingly striking through Alarodian race with the short, high skulls and the big and wild swung noses, assaulted the Entente batteries with their provisional equipment."[211]

During his stay in Turkey, Diem could not visit all historical sites en route, since this was only possible if such landmarks were on the journeys path. Instead, he concentrated mainly on his work but his journey still bore characteristics of a "mixture of political-administrative work [...] and an educational experience."[212] However, Diem had to return to Germany on 23 October because he was obliged to participate in a meeting regarding the construction site for the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games. In letter to Recep [Peker], he apologized for cutting his stay short as well as for his absence during the 10th anniversary festivities in Ankara.[213] Diem returned to Turkey on 12 November where he spent his time until his final return on 5 December 1933 in the Turkish capital, typing up the report that was subsequently translated into Turkish by Ekrem Rüştü for the CHF.[214]

Diem's Sportive Development Aid

For Diem it was obvious that in Turkey the sport associations were insufficient and sport was not a mass phenomenon at all. In addition, the state's limited budget did not allow for funding of sports clubs and a nation-wide youth association similar to the German Hitler Youth.[215] However, we can state that Carl Diem's work of the previous two decades[216] as well as the developments in Nazi Germany at the time of his journey and the writing phase of the report gained currency in Diem's proposal for the CHF.

Diem attached the draft law to his report,[217] stating that the youth of both sexes between the ages of 10 and 18 had to participate in physical and moral in-

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211 Quoted after Becker, *Carl Diems Leben, vol.* 3, 81.

212 Becker, *Carl Diems Leben, vol.3,* 80.

213 Diem to Recep, 9 October 1933; BCA 490 100 K1116 D75 Sira 2 Sayfa 26.

214 Becker, *Carl Diems Leben, vol. 3*, 81; Schäfer-Borrmann, *Ekrem Rüştü Akömer*, 95.

215 Schäfer-Borrmann, *Ekrem Rüştü Akömer*, 82.

216 For his proposals after 1929 see Becker, *Carl Diems Leben, vol. 3*, 230.

217 Carl Diem, *Staatliche Führung und körperliche Erziehung in der Türkei: Gesetzesvorschläge, Sportordnung und Stoffverteilungsplan ausgearbeitet aufgrund einer Studienreise September-Oktober 1933 im Auftrage der Türkischen Volkspartei von Dr. Carl Diem* (November 1933) Turkish translation was not traceable in the German and Turkish archives. For the German typewritten original(s) see: BCA F490 100 K1107 D 43 Sı 1, 54–140; For the identical copy submitted to Reich

Figure 7: Carl Diem (right) with his wife Lieselott, visiting the former general and governor of İzmir Kâzım [Dirik] Paşa (in light suit), 1933

struction, expanded by daily gymnastic at school (Diem's *ceterum censeo* from the debate in Germany.) For this task, the Ministry of Defense should establish a special department and cooperate with the Ministry of Education. Following the German *Zeitgeist*, Diem suggested creating the position of a sports leader (*Sportführer*), who would cooperate national efforts in all sports-related matters.[218] Although Diem had lost his influential position in Germany due to the developments in the summer of 1933, his adherence to *Gleichschaltung*[219] and National Socialist principles, including the "leader principle" (*Führer-Prinzip*)[220] and the nation's readiness for military service (*Wehrfähigkeit der Nation*)[221] became apparent. Yet Diem in his report also included the opinion of local experts,

Chancellor Adolf Hitler by Carl Diem in 1934 see BA-L R 43-II/ 1499, 176 – 228; For the reprint (in reverse order, i. e. the law proposal after the report) in Carl Diem: *Olympische Flamme*, vol 3, 1942, 1157 – 1176.

218 BCA F490 100 K1107 D 43 S1 1: 55 – 56.

219 See the schematic organization chart with president Mustafa Kemal at the top in BCA F490 100 K1107 D 43 S1 1: 94; Diem: *Olympische Flamme,* vol 3: 1942, 1163.

220 BCA F490 100 K1107 D 43 S1 1, 59.

221 BCA F490 100 K1107 D 43 S1 1, 87.

as a suggestion by Selim Sırrı. In a personal conversation, the veteran of the *Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri* had advised the German visitor to stress the need of more Swedish gymnastics instructions in Turkey.[222] This was a plea that was supported by Carl Diem, since he like Selim Sırrı was not a follower of German *Turnen*.[223] Diem also showed cultural sensivity in his report and was responsive to country-specific features. He included the 19 May festivities in the feast calendar of the proposed sport organization's annual programme[224] and paid attention to the traditional role of women in Turkish society, who could only become members in compulsory sport and youth organization until the (marital) age of 16.[225] Especially with regard to the first issue, Diem showed greater respect for Turkish realities than Heinrich von Hoff had done in the Ottoman environment. However, Diem also followed practices that had proven their effectiveness in the case of the BJD and the OGD. Young men who were to join the compulsory and the volunteer elements of physical education on a regular basis would benefit in the context of their future military service.[226]

Jungdeutschland Reloaded? The 'Gazi Youth'

The core of Diem's proposal was to establish of a nation-wide volunteer youth organization, which would bear the name of the state founder. The Gazi Youth Association (*Gasi-Jugend-Verband;* GJV) was to consist of *"wolf cub" (kurt yavrusu)* units for boys and girls, a term deriving from the German Boy Scout movement. The animalistic connotation fit well with Turkish mythology and the Turkish General Staff's ideas of the Greywolves Organization in the past. The

222 BCA F490 100 K1107 D 43 S1 1, 103.

223 Becker, *Carl Diems Leben, vol. 3*, 36.

224 "Feast of the Kemal youth (conducted by the sport organization for them, combined with a patriotic celebration, consistent date for instance 19 May every year)[...]" BCA F490 100 K1107 D 43 S1 1, 70. On this republican festival in those years see Alkan, "Osmanlı İdman Bayramı'ndan Atatürk'ü Anma, Gençlik ve Spor Bayramı'na," 34–36.

225 BCA F490 100 K1107 D 43 S1 1, 55; § 2. The young girls were not instructed in military topics but in care for the wounded, poor relief and in baby care; ibid., 58. Diem attributed the mother role to the Turkish girls and warned that sport exercises in the youth organization should not endanger the girl's fertility. For Diem it was important to attract women "since they give birth to healthy children and should educate the children from the very beginning [in sport activities]. In this regard there are big constraints, and it is important to choose a path suitable for the Turkish woman. Not all forms of Western sport would fit [the Turkish conditions]." BCA F490 100 K1107 D 43 S1 1, 89.

226 BCA F490 100 K1107 D 43 S1 1, 55, § 5.

organization should have its local domicile (for six groups each) in the party's People Houses (*Halk Evleri*).[227] Diem suggested to have the groups led by men chosen by the party and former GJV members older than the age of 18, a lesson from past mistakes made in the *Bund Jungdeutschland*.[228] The members, as in the case of the BJD and OGD, were exempt from membership fees and were divided in groups: 10 to 15 year-olds and 15 to 18 year-olds. These groups should assemble twice a week and focus on physical, ethical (not otherwise specified) and military training.[229] The GJV should attract young people from all layers of society, wear uniform with rank insignia while in service and it should also offer in-depth courses of military knowledge for their male members, in addition to the *Askerlik Dersi* at school.[230] What was to become of the Turkish Boy Scout organization was not part of Diem's considerations.

Like in the German Imperial Youth Competitions, the GJV's "*wolf cubs*" were to compete with other groups in regular sport contests which, apart from running, swimming and other disciplines, should also include firearms shooting as part of their paramilitary training (*Wehrsport*) section.[231] Diem also suggested to equip the Kemal Youth with the necessary sport and instruction material ("150,000 Kemal books" listed without further description), including 25 rifles with sufficient ammunition and the same number of exercise hand grenades for every People's House.[232] This part of Diem's proposal sounded like the prep-

227 Those nationwide institutions had been founded in 1932, providing instructions, courses and other activities free of charge for all age groups thereby serving the spread of the Kemalist state ideology. The People's houses were subordinated to the CHF. See Neşe Gürallar Yeşilkaya, "Halkevleri" [People's Houses], in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce*. Vol.2: *Kemalizm*, ed. Tanıl Bora and and Murat Gültekingil (Istanbul: İletişim, 2002), 113–118.

228 For Diem it had been a rather awkward situation that an association bearing the term 'young' in its name was presided by Colmar von der Goltz, a man in his late sixties. Even though the military was held in high esteem by the Wilhelmine society, this was not appealing to 12 to 18 year-old boys. They needed a younger national leader as well as similar aged group leaders at the local level. In reality, older teachers and officers often gave instructions, especially during the first years of World War One until the activities of the BJD slowly faded out. Diem saw this as a major disadvantage in the structure of the BJD. For Diem, youth had to be led by youth, especially after he had made the acquaintance of the 30 years-old leader of the Hitler Youth, Baldur von Schirach. Cf. Becker, *Carl Diems Leben, vol. 3*, 154.

229 BCA F490 100 K1107 D 43 S1 1, 58.

230 BCA F490 100 K1107 D 43 S1 1, 107.

231 BCA F490 100 K1107 D 43 S1 1, 70.

232 BCA F490 100 K1107 D 43 S1 1, 78.

aration for an imminent civil war in Turkey rather than focus on the physical education of Turkish youth.[233]

In this militarist sense, Diem concluded the proposal by characterizing the moral instruction in all the proposed organizations:

> "Through physical education different aims can be achieved, such as personal health or individual joy. They all have to be incorporated into the military readiness of the nation. [...] By deliberate fostering of patriotism in all clubs and all festivities there will be a success. This also includes the care for folk traditions and for Turkish culture, valuable customs and practices."[234]

In this regard, Carl Diem's report was to have an impact on the further development of the proposed Turkish youth organization in the subsequent years. The considerations of the German specialist became the fundament of the ongoing debate. However, this process was to be a slow one and did only accelerate in the end of the decade.

The sceptical Turkish View of the Hitler Youth

Upon Carl Diem's return to Germany there was initially no further progress regarding the youth organization. Instead, there were internal debates within the Republican Party on the further proceedings, oriented mostly around contemporary models in other countries. The appearance of the Hitler Youth during the 1936 Olympic Games left an especially deep impression on visitors from Turkey.[235]

In 1936 the Hitler Youth had become mandatory for every German boy and girl and the militant orientation of its paramilitary activities had become evident.[236] A HJ group existed even in Istanbul and composed of children from

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233 For the restrictive early republican Turkish interior policy towards the Kurdish population see Murat Yüksel, "Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye'sinde Güvenlik Siyaseti ve Nüfus Politikaları" [Security Policy and Population Policies in Turkey in the Early Republic], in *Türkiye'de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti*, ed. Evren Balta Paker et al., (Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), 293–305.

234 BCA F490 100 K1107 D 43 Sı 1, 87.

235 Akın, *Gürbüz ve Yavuz Evlatlar*, 149; Corry Guttstadt, *Turkey, the Jews, and the Holocaust* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 39.

236 Hajo Bernett, "Die 'totale Mobilmachung' der deutschen Jugend: Pläne zur vormilitärischen Ertüchtigung von 1933–1936," *Sportwissenschaft* 12 (1982), 345–375 and Michael Buddrus, "'Vormilitärische Ausbildung' und 'Leibeserziehung' der Jugend. Training für den Kriegseinsatz der

the German community. Its activities were under the surveillance of the Turkish authorities and its members were not allowed to wear the HJ uniform in public.[237] As part of his tour through South Eastern Europe, Baldur von Schirach, the head of the HJ, also visited Turkey in December 1937. However, this part of his journey was not mentioned in detail in the HJ periodical since the Turkish government had followed a rather distancing policy towards the NS movement on this issue.[238] Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who was more interested in National Socialist policy for young workers than in the HJ organization received Schirach. Schirach's statement about the Turkish president was also illustrative of someone being close to Hitler's inner circle. For the German *Jugendführer,* Atatürk was "one of the most approachable and polite dictators I have ever met. He was also the cleverest one."[239]

Even though Carl Diem kept a conservative distance to the HJ and called the organization "pretentious kitsch"[240], he supplied Ekrem Rüştü Akömer, his interpreter during his stay in Turkey in 1933, with the *HJ Kampfblatt* periodical.[241] The Turkish sport organization was also interested in the HJ development and offered a detailed description of the organization in several articles.[242] Nevertheless, the activities of the HJ in Turkey were under the strict surveillance of the Turkish police and intelligence service, which carefully monitored Schirach's visit in Turkey.[243] The Hitler Youth was not to be a role model for the Turkish state.

HJ," in *Totale Erziehung für den totalen Krieg: Hitlerjugend und nationalsozialistische Jugendpolitik*, ed. M. Buddrus (Munich: Saur, 2003), 175–249.

237 Anne Dietrich, "Teutonia- ein deutscher Verein in Istanbul," *Zeitschrift für Türkeistudien* 11–1 (1998), 30.

238 See the illustrations in *Die HJ: Kampfblatt der Hitlerjugend* 52 (1937), 3 and 1 (1938), 6. They solely depict random scenes from Schirach's visit to Istanbul. Akın's claim that there was a special number of the HJ periodicals on Turkey could not be validated; Akın, *Gürbüz ve Yavuz Evlatlar*, 150. However, there was as special number focusing on the modernization process under the Kemalist government and politico-economic German views on Turkey in the HJ's leadership periodical in the autumn of 1938, see *Wille und Macht: Führerorgan der nationsozialistischen Jugend* 6–18 (1938). On the CHF policy see Naumann, *Die politischen Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und der Türkei 1923–1935*, 194–196.

239 Baldur von Schirach, *Ich glaubte an Hitler* (Hamburg: Mosaik, 1967), 228.

240 Becker, *Carl Diems Leben, vol. 3*, 163.

241 Schäfer-Borrmann, *Ekrem Rüştü Akömer*, 56.

242 Hikmet Tuna, "Gençlık ve Silâh" [Youth and Weapon], *Türk Spor Kurumu Dergisi* 60 (1937), 6–7; Nizam Kırpan, *Almanya'da Gençlik Teşkilatı* [*The Youth Organization in Germany*], *Türk Spor Kurumu Dergisi* 82 (1938), 12–13 and 83 (1938), 14–15.

243 Security Directorate of the Turkish Ministry of the Interior to the office of the Prime Minister, 8 March 1938, regarding a pamphlet distributed by Schirach to the Istanbul HJ section. BCA F 30.10.0.0 K 231 Do 558 S15, 1–10.

Turkish Reactions and the Law of 1938

Already around the time of Diem's visit to Turkey there had been calls in the Turkish Boy Scout movement for a stronger state supervision. Pointing to the French model, the Turkish General Staff, the Ministry of Defense and of Education should "take the Boy Scout topic in their hands as a national subject".[244] Accordingly, the Turkish Boy Scout leadership would provide advisory support, drawing on their rich experience. The orientation of the Boy Scouts was clear during those years. The Boy Scouts were seen as the best preparation of young men for military service: "The adolescent, trained as an agile, intelligent, exclusively chosen, owner of a strong will, used to discipline, sturdy [gürbüz] and vigilant Boy Scout will be the most excellent soldier in the Turkish army that will ever be formed in the future."[245]

The Turkish state supported those claims. In the year that Selim Sırrı retired, the Ministry of Education created a special department for physical education and Boy Scouting.[246] The topic was also popular among Turkish sport students studying abroad. A student in Diem's former Hochschule für Leibesübungen even wrote his thesis about the militarized physical education in Turkish schools.[247] In a similar vein, a former German officer who had withnessed the Boy Scout parade during the National Day in Ankara was full of praise for the Turkish youth movement and its militarist spirit:

> "[...] Officers with war experience [...] educate the youth according to the will of the Gazi, mainly in the spirit of the Turkish war of liberation in which those officers had fought. [...] 'Askerlik' is rather a matter of the heart than of the head. It means fulfillment of duties, reliability, physical and moral cleanliness, abstinence, loyalty, camaraderie, open and hard manliness. [...] Looking at the Turkish youth I think back 25 years in time. In those days I was a member of the Wehrkraft youth association. [...] The time will come [in Germany] to recall the premilitary training of the youth in its ultimate result."[248]

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244 M. Raif, "Bizde İzcilik Ne İdi- Ne Dir- Ne Olacak? 5: Başka Memeleketlerde İzcilik" [What was, What is, What will be Scouting for Boys in our Country? No. 5: Boy Scouting in other Nations], *Türk İzciler Birliği* 7 (1932), 4.

245 Daniş Remzi, "Bu Günün İzcisi Yarının Askeridir" [Today's Boy Scout is Tomorrow's Soldier], *Türk İzciler Birliği* 18–19–20 (1933), 8.

246 Law No. 2773, *T.C. Resmi Gazete* 15 June 1935, 5332.

247 Cf the graduation thesis of Nefi Kadri, *Wie heute in der Türkei Wehr-Sport geführt wird und geführt werden muss* (Diploma thesis, Hochschule für Leibesübungen Berlin, 1934), 23 with similar claims as Diem in his 1933 report.

248 Br. [Anonymous], "Die vormilitärische Erziehung der türkischen Jugend," *MWB* 121–35 (1937), cols. 2087–2089.

Figure 8: 'Atatürk Army and Atatürk Youth': The Turkish Boy Scouts (left below), together with the armed forces and the sportsmen, as one element of the mobilisatory national self-image, united under president Atatürk. Photograph collage in a civilian periodical on the occasion of the 1936 national day.

In the same year Hüseyin Rahmi Apak, the man who had organized Carl Diem's visit to Turkey, received the report of a much-traveled party member who had studied the youth organizations in more than 20 countries. The latter were partially a 'who's who' of the contemporary main authoritarian countries. Naili Meran's realization of the contemporary *Zeitgeist* was essentially expressed in the following sentence:

> "The main purpose of the party has to be to resign oneself with the people, to instill in them culture and teach them the Republican, revolutionary, nationalist basics. The result has to be to guarantee a unity that is marching towards the same objective in every corner of the Turkish country, standing on a solid basis [...]."[249]

Together with Diem's study, Apak used Naili Meran's booklet for his own report. As this report also contained an internal Turkish perspective, in addition to Diem's external review, it deserves further analysis.[250] Even though Apak's report

249 Naili Meran, *Türkiye'de Beden Terbiyesi, Rekreasyon ve Sport Programları Ne Olmalıdır* [*How Physical Education, Recreation and Sport Programmes in Turkey have to be (done)*] (N.p., n.d., c. November 1937), BCA 490 100 K1107 D43 Sira 1, 3.

250 Tekirdağ Saylavi and Rahmi Apak, *Gençlik Teşkilatı Hakkında Rapor* [A Report Regarding the Youth Organization] (Anakara: Ulus Basımevi, 1937).

did not include any references to the former German-Ottoman cooperation during the war, the text contained the occasional reference to Germany.

Apak stated that the idea of establishing a youth organization was nothing new. Prior to 1914 it had been used for military purposes (Germany being but one example) or for political aims, as in the case of the Southeast European Pan-Slavist Sokol organization. The authors mentioned the latter since they had "helped to achieve the indepence of the nation".[251] Obviously, here the ideas behind the Sokol movement was closer to the ideology of the Kemalists, since Germany, with its *Bund Jungdeutschland*, could not offer such a struggle for national independence. After a classification of the European post-1918 youth organizations the authors concluded:

> "In this regard, I will relate here some words that are also said in the Soviet provinces, in Mussolini's Italy or in Hitler's Germany: The strength of a revolution [inkılâp] [bases on] creating a new man appropriate for this revolution as well as creating [him] in a very short time. Without this talk of a revolution, it is like talking of a dream [hayal]. The younger the ones on top of this revolution are the smaller the opposition will be. And the revolution will be prepared for new times and new challenges."[252]

From this statement it becomes clear that the CHP feared further uprisings like a second Menemen incident or another insurrection similar to the one in Dersim that had begun in March 1937. Rahmi Apak was fascinated by the opportunities a state-funded, centralized youth organization offered in this regard. Through the early indoctrination of youth, the sustainable effects of the Kemalist revolution could be guaranteed. The view of the new man was also not far from the model of totalitarian regimes.[253] This is why in Turkey, the state wanted to con-

251 Saylavi and Apak, *Gençlik Teşkilatı Hakkında Rapor*, 2. On the Sokol movement see Nizameddin Kırşan, "Çekoslovakya'da Sokol Teşkilatı" [The Sokol Organization in Czechoslovakia], *Türk Spor Kurumu Dergisi* (15 March 1937), 6–7; Ibid. (22 March 1937), 6–7.

252 Saylavi and Apak, *Gençlik Teşkilatı Hakkında Rapor*, 5.

253 Cf Hitlers view regarding the use of sport in accordance with National Socialist ideology, which went far beyond the CHP concepts. Cf. Hitler's statement on the education of the youth in the party's *Ordensburgen* (Order Castles), the cadre training and drill facilities for the future elite of the NSDAP leadership before 1940: "A youth will rise in my order castles who will scare the whole world. I want a violent, imperious, relentless, cruel youth. [...] I will have them trained in all kind of physical exercises. I want an athletic youth. [...] In that way I can create the new [order]." Hermann Rauschning, *Gespräche mit Hitler* (Zürich: Europa-Verlag 1940), 23. These lines are not to be taken literally; cf. Theodor Schieder, *Hermann Rauschnings 'Gespräche mit Hitler' als Geschichtsquelle* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1972), 24.

centrate on the 10 – 13 millionen citizens born after 1912.[254] The authors pleaded for public parades of young people following political statements from the government, as in Stalin's Soviet Union. Atatürks political statements had to reach the last Turkish shepherd the very next day and every young man returning from military service had to present the revolutionary spirit to his fellow village people after his return.[255] Otherwise, "the regime would never become strong."[256] Therefore, the youth had to be instructed in an organization. The first aim should be to prepare young men for their military service and to provide the requirements for a "nation in arms" ("silhalanmış millet"),[257] a recourse of Colmar von der Goltz's concept.

In this regard, the premilitary training and physical instruction were urgent necessities. The latter was to encompass all young people in the country. The entire young generation, including office clerks sitting for long hours, factory workers with their monotonous movements and the majority of the hard-working rural population needed physical activities. The need for physical activity was best illustrated in a quote from a brochure published by the Ministry of War in 1936, being a favorite role model of the Young Turk generation.[258] Due to the raised requirements of modern warfare the boys should start their physical education already at the age of 14, not at the age of 20 when they are eligible for military service. To prove the need for ethics instruction (*ahlak*), the authors then even quoted several sentences from Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, in which Hitler referred to the seductive features of modern urban life and the need for the state's preventative authoritarian intervention for physical education. In the view of Saylavi and Apak, only a state-led youth organization could prevent bad outcomes and could educate "highly qualified and gentlemanlike people."[259] The authors then took a closer look at the social conditions of the different social layers to which the young people belonged. They got better insight into Turkish village realities than Carl Diem did during his short visit four years before them. Prostitution, sexual assaults, misuse of alcohol and tobacco, the neg-

254 Saylavi and Apak, *Gençlik Teşkilatı Hakkında Rapor*, 5. Cf. a previous similar claim: B. K. Çağlar, "Spor Lüks Değil İhtiyaç..." [Sports: Not a Luxury, Necessity...], *Türk Spor Kurumu Dergisi*, 9 September 1936, 2.

255 For the use of discharged conscripts as advocates of the Kemalist ideas see also Anonymous, "Ordu ve Spor" [Army and Sports], *Türk Spor Kurumu Dergisi*, 6 July 1936, 16.

256 Saylavi and Apak, *Gençlik Teşkilatı Hakkında Rapor*, 7.

257 Saylavi and Apak, *Gençlik Teşkilatı Hakkında Rapor*, 8.

258 Saylavi and Apak, *Gençlik Teşkilatı Hakkında Rapor*, 10; cf. Pertev Demirhan, *Japonların Asıl Kuvveti: Japonlar Niçin ve Nasıl Yükseldi?* [The Major Strength of the Japanese: For what and how did the Japanese rise?] (Istanbul: n.p., 1937).

259 Saylavi and Apak, *Gençlik Teşkilatı Hakkında Rapor*, 13.

ligence of fieldwork and other social vices, according to the authors, were a daily occurrence in the Turkish countryside. That is why the males in the village had to be educated through sport.[260] In the cities, venereal diseases were another threat to the health of young people. Here, Saylavi and Apak referred to the scare that had also occured in Germany before 1914.[261] In addition, the authors feared the spread of communist ideas, especially among civil engineers.

Foreign role models were the focus on the second part of the report. In terms of a possible name for the organization, the authors kept with the tradition of Carl Diem and suggested "*Atatürk Youth*".[262] However, Turkish youth could only be eligible for admission into organizations at the age of 16, since the entry into the Hitler Youth at age of 14 was too early in terms of maturity and the cost intensive structure in the less urbanized Anatolia.[263] This was a feasible point that had also been neglected by Heinrich von Hoff, when he implemented the German role model in 1916. The *Bund Jungdeutschland* model was not positively reviewed in the periodical of the Turkish sport association in the late 1930s. One author blamed the setback of the World War for failure of the organization:

> "After some (preliminary) studies, von Hoff came up with a project called 'Genç Dernekleri Teşkilatı' [...]. Coinciding with the war's most severe and for our side difficult period, this organization was left half-finished and did not prevail but disappeared together with the armistice."[264]

This can be read as a proof of the fact that the existence of the OGD was not forgotten. Furthermore, the following year, the same periodical also featured a more negative assessment and characterized the OGD as "a bad copy of the organization that had been headed by von der Goltz Pasha (Young Germany)."[265]

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260 Saylavi and Apak, *Gençlik Teşkilatı Hakkında Rapor*, 19. Cf. in this regard the illustration of Hitler youth girls in *Türk Süpor Kurumu Dergisi* 19 October 1936, 6. The caption reads as follows: "The German village girls that we see during sport under the guidance of a female coach have learned that training their bodies is a duty."

261 Cf. Williams, "Ecstasies of the young".

262 Saylavi and Apak, *Gençlik Teşkilatı Hakkında Rapor*, 24.

263 Saylavi and Apak, *Gençlik Teşkilatı Hakkında Rapor*, 25.

264 Nizameddin Kırşan, "İzcilik" [Boy Scouting], *Türk Spor Kurumu Dergisi* 71 (1937), 6–7.

265 Vildan Aşir. "Türk İzcilik Tarihine Kısa Bir Bakış" [A Brief History of the Turkish Boy Scouts], *Türk Spor Kurumu Dergisi* 97 (1938), 2.

Towards a Turkish Youth Organization

In the Turkey of 1937, evaluations for a new nation-wide youth organization did not refer to the OGD model. However, like its predecessor the new organization had to be compulsory, starting with weekly gatherings. Through the use of active and reserve officers and local teachers, Saylavi and Apak calculated the costs for such an organization in the Western provinces of İzmir, Balıkesir and Kırklareli as being less than 350,000 Lira per annum.[266] Obviously, two of those provinces had been selected since they had once been the sites of political upheaval (Menemen laid in the İzmir province) or were considered strategically important borderland, as in the case of Kırklareli. Like in Carl Diem's proprosal, the annual camp exercises should also feature the handling of firearms as an integral part of the programme. The authors warned that the founding of a nation-wide youth organization should not be postponed and should deserve as much importance as other elements of the Turkish modernization project. If the Turkish rural youth would not be properly trained, then just like in the First World War, i.e. "[...] like in the past, also in the future the Turkish soldiers would only be able to conduct a defensive war having a limited offensive power [...]".[267] The authors then concluded their pamphlet with a collection of quotes about the paramilitary education of the young generation from General Pétain (the later dicatator of Vichy France, 1940 – 1945), Mussolini, Hitler, Stalin and, last but not least, Atatürk. As obedient Kemalists, the authors claimed that Atatürk had obliged the defense of the principles of the revolution to the Turkish youth in his 1927 speech, "therefore he did not give to us the task of immediately educating the youth?"[268] In the appendix to their plea, the authors then gave an overview of similar proposals of other state and party officials, concluded by an overview of Carl Diem's report from 1933.[269]

Carl Diem had stayed in contact with the Turkish authorities and offered to return to Turkey to prepare a second report, this time about the foundation of a civil school for physical education.[270] However, in 1938 the National Socialist au-

266 Saylavi and Apak, *Gençlik Teşkilatı Hakkında Rapor*, 30.
267 Saylavi and Apak, *Gençlik Teşkilatı Hakkında Rapor*, 37.
268 Saylavi and Apak, *Gençlik Teşkilatı Hakkında Rapor*, 43.
269 Saylavi and Apak, *Gençlik Teşkilatı Hakkında Rapor*, 47 – 48.
270 Diem to Colonel Cemil, head of the department for physical education in the Ministry of Education about Diem's planned visit to Ankara in autumn 1937; dated 24 July 1937. BCA Ankara 490 100 K1116 D75 Sira 2 Sayfa 2.

thorities refused to issue a travel permit for more than three months, as they needed Diem to prepare the 1940 Olympic Winter Games in Germany.[271]

Now it was up to the Turkish side to take further steps on its own. With the passing of law number 3530, the Directorate General of Physical Education *(Beden Terbiyesi Genel Müdürlüğü)* was founded.[272] It was headed by the active General Cemil Cahir Taner. Its main task was the coordination of paramilitary and sports activities in Turkey, thereby serving "national and revolutionary aims".[273] The rather imprecise paragraph four of the law was to be the legal fundament for compulsory physical and paramilitary instruction, since the latter would serve the defense of the country and the ruling political regime alike in times of growing threat of war in Europe.[274] Nevertheless, the planned size of the organization was not achieved due to budget restrictions after the mobilization of the army during the Second World War. In 1941, there were nearly 90,000 young people between the age of 15 and 20 that were active in one of the clubs under the control of the *Beden Terbiyesi Genel Müdürlüğü*.[275] However, this was only half of the proposed size in Diem's report.

Conclusion

The Ottoman youth organizations clearly drew on a variety of different European sources. The German element never dominated, but was very recognizable during the wartime due to the alliance with Germany. In both countries, those organizations served the goal of homogenizing the society towards a 'nation in arms' in the sense of Colmar von der Goltz. But in both cases, the time was too short for both associations to gain ground within their societies, especially during wartime.

The circumstances of their development were quite different. While the BJD could count on a youth with a sufficient primary education, this factor was not a given in the Ottoman Empire. Here, the OGD had to carry out pioneering work in the truest sense of the word.

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271 Becker, *Carl Diems Leben, vol. 3*, 167.

272 Akın, *Gürbüz ve Yavuz Evlatlar*, 158 – 170.

273 Law No. 3530, *T.C. Resmi Gazete*, 29 June 1938, 10300.

274 See Kadri Yaman, "Memleket Müdafaası ve Rejim Bakımından Gençlik Teşkilâtı ve Spor" [The Youth Organization and Sport seen from the point of Defending the Country and the Regime], *Beden Terbiyesi ve Spor* 1 – 11 (1939), 13 – 14.

275 Akın, *Gürbüz ve Yavuz Evlatlar*, 168.

All of these appropriations in terms of organizing the nation's youth have to be seen as a means to westernize the Ottoman state following European models. For this transitional period, foreign instructors were hired. The Republic of Turkey then tried to implement its own institutions, but opted for foreign assistance. In this process, the needs and special conditions of Kemalist Turkey also played a role. Even though both men contributed to the creation of a law, Heinrich von Hoff during war had not been very successful with the establishment of the Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri, whereas Carl Diem had a bigger impact on further developments. Yet to a certain degree, both men were 'external consultants'. Both German specialists were called in when the situation hit a stalemate, even though the Ottoman Ministry of War and the Turkish Republican Party had experiences from the past to draw on. The German 'youth organization consultants' added some of their own ideas, yet in the end they had no further insight into internal processes and only confirmed what the internal decision makers already knew, thereby only granting a certain legitimy for those decisions, resulting in the laws of 1916 and 1938.

Looking at the personal level, it is also noticeable that there were networks based on military connections between Germany and the Ottoman Empire/Turkey. Indeed, the military had a decreasing influence on the paramilitary instruction of the youth in both countries as a resultfrom its altered status within the society. It was to be the ruling regime in the single party state that defined the conditions of the paramilitary education of the youth. In this regard, Carl Diem was not far from the ideology of his time, when he stated that in Turkey "[t]he physical education of the people is ensured by a compact, interlocked system."[276] This was an idea that was not far from Hitler's vision of an indoctrinated youth.[277] It therefore has to be pointed out that there is a direct connection be-

276 BCA F490 100 K1107 D 43 S1 1, 87.

277 Hitler's speech on 2 December 1938 about the life trajectory of young German men: "These boys join our organization at the age of ten and [...] then four years later, they move from the Jungvolk to the Hitler Youth and there we keep them for another four years. And then we [...] take them immediately into the party [organizations] [...]. And if they are there for eighteen months or two years and have still not become real National Socialists, then they go into the Arbeitsdienst [Labour Service] and are polished there for six or seven months. And if, after six or seven months, there are still remnants of class consciousness or pride in status, then the Wehrmacht will take over the further treatment for two years and when they return after two or four years then [...] we take them immediately into the SA, SS etc. and they will not be free again for the rest of their lives." Quoted after the transcript in Heinrich Kanz, *Der Nationalsozialismus als pädagogisches Problem: Deutsche Erziehungsgeschichte 1933 – 1945* (Frankfurt: Lang, 1984), 241. On the outcome of this policy after 1939 see Stephen Hart, "Indoctrinated Nazi Teenage Warriors: The Fanaticism of the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend in Normandy,

tween the Bund Jungdeutschland and the Hitler Youth.[278] To a certain degree this was also the case for the Turkish model, though it never reached the dimensions of an all-encompassing totalitarian state youth due to monetary restrictions.

After the analysis of the German-Ottoman/Turkish civil-military cooperation in the establishment of paramilitary youth organizations we will return to the transfer of military knowledge. After 1918, the teaching of (retired) German officers in Turkey and the interest of the Turkish army's leadership in the German model continued. However, as it also became evident in this chapter, scepticism about the applicability of German military knowledge and practices in a Turkish environment had increased after the defeat of 1918.

1944," in *Fanaticism and Conflict in the Modern Age*, ed. Matthew Hughes and Gaynor Johnson (London, New York: Frank Cass, 2005), 81–100.

278 Schäfer, *Militarismus, Nationalismus, Antisemitismus*, 449; Krethlow, *Generalfeldmarschall Goltz*, 406, 416.

4 German-Turkish Military Cooperation after 1918

Chapter Outline

After the defeat of the Central Powers in 1918, the social postion of the German and the post-Ottoman army changed dramatically. Yet commissioned officers of both armies could retain their influential status within the state, as indicated by the presidency of the two most distinguished generals in both republics. The armed force's active leadership had to accept the primacy of politics in Turkey, or rather endure it in the German case.[1] Nevertheless, the relations of both armies were affected by the past alliance, since some of the leading Turkish officers must have been driven by the Turkish proverb, hence "an old friend will never be a foe."[2]

The motto 'after the war is before the war' applies particularly to military affairs. Officers of both sides began to analyze the course of war, its campaigns and outcomes. With no limitations imposed by wartime censorship, experts could now express views that were absent in earlier evaluations. As usual, in the production of military knowledge, the question of 'lessons learned?' was dealt with extensively. The first part of this chapter will thus explore these debates and the often diverging views of German and especially the Turkish veteran officers. How did the Turkish side rate the Ottoman participation in the war? What were the lessons for further cooperation? With regard to the German evaluation of the war, there is also the question of whether there were any Ottoman warfare practices that found their way into the strategy planning of the Reichswehr and the Wehrmacht.

The memoirs in those years provided insight to the German-Ottoman alliance for the first time. This was previously restricted by lost or still confidential sources and the consideration of personal sensibilities, as in the case of Liman von Sander's memoirs, which were published quite early. With Turkish memoirs this was even more the case. Insignificant remarks could already have juridical repercussions. On these grounds we can state that the fear of defamation suits prevented many veterans from openly expressing their views or even from joining the debate, as this chapter will show.

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1 On Turkey see Bülent Dâver, "Military's Political Role during the War of Independence, 1919–1922," *Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire* 67 (1988), 201–207; William Hale, "The Turkish Republic and its Army, 1923–1960," *Turkish Studies* 12–2 (2011), 191–201; for the Reichswehr/Wehrmacht see Geyer, "Der zur Organisation erhobene Burgfrieden," 86–100.

2 "*Eski dost düşman olmaz.*"

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110554786-004

The second part of this chapter will focus on the renewed hiring of German military instructors, beginning with the interesting case of Captain Hans Tröbst during the Greco-Turkish war until the employment of retired staff officers between 1925 and 1939. What were the limitations and fields of action of those German specialists? In which aspect of German military knowledge was the Turkish side interested? This chapter will conclude with an overview of the time after 1939, when Turkey drew its lessons from the devastating effects of World War One.

'Lessons Learned'? A Look at the Sources

After the end of hostilities with Greece, the Turkish army began to analyze the outcome of the war. According to its commander in chief, Mustafa Kemal, the Turkish army had also consulted foreign sources: "[...] the most useful periodicals and military publications by military specialists, published both during the First World War and afterwards, were translated, printed and distributed to the army in thousands of copies."[3]

In Germany and Turkey, the two 'flagships' of military press, the *Militär- Wochenblatt* (MWB) and the *Mecmua-ı Askeriye* (renamed to *Askerî Mecmua* in 1928; AM) continued to exist. They contained articles and reports about general developments in land warfare in their countries and news from the armies of other countries.[4] The MWB and its affiliate, *Wissen und Wehr* (1919 – 1944), were openly subsidized by the Reichswehr Ministry,[5] as was the case with all relevant Turkish periodicals. Beyond these two German main publications, articles from the privately edited *Kriegskunst in Wort und Bild* with its illustrative pictures[6] were often reprinted in translation in several Turkish military periodicals. The contributions in the periodicals of the conservative officer's association, namely, *Deutsches Offizierblatt* (1908 – 1927) and the *Deutscher Offizier-Bund* (1923 – 1933), frequently contained articles that dealt with topics related to the German-Ottoman wartime alliance or contemporary developments in Turkey. Most of the authors had

3 Mustafa Kemal's opening speech at the Turkish National Assembly, 1 March 1923. *TBMM Zabit Ceridesi* [Stenographic Records from the Sessions of the Turkish Grand National Assembly], ed. T.C. Büyük Millet Meclisi, vol 28 (Ankara: TBMM, 1923), 14.

4 For a comparison of both journals see Sencer, *Order and Insecurity in Germany and Turkey*, 11.

5 Christian Haller, *Militärzeitschriften in der Weimarer Republik und ihr soziokultureller Hintergrund: Kriegsverarbeitung und Milieubildung im Offizierskorps der Reichswehr in publizistischer Dimension* (Trier: Kliomedia, 2012), 84, 96.

6 Haller, *Militärzeitschriften*, 106.

served in the Ottoman army. Nevertheless, the Turkish military press did not refer to debates in those two periodicals. The same also applied for the German military press, which focused on the advancement of practical and theoretical knowledge in the armies of Germany's potential adversaries, but not in the army of its former ally. This might also have been related to the fact that more specialized periodicals of the Turkish military press were available during the Republican period that could hardly be overviewed. In addition to the aforementioned AM, all of the main branches of the Turkish army founded their own periodical. These ranged from the infantry (*Piyade Mecmuası*; PM), cavalry (*Süvari Mecmuası*; SM), artillery (*Topçu Mecmuası*; TM) to the engineer's periodical (*T.C. Fen Kıtaatı Mecmuası*), and even to a special one for the army's quartermaster's branch (*Levazım Mecmuası*). Nonetheless, the Turkish periodicals were limited regarding their freedom of opinion. Therefore, it is correct to state that, even after 1933, the German military press had a "wider legal margin of operation".[7] Most of these Turkish journals referred to German publications or translated German articles for their readership, followed by articles from French, British and (rarely) Russian origin. However, this was to change in the beginning of the 1930s when the Turkish army set out on its own path, particularly in the field of war history.

In terms of lessons that can be drawn from misinterpreting war experience, biased and incorrect readings can never be fully excluded. This had also been the case prior to 1914, when the siege episodes of the Russo-Japanese war had been overseen. The Japanese victory had been ascribed to the troops' higher morale and any evidences of possible trench warfare had been neglected in Germany.[8] German military strategists preferred a war image in which Germany stood a winning chance. Negative aspects, such as the superiority of the enemy forces in the East and the West were set aside, and many Ottoman officers had shared the German self-confidence. After 1918, the analysis of the past campaigns also bore the danger of coming to wrong conclusions and excluding possible alternatives, especially by neglecting one's own societal and military limitations.[9] It is, therefore, interesting to see how the German and Turkish military analysts perceived their common efforts during the First World War.

7 Sencer, *Order and Insecurity in Germany and Turkey*, 3.

8 William C. Fuller, "What is a Military Lesson?," in *Strategic Studies: A Reader*, ed. Thomas G. Mahnken et al. 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2014), 29.

9 Fuller, "What is a military lesson?", 35.

Coalition Warfare under Assessment

In the German military press, most wartime shortcomings of the German army were discussed critically. The lack of prewar preparation and supply management as well as the numerous long fronts were frequent topics. Adding to that criticism of the reluctant allies dominated the evaluations, with a focus on the cooperation with Austro-Hungary and the unexpected Italian withdrawal from the war alongside the Central Powers.[10] In the rare references to the Ottoman case, this was often related to the decisions of the policy maker Enver Pasha, who was regarded as unqualified, and the high Ottoman desertion rate, even though in the latter case, the German army had suffered from the same problem during the last year of the war.[11] On the other hand, the Turkish side carefully analyzed the bitter lessons of the alliance. In 1935, the Germanophile Captain Asım Eren stressed the need for Turkish politics to take sides in a future conflict. The army was to accept the alliance decisions of the politicians. However, the disaster of 1912 had shown the need to prepare the army for entering a war without an ally. For Eren, the German political decision makers had made a similar mistake in 1914, even though Germany could count on several allies. Eren then adopted the view of the German military elite and blamed the German politicians for the poor preparation for conflict and the bad outcome of the war. The main source for his arguments were quotes from the memoirs of Field Marshal Hindenburg. For Eren, warfare was not to be restricted to political limitations and dreams. This had become evident in the negative outcome of the Ottoman campaigns in the Caucasus and Iran, whilst the Syrian front was close to collapse.[12] Based on these considerations, Eren stressed the need not to totally trust the ally, keeping in mind the ally's natural self-interest and his weaknesses, which would also effect its situation in war.[13] Regarding the ally's dubious trustworthiness, Eren mentioned the case of the break-up of the Balkan League in 1913 due to unresolved territorial disputes. Since each partner in the alliance had its own interests at heart, Turkey was to be equally selfish. In order to provide a negative example for neglect of the own political interests, Eren quoted Hindenburg's statement that Enver Pasha's policy towards Germany had been close to self-de-

10 Even in a major monograph on the General staff the Ottoman command was not part of the evaluations; see Wolfgang Foerster, *Aus der Gedankenwerkstatt des Deutschen Generalstabes* (Berlin: Mittler, 1931).

11 Haller, *Militärzeitschriften*, 297–301, 310–311.

12 Asım Eren, "Askerî Andlaşmalar (İttifaklar) Nasıldır ve Nasıl Olmalıdır?" [What are Military Treaties (Alliances) and How do they Have to be?], *AM* 6 (1935), 419–420.

13 Eren, "Askerî Andlaşmalar," 421.

nial. Eren shared the German view, since he saw Enver's behaviour as a feature of the Turkish national character. In the future Turkey had to be aware that "[...] we have to learn those egoistical lessons well."[14] Turkey should not make the mistake again to use its force solely for the alliance's purposes, like the deployment of the Ottoman army to South Eastern Europe in order to serve German war aims. Without having first stabilized the domestic situation, Turkey should not join any alliance.[15] This was a clear reference to the national uprisings in the mid-1930s and the fear of the Republican elite that their nation-building project could be swept away by a failed foreign policy. In the latter case, there was the danger that the Turkish army would dissipate its energies at numerous fronts without gaining anything. Having stated this Eren proposed that in time of war, the political and military power should be united in the hand of a military leader. This was an expectable claim from a representative of a generation that was used to the idea of authoritarian rule and that followed Colmar von der Goltz' concept of the 'nation in arms'.[16] In addition to this claim, Eren suggested to prepare the army and the civil society in time for the coming conflict.[17] It is interesting to note that Eren neither mentioned Hindenburg's criticism of Enver Pasha's commanding skills,[18] nor the challenges arising from the German staff officers with problematic personalities that had been posted to Ottoman leadership positions without consent. It did not take long for others to disagree with Eren's view. Captain Şemsi Zorbu detested the proposed unity of political and military leadership. In contrast to Eren, Captain Zorbu interpreted the German defeat in 1918 as the outcome of the military domination in German wartime politics. Thus to achieve victory, one should rather take the period of Bismarck's chancellorship, and the military leadership of Moltke (the elder) in 1866 and 1870/71 as a successful model.[19] However, military leaders were required to follow global political developments to form their opinion. Zorbu was also convinced that it was nearly impossible to accommodate the policies of the allies. This had been the case with the Central powers regarding Italy, and later with the Ottoman state. Zorbu did not go into details but claimed that Germany

14 Eren, "Askerî Andlaşmalar," 428.

15 Eren, "Askerî Andlaşmalar," 430.

16 It is understood that Eren referred to the de-facto German wartime Hindenburg/Ludendorff duumvirate; Eren, "Askerî andlaşmalar," 434.

17 Eren, "Askerî Andlaşmalar," 435–26.

18 Paul von Hindenburg, *Aus meinem Leben: Volksausgabe* (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1934), 135–136.

19 Şemsi Zorbu, "Harb, Siyasa ve Askerler: 97 sayılı Askerî Mecmuada 'Askerî Andlasmalar' İsmindeki Yazıya Karşılık" [War, Politics and Soldiers: Reply to the Article in AM no. 67 'Military Alliances'], *AM* 53–99 (1935), 1020.

had benefitted by 85 per cent from the conditions of the alliance treaty signed on 2 August 1914. Turkey was expected to calculate the risks of future similar contracts carefully. For that purpose, the republic did not need military rule in wartime.[20] From this debate it became evident that conditions had changed in Turkey and that renewed allegiance with Germany was questionable. This also became evident in the diverging assessment of the war-time cooperation in German and Turkish military journals.

Between Self-Assertion and Blame Shifting

In the German military press, the intense debate over the purpose of war history came to a peak on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the outbreak of the war. Of course the German army was regarded as the best among all fighting nations by German veteran officers since it had carefully analyzed the conflicts before 1914. Mistakes of the German High Command were played down, and the performance of the "German Spirit and will during the World War"[21] was rated as excellent. Wetzell claimed, quite in the sense of Colmar von der Goltz,[22] that the Supreme Commander had to be selected carefully among the best candidates in peacetime. Wetzell had to acknowledge the need for several of those extraordinary gifted commanders in wartime. On each of the different fronts, including the Ottoman one, no military genius had been in command.[23] In the narrow-minded world of the former staff officers, there was no space for criticism. One author warned not to discuss own military failure in public, since the young generation of readers would only start asking critical questions.[24]

Exactly those critical questions were raised in the Turkish postwar debates. For many analysts, the Germans had come off easy, since "[t]he German Empire had found an innocuous ally."[25] Regarding the transfer of infantry attack schemes from the Western front to the Ottoman theaters of war, the stubborn

20 Zorbu, "Harb, Siyasa ve Askerler," 1021.

21 Wetzell, "Kriegslehren," *MWB* 119 – 18 (1935), cols. 683 – 686.

22 Goltz, *Nation in Arms*, 45 – 111.

23 Wetzell, "Kriegslehren," *MWB* 119 – 19 (1935), cols. 724, 727.

24 Badinski, "Die Aufgaben unserer kriegsgeschichtlichen Forschung," *MWB* 119 – 36 (1935), col. 1419. The authors followed an official guidline from the old Imperial army; cf. Markus Pöhlmann, *Kriegsgeschichte und Geschichtspolitik: Der Erste Weltkrieg; Die amtliche deutsche Militärgeschichtsschreibung, 1914 – 1956* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2002), 40.

25 Şemsi Zorbu, "Çanakkale Nasıl Müdafaa Edildi?" [How was Çanakkale defended?], *AM* 53 – 98 (1935), 763.

conduct of operations by Liman von Sanders during the stalemate in Gallipoli were criticized. Captain Zorbu, who had lost his son in the battle, commented on Liman's strategy:

> "Falkenhayn turned the battlefield of Verdun into a slaughterhouse, Liman von Sanders did it also on the Gallipoli peninsula. What else can you expect than blood shed from throwing oneself against enemy trenches with today's automatic weapons? [...] 9000 young men in one night...you can only guess in how many years, with how much effort you can train so many people."[26]

Yet there was still substantial interest in the 'classical' books by German and French military writers within the Turkish army.[27] Reading skills were required among young officers to study these works in the original language, as a stated by an active artillery captain: "For us it is a vital prerequisite to know French and German."[28] However, there was a growing resistance against the thoughtless copying of European war history analyses, which did not fit the Turkish context. The retired General Kâzım Karabekir stated in retrospect that the young Ottoman officers of his generation had known the names of rivers and towns of the Prusso-German military history better than the ones of their own past, a state of affairs that had made the Ottoman military students feel unhappy.[29] Another staff officer pointed to the two factions within the Turkish army, which wondered whether the Republican officer should follow the French or the German model. In this case, the unconditional application of the offensive spirit inherent in both systems had led to the Ottoman defeats in Kırklareli in 1912 and in Sarıkamış in 1915.[30] The conduct of warfare had to be adapted to Turkish customs because

> "[w]e neither resemble the French nor the Germans. We have to create a school of thought according to ourselves and have to deduce this school from our own battles where we shed blood. [...] The Turkish army has so much war experience pointing the way in terms of methods and thoughts. To search for them in foreign countries is a serious sin."[31]

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26 Zorbu, "Çanakkale Nasıl Müdafaa Edildi?," 768–769.

27 See the rather uncritical view of the retired Major Hüsnü, "Harp Tarihinden: Hangi Seferleri Okuyalim?" [From the History of War: Which Campaigns Should We Read?], *PM* 9–86 (1933), 36–40.

28 Nureddin Alpkartal, "*Harp Tarihi*" [*War History*], *AM* 55–106 (1937), 555.

29 Karabekir, *Tarihte Almanlar ve Alman Ordusu*, 14–15.

30 Sadık, "Muharebede Kendiliğinden İşgörme ve Bunun Hudutları" [Applicability of own War (Experiences) and its Limitations], *AM* 74 (1929), 2.

31 Sadık, "Muharebede Kendiliğinden," 10–11. Cf. for a later similar view İskora, *Türk Ordusu Kurmaylık (Erkânıharbiye) Tarihçesi*, 69.

In the subsequent years, the Turkish military press took a more national approach to military history without excluding its European sources. The Askerî Mecmua's supplement (Askerî Mecmua'nın Tarih Kısmı; AMTK) became a platform for works on (late) Ottoman campaigns and the Graeco-Turkish war. There were several studies on the 'classical' Ottoman campaigns of the past.[32] Other inquiries contained references to contemporary issues such as the counter-insurgency strategies applied by the Ottoman military.[33] In addition, the branch specific periodicals also published articles related to the 'national' history of the military.[34]

There were two reasons for this appeal to national virtues and practices. On the one hand, they were part of the national pride after the victory over Greece in 1922 and the withdrawal of the victory power's occupation force. Both events had helped to forget the humiliating defeat in the World War. On the other hand, however, this pride also must have been related to the somehow arrogant approach of many German authors. They had tried to associate the German efforts between 1914 and 1918 with the Turkish victory in 1922, based on the intent to diminish the Ottoman/Turkish share. It should be noted at this point that these thoughts were not openly racist, as indicated by Erickson and Uyar.[35] Nevertheless, official Turkish military history writing in the early republic was definitely rooted in the feeling "[...] of insecurity toward the West, if not a full-blown inferiority complex."[36]

In general, the contribution of the Ottoman army to the course of the war was seen as important, since the Ottoman forces had undeniably kept away enemy troops from the German fronts. Without the high concentration of the Entente in the Eastern Mediterranean region, Germany would have faced its own Gallipoli invasion in Pomerania.[37] Yet German leadership skills were rated higher than the Ottoman commander's abilities in most of the articles published in the German military press. Without the revival of the Ottoman military strength after the defeat of 1912/13 "Kemal Atatürk barely would have been able to conduct his

32 The occupation of Crete: Şükûn and Ziya, "Girit Seferi Mart 1645-Eylül 1669," *AMTK* (1933) and the second siege of Vienna: Alâettin and Cavit, "İkinci Viyana Muhaberesi 1683," *AMTK* (1933).

33 Here refering to the Greek rebellion; Fahrettin and Seyfi, "1820 – 1827 Mora İsyanı," *AMTK* (1934).

34 The Ottoman akıncı cavalry as a source of inspiration for the modern Turkish cavalry in Nami Malkoç, "Akınlar, Akıncılar ve Büyük Akınlar," *SM* 12 – 97 (1936), 68 – 89.

35 Erickson and Uyar, *Military History*, 279.

36 Sencer, *Order and Insecurity in Germany and Turkey*, 25.

37 Otto Welsch, "Zum zehnten Jahrestage der türkischen Kriegserklärung," *MWB* 109 – 26 (1925), cols. 756 – 759.

big reform work. The stimulating work of German soldiers from Moltke to Goltz and Liman von Sanders probably had a share in today's upswing of Turkey."[38]

Several German authors alleged a German impact on president Mustafa Kemal. In July 1933 Otto Welsch claimed that Mustafa Kemal's tactics in the Graeco-Turkish war were borrowed from General Ludendorff's 'elastic defense'.[39] Even though Welsch's article was not published in the Turkish military press, such a statement was contrary to the Turkish self-image. For Turkish experts, their tactics in the war against the Greeks were the result of a learning process after their own mistakes between 1914 and 1918 and not taken from German sources.[40] More than that, quite contrary to Welsch's view, there was even a retrospective Turkish claim that the Wehrmacht had adopted Mustafa Kemal's 'defense-in-depth' strategy during the Second World War.[41]

Mutual finger pointing was also visible in terms of evaluations of the supply system in wartime. For a German author, the poor Ottoman railway network and making the capital the main hub for the imperial army counted as severe deficits in the Ottoman conduct of war.[42] A Turkish captain contrariwise mentioned the low ammunition supplies in the French and German army in the autumn of 1914 as one of the main reasons why the war was not decided in its early stage.[43] Regarding this early stage of the First World War, there were also critical opinions in the memoirs of former Ottoman officers. However, this literary genre was sub-

38 Anonymous, "Vor 100 Jahren: Moltke in der Türkei," *MWB* 119 – 47 (1935), col. 1891.

39 Otto Welsch, "Gedanken zur 'Türkischen Marneschlacht' und zur 'Schlacht des Generalissimus'," *Deutscher Offizier- Bund* 21 (1933), col. 589. See also a similar sentence in an earlier monograph: "As a soldier Mustapha Kemal is a scholar of Marshal Liman von Sanders." Erich Prigge, "Die Kampfhandlungen der Türkei," in *Der große Krieg: 1914 – 1918 in 10 Bänden*. Vol 4: *Der Seekrieg. Der Krieg um die Kolonien. Die Kampfhandlungen in der Türkei. Der Gaskrieg. Der Luftkrieg*, ed. Max Schwarte (Leipzig: Barth, 1922), 484.

40 Kenan, "İstiklal Savaşımızda Büyük Sevk ve İdare Bakımından Müdafaa Sistemimiz" [A Leadership Point of View on our Defense System During our War of Independence], *AM* 53 – 96 (1935), 124 – 147. For the extended comparison see Fahri Engin, "Başkomutanlık Meydan Muharebesinin Kan, Ulm, Yena, Marn ve Tanenberg Meydan Muharebelerile Mukayesesi" [Comparison of the Supreme Commander's Battle with the Battles of Cannae, Ulm, Jena, Marne and Tannenberg], *AM* 55 – 106 (1937), 528 – 537.

41 Kenan Kocatürk, *Bir Subayın Anıları, 1909 – 1999* [The Memoirs of an Officer, 1909 – 1999] (Istanbul: Kastaş, 1999), 171.

42 Kretschmann, "Die türkischen Eisenbahnen im Weltkrieg," *DOB* 13 (1928), 525 – 530; Kretschmann, "Der Einfluß der rückwärtigen Verbindungen auf die Kriegführung: Die türkischen Operationen im Weltkriege," *MWB* 116 – 1 (1931), cols. 5 – 9.

43 M. Şevki, "Ordu Malzemesinin Yerleştirilmesi" [The Distribution of Military Goods], *AM* 50 – 88 (1931), 900.

jected to other conventions than the military periodicals. Since it had a much bigger readership as the periodicals, it deserves special attention here.

In a 'Storm of Paper' I: Turkish Veteran Officer's Writings about the War

After the defeat in 1918, different factors, in particular untreated trauma and mortifications by the German ally and by the own (former) Ottoman superiors, nourished the desire to communicate one's own point of view.[44] In the Republican era former Ottoman officers could express their views about the German-Ottoman alliance without the limitations of wartime censorship. Moreover, the impression of the victorious outcome of the Greco-Turkish war (1919 – 1922) shaped their view on the past military cooperation. These memoirs contained their personal review of a turbulent decade, coined by societal and military turmoil. But what role did these works play in influencing the image of the alliance? What impact did they have on the self-perception of those officers? Some Turkish officers also made use of references to the memoirs of German officer that had been in Ottoman service. This is evident in the writings of Kâzım [Karabekir] (1882 – 1948), Ali İhsan [Sabis] (1882 – 1957) and Behiç [Erkin] (1876 – 1961). The postwar autobiographical publications of the respective former members of the Ottoman General Staff form the basis of this analysis in this section. All these men had left active military service in the early 1920s due to dissent with the ruling regime. It should be kept in mind that those public evaluations had to be written in a carefully balanced tone, since free speech was restricted. We can also state that there was an indirectly defined guideline of how the alliance with Germany had to be rated. President Mustafa Kemal stated in a 1923 interview:

> "The ones conducting and leading the war were entirely taken as captives by the Germans [Almanların esiri olmuşlardır], by forgetting our existence [mevcudiyetimizi] in the Great War. To tell the truth, by sending our forces, that were inadequate to defend the fatherland, to Galicia, Macedonia and the Iranian plains they deteriorated."[45]

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44 In this regard the headline of this subchapter is derived from the German author Ernst Jünger's memoirs "In Stahlgewittern", first published in 1920. Contrary to the wartime lethal rain of metal, veteran officers used the written word to defend their cause and underline their perception of the war. Cf. for a similar wording Marie Thomas, *In Papiergewittern: Die Kriegssammlungen der Bibliotheken 1914 – 1918/ Orages de Papier 1914 – 1918: Les Collections de Guerre des Bibliothèques* (Paris: Somogy Éditions d'Art, 2008).

45 Arı İnan, *Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün 1923 Eskişehir-İzmit Konuşmaları* [Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's Eskişehir-İzmit Speeches, 1923] (Ankara: TTK, 1982), 42.

The Turkish Presidential assesment of the alliance with Germany became part of the Turkish official view, to be reproduced by active and retired officers alike.[46] Postwar statements of German supreme commanders about the Ottoman ally also irritated Turkish officers and can be read as proof of the latter's allegations. For Hindenburg, the allies had fought well, but the Germans had shown the greatest efforts.[47] According to Ludendorff, the Ottoman army had only done well as long as they had followed the 'German Spirit':

> "When Turkish troops [...] were under unified German command, then they fought passably, even well; when they were under Turkish command they quickly forgot what German seriousness [Deutscher Ernst] had taught them."[48]

That is why it stands for reason that the Turkish president was no admirer of the former German vice chief of staff.[49] Just like their commander in chief, also other Turkish staff officers joined the group of critics.

Rejecting the Junior Partner Role

With the beginning of the mobilization in 1914, Karabekir had been promoted head of the General Staff's military intelligence section. In his memoirs he claimed that he had special insight into the activities of the Germans within the Ottoman supreme command. For Kâzım Karabekir, the terrible outcome of the war was not the work of a single person, but a bundle of wrong decisions. One of them had been the appointment of Friedrich Bronsart von Schellendorf as the vice head of the General Staff:

> "What has a German head of the General staff to do in command of the mobilized Turkish army? [...] The German head of the General staff considers the orders he will receive from

46 Kenan, "İstiklal Savaşımızda Büyük Sevk ve İdare Bakımından Müdafaa Sistemimiz," 127. See the 1952 article by Çambel, "Bir İmparatorluk Nasıl Battı?" [How did an Empire Fall?] in *Makaleler Hâtıralar*, 47; Gündüz, *Hatıralarım*, 31.

47 Hindenburg, *Aus meinem Leben*, 132–133. Turkish translation with the title Hindenburg: *Hayatım*, trans. Tahsin İsmail (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Askeriye, 1341/1925).

48 Erich Ludendorff, *Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914–1918*, 4th ed. (Berlin: Mittler, 1919), 200. Turkish translation: *Ludendorff'un Hatırat-ı Harbiyesi* (Istanbul: Erkân-ı Harbiye Mektebi Matbaası 1336/1920).

49 Mustafa Kemal in an Interview in 1930: "A General is always dangerous as a ruler, if he is nothing else than that and if nobody checks him. You have experienced that in Germany. [...] Ludendorff [...] is not a leader: a man who runs away in [the face of] breakdown." Emil Ludwig, "Besuch bei Mustafa Kemal: Die neue Türkei," *Neue Freie Presse*, 9 March 1930, 2.

> his own headquarters and the well-being of his own fatherland. They use up our army without mercy, devastate our country and leave. [...] [To Enver Pasha:] Now I am telling openheartedly that the Germans want to drag you into adventures for their own benefit [kendi hesaplarına] [...] Now even the Holy War was declared. Now you have to choose not only the head of the General staff, but also the directors of the [ministry's] departments among the Turks. Today's state of affairs not only badly effects the army but also the people [halk]."[50]

The argumentation here was similar to Mustafa Kemal's statement in 1923, including the claim that the German commanders used the Ottomans as a tool. In the view of Karabekir, Enver was a toy in the hands of the Germans.[51] Sabis felt that the Germans "used us like a servant [uşak]."[52] For Karabekir, the Ottoman leadership had surrendered to the ally, abiding by the contract for the military mission that had been signed by the former Grand Vezir Mahmud Şevket in 1913. Karabekir could not hide his disappointment over the reluctance of his superior, Enver Pasha, to limit the power of the Germans in this early stage of the war. Karabekir also expressed (like Ali İhsan Sabis) his profound dismay of Enver's admiration for Napoleon.[53] Enver even kept secrets from his own staff and followed his Turanist dreams of conquest which were unrealistic due to the poor state of the Ottoman army. In addition, the German staff officers had no clue about the military and social realities in the Ottoman state, a worrying development since they had the power to make decisions now.[54] Even though they were pro-German, in September 1914 Sabis and Karabekir were not convinced that the German army would win in the West: "We believed in the German military strength. The German army was the strongest one in Europe, however, I had doubts whether France would be defeated within six weeks."[55]

Under those conditions, entering the war alongside the Central Powers was not promising at all. Karabekir needed to get used to the peculiarities of some of the German staff officers. Karabekir had the utmost understanding for useful

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50 Kâzım Karabekir, *Cihan Harbine Neden Girdik, Nasıl Girdik, Nasıl İdare Ettik,* vol.2: *Cihan Harbine Nasıl Girdik?* [Why and How did we enter the World War, How did we handle it, vol. 2: How did we enter the War?] (Istanbul: Tecelli Basımevi, 1937), 182, 274, 277.

51 Karabekir, *Cihan Harbine Neden Girdik,* 470.

52 Ali İhsan Sabis, *Harb Hatıralarım.* Vol. 1: *Birinci Dünya Harbinden Evvelki Hadiseler: Harbin Zuhuru ve Seferberlik İlânı; Harbe Nasıl Sürüklendik?* [My War Memoirs. Vol.1: Incidents before the War: The Appearance of War and Mobilisation. How did we get involved in the War?] 2nd. ed. (Istanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1943), 58.

53 Karabekir, *Cihan Harbine Neden Girdik,* 271; Sabis, *Harb Hatıralarım*, vol.1, 66.

54 Karabekir, *Cihan Harbine Neden Girdik,* 287–288, 309–310.

55 Sabis, *Harb Hatıralarım*, vol. 1, 46. Karabekir was also not persuaded by Bronsart's confidence in victory; Karabekir. *Cihan Harbine Nasıl Girdik*, 348.

practices, including the daily briefing (*Vortrag*) on current military and intelligence developments for Enver and Liman.[56] However, other customs of the German staff officers were a bit strange for Karabekir. They answered the phone by shouting their surnames without mentioning their ranks, hung (like Otto von Feldmann) bilingual name signs to their office doors in the heydays of emerging Turkish nationalism, repudiated official papers by Karabekir which were undated, and in general were always up to find some mistakes in the paperwork the Ottoman officers delivered.[57] For an Ottoman officer, those were humiliating daily occurrences, which contributed to the growing dissatisfaction with the ally in the second half of the war.

In addition, there were severe problems with the German officers on a personal level. The Ottoman officers felt aggrieved by their German allies, who received higher ranks upon their entry into the Ottoman army. After the war those emotions returned whenever the shortcomings of Ottoman officers were mentioned in German memoirs. In the case of Ali İhsan Sabis, it was a comment in Liman von Sander's memoirs that appeared absolutely unjustified to Sabis.[58] The retired General, therefore, dedicated six pages of his memoirs to the prejudices and the vilification by Germans, which he and other officers had to endure. Regarding his training in Germany from 1910 to 1912 he stated: "I can even say that I went to Germany as a friend and admirer; upon to my return I was convinced that the Germans did not harbour good feelings and ideas about us."[59]

A similar reaction can also be found in the memoirs of Behiç Erkin, who worked at the railway department at the beginning of the war. Because his superior, Hans von Kannengießer, questioned his loyalty,[60] Erkin defended himself by pointing out the following:

> "I am among the ones who appreciate the high abilities of the German people [Alman millet] in every field. There was no reason for me to dislike the Germans in general [kül hal-

56 Karabekir, *Cihan Harbine Nasıl Girdik*, 188.

57 See for these accusations especially Kazım Karabekir, *Tarih Boyunca Türk-Alman İlişkileri* [Turkish-German Relations throughout History] (Istanbul: Emre, 2001), 395 – 396, 424 – 427.

58 Liman criticized a senseless operation in Persia under the command of "the very influential and clever, but very intriguing and less German-friendly Ichsan Pascha." Otto Liman von Sanders, *Fünf Jahre Türkei* (Berlin: Scherl, 1919), 170.

59 Sabis, *Harb Hatıralarım*, vol.1, 58.

60 "I do not know if he [Erkin] was a staunch 'Germanophile'. I believe he held the opinion of some higher Turkish officers who accepted the fact that the army could not reorganize on its own, considering the [German] military mission as a necessary evil. In a few years they hoped to be able to stand on their own feet." Kannengießer, *Gallipoli,* 102 – 103.

> inde], however, the impertinencies committed by some of them who were to be found in our land created a distance towards the Germans."[61]

Erkin then turned to the need for a real reform of the Ottoman army and the reasons for why internal Ottoman friction had led to the acceptance of a German military mission:

> "We neither saw the bad outcomes, why to undertake a reform, where to make changes in the instructions we had at hand, nor where to make extensions to them. [...] However because of we [the Ottoman officers] could not abide each other, and we deliberately did not like what the others did, and in general we did not have a full self-confidence, from this point of view I saw that we were obliged to accept the need for a German military mission for ourselves."[62]

This was an absolutely open statement in Erkin's memoirs and it was only possible due to its very late publication. Since it was dangerous for veteran officers to critically remark on their wartime fellow officers during the single party period, many other Ottoman officers refrained from writing about those topics or from writing at all. Kazım Karabekir was careful enough to avoid this trap by pointing to the deceased Enver Pasha as the internal 'evil man'.[63] Ali İhsan Sabis, who had to make a living from professional writing after his military career, was in serious trouble soon after the publication of his memoirs. In 1943 there were seven defamation suits by living persons or their relatives (like Behçet Cemal, the son of Cemal Pasha) who felt offended by rather negligible remarks in Sabis' memoirs, among them also former officers as Halil Kut and Falih Rıfkı Atay. The argument with the journalist Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın was even fought in a public debate prior to the trial.[64] In 1943 Sabis was acquitted on the condition that the second volume of his memoirs was to be confiscated to prevent further upheaval. It could only be published after the end of the single party period in the early 1950s. Finally, in a second trial in 1944, Sabis, "a man distinctly pro-Nazi"[65], was sentenced to 15 months imprisonment for the renewed publication

61 Erkin, *Hâtırat*, 130.

62 Erkin, *Hâtırat*, 130.

63 On this common postwar strategy of denying the own pro-German sentiments see Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914*, 190.

64 See his article against Yalçın's accusations, where he mentioned the latter's wartime Pro-German writings. Ali İhsan Sabis, "Meine Antwort an Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın," *Türkische Post*, 24 September 1943.

65 Edward Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943 – 1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 80.

of pro-German and anti-CHP articles.[66] In this regard, Karabekir's warning about a potential repetition of the mistakes from 1914 was entirely appropriate, namely, not to 'back the wrong horse' by chosing Germany as an ally for the second time.[67] It follows from what has been said so far that most of the remarks of the Turkish veteran officers were not only a portrait of the German-Ottoman alliance period, but also reflected the times when they were written.

As it becomes evident from those statements, national prestige played a big role in the whole debate. Especially in Germany, the official military historiography undertook a major effort to promote this national view in several monographies. As will be examined below, there were similar arguments among the German veteran group just like in the post-Ottoman case.

Towards an Official View: The Preparation of the Reichsarchiv Volumes about the Ottoman Theaters of War

The new founded German republic had reorganized its archives after the war. For the civilian and military imperial archive collections the Reichsarchiv (1919–1945) was founded. Only the Foreign Ministery maintained its independent archives. The Reichsarchiv's biggest project was the preparation of a series of official historical monographs about all major campaigns of the First World War. Four of these volumes covered the Ottoman land and naval operations during the war.[68] The series was intended to serve the purpose of historical engineering by regaining control over the culture of rememeberance of this conflict.[69] By publishing a popular edition for a reasonable price, the editorial board hoped to reach a broad public in Germany and abroad. Regarding the volumes on the Ottoman theaters of war, the archivists were confronted with a major problem. Not all of the official documents had survived the hasty packing in the last days of October 1918.[70] Therefore the *Reichsarchiv* developed a questionnaire that was sent to all of the German staff officers, who had played a major role in the German-Ottoman alliance. However, the evaluation of all those subjective

66 For all these trials see the publication of his lawyer: Suad Tahsin Türk, *General Ali İhsan Sabis'in Müdafaası* [*The Plea for General Ali İhsan Sabis*] (Istanbul: İnsel Kitabevi, 1944).

67 Karabekir, *Cihan Harbine Nasıl Girdik*, 509, 516.

68 The series 'Battles of the World War' ('Schlachten des Weltkrieges') comprised of 36 volumes in total.

69 Pöhlmann, *Kriegsgeschichte und Geschichtspolitik*, 22–24, 86–70.

70 See the correspondence between Reichsarchiv and German Foreign Ministry in 1924, AA-PA R 78548.

views contributed to the late publication of the volumes in the second half of the 1920s when private publishing houses had already released dozens of memoirs and popular accounts on the market.[71]

In a 'Storm of Paper' II: Answers to the Reichsarchiv Questionnaire

The wartime military representative in the German embassy, Otto von Lossow, received his letter from the Reichsarchiv in February 1921.[72] For Lossow it came as a welcomed 'tit-for-tat' response against the personal accusations in Liman von Sanders' 1919 memoirs.[73] In these memoirs, the head of the German military mission had claimed that Lossow had provided overexaggerated estimations of the Ottoman strength in his report to Berlin and that the Bavarian General had supported Enver Pasha's dreams of conquest in the Caucasus.

However, the reply from Munich took more than half a year due to Lossow's busy position as head of the Bavarian Reichswehr. The General from Munich was particularly angry about the allegations in the questionnaire. Most of the questions dealt with the personal relations between Enver Pasha and Liman von Sanders, as well as the relationship between Lossow in the German embassy and Liman in the German military mission in the Ottoman capital. The deviating reports by Lossow and by members of the military mission to Berlin were rated as quite irritating.

Lossow's answer was written in an offended tone. He stated that the author of the questionnaire only had a superficial knowledge of the real events in wartime Constantinople. Lossow knew that the volume was to be edited by Liman von Sander's former personal aide de camp, Carl Mühlmann. Lossow thus stated that he himself should write the volume on the Dardanelles campaign, if the Reichsarchiv should not like his answers. Lossow openly addressed his reply to Mühlmann, the editor in chief, whom he saw as pro-Liman and made clear that "I don't wish to have any contact, may it be direct or indirect, with General Liman."[74] After those opening remarks, Lossow described the conditions in the Ottoman army after the defeat in 1913 which he had withnessed as a field commander in the Çatalca front and later in the Ottoman capital. By creating

71 Pöhlmann, *Kriegsgeschichte und Geschichtspolitik*, 135.

72 Von Mertz to Otto von Lossow, 4 February 1921. Bay HStA HS 3158: n.p.

73 For the German postwar memoirs see also Reichmann, *Tapfere Asker*, 12–14.

74 Lossow to Reichsarchiv, 25 November 1921. Bay HStA HS 3158, n.p. Lossow noted on his dactylo press copy that he had received no answer to this letter from Berlin.

the military mission, Germany had made major mistakes: "Thereby a state within the state of the Turkish military affairs was created. Upon Turkey a new 'capitulation' was enforced in a field where its sovereignty had not yet been compromised. [...] The Turk had no choice, for him it was a 'take it or leave it' decision."[75]

This was only one side of the coin. German officers in Ottoman service, like Lossow, had called for a strong German military mission back in 1913 and had insisted on this particular 'state within the state.'[76] From the following statement it also becomes evident why the Reichsarchiv did not use Lossow's answer for the monograph on the Dardanelles campaign. For Lossow, the Ottomans had been experienced in showing passive resistance against European claims. The German officers and diplomats had ignored those sentiments, which threatened the sovereignty of the Ottoman State:

> "[...] [T]oday we understand the mentality of the Turks better as before, since we suffer from those many Capitulations imposed on us by the Treaty of Versailles, which might be expanded by the dette publique allemande."[77]

In addition to wartime territorial claims and the growing Turkish nationalism, the Ottoman-German relations were strained by Liman's difficult character. Lossow rated the choice of the Prussian general as a "sin" of the peacetime military cabinet in 1913:

> "Based on some remark by the Kaiser during the farewell reception for the military mission, General Liman considered himself an 'emissary of the emperor' (direct access to the emperor etc.) Such purely emotional things might be understandable for the officer who had grown up in the Old-Prussian tradition. Yet abroad those things are not understood. On the contrary, if someone appears there with an attitude and words like 'my father Parcival wears its crown, I – am called Lohengrin' at every opportunity this appears both annoying and ridiculous. This has also excerbated General Liman's position towards the Turks, the foreigners and towards the German embassy."[78]

For Lossow, the decision for Liman as head of the military mission and the contractually committed rights of his position had been a mistake. Instead of his dis-

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75 Lossow to Reichsarchiv, 25 November 1921. Bay HStA HS 3158, 2.

76 See Lossows 1913 report: "The head of the mission should get the highest Turkish rank. His position must be so strong, that he can cause the change of the Minister of War or the head of the General Staff, if it is needed in the interests of the reform agenda." Gedanken über Reformen in der Türkei, 6. Bay HStA IV HS 1571.

77 Lossow to Reichsarchiv, 25 November 1921. Bay HStA HS 3158, 3.

78 Lossow to Reichsarchiv, 25 November 1921. Bay HStA HS 3158, 4.

tinguished position, the head of the military mission should only have had a distinguished senior position vis a vis the other German officers in the mission. The German government should have threatened Liman with refusing his return to the German army in case of any misbehavior. In his letter, Lossow also responded to the Reichsarchiv manuscript entitled *The Turkish Soldier and Officer after the End of the Balkan War 1913*, which he had received in addition to the questionnaire in August 1921.[79] Lossow added some comments about the outcome of the Hamidian authoritarian rule, however, his lengthy remarks did not find their way to the volume published by the Reichsarchiv. The Bavarian General had once again touched the sensible topic that Liman did not qualify for this important position. According to Lossow the men of the new mission ignored the previous missions under Goltz and wanted to "apply, in their attempt at reform, purely German standards and German methods neglecting Turkish peculiarities and psychological necessities."[80] An officer from Württemberg also expressed the same view once he had received a similar chapter for the proposed Reichsarchiv monograph to review. For Fritz Lauffer, the Germans had implemented their regulations at a ratio of 1:1 in terms of transferring German military knowledge. Those instructions were thus "carried out according to the German world of thought and terminology without considering Turkey's conditions, which differed from the European ones."[81]

For Lossow, the German assistance had not been the reason for the early Ottoman victories but rather the outcome of earlier missions before 1912. Germany had not made any sacrifices for the Ottoman side; wartime contributions were nothing more than normal aid within an alliance. Of this conciliatory view, Lossow followed the general guidelines for the *Reichsarchiv* series on the war.

The answers on those questionnaires contributed to the first introductory pages of the *Reichsarchiv* volume on the Dardanelles campaign. The sources were quite informative even though they were not mentioned. Admittedly, the respondents kept silent about the negative aspects of German conduct of operations and abstained from self-criticism.[82] However, Lossow's remarks regarding

79 Bay HStA HS 3158, n.p.

80 Bay HStA HS 3158, n.p.

81 See Lauffer's comments on the following document: "Die türkische Armee vor dem Weltkrieg. Eine Ausarbeitung des Reichsarchivs über die türkische Armee" (1922), HStAS M660/024 Nr. 14, 4. Lauffer's comments regarding the Ottman artillery were used by Carl Mühlmann, *Der Kampf um die Dardanellen, 1915* (Oldenburg, Berlin: Gerhard Stalling, 1927), 30 – 31.

82 Pöhlmann, *Kriegsgeschichte und Geschichtspolitik*, 171.

his enemy, Liman von Sanders, were not accepted by the editorial board and were left unused.[83]

Leaving out critical comments from the volume was one challenge for the editors and the unexpected criticism by Turkish readers another one. Prior to the volume on land warfare, the Navy Archives volume on the naval Ottoman campaigns had been published.[84] The Turkish translation of this book led to an outcry in the civilian newspaper *Cumhuriyet*, caused by critical and often personal remarks on the wartime state of the personnel of the Ottoman navy by Admiral Wilhelm Souchon. In the words of a Turkish reviewer, derogative remarks regarding the 'unqualified' Ottoman navy officers, were "deliberate and political lies by Admiral Souchon."[85] The respective accusations had been used unchecked by Admiral Lorey, the editor of the volume. Souchon himself was even accused of not being seaworthy, like most of his German naval reserve officers, since according to the Turkish reviewer, the German Admiral himself had even vomited once aboard an Ottoman ship during relatively calm seas. The German embassy could prevent further criticism of the book and urged the Reichsarchiv to be careful in further volumes when dealing with the Ottoman army and navy. According to ambassador Nadolny, even "German minded Turks [...] no longer silently acquiesce [with such criticism]."[86]

Mühlmann's depiction of the battle for the straits in 1915 avoided Lorey's mistakes. Carl Mühlmann had prepared his study carefully by using the aforementioned questionnaires and refrained from excessively criticizing Ottoman military leaders.[87] Prior to its publication, the Reichsarchiv had sensed that this study would receive the broadest interest among Turkish veterans and the general readership.[88] Thereafter, Mühlmann's book became a standard work in Germany and Turkey. It was even used to prove alleged mistakes in Liman von Sander's strategy

83 The first photograph in the monograph on the Dardanelles campaign showed Liman von Sanders with his handwritten motto "The one always having reservations will never reach the path to action!" Mühlmann, *Kampf um die Dardanellen*, table 1. Accordingly there was only moderate and hidden criticism of Liman's special character, cf. ibid. 162.

84 Hermann Lorey, *Der Krieg in den türkischen Gewässern*, vol. 1: *Die Mittelmeer-Division* (Berlin: Mittler, 1927). Volume two of this monograph, *Der Kampf um die Meerengen*, was eventually published in 1938. The German navy had established its own archives (*Marinearchiv*), independent from the *Reichsarchiv*.

85 Nadolny to the German Foreign Ministry, 10 August 1928. AA-PA R 78576, 3.

86 Nadolny to the German Foreign Ministry, 10 August 1928. AA-PA R 78576, 2.

87 See the exerted friendly comment in Mühlmann, *Kampf um die Dardanellen*, 81.

88 It was immediately translated in the year of its publication; see [Carl] Mühlmann, *Çanakkale Muharebesi*. [The Battle of Çanakkale] trans. Colonel Halil Kemal (Istanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1927). A second translation in Latin script followed in 1933.

in Turkish public debate.[89] The Reichsarchiv's second 'Ottoman' volume dealing with the campaign in Palestine did not attract as much attention and awaited translation for eight years.[90] Beyond the interesting insight into inner German sensitivities, Mühlmann's study, among others, would also serve as a source for the German defence of the French coastline in World War Two. To the detriment of the German efforts, however, those evaluations did not include the Turkish debate, which will be examined in the following paragraph.

Turkish Lessons from Çanakkale

The battle for Çanakkale had been the biggest combined arms campaign of the war. However, the German side did not draw the right conclusions from this experience.[91] Similarly to the case of the separate publication of an official history of the war, there were reviews independent from each other in the German army and navy. Both views were based on the German first-hand reports from the battlefield. However, these reports ignored the Turkish analysis of the battle.

The Turkish view on one of the major wartime successes of the Ottoman armed forces had formed late. In the first years of the Republic of Turkey, the battle for the straits was not seen as important as the war against Greece. However, the increasing glorification of Mustafa Kemal as one of the leaders of the Ottoman defense in 1915/16 and regaining of Turkish military control over the straits in 1936 changed the whole situation.[92] At this stage there were even diplomatic complications over the issue of the unmentioned German contribution to the battle of Gallipoli in a Turkish schoolbook.[93]

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89 See the newspaper comment relating to the German General's wrong decisions based on his ignorance of the strategic situation on 24 April 1915 in *Cumhuriyet Gazetesi*, 23 June 1935, 3.
90 [Werner] Steuber, *'Jildirim': Deutsche Streiter auf heiligem Boden* (Oldenburg/Berlin: Stalling, 1924). Translated by Colonel Nihat under the 'desecrated' short title *Yıldırım* (Istanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1932).
91 Wolf, *Gallipoli 1915*, 204.
92 Pheroze Unwalla, *Between Nationalism and Reconciliation: The Turkish Government and the Dual Narrativization of the Battle of Gallipoli, 1923–2007* (M.A. Thesis: Simon Fraser University Burnaby/ Canada, 2008), 31–54.
93 Veysel Simsek, "'Backstabbing Arabs' and 'Shirking Kurds': History, Nationalism, and Turkish Memory of World War I," in *The Great War: From Memory to History*, ed. Jonathan Vance et al. (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2015), 104. For the German critique of the schoolbook see Selim Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An 'Active' Neutrality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 60.

The Turkish military press also neglected the battle in the beginning.[94] In one of the first analyses, artillery captain Hakkı stated that the Turkish army needed a new heavy artillery service regulation, and that the defensive positions had to be made of concrete in order to withstand enemy shelling. Quite contrary to the German view, Hakkı stated that the best defense against any landings on Turkish shores would be a strong navy, which could prevent any intentions in that direction.[95] The commander of the Turkish naval academy also analyzed the landing manoeuvers of the campaign. Mehmet Fahri Paşa came to a similar conclusion, pointing to the need of a modern and strong navy as the prerequisite for the attacking force to cover the landing phase.[96] The Ottoman coastal batteries and the shelling by enemy fleet had shown little effect on both sides. Therefore a modern defence at the Turkish straits should include long ranging ordnance with higher calibre and better coverage for the crews.[97] Mehmet Fahri also pointed to the increasing abilities of the airplane, the American tank landing experiments and to the opportunities of artificial harbours in future wars. For him the Turkish army and navy had to develop a common defensive strategy in the next years.[98] One year later, a retired Turkish captain saw the idea of building half fortified and inflexible batteries at the Dardanelles as a wrong decision made by German instructors. Fortresses could never keep up with the fast developments in modern warfare, therefore, the defense had to be more flexible. In the case of the straits, the (German) fortress strategy had proven successful. Nonetheless, this approach was not seen as transferable to every geographic location.[99] In addition, Captain Nizamettin also warned to have enough reserves at hand to counter any paratrooper landing attempts in the rear of the line of de-

94 The official historiography focused mainly on operational aspects of singular battles within the campaign. For the first overview see the General Staff's publication *Cihan Harbinde Osmanlı Harekatı Tarihçesi*, vol. 1: *Çanakkale Muharebatı* [History of the Ottoman Operations in the World War, vol. 1: The Çanakkale Campaign] (Dersaadet: Matbaa-i Askeriye, 1338/1922).

95 Hakkı, "Topçu Atış Mektebindeki Konferanslardan: Asri Müstahkem Mevki ve Sahil Tahkimatı Nasıl Yapılmalıdırlar?" [From the Conference at the Artillery School: How do Modern Fortified Positions and Shore Fortifications have to be made?], *TM* 7 – 74 (1931), 23 – 25.

96 Mehmet Fahri, *Çanakkale Muharebelerinden Çıkartma Hususunda Alınan Dersler* [*Lessons drawn from the Battle of Çanakkale about the Landings*]. (Yıldız [Istanbul]: Harp Akademisi Matbaası, 1933), 24.

97 Fahri, *Çanakkale Muharebelerinden Çıkartma Hususunda Alınan Dersler*, 20, 26.

98 Fahri, *Çanakkale Muharebelerinden Çıkartma Hususunda Alınan Dersler*, 30 – 31, 37.

99 Nizamettin, "Büyük Harpte Çanakkale'ye Yapılmış Olan Büyük Deniz Zorlaması ve Bundan Bugün için Alınacak Öğütler" [The Big Naval Attack on Çanakkale during the Great War and Advice to be taken from it for Today], *TM* 10 – 95 (1934), 20 – 21.

fense.[100] For defensive measures against invasions by the sea, the Turkish army even developed pictorial instruction materials to teach the modern way of coastal defense.[101] In those regards, the Turkish debate was far ahead of the German ideas on the defense of coastal areas. Due to the language barrier, Turkish warnings had no influence on the German concept, which was only based on German experience and British evaluations.[102] In retrospect, the negligence of the former ally's ideas regarding coastal defence would turn out to be a grave mistake.

Making Sense of Gallipoli: The Split of German Postwar Coastal Defence Doctrine

For Germany, Gallipoli had been the biggest shore defence operation of the war. Several private and official postwar evaluations of this campaign had been published, even though the battle had taken place in a rather exotic and remote theater of war. One of the first accounts had been written in a rather patriotic tone, intended to cheer up the depressed former soldiers. In a popular anthology, which served the glorification of war, an eyewitness declared the following:

> "Let us [Germans] learn a lesson from yesterday's Turks! If the Turks succeeded in victouriously withstanding for months the world's best equippped army superior in every respect, without enough rifles, canons brought from the museum, exceeding lack of infantry and artillery ammunition, without aircraft or any other modern resources, if they succeeded [...] to force the English flag with their inferior ordnance into avoiding the Turkish territorial waters [...] so herein lies a serious warning [eine ernste Mahnung] for us!"[103]

These lines were written under the severe conditions of the Versailles Treaty and not, as might be assumed, for the German defenders of occupied France in the summer of 1944. The development of the existing German coast and land defences was restricted since 1919. The first modern fortresses were only built after 1935 with the unilateral cancellation of those regulations. Therefore the German army had to focus on the theoretical evaluation of the battle for the Dardanelles.

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100 Nizamettin, " Büyük Harpte Çanakkale'ye Yapılmış Olan Büyük Deniz Zorlaması," 26.

101 See the pictured lesson guide for artillery and infantry units in Orhan Ergüden, "Sahil Müdafaası" [Coastal Defense], *PM* 10 – 98 (1936), 7 – 10.

102 See the review oft he British offical work of the Gallipoli campaign in Felix Guse, "Amtliche Geschichte des Gallipoli- Feldzuges: 1. Band," *MWB* 6 (1929), cols. 219 – 220.

103 Walter Lierau, "Feldgeschütz gegen Dreadnought: Bilder aus den Kämpfen der Armee Liman von Sanders," in *Im Felde unbesiegt: Der Weltkrieg in 29 Einzeldarstellungen*, ed. Gustav von Dickhuth-Harrach (Munich: J. F. Lehmanns, 1921), 128.

The army decided to focus on mobile and flexible artillery batteries. The standard work on this issue referred to Hans Wehrle's 'flying batteries' during the Gallipoli campaign.[104] Klingbeil did not focus on the Ottoman defenders. Solely the German side was important for his study. In his general assessment of the campaign, he pleaded for flexible artillery units moving between prepared firing positions, since Germany was not allowed to maintain heavy artillery because of the Versailles Treaty. The German coast defenses were not to be made of concrete since they were vulnerable to heavy ship artillery shelling. Moreover flexibility was of paramount importance, supported by reserve troops in the hinterland out of the reach of the enemy's naval artillery.[105]

On the contrary, the German navy drew entirely different lessons from the Çanakkale campaign. At the navy's coast artillery school, the Ottoman victory in Gallipoli had proven the superiority of coastal defenses and the difficulty of the enemy's naval artillery to destroy them. There had been a rain of shrapnell on the defenders that had even penetrated the fort's earthwork. In 1917 the Germans even brought a heavy naval coastal battery to Canakkale in order to shell the island of Imbros. The Allied fleet had to withdraw to the other side of the island and therefore could not prevent Ottoman naval operations south of the Dardanelles. The experience in the defence against British landing attempts in Flanders in 1917 had also proven the superiority of land based naval artillery.[106] The debate was also conducted in the *Militär-Wochenblatt*. Erich Klingbeil repeated his favor for the army's dominance in the coast defence and pointed to the dangerous dispersion of the own forces, if the whole coastline would be secured by fortifications. In a future war, the army, navy and airforce were to cooperate in the defence of the national shores. Pointing to several examples from the German war campaigns, for the Major General, the Ottoman defense in 1915 was still quite impressive, since

> "[...] the Turks had only quite old installations with high walls [protruding from the surrounding ground] that were easily identifiable and had to conduct the defensive fight with insufficient supplies of ammunition and unarmored batteries."[107]

104 Erich Klingbeil, *Küstenverteidigung und Küstenbefestigung im Lichte der Weltkriegserfahrungen* (Charlottenburg: Offene Worte, 1921) basing on Prigge, "Die Kampfhandlungen der Türkei," 430.

105 Klingbeil, *Küstenverteidigung und Küstenbefestigung*, 27.

106 Wilhelm von Harnier, *Artillerie im Küstenkampf* (Munich: J.F. Lehmanns, 1969), 8–9, 17.

107 [Erich] Klingbeil, *"Küstenbefestigungen," MWB* 121–24 (1936), col. 1317.

However, at this point of time the German navy had already drawn conclusions of its own.

From Gallipoli to Overlord: Failed Application in Occupied France, 1940 – 1944

Due to the loss of archival material in World War Two, the sources that best document the view of the Wehrmacht and Kriegsmarine officers can be found in the postwar studies of the US Army's Historical Division.[108] In these studies, the German officers explain in detail what had gone wrong in the German preparations for the defense of an invasion.

After the fall of France in 1940, on Hitler'a decision, the German High Command had ordered to fortify the whole Atlantic coastline, from the Spanish border to the Arctic circle in Norway. The army's model for this megalomaniac project, the so-called *Atlantikwall*, had been the building of the fortifications along the German Western border (the *Westwall*, built from 1935 onwards).[109] Colonel Erhard Raus elevated the case of Gallipoli as a positive example of the defense of isthmuses. It seems that this experience was also applied to the French coast where the German navy was too weak to participate in the defense:

> "Isthmuses between seas were unconquerable if their flanks were protected by superior air or naval forces. Enemy landings could be repulsed by heavy artillery and aircraft or hindered by mobile reserves even if one's own naval forces had been defeated. Thus, for instance, the isthmus defended by the Turks on the Gallipoli peninsula in World War I could not be taken by the British despite the support of their superior battle fleet and air force."[110]

During the first years of the *Atlantikwall* construction, "the German High Command only had a limited experience in coastal defense."[111] This resulted in a

108 US NARA HD M1035. Manuscripts assembled under the Foreign Military Studies Program of the Historical Division, United States Army Europe, 1945 – 1954. I thank Steven J. Zaloga for pointing this out to me.

109 Christoph Tempel, *"Kurze Beschreibung der Geschichte des Westwallbaus in den Jahren 1938 – 1945,"* in *Wir bauen des Reiches Sicherheit: Mythos und Realität des Westwalls, 1938 – 1945*, ed. Eberhard Elfert et al. (Berlin: Argon, 1992), 9 – 31.

110 Erhard Raus, *German Defense Tactics against Russian Breakthroughs*, US NARA HD T-010 DA Pamphlet No. 20 – 233, 1951: 156.

111 R[udolf-Christoph] von Gersdorff, *Critique of the Defense against Invasion*, US NARA HD A-895, 1945, 2.

piecemeal building program especially at the French Atlantic coast. There had been continuous arguments between the army, navy and the paramilitary construction corps *Organisation Todt*, which was responsible for building massive bunkers. Earlier warnings regarding the enemy's mistakes in the planning of the 1915 invasion, namely, that "'too many cooks spoil the broth', and what is the result of 'amateur strategists' exercising a decisive influence on the supreme conduct of war"[112] were neglected in this case. Regarding the construction of beach defences, the description given by Carl Mühlmann on the Ottoman measures also applied to France:

> "Machine guns and single canons, arranged to be invisible from the sea, covered the shore strips. Behind the first trench were infantry strongpoints within mutual firing range. Barbed-wire obstacles sunk into the shallow water at single positions were intended to keep the landing enemy within shooting range, anti-personnel mines were to inflict casualties when the enemy went ashore. In order to enable the troops to maintain their coastal positions for longer time and to be independent from supplies, everywhere small ammunition and food depots were erected. Medical care facilities were not neglected."[113]

However, just like in 1915, German estimations of a possible allied invasion zone had been wrong and the Allies did their best to conceal their operational plans. In the case of the Atlantikwall, the whole French coastline had to be defended, and this resulted in a total fragmentation of the German defence forces. The obstacles on the beach could not prevent the landing of enemy forces. Even the most advantageous time for a landing was miscalculated:

> "The enemy invasion was hindered more by coastal field obstacles (hedgehogs, dragons' teeth, pile-driver rafts, underwater mines, roll mines, etc.), the construction of which suffered, however, from lack of experienced men and materials; which in the beginning, were built under the assumption that the invasion would be made at tide time only."[114]

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112 Otto Welsch, "Das Gallipoliwunder oder die Schlacht der verpaßten Chancen," *Wissen und Wehr* 7 (1935), 74 – 76, 95. Regarding Hitler's ignorance in the face of a possible Allied invasion in March 1944 see Andreas Hillgruber, *Staatsmänner und Diplomaten bei Hitler: Vertrauliche Aufzeichnungen über Unterredungen mit Vertretern des Auslandes*. Vol. 2: *1942 – 1944* (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe, 1970), 390.

113 Mühlmann, *Kampf um die Dardanellen*, 86. Unfortunately, the 1943 report of a delegation visit of the Turkish General Staff to a section of the Atlantikwall in Northern France, could not be traced in the ATASE archives. For the journey see Rıfat N. Bali, "Ordu Komutanı Orgeneral Cemil Cahit Toydemir'in Almanya Gezisi: Hitler ile Görüşme" [The Germany Tour of General Cemil Cahit Toydemir: Meeting with Hitler], Toplumsal Tarih 165 (2007), 38 – 42 and figure 9 above.

114 Fritz Ziegelmann, *352nd [German] Infantry Division. Special Questions (Normandy)*, US NARA HD B-021, 1946, 4.

Figure 9: Colonel Salih Erkuş and General Cemil Cahit Toydemir (in light uniforms, from left) with a third member of the Turkish General Staff's delegation on a visit at a German Atlantikwall section, probably Le Touquet, June 1943

The German High Command was aware that, after the experience in Gallipoli, a quick victory within the first days of the invasion was essential: "The guiding principle was that the enemy must be defeated on the beaches within three or four days after the initial landing. If this failed, all would be lost."[115]

For the German staff officers it was obvious that the German defensive forces had lacked unified command similar to the one the Allied invasion army had possessed in 1915.[116] After four years of war the German navy could not assist in the defense of the coastline. The German airforce was understrength in the summer of 1944. On the ground, like in the Ottoman case in the past, due to production shortages, not all of the German shore batteries were equipped properly

115 Max Pemsel, *Preparations for Invasion. Foreword by [U.S.] Captain George Blanchard*, US NARA HD B-234, 1946, 3. See also the 1941 order Cf. the 1941 Wehrmacht High Command order for an early prevention of any enemy landing attempt in Rudi Rolf, *Der Atlantikwall: Die Bauten der deutschen Küstenbefestigungen, 1940 1945* (Osnabrück: Biblio, 1998), 82.

116 Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg, *The Theory behind Troop Dispositions in France. Commentary to Speidel, Hans: Rommel's Views (1 Apr.-May 1944)*, US NARA HD B-720, 1947, 11.

to defend fast moving enemy water craft.[117] Moreover, the quality of the Germans troops had deteriorated dramatically by 1944. The German bunker troops and the reserve troops in the hinterland were not newly drafted as the Ottoman units, which had already served approximately five months in 1915. Most of the Wehrmacht and Kriegsmarine garrison troops consisted of World War One veterans, most of them unfit for service, and young and inexperienced soldiers: "To me, as an old soldier who has passed through the first World War, acting as a battery- and battalion commander in the artillery, it seemed as if these young soldiers could not stand the artillery fire of the enemy as easily as those who had taken part in the first World War."[118]

The Progress of Military Technology since Gallipoli

The disaster of the Gallipoli campaign was studied extensively by the Royal Navy and later the US Navy as well as the US Marine Corps. The British Navy had developed an instruction manual for combined army and navy operations, also using the 1915 experiences before anything comparable was undertaken by the German armed forces. Furthermore, the accuracy of naval artillery was improved to increase the damage of enemy shore batteries. The Royal Navy also developed a new generation of armored landing ships that offered enhanced protection for the landing party under enemy fire.[119] The US Navy also showed considerable interest in the battle for the straits, even though the United States had not participated in this operation due to their late entry into World War One. The first English translation of Liman von Sanders' memoirs was published by the Naval Institute Press in 1927. Together with other operations, especially by Japan, the main prospective US adversary in the late 1930s, Gallipoli served as one of the models for the development of a modern US Navy landing doctrine.[120]

In the special situation of the German occupation of France, the divided command of the German Wehrmacht and Kriegsmarine played into the hands of the Allied planning. Unlike the Ottman troops at Gallipoli, the German troops defended foreign soil and were the occupiers. Allied military intelligence made use of the French Résistance movement in the campaign, an advantage the En-

117 Ernst Goettke, *Coast Artillery- Atlantic Wall*, US NARA HD B-663, 1947, 22.
118 Gerhard Triepel, *Fighting on the Cotentin Peninsula, with Special Reference to the Coast Artillery: Cotentin Artillery (6–18 Jun. 1944)*, US NARA HD B-260, 1946, 10.
119 Ian Speller, "In the Shadow of Gallipoli? Amphibious Warfare in the Interwar Period," in *Gallipoli: Making History*, ed. Jenny Macleod (London, New York: Frank Cass, 2004), 141–142.
120 Speller, "In the shadow of Gallipoli," 146.

tente could not enjoy back in 1915.[121] It is also interesting to note that most of the ordnance systems and small arms (regarding the bolt-action rifles, namely, the British SMLE and the German Mauser system) were used in both campaigns.[122] Despite these similarities, military reconnaissance technology had undergone rapid development between the wars. While the state of Ottoman fortification works had been uncertain for the Entente in 1915, the Allies had high-resolution photographs of the German defences at their disposal in 1944. Preparations on both the Allied and German sides took much longer and were technically more sophisticated than at the beginning of the First World War. In addition to the armored landing ships, amphibious tanks had been built especially for this operation to support the landed infantry. Finally, the landed Allied infantry units were much more specialized in assault techniques than their British, French and ANZAC predecessors had been.[123]

The preparations for 'Operation Overlord' had been a mixture of old and new tactics, technologies and weapons. In this regard it was a "successful Gallipoli due to better planning and shorter distances."[124]

Disproval of the German Doctrine during the 'The longest Day'

The diverging ideas of coastal defense proved to be a big obstacle to the defense of Normandy shores. Admiral Theodor Krancke complained about the Wehrmacht's wrong doctrine, clearly drawn from Hans Wehrle's flexible defense:

> "The apparently complicated organization of the coastal defense was preconditioned by the attitude of the Army whose ideas were mainly directed toward the conception of land warfare. The firing against quickly movable sea targets requires, however, methods of firing, and formations of Batteries that are different from those for land battle. The Heer was accustomed to fire indirectly from covered gun positions and did not consider the location of the [Navy's] coastal batteries near to the shore for direct firing to be a solution forced on us by new conditions but regarded the idea as obsolete. But when fighting took place against

121 Robin Higham, "Weapons Old and Weapons New: Technology at D-Day," in *Seemacht und Geschichte: Festschrift zum 80. Geburtstag von Friedrich Runge*, ed. Deutsches Marine- Institut (Bonn, Bad Godesberg: MOV, 1975), 130.

122 Higham, "Weapons Old and Weapons New," 131.

123 Peter Chasseaud, "Comparison with D-Day, 1944," in *Grasping Gallipoli. Terrain, Maps and Failure at the Dardanelles, 1915* (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2005), 265 – 269. See also Rupert Hamer, "D-Day in Normandy and Suvla Bay," *Sabertache* 39 (1998), 3 – 9.

124 Higham, "Weapons Old and Weapons New," 123.

> quickly moving sea targets, especially in the case of a landing, direct aiming at the targets should be feasible."[125]

Another former Kriegsmarine admiral also accused the Wehrmacht of disregarding obvious lessons from the Dardanelles campaign:

> "The circumstances of combat at the Dardanelles were completely different from the landing battles of World War Two, and they were of no use as an experience basis for the latter. The major positive experience [from Gallipoli], that landings had to be opposed by operative army forces, was not part of the navy's evaluation area of responsibility. It was not considered sufficiently by the German Wehrmacht under the constraints of war."[126]

At the Normandy shores the German Navy faced the problem that the enemy fleet had drawn their lessons out of the "primitive-naive conduct of the Allied ships in front of the Dardanelles".[127] In 1944 the Allies made use of smoke screens and deception tactics to interfere with the German radio ranging technique. Similarly to the Wehrmacht, the Kriegsmarine also drew the wrong conclusions from the Gallipoli campaign. The Wehrmacht criticized the immobile navy command and artillery posts in the first line of defense, since for them, "[...] the Navy believed itself onboard a warship on the high seas [...]" trusting their heavily armed bunkers.[128] The Kriegsmarine defence plan generated "[t]he belief that the concrete fence all around the coast would prevent anyone from landing on it."[129]

In the end both the Wehrmacht and the Kriegsmarine were wrong in their assumptions. Allied air superiority had made a flexible defense difficult and the German reserves arrived too late in the invasion area. The Kriegsmarine bunkers failed to repel the Allied naval landings and proved useless when attacked from the rear by commando units and paratroopers.

It also has to be stated that neither on the Allied nor on the German side the experiences of Gallipoli had been the main driving force behind the development of a modern doctrine. It was rather a combination of wartime and interwar experiences[130], including wrong interpretations of the Gallipoli campaign by the

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125 Theodor Krancke, *Naval Group West in Defense against the Allied Landing; of Historical and Technical Interest*, US NARA HD B-169, 1946, 9–10.

126 Wilhelm von Harnier, "Küstenartillerie und Atlantikwall," *Marine-Rundschau* 52–4 (1955), 91–92.

127 von Harnier, "Küstenartillerie und Atlantikwall," 92.

128 Gersdorff, *Critique of the Defense against Invasion*, 10.

129 Günther Blumentritt, *Effect of Fortifications on Strategic Planning*, US NARA HD B-652, 1947, 33.

130 Speller, "In the Shadow of Gallipoli," 148.

German armed forces that led to the defeat in 1944. The prerequisites were entirely different and the technology had evolved during the 29 years since Gallipoli. General Blumentritt implicitely recognized that the German interwar analysis of prior landings had been wrong. He therefore pleaded that

> "[..] we should evolve [sic] a 'theory' from experience, war history and practice, using it as a basis of instruction at military schools [...] [and] constantly endeavor to realize what direction evolution will take [..] even when [the result would be] opposed to the 'textbook.'"[131]

After this excursion into the field of one of the latest impacts of the German-Ottoman alliance we will now turn towards the continued German-Ottoman knowledge transfer during the interwar period.

Captain Hans Tröbst in the Greco-Turkish War, 1920–1922

After the defeat in 1918, the German military mission had to leave the Ottoman state. In the aftermath of the war the Entente's occupation force monitored the borders to keep Germans interested in serving with the Nationalist Turkish army out of the country. However, at least one German officer managed to evade the controls. Hans Tröbst (1891–1939), a former engineer captain of the German Imperial army, had been dismissed from active service due to demobilization. After his career as a mercenary in diverse Freikorps formations in Poland and the Baltics, he participated in the Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch in Berlin in March 1920. To evade legal prosecution, he eventually decided to join the Wrangel army in the Crimea, however, due to its defeat by the Bolshevik forces, Tröbst changed his mind and chose the Nationalist Turkish army under Mustafa Kemal.

His activities in Anatolia deserve further attention, since it has been indicated that he presented the genocidal policies of the Young Turk era to the German right-wing circles in Munich in the autumn of 1923.[132] Furthermore, it will be shown in this section that Tröbst's experience in this regard was based on his participation in the Russian Civil War. Tröbst's memoirs covering the period between 1919 and 1923 are the main source of this analysis.[133]

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131 Blumentritt, *Effect of Fortifications on Strategic Planning*, US NARA HD B-652, 1947, 53.

132 Ihrig, *Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination*, 82–91.

133 Hans Tröbst, *Soldatenblut: Vom Baltikum zu Kemal Pascha* (Leipzig: R.F. Koehler, 1925). Fr his experiences of the Russian Civil War, see Hans Tröbst, *Grenzschutz Ost: Freikorps 1919–1920*, ed. Mario Tröbst (Hamburg: self-published, 2016); For the autumn of 1923 see Hans Tröbst, *Hitler-Putsch: Die Ereignisse in München November 1923*, ed. Mario Tröbst (Hamburg: self-published, 2013), unpaginated Kindle edition.

The time in the *Grenzschutz Ost* was not the only 'school of violence' for Hans Tröbst, yet this unit was already seen as a "wild band of soldiers [...] like [in Friedrich Schiller's] Wallenstein's camp" by the Istanbul wartime German naval attaché.[134] This was to be seconded only by the Iron Division, Tröbst's next 'staging post'.[135] Writing about the brutal skirmishes in Latvia in 1919, his memoirs incidentally refer to the violence he had witnessed. Four years of war as a regular soldier had turned Tröbst into a hard-bitten man. The casual remarks in Tröbst's memoirs referring to brutal warfare are shocking. When his unit took Bolshevik prisoners during the battle for Riga, Tröbst even volunteered to execute them together with his own men. However, this was only a foretaste of what he saw in the city:

> "[...] [N]early in the twinkling of an eye a dithering human heap sprinkled with blood and inner organs laid in front of us. [...] Everywhere in the streets the dead Bolsheviks were still lying around. Crossing the new built bridge over the Düna in impeccable marching order singing 'Deutschland über alles!' we went to the old city."[136]

In a similar vein Tröbst had developed a radical anti-semitic worldview. He did not hide his feelings; a stepping-stone for his ideas later expressed in Munich. Long before his time in Anatolia, he wrote about the Jewish settlements in Latvia, Lithuania and Northern Poland, calling for persecution measures:

> "Pogrom and once more pogrom! That is the only solution for the Jewish question. Hopefully we will reach this solely cultural attitude [Kulturstandpunkt] in Germany pretty soon. [...] The whole nest was inhabited by Jews and one could see such disgusting faces, that one could slap them for hours and hours."[137]

For Tröbst the killing of innocent people, a "refreshing incident", was one of the unavoidable circumstances of war.[138] He expressed a similar opinion when he was with the *Freikorps Erhardt*, stating that during the putsch in Berlin he felt "like in Reval, or the entry to a conquered city."[139] He also used the opportunity

134 Hans Human to Otto von Lossow, 28 May 1919. Bay HStA IV HS 3158, 3. Humann was absolutely right in his assumption; see the Schiller quotation in Tröbst, *Soldatenblut*, XI.

135 On the German participation in this front of the Russian Civil War see Boris Barth, *Dolchstoßlegenden und politische Desintegration: Das Trauma der deutschen Niederlage im Ersten Weltkrieg 1914 – 1933* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2003), 255 – 290.

136 Tröbst, *Grenzschutz Ost*, n.p.

137 Tröbst, *Grenzschutz Ost*, n.p.

138 Tröbst, *Grenzschutz Ost*, n.p.

139 Tröbst, *Grenzschutz Ost*, n.p.

to distribute anti-semitic leaflets to his soldiers.[140] At this point it is no exaggeration to say that Tröbst had acquired his violent sentiments before he was confronted with the post genocidal realities in Anatolia.[141]

On his way to Turkey Tröbst had an 'undesireable' encounter with a Jew.[142] In the Turkish army his dreams of joining well-trained troops came true and while attending basic drill instructions in Kastamonu, he was glad to once again be in a regular army:

> "Everything was like at home! The drills were in accordance with German standards and the tone of Turkish commandos resembled that of ours so that one could [understand them without knowing any Turkish]. [...] For me this spectacle was really refreshing and in my mind I saw myself working in a similar environment."[143]

Tröbst eventually received a position in the Kemalist army. However, there were some changes to wartime practices. Tröbst kept his rank as a captain, since the Turkish army had learned from the sensitive practice of promoting German officers automatically and causing jealous Ottoman officers. Tröbst realized quickly that the German methods that had been applied by the German military mission and the Ottoman officers who had been trained in Germany were inapplicable to the Turkish recruits due to cultural differences.[144] For the time being, he had no active command in Ankara and simply hung around, smoking hashish. This waiting period was followed by service behind the front, where a construction corps built reserve trenches against a Greek breakthrough. Tröbst was not sent to the front on purpose. His possible captivity might have caused political problems for Germany and would have challenged the national Turkish character of this war of independence.[145] Tröbst only had the right to give advice to the commanding Turkish officer, another Turkish lesson from the unfavourable outcome of the German military mission. Those principles were also to be applied in the future Turco-German military cooperation after 1925.

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140 For examples see the reproductions in Tröbst, *Grenzschutz Ost*.

141 On Freikorps tendency for violence see Matthias Sprenger, *Landsknechte auf dem Weg ins Dritte Reich? Zu Genese und Wandel des Freikorpsmythos* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2008), 133–144.

142 Tröbst, *Soldatenblut*, 33.

143 Tröbst, *Soldatenblut*, 131–132.

144 Tröbst, *Soldatenblut*, 154, 188.

145 For the issue of the national myth in Turkey, see Ryan Gingeras, "Gangsters, Kidnappers and Other Patriots: The Writing of a New Social History of the Turkish War of Independence," in *Towards a Social History of Modern Turkey: Essays in Theory and Practice*, ed. Gavin D. Brockett (Istanbul: Libra, 2011), 39–57.

Tröbst also remarked the Turks abiding by the engineering regulation, whereas the German officer was used to applying the 'spirit' of the written word accordingly. In addition, the Turkish army used several prewar instructions from Germany that had become outdated through the experience of war.[146] The Turkish officer's attitude towards the 'untrustworthy' Armenians and Greeks was accepted by the German captain without much critique. Those ideas seemed to match his own worldview from his time in the German *Freikorps*, though the German captain, with his classical Greek education, replaced those two enemy groups with the Jews and Bolsheviks in his mind.[147]

However, also in the life of a mercenary, all 'good' things had to come to an end. After his last posting to a railway regiment, his contract was terminated due to the peace treaty with Greece in the summer of 1923. During his time in Turkish service, Tröbst also had come to a more realistic insight regarding the difficulties of the past and contemporary German-Turkish military cooperation. The German *hireling* disapproved the wartime practices of the German military mission. The Prussian way of military education had to be a failure:

> "[The German instruction officer] rated everything according to European standards and he believed in introducing reforms everywhere in order to achieve records and perform [...]. The typical Prussian 'military mind' ['Kommißkopf'] does not fit foreign nations, it is only designed for the Prussian psyche."[148]

Nearly all of the German veterans had blamed the Turkish side in their memoirs, but rarely questioned their own omissions. Therefore it was no surprise that the Turkish army of the republic rejected most of the applications of German officers. The German side had to first learn their lesson as a prerequisite for further cooperation.[149] In addition to these considerations Tröbst's favor for authoritarian leadership was obvious. Writing about the supreme commander, Mustafa Kemal, he stated: "The fate gave the country in the moment of severest hardship the man, [...] that we [in Germany] also require and whom we are waiting for with consumptive fervor!"[150]

146 Tröbst, *Soldatenblut*, 175, 190.
147 Tröbst, *Soldatenblut*, 204 – 205.
148 Hans Tröbst, "Der deutsche Offizier und Soldat und die 'Neue Türkei'," *DOB* 20 (1925), 156; ibid. 21 (1925), 166.
149 Tröbst, "Der deutsche Offizier und Soldat und die 'Neue Türkei'," *DOB* 21 (1925), 167.
150 Tröbst, *Soldatenblut*, 329.

Bavarian Readings of the Turkish Nationalists, 1923

Meanwhile there were no longer any job opportunities as a mercenary in Germany. As not even the German Foreign Ministry was interested in Tröbst's expertise, he had to look elsewhere for sources of income.[151] In order to save money, the returnee stayed with his brother in Munich, where he soon came in contact with right-wing extremist circles. After a presentation about the Turkish conduct of war for the retired General Ludendorff, the latter helped Tröbst to publish an article series in the conservative *Heimatland* newspaper.[152] Tröbst used the opportunity and presented the Turkish war against the victorious powers and the imposed Sèvres Treaty as a role model for the German resistance against the Versailles Treaty. Tröbst made three very clear points. First of all, there was the need for a dictatorship in Germany to unite all forces, as Mustafa Kemal had refused to follow the orders of the Sultan's government in occupied Istanbul (similar to the German politicians in Berlin). Secondly, the 'non-native' population (i. e. the German Jews) had to be expelled. Tröbst defined the Greeks and Armenians as *"bloodsuckers and parasites"*, who either had been annihilated or deported by the Turkish authorities. Their houses were thereafter handed to "ethnic compatriots" ("Volksgenossen"), thereby completing the "purification of the racial corpus" ("Reinigung des Volkskörpers"). Finally, just like in Turkey, a war against the exterior enemies was to be waged with real volunteers rather than unreliable drafted men.[153] Tröbst three points interfused the former stages of his 'career' in his worldview: his impressions as a former German imperial soldier, his participation in the Freikorps movement with its uninhibited use of violence in the Russian Civil War and in Berlin as well as his service in the Turkish army, where he might have grasped one or two details regarding the (previous) annihilation campaigns against the Armenians and Greeks. All of these impressions culminated in the said article written during the heated political situation in Munich in the autumn of 1923. In the Bavarian capital, the captain from Ankara, with his notorious alcohol addiction, enjoyed listening to Hitler's "fascinating

151 Unanswered letter of Hans Tröbst to the German Foreign Ministry, with the offer to give insight to the Greco-Turkish war; 10 August 1923. AA- PA R78561, n.p.

152 Hartwig Gebhardt, *Mir fehlt eben ein anständiger Beruf: Leben und Arbeit des Auslandskorrespondenten Hans Tröbst, 1891–1939* (Bremen: Edition Lumière, 2007), 20.

153 For all quotations see the last article of the series in Hauptmann Tröbst, "Mustafa Kemal Pascha und sein Werk," *Heimatland: Vaterländisches Wochenblatt; Bayerische Volksstimme* 4–42 (1923), 7. Cf. Ihrig, *Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination*, 82.

gift of oration" in the crowded beer halls.[154] After the publication of those articles, he even met Adolf Hitler in person and was impressed by this man who was "loaden with electricity".[155] Hitler was mainly interested in Tröbst's Turkish experience. However, Tröbst had gained access to those right-wing circles by his officer rank from the Imperial army, and in these weeks in Munich Tröbst rather used ideas from his time in the *Freikorps*.

As a first step towards a revolution, Tröbst seriously considered the idea to raid the homes of the members of the Bavarian government. Dressed in fake police uniforms, he intended to kidnap or execute those politicians by a squad selected from the right-wing veteran organizations. However, he soon realized that the prospects of an uprising were not promising since the Bavarian police and the local Reichswehr units would suppress any attempt to come to power. In the end, Tröbst had an unexpected blessing in disguise. He was sent to Berlin by Ludendorff in an urgent matter and returned to Munich in the morning of 9 November 1923 when the putsch was close to failure.

Due to the involvement of several officers, who had either served in the Ottoman army or had to seek refuge in Turkish service after the events of November 1923, the Hitler putsch deserves more attention here.

Between the Fronts: Ankara in Munich

The former German Military Representative in the Ottoman Empire, Otto von Lossow, was a good example for the assesement of Gerold von Gleich "that some Germans were used to learning more from the Turks than the other way around."[156] During his employment at the German embassy in Constantinople in 1916, the Bavarian General had provoked the ambassador Wolff Metternich after he had discussed sensitive matters with Enver Pasha. For the German diplomat, this was an "uncomprehendingly excess of militarism [...]. A sergeant who

154 For Tröbst's admiration of Hitler see Tröbst, *Die Ereignisse in München*, n.p.; on the Munich venues of the National Socialist and *Völkisch* movement see also Susanne Meinl, "Bühne und Schauplatz- Kulisse und Schlachtfeld. Münchener Bierkeller als politische Orte 1919 – 1945," in *Bier. Macht. München: 500 Jahre Münchner Reinheitsgebot in Bayern*, ed. Ursula Eymold (Munich: Süddeutsche Zeitung Edition, 2015), 118 – 121.

155 Tröbst, *Die Ereignisse in München*, n.p.; cf. also the reproduction of Hitler's invitation letter in Ibid.

156 Gleich, "Feldzug in der Türkei 1916," 32.

obeys [Lossow's orders] would be more appropriate than an Imperial ambassador."[157]

Lossow continued to exhibit this attitude while serving as the commander of the Bavarian Reichswehr after 1918. According to the Bavarian General Hilmar Ritter von Mittelberger (1878 – 1953), Lossow had refrained from the Prusso-German ideal of the unpolitical officer during the eight years in Ottoman service: "The longtime occupation with politics had veered him away from the purely military range of thoughts and had awakened his interest in political issues."[158]

Lossow and other German officers had worked in a violent atmosphere characterized by regular turmoil. The Young Turk revolution and the 1909 countercoup had paved the way for further violent incidents. The CUP regime and Lossow's main contact person, Enver, had come to power through a coup in January 1913. During the First World War, German diplomats distrusted the political stability of the Ottoman ally.[159] These events also shaped the German Military Representative.

Otto von Lossow managed continue his career in the Reichswehr in 1919. He was promoted to commander of the Bavarian military district and became head of the 7th Infantry division. Lossow stayed loyal to his supreme commander, Hans von Seeckt, until the peak of the Ruhr occupation crisis in September 1923. At this time, Lossow had obtained an extended area of responsibility due to the national state of emergency in Germany. When the Munich based National Socialist periodical *Völkischer Beobachter* published an offensive article about the members of the German government and the Reichswehr leadership, Lossow was ordered to shut down the newspaper. However, he refused to do so, since the Bavarian government was reluctant to provoke the growing right-wing movement. Lossow was officially dismissed by his superior, Seeckt, due to the refusal to obey orders from Berlin. However, he was supported by both the Bavarian civil government and the commanding officers in Bavaria.[160] In this atmosphere Lossow met with the leaders of the right-wing organizations and issued an internal memorandum for the Bavarian Reichswehr commanders which was leaked to the leaders of those groups.[161] In this memo he referenced the views expressed in

157 Wolfgang Gust, "Armenien 1915: Verständnislose Auswüchse des Militarismus," *Historicum* 7 (2007), 21.

158 Hilmar Ritter von Mittelberger, "Wanderer in vier Welten: Erinnerungen des Generals der Infanterie Hilmar Ritter von Mittelberger," vol. 2, Bay HStA IV HS 2709, 61.

159 See the Foreign Ministry file "Prosepct of a breakdown of Turkey," AA-PA R 14043.

160 Heiner Möllers, *Reichswehrminister Otto Geßler: Eine Studie zu 'unpolitischer' Militärpolitik in der Weimarer Republik* (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1998), 233 – 238.

161 Ihrig, *Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination*, 96.

the *Heimatland* periodical and advocated to follow Turkey's example. Though, as in his previous letter to the Reichsarchiv on wartime events, Lossow stated that the *Heimatland* authors had no clue about postwar Turkey (even though Lossow himself had left Istanbul in 1918). The circumstances in Turkey were quite different from those in Germany and the success of Mustafa Kemal was not reproducible in the politically divided atmosphere in Germany. Lossow did not distance himself from the idea of disposing of the elected German government by a coup d'etat. However, this task needed more preparation. For the Bavarian Reichswehr commander, the nationalist groups assembled in Munich were a minority led by incapable men. Their 'revolution' would fail due to the lack of support from outside the Bavarian capital. Therefore, the nationalist movement were to put their plans to overthrow the Berlin government on a firm nation-wide footing. By using the experiences from the Turkish nationalist movement, they should also give the leftist groups of the German society another objective "for their mental attitude."[162] Nevertheless, the Bavarian Reichswehr did not support the Hitler putsch and stayed in their barracks; only the cadets of the Munich infantry school participated in the uprising. Lossow was finally forced to retire after the Bavarian government resigned on 18 February 1924. He was criticized in the same year by Hans Tröbst for the Bavarian Reichswehr's withdrawal of support for the national revolution at this crucial stage.[163] However, even Tröbst had second thoughts about a national renewal under Hitler and in his memoirs he professed to prefer a General of the caliber of Erich Ludendorff:

> "We Germans are no nation where you can do revolutions on command; for that we are too clumsy. [...] I do not consider Hitler a leader [Führer] but a wonderful agitator who knows how to deeply incite the people. He will and he must be the trailblazer for an even bigger leader."[164]

Otto von Lossow clearly transferred his Ottoman experience to the German political situation, just like Hans Tröbst had used his Turkish impressions for his article series. However, it is inappropriate to rate the 'Ottoman/Turkish years of apprenticeship' in the lifes of German officers as a decisive factor in their

162 The memorandum for the Bavarian Reichswehr and the Bavarian government by Otto von Lossow, "Her mit der Angora-Regierung!," Undated, c. 6 November 1923. Bay HStA MA 1943 D.R. Nr. 473. Quoted after: Ernst Deuerlein, *Der Hitler- Putsch: Bayerische Dokumente zum 8./9. November 1923* (Stuttgart: DVA, 1962), 502–503.

163 Möllers, *Reichswehrminister Otto Geßler 1998*, 239–244; Ihrig, *Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination*, 98–100.

164 Tröbst, *Die Ereignisse in München*, n.p.

orientation towards an active political role of the military within the state. Hans von Seeckt had remained loyal to the government. Friedrich Kreß von Kressenstein had also refrained from interfering in politics and was later rewarded with Lossow's position in 1924. Moreover, Liman von Sanders did not participate in the putsch at all. Only Otto von Lossow refused to obey orders during his active service. Hans Tröbst and the former naval attaché, Hans Humann[165], both participated in the Kapp-Lüttwitz putsch in 1920. However, the allegation that the service in the Ottoman army was a prerequisite wanting to participate in a putsch back in Germany cannot be substantiated.[166] In the case of Hans Tröbst and Max von Scheubner-Richter, the experience of violence in the Russian Civil War combined with the political developments in Germany generated this type of extremist mentality.[167] And at least in one case, obeying orders in the evening of 8 November 1923 had lasting consequences. First Lieutenant Maximilian Braun (1883–1955), a decorated infantry officer wounded several times on the West front, continued his career in the Reichswehr. In the night before the Hitler putsch he was on duty in his 2nd company in the Munich Infantry Regiment, which was put on alert at the outbreak of the putsch. When Hitler's storm troopers occupied the building of the former Bavarian Ministry of War, Braun received an order the following morning to arrest all illegal intruders. In the course of executing the order, one SA trooper refused to surrender, opened fire on the Reichswehr squad and was shot dead by Braun. After this incident, the National Socialists started a hate campaign against Braun in the late 1920s, which eventually lead to his dismissal from active service in 1934. In this situation he was protected by the (Bavarian) General Franz Halder who, with the help of General Mittelberger, offered him the position of an instructor in the Turkish military academy.[168] For the rest of his life he was "resentful toward Hitler's Germany and an enemy of the Nazis"[169] and he did not hide these feelings from his Turkish friends.

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165 Listed in Gumbel, *Vier Jahre politischer Mord*, 106, No. 36.

166 See Levinia Anderson, review of *Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination*, by Stefan Ihrig, *Central European History* 49–1 (2016), 139. Ihrig also mistakenly stated that Otto von Lossow returned to Turkish service after the putsch. This was not the case. However, a German navy captain of the same surname served in the Turkish Naval Academy between 1928 and 1930; see Anonymous, *Deutsche Offiziere in der Türkei*, 47.

167 Scheubner-Richter is mentioned by Ihrig, *Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination*, 103. However, like Tröbst, he fought as a Freikorps member in the Baltics. Cf. Johannes Baur, *Die russische Kolonie in München, 1900–1945: Deutsch-russische Beziehungen im 20. Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1998), 255.

168 See the documents in Braun's personal file, BAY GStA IV OP 61432.

169 Kocatürk, *Bir Subayın Anıları*, 259.

In the case of General Mittelberger, the coincidence of his leaving to Turkey with the National Socialists coming to power is striking. Mittelberger had reached the age of retirement in January 1933 and had signed the contract when Hitler was appointed Chancellor. However, as the commander of an infantry regiment in Bayreuth, on 9 November 1923 he had assisted in the surpression of the local SA rebellion.[170] It can, therefore, reasonably be concluded that he must have sensed the danger of staying in Germany in early 1933. Although Mittelberger was a conservative and even joined the local branch of the NSDAP after his arrival in Istanbul, just like Carl Diem, he was not a genuine follower of the regime.

The possibility of seeking refuge in Turkish service would not have been possible without the rapprochement between the two armies. Apart from all the negative experiences, which were expressed openly after 1918, both armed forces had several common interests.

Politics and Pensions

After the war the cooperation between both countries had come to a standstill. However, the interest for further cooperation on both sides was preponderant. Nonetheless, the Turkish army avoided the repetition of several of the side effects that had accompanied the military mission after 1913. The negative outcome of political aspects, as evaluated by Kazım Karabekir and Otto von Lossow, urged the Turkish military leadership to establish new rules for the recruitment of German instructors. First of all, the majority of the younger German officers had proven their incapability for service in the Ottoman environment. It could not be expected of a senior Turkish officer to follow the instructions of a freshly graduated and thus inexperienced German Lieutenant. Hence older, more experienced German officers had to be hired. Those distinguished men were not to have any contact with the common rank and files. Rather, they were to focus on the education of future officers. There were enough Turkish sergeants and lower ranking officers with war experience available to guarantee the daily basic drill instructions. The military restrictions enforced on the Reichswehr by the Versailles Treaty favored the Turkish military education system. There were plenty of distinguished German officers available, since not all of them could continue their service in the smaller Reichswehr. As paragraph 177 of the treaty forbade active soldiers to enter the service of a foreign army, the revival of a military mission was im-

170 Cf. Mittelberger, "Wanderer in vier Welten," vol. 2, 109 – 111.

possible. As explained by a British airforce instructor, the Turkish army could avoid the problem of this former extension of the German foreign policy: "[T]he Turks refused to have any form of mission in their country for they had been taught a lesson by the German military mission in the last war, which dragged them into hostilities against Russia."[171]

Furthermore, retired German Reichswehr officers were not allowed to wear uniform in Turkish service. Thus any return to the former German sense of superiority or the formation of a 'mission pack' was prevented. However, the Turkish insistence on private contracts had other reasons. Between 1882 and 1918 the German officers had joined Ottoman service on the basis of acquiring the right to receive a pension from their service time in the Ottoman army. In addition, wartime service in the Ottoman army counted as service time in the German army.[172] This system created a pension burden for the former German instructors on the Republican budget. In the case of Louis von Kamphoevener who had joined Ottoman service under Sultan Abdülhamid II, the republic had to pay the pension for his widow until 1932.[173] That is why not all of the German officers were eligible for a Turkish pension. Payments were held back until the passing of a respective law in 1926.[174] As a result of this practice, severe problems emerged for the German authorities. There were several open pension cases by German officers who had returned from the Ottoman service and now faced difficulties of making a living with their German pension in inflation shaken Germany after 1923. Captain Franz Carl Endres was infected with malaria while in the Ottoman army and was declared unfit for service in 1915. Because of his chronic disease he had no regular income and was solely dependent on his scarce pension for his time in the Bavarian army. The Turkish state, however, refused to pay him his pension for his time in the Ottoman army after he had published a critical article about the contemporary Republic of Turkey.[175] Endres complained to

171 Arthur S. Gould Lee, *Special Duties: Reminiscences of a Royal Airforce Staff Officer in the Balkans, Turkey and the Middle East* (London: Marstin & Co., n.y. [1946]), 13. For the continuation of this policy after 1945 cf. MacGarity, *Foreign Influence on the Ottoman Turkish Army,* 133.

172 Cf. the secret order from 19 August 1914; copy in BA-L R3901/ 10111, 21.

173 Milli Savunma Bakanlığı Arşivi, personal file Kamphoevener, Sicil No. 325 – 211.

174 The Turkish law No. 717 contained a detailed list with names of German officers and provided legal certainty. Cf. *T.C. Resmi Gazete* No. 279, 24 January 1926, 901 – 902.

175 Endres had openly referred to the wartime genocide and had additionaly argued that Mustafa Kemal had aspirations of becoming a new type of sultan. Cf. Franz Carl Endres, "Was hat Europa im Türkisch-Griechischen Krieg an Asien verloren?," *Europäische Gespräche* 11/12 (1926), 594 – 603.

the German authorities that the Turkish state refused to pay his pension due to his hostile publications until he finally received a higher one.[176]

There was also another sensitive case, namely, the former head of the military mission threatended to bring the German state to trial. Otto Liman von Sanders claimed to have lost all of his furniture during the British occupation. The German authorities were reluctant to go to court where "the political circumstances [of the military mission] would most likely come up."[177] From this incident it becomes evident that the German state was not interested in exposing the German military mission's impact upon Ottoman wartime politics. This also became part of the official Reichswehr policy. Germany feared the criticism of the victorious powers following postwar accusations of a German participation in the genocide of the Armenians. After the first accusations against the deceased Colmar von der Goltz,[178] the former naval attaché Hans Humann was removed from the German Versailles peace treaty delegation. There had been a serious criticism of his alleged support for the elimination of the Armenian population in Henry Morgenthau's book *The Secrets of the Bosphorus*.[179] This policy was continued. Otto von Lossow did not appear in public during Cemal Pasha's 1919 visit to Munich and in 1921 he also did not attend the funeral of Talaat Pasha to prevent a bad image of the Reichswehr.[180] In the case of the latter incident, the Reichswehr had even intervened for a premature termination of the court against Talaat's as-

176 Carl Endres' letter to the German Foreign Ministry, 29 March 1926 and the decision of the German Ministry of Finance, 7 April 1928, both in BA-L R3901/10112. The disappointed former captain had become a harsh critic of the wartime German military system during his critical financial situation, Endres, "Soziologische Struktur." For his social condemnation among veteran officers, resulting from this kind of criticism, see Schaerer, "Franz Carl Endres," 235–241.

177 Heeresabwicklungsamt Preußen to Auswärtiges Amt, 24 November 1920. AA-PA R 78553. Obviously Liman von Sander's family had experience in exploiting their prominent status. Two pleading letters, one in 1951 and the other in 1955 by Liman's daughter, Doris Mayr, to the Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes were also successful. They contained the same lamentation, i.e. the reference to her father's property deprivation in late 1918 combined with the material family losses during the Second World War. Cemil Güngör, "Liman Paşa'nın Kızı Menderes'ten Yardım İstiyor" [Liman Pasha's Daughter Wants Help from Menderes], *Atlas Tarih* 25 (2015), 18–19.

178 See the accusation (from 25 November 1918) that Goltz knew about the 1915 deportation plans in advance, however, for the anonymous author the Germans had no significant influence on the CUP government. Anonymous, "Die deutsche Regierung und die armenische Frage," *Deutsch-Armenische Korrespondenz* 2 (1918), 2.

179 Hans Humann to Otto von Lossow, 28 May 1919 and Humann's sister Marie Sarre to Lossow, 27 May 1919.BayHStA HS 3158, n.p.

180 Letter to Lossow by an unknown sender, 3 April 1919 and Hans Humann to Lossow 27 June 1921; BayHStA HS 3158, n.p.

sassin in its preliminary stage in order to prevent possible incriminating witness accounts of former German officers who had served in the Ottoman army.[181]

Thus Germany and Turkey had no interest in returning to old practices of military cooperation. After the reduction of the German armed forces, dozens of officers, among them also several veterans from the Ottoman army, sought fixed-term employment in the armies of smaller states.[182] Officially, the German state did not support the hiring of German officers for Turkish service and abode by the principles of paragraph 177 of the Versailles Treaty.[183] In response to the criticism leveled by the *Allied Control Commission*, German authorities declared that they had no legal measures of preventing those citizens (retired officers), from leaving the country. Once the initial Anglo-French excitement over this policy had waned, no more diplomatic protests were recorded, since those German "retirees who want to earn some additional money to their pensions" were not regarded as dangerous.[184]

The Status of the Turkish Army after 1923

The Turkish army was demobilized after the end of the hostilities with Greece. Its numbers dropped from 200,000 men in 1922 to 80,000 soldiers in 1924.[185] Conscription was retained since even after the Lausanne Treaty, the threat of an enemy invasion was still eminent. The Italian forces based on the Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean Sea could reach the Anatolian mainland within a short

181 Hans Lukas Kieser, "Modernität und Gewalt im Aufbau des türkischen Nationalstaates," *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 3 (2006), 166 – 167.

182 Stefan Berleb, *'... for China's benefit.' The Evolution and Devolution of German Influence on Chinese Military Affairs, 1919 – 1938* (PhD diss.: Queensland University Brisbane, 2005); Stefan Rinke, "Experten in der Grauzone: Militärischer Wissenstransfer zwischen Deutschland und Südamerika, 1918 – 1933," in *Expert Knowledge in Latin American History: Local, Transnational, and Global Perspectives*, ed. Stefan Rinke and Delia González de Reufels (Stuttgart: Heinz, 2014), 65 – 86.

183 De Hass, Reich Chancellory to Haniel von Haimhausen, Bavarian State Chanchellory; 31 January 1926. BA-L R 43-II/ 1499,14.

184 Köpke to the Foreign Ministry, 23 November 1928. AA-PA R 78561.

185 İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi*. Vol. 1: *Dış Siyaseti ve Askerî Stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye'si* [World War Two Turkey. Vol.1: World War Two Turkey in Foreign Policy and Military Strategy] (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013), 76. For a general overview of the period see also Levent Kalyon, *Türkiye'nin Savunma Politikaları Üzerine: Kırmızı Kim?* [On Turkish Defense Policy: Who's the Red?] (Ankara: Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık, 2010), 61 – 97.

time.[186] The same was true for the French occupation force in Syria. However, the Western border was the main line of defence. As a consequence of the insufficient wartime supply system of the Ottoman army, several military factories were established and cooperation with mainly German companies was sought in order to prepare the Turkish army for total war.[187]

In the early republic, the Turkish armed forces served three main functions. First of all, they were needed to support and sustain domestic security. The uprisings in Turkey became a testing ground for the strength of the new army. In 1925 alone, more than half of the Turkish forces were mobilized against the rebellion of *Sheikh Sait*, much more than in the case of the Reichswehr deployment in Saxony in 1923. This being the case, both armies played an important role during the state of emergency in their respective countries.[188]

Secondly, the Turkish army was part of the education system. Illiterate recruits were taught to read and write and received courses in basic mathematics and the fundamentals of health care. Recruits from rural areas were instructed in animal care and agriculture. All recruits were indoctrinated with republican principles during civic courses.[189] When outlining this policy, President Mustafa Kemal provided an interesting reference to Germany in 1923:

> "[...] [T]his country is twice the size of Germany. In Germany there are 79 million inhabitants. We have eight million. In this country the inhabitants do not die from hunger but the only [thing] that is killing these people is ignorance. [...] [Therefore] the military [service] has to be kind of a school so that [the conscript] will learn both, the military art of defending the fatherland as well as advantageous things for the whole village and the villagers and his own life."[190]

We can clearly state that even though the alliance with Germany was perceived critically by the Turkish head of state, the German role model of a strong nation remained valid. As such, it could even serve as a kind of stimulus for the Turkish

186 See the Italian view in Maria Gabriella Pasqualini, *L' Esercito Italiano nel Dodecaneso 1912–1943. Speranze e Realtà: I documenti dell'Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito* (Rome: Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito, Ufficio Storico, 2005), 201–408.

187 Tekeli and İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi*, 78, 80, 82, 104, 105.

188 Tekeli and İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi*, 93 and 112; cf. the 1924 Reichswehr memorandum on the state of emergency in Heinz Hürten, *Das Krisenjahr 1923: Militär und Innenpolitik, 1922–1924* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1980), 334–362.

189 Doğan Akyaz, *Askerî Müdahalelerin Orduya Etkisi: Hiyerarşi Dışı Örgütlenmeden Emir Komuta Zincirine* [The Influence of Military Interventions on the Army: From Organizing Outside the Hierarchy to the Chain of Command] (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 35.

190 İnan, *Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün 1923 Eskişehir-İzmit Konuşmaları*, 54; Ibid. a similar reference to Germany on p. 110.

nation-building project.[191] This statement also indicated Mustafa Kemal pointing to the third task for the Turkish armed forces, namely, the defense against external threats. The army's overall size was increased again in the 1930s. It reached 120,000 men in arms in 1936 with a mobilization plan from 1938 for drafting 1,300,000 men in total, that is, 65 per cent of all men eligible for military service.[192] However, the manpower of the Turkish army did not equal its combat strength. The state budget was not sufficient to fund a modern equipped, motorized and mechanized force, supported by a strong airforce and navy. In addition, on the eve of World War Two, the Turkish military production facilities could not fulfill the needs of a modern total war. Therefore, the army could solely serve to deter potential invasion. For this task, the Turkish military leadership sought the assistance of German instructors.

Common Interests

The Turkish officer corps was dominated by Ottoman veterans, who had lived through a turbulent decade. They were tasked with molding the young leaders of the Republican army: "They had come from the empire and believed that they had helped to establish the republic. This generation had done the 1908 revolution. [...] This was the generation of the Envers, the Atatürks, the İsmets."[193]

In this regard their considerations were similar to the rather pragmatic view of some of their German instructors. After the fall of the German monarchy, General Mittelberger was engulfed in doubt over his ability to embrace the Republican spirit. Nonetheless, Mittelberger decided to join the Reichswehr out of ideological conviction since he favored the rule of President Hindenburg:

> "[...] [W]ithout an army [Wehrmacht] driven by moral values and discipline, the reconstruction of a healthy empire [Reich] was not possible. [...] The soldier must not serve a party, but has to be the servant of the whole nation. He has to accept the Republic, but he could not be a political soldier in the sense of basing the fulfillment of his duties on a party program. A healthy army represents the state's authority. This was the case in Imperial Germany and it had to be like that in the Republic. [...] Essential was the core and not the outer shell and the core, like in every serviceable army, consisted of the selfless fulfillment of duties and

191 For the militarist discourse in the early republic see also Altınay, *The Myth of the Military-Nation*, 27–30.

192 Tekeli and İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi*, 97, 106, 117; Akyaz, *Askerî Müdahalelerin Orduya Etkisi*, 39.

193 Adnan Çelikoğlu, *Bir Darbeci Subayın Anıları: 27 Mayıs Öncesi ve Sonrası* [*Memoirs of a Putschist Officer: Before and after May 27 (1960)*] (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2010), 23.

> sacrifice for the greater good. This spirit had to be preserved in the republican army [...] The salvation of Germany in its interior fragmentation and its exterior weakness imperiously required the rule by a man who had become a national hero for the people."[194]

This pragmatic view was also visible among the older officer ranks in the Turkish army. The younger Turkish officers also highly admired Mustafa Kemal. Kenan Kocatürk recalled how he saw his national hero for the first time at the seaside: "If Ata[türk] at this day would have said to us 'All of you dive into the sea from this landing stage' I would have been the first one to jump."[195]

Resulting from this attitude, the German model of recruiting officers in accordance with their reliability became a common practice in the Turkish army. Gone were the days of the Ottoman *alaylı* system with nepotist officer circles lacking higher academic military education.[196] Just like in the case of the Reichswehr, the Turkish commanders who refused to accept the primacy of politics over the military had to leave the army. This was a lesson learned in both countries from the military dominance of Imperial politics. Military duties and the exertion of political political power were not reconcilable in the Republic, with an exception of the state of emergency under tight political control. Nonetheless, in both armies, the idea of overthrowing unpopular political rulers was more than just a thought experiment of a military mind.[197]

There were also converging views about the political function of the army. As previously mentioned, the Turkish armed forces served to "spread the ideas of

194 Mittelberger, "Wanderer in vier Welten," vol. 2, 2–3, 201.

195 Kocatürk, *Bir Subayın Anıları*, 80.

196 Akyaz, *Askerî Müdahalelerin Orduya Etkisi*, 38.

197 A detailed discussion on this issue is far beyond the scope of this study, since there is less source material available on the Turkish side. For indications see George S. Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics," *Middle East Journal* 19–1 (1965), 56–58; Francis L. Carsten, *Reichswehr und Politik 1918–1933* (Köln, Berlin: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1965), 267–271. For the later period see Hans Mommsen, "Die Stellung der Militäropposition im Rahmen der deutschen Widerstandsbewegung gegen Hitler," in *NS-Verbrechen und der militärische Widerstand gegen Hitler*, ed. Gerd R. Ueberschär (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgemeinschaft 2000), 119–134; For tightened political control over the army after Mustafa Kemal's death see Akyaz, *Askerî Müdahalelerin Orduya Etkisi*, 40–41; For an alleged failed putsch against İsmet İnönü in 1941 see Jörg Hiltscher, *Die deutsch-türkischen Beziehungen 1940–42 in der Perzeption Hitlers, Ribbentrops und Papens: Eine Studie unter besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer nachrichtendienstlichen Dimension* (Ludwigsfelde: Ludwigsfelder Verlagshaus, 2011), 224. In conclusion, it should be noted here that this comparison does not intend to put the political regimes in both countries on an equal footing.

modernization and secular nationalism".[198] The former General Mustafa Kemal had a clear vision in this regard:

> "Our soldiers come to the barracks as raw material [ham madde]. [...] They return home [from military service] enriched, elevated, and strengthened. To us, the barracks is not only the place of military instruction but at the same time also a cultural seedbed [ocak], a school of art and, in this regard, it adds an immense value to the nation."[199]

In the Reichswehr the principles of education were quite similar. Since German professional soldiers served up to 12 years instead of the 18 months of the Turkish conscripts, there was plenty of time to educate them accordingly. In 1932, the head of the army, Hans von Seeckt, wrote a memorandum on the education of those long serving soldiers: "The knowledge shall not be restricted to his [military] task, the [soldier's] common general education shall be elevated and train the soldier for his whole life as a valuable and useful national comrade [Volksgenosse]."[200]

The Prussian practice of regarding the army as the 'school of the nation' continued after the reintroduction of military conscription in 1935. General Blomberg, the head of the newly established Wehrmacht, defined the tasks of the army as the "last and highest school of patriotic [vaterländisch] education" where the recruit should also "be fostered for his later life". After their military service, the young men were to be proud to "[have] served in the toughest, fairest, cleanest, but also in the most comradely and most caring school." Lastly, here the youth should be educated "in the spirit of National Socialism and in accordance with the will of their Commander-in-chief."[201] Mustafa Kemal's view was not quite that authoritarian. However, in a 1931 speech, he allocated a leadership role to the Turkish armed forces:

> "Whenever the Turkish nation has wanted to take a step up, it has always looked to the army [...] as the leader of movements to achieve lofty national ideals. [...] When speaking of the

198 Hale, "The Turkish Republic and its Army," 80.

199 Enver Ziya Karal, *Atatürk'ten Düşünceler* [Thoughts from Atatürk], 2nd. ed. (Ankara: Doğuş, 1962), 108. For the education of male conscripts during military service in the early republic in accordance with this spirit see also Güven Gürkan Öztan, *Türkiye'de Militarizm: Zihniyet, Pratik ve Propaganda* [Militarism in Turkey: Mindset, Practice and Propaganda] (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2014), 50 – 56.

200 Quoted after Karl Demeter, *Das Deutsche Offizierskorps in Gesellschaft und Staat 16501945*, 4th ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Greafe, 1965), 318.

201 Quoted after Absolon, *Die Wehrmacht im Dritten Reich*, vol. 3, 9 – 11.

> army, I am speaking of the intelligentsia of the Turkish nation who are the true owners of this country. [...] The Turkish nation [...] considers its army the guardian of its ideals."[202]

These similarities in the military thinking of both armies are striking. Thus we can state that General Hindenburg was right when he wrote in his memoirs that the German military assistance had not only consisted of a material side, but had also helped to prepare the subsequent nation building mentally.[203] This assistance continued in the years between 1925 and 1939.

Germans to the Lecture Room Font, 1925 – 1939

In the interwar period the German instructors outnumbered the instructors from other nations. Between 1925 and the beginning of the Second World War, 24 retired army and 12 retired navy officers in total taught at the Turkish military academy in Istanbul. While there are no reliable numbers of the French instructors available for the time before 1939, the activities of eight British and five American officers are documented.[204] The British airforce instructor Lee recalled the strong orientation towards Germany in 1938:

> "During the past twenty three years German military doctrines and influence had had a clear field. The staff colleges were the only center of higher military training, and here, since the last war, German instructors had served continuously, up to ten at a time, many of them generals and admirals with distinguished war records."[205]

Though, after the experiences of World War One, the Turkish side was anxious to prevent a dominance of German instructors and French specialists were also hired. The staff at the academy decided to also make use of the military strengths of the instructors' country of origin. While the French instructors mainly taught defensive tactics and military engineering, the Germans concentrated on the history of war, attack warfare and strategy (*tabiye*).[206] However, the Turkish military

202 *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri* [Atatürk's Speeches and Statements]. Vol. 2, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1959), 269 – 270. Cf. Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics," 56.
203 Hindenburg, *Aus meinem Leben*, 310.
204 For the Germans see Anonymous, *Deutsche Offiziere in der Türkei*, 45 – 48; For the other nations see İskora, *Harp Akademileri Tarihçesi*, vol. 2, 35.
205 Lee, *Special Duties*, 8.
206 Akyaz, *Askerî Müdahalelerin Orduya Etkisi*, 35 – 36.

command was aware that the French army also assisted the former enemy on the other shore of the Aegean Sea.[207]

The first inofficial 'head' of the German army officers was Wilhelm von Klewitz (1872–1928). His employment resembled that of Hans Tröbst. Despite being a distinguished artillery colonel, Klewitz did not receive a position in the Reichswehr. He had joined the Freikorps Hülsen as Chief of Staff and later another Freikorps against the Communist uprise in Saxony in 1924, where he "established order."[208] Among the German officers he proposed to the Turkish embassy were Admiral Magnus von Levetzow, a participant in the Kapp-Lüttwitz putsch in 1920.[209] Levetzow himself was not interested in the position, but he advised the Turkish ambassador, Kemaleddin Sami, to get in contact with other German navy officers who might have had an interest in working for the Turkish military academy.[210] However, none of those candidates were chosen by the Turkish diplomats.

Wilhelm von Klewitz signed his two-year contract with the Turkish embassy in August 1925. However, the contract could be terminated by the Turkish side should the Turkish-German diplomatic relations become strained. The German signee had to respect the Turkish military law and his superiors and had to wear civilian clothing. Yet the foreign instructor was also entitled to the military health care system and held the status of an officer.[211] An additional monthly salary of 400 Turkish Lira made the employment conditions quite appealing. Even though the German officers had no power of command over their Turkish students, they were far better off than at home, where they had no possibility of working in a military related sector. In Turkey there was "[...] a wide range of constitutive military activity, the possibility to test anything new in the military-technological field and not least, an enthusiastic recognition of his merits for the Turkish army [...]"[212]

Turkey was only restricted budgetwise but free of armamement prohibitions since the Lausanne Treaty. Nonetheless, the army was in need of updated in-

207 Charles Personnaz, "Les Mission Militaires Françaises en Grèce après la Première Guerre Mondiale, 1918–1928," in *Les Relations Militaires Franco-Grecques: De la Restauration à la Seconde Guerre Mondiale*, ed. Rémy Porte and Abdil Bicer (Vincennes: Service Historique de la Défense, 2007), 102–115.

208 Fr. Wilhelm Schallehu, *Wilhelm von Klewitz zum Gedächtnis* (N.p., n.pl.: c. 1928), 3. For his service in 1919 see Gumbel, *Vier Jahre politischer Mord*, 102, No. 4.

209 Gumbel, *Vier Jahre politischer Mord*, 105, no.1.

210 See the exchange of letters between Levetzow and Klewitz in the summer of 1925. BA-MA 239/66.

211 BA-MA 239/66, 34.

212 Schallehu, *Wilhelm von Klewitz zum Gedächtnis*, 3.

structions that stayed abreast of the wartime changes. For this reason, the distinguished German staff officers were hired. The head of the Turkish General Staff, General Fevzi [Çakmak], explained to the German military attaché that the Turkish army had to hire Klewitz and other German specialists, "since the artillery and engineer branches were exclusively based on German service regulations.[213] By the sending of experienced men in the conduct of the 'German way of war', the Turkish military academy courses were not restricted to dry theory. It was the fundament for realistic operational lessons. However, these courses could also resemble ex-cathdrea teaching in order to educate young officers in a desired direction. A retired German officer commented the following way on the use of World War One veterans in the Wehrmacht:

> "It is not taught how it should have been done, but how the leaders and the soldiers [...] knew how to defeat the enemy brilliantly and how they knew to die back then. [...] Every student has to nail his colours to the mast, is nailed down to a firm decision. [...] This kind of lesson imparts all of the real knowledge onto the officer of the new army which he needs as a set of tools to go to war unprejudiced, as all of us did in 1914 to keep a whole world of enemies in check and on edge for four long years."[214]

However, teaching these type of courses took a lot of effort. Working for the Turkish military academy as a foreigner was hard earned money. Maximilian Braun, who joined Turkish service out of political persecution in 1934, stated in a letter to a friend back in Germany that he often had to work 16 hours a day:

> "Every spoken word has to be written down by me, since there is no typist [Edeltipse] available for me [...]. Each hour of presentation requires four hours of work. One has to think of every word one hundred times in his mind since one has to take the responsibility for it in front of the entire army. The word of a German specialist counts as a Bible word. God forbid if there is a contradiction! My whole annual work is immediately printed as a book and distributed for the army in all branches. It thereby becomes a training manual. Especially in my field – army motorization, armoured cars, aircraft, air defence – a tiredless study of literature of all nations is needed, which adds to my preparation of the courses. What is new today is already old by tomorrow. Well, I am content. The work absolutely fascinates me. Besides, my students participate with remarkable efforts. To catch and identify everything new, every progress is in the essence of today's Turkish people, who resemble the Japanese in many regeards. To reach Europe, even beating Europe is the order of the day! And they are right from the point of their commendable, correct national attitude. If I can contribute to make [the Turkish military] a bit more Germany oriented then 'my exile' is not in vane."[215]

213 Nadolny to the Foreign Office, 14 February 1925. AA-PA R 78561.

214 Badinski, "Die Aufgaben unserer kriegsgeschichtlichen Forschung," 1419.

215 Maximilian Braun's letter to Gerhard Böhme, 17 April 1935. BayHStA IV OP 61432, 2–3.

The courses mentioned by Braun were intense for both sides. In all the classes, a Turkish interpreter, in many cases older officers who had served in the German army before 1914, translated sentence by sentence for the students. This also led to the young generation of Turkish staff officers getting used to the German language from the very beginning.[216]

During his three years of service, Wilhelm von Klewitz also wrote a dozen instruction books about strategy and general staff service.[217] However, he also gathered military related informations and sent reports to Germany on a regular basis. In 1926 Klewitz described the General Staff excursion to the Turkish straits, where the possibilities of modern defense against future invasions by sea were evaluated. Klewitz studied the combined arms warfare of navy and airforce, a neglected topic in the German army and navy due to aramament restrictions. This was also a great opportunity to advise the Turkish staff officers to acquire German Junkers A20 airplanes for aerial reconnaissance. Klewitz suggested that the Junkers representatives should use this maneuver as a sales argument, but should not mention his name. Regarding his journey to inner Anatolia Klewitz pointed to the mountainous areas and the need for more specialized mountain infantry and for (German made) machine guns.[218] With regard to the question of uniforms, German instructors had found a good compromise. On a photograph depicting Klewitz and the naval instructor Admiral Ernst von Gagern (1878–1954), both men wore uniform-like clothes.[219]

For the year 1927 another report is traceable, most likely written by Klewitz. From the insight gained during the General Staff journey in Anatolia the author stated:

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216 Kocatürk, *Bir Subayın Anıları*, 81.

217 Kleviç, *Tabiye: Harp Akademisi 3. Sınıf* [Strategy: 3rd Year of the War Academy], 2 vols. (Istanbul: Erkân-ı Harbiye Mektebi Matbaası, 1926); Kleviç, *Erkân-ı Harbiye Vezâifi* [General Staff Service], (Istanbul: Erkân-ı Harbiye Mektebi Matbaası, 1926); Kleviç, *Üçüncü Sene Tedrisatına Aid Demiryolu Harb Oyunu* [Military Railway (War) Game for the 3rd Year Grades] (Istanbul: Erkân-ı Harbiye Mektebi Matbaası, 1927); both published in new editions every year. See also Kleviç and Süleyman, *Harp Akademisi Üçüncü Senede Von Kleviç Bey'in Tabiye Tedrisatına Aid Geri Hidmeti Konferansları* [Rear Services Conference: Belonging to the Strategy Course by Mr. Klewitz in the War Acdemy; 3rd year] (Istanbul: Askerî Akademiler Kumandanlığı Matbaası, 1928).

218 Klewitz's report to Levetzow, 19 May 1926. BA-MA 239/66, 88–90. It remains unclear if this report was only intended for armament sales by Levetzows network in Germany or if another copy was also delivered to the *Reichswehr*.

219 Cf. Askeri Müze F 572: Klewitz in riding boots and breeches and his patch pocket jacket with the flat cap resembling the Turkish army's officers dress. Admiral von Gagern had adapted to the Turkish navy officer's uniform with his captain's cap *(Prinz Heinrich-Mütze)* and the dark double-breasted navy blazer.

> "[I]n the tone of command there is still some schematism and pendantism visible, according to the French example [...] [however, some Turkish commanders] demanded the more free German procedure with its harsh drive for offensive. [...] The foreign instructors enjoy confidence. Admittedly in the Orient nobody is safe from intrigues. It is absolutely wrong to state that the Turkish offcers believe they know everything and [could] disrepect and disallow the foreigner. The one who writes things like that has no idea of the modern Turkish [army's] mind."[220]

Regarding those reports, Nadolny was correct when he stated that Klewitz had served the German cause in Turkey.[221] The Turkish-German military cooperation was by no means a one-way road, in contrast to the arguments put forth by previous research.[222] For Germany, sending retired officers as instructors to Turkey was an opportunity to maintain German influence and gather information on the development of Turkish warfare capabilities. German military regulations were accepted by most of the Turkish students because the prestige of the German army remained high.[223]

After Klewitz' sudden death in 1928, General Robert Bührmann (1879 – 1940) became the main person of contact for the German authorities. The General was careful to avoid disturbing the good relations with the Turkish General Staff. He rejected retired German officers who tried to gain employment in the Turkish army under false pretenses.[224] However, the world economic crisis also affected the Turkish state and resulted in a temporary reduction in the salaries of German instructors.[225] For this and other reasons, Bührmann did not extend his contract with the Turkish state.[226] The Turkish army requested a new German staff officer with experience in conducting army corps' and bigger formation's operations and, if possible, had a personality similar to the "very successful Kleviç Bey."[227] Fortunately, a Bavarian General nearing the end of his career agreed to the Turkish terms.

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220 Anonymous, *Progresses in the Turkish Army*. Nadolny to Foreign Ministry, 17 April 1927. AA-PA R 30649: K017199- K017201. Due to wartime fire damage, not all parts of this report were readable.

221 Schallehu, *Wilhelm von Klewitz zum Gedächtnis*, n.p.

222 Mangold-Will, *Begrenzte Freundschaft*, 375.

223 Çelikoğlu, *Bir Darbeci Subayın Anıları*, 41.

224 Bührmann to Reichswehr Minstery via the Istanbul Embassy, 30 Janauary 1930. AA-PA R 78562.

225 For the reduction by 10 per cent see Tucher, Istanbul Embassy, to the Foreign Ministry for Reichswehr Ministry, 18 May 1932. AA-PA R 78562.

226 Bührmann to the Reichswehr Minister, General von Schleicher, 25 April 1932. BA-MA N 42/86, 113 – 113a.

227 Turkish embassy in Berlin to the German Foreign Ministry, 3 August 1932. AA-PA R 78562.

The Mittelberger Era, 1933 – 1939

Hilmar Ritter von Mittelberger arrived in Istanbul at the end of February in 1933. The retired General admitted that he had no real idea of the conditions in Turkey. His knowledge was solely based on conversations with German officers who had been in Ottoman service as well as on reading the scarce literature available on the Republic of Turkey in German language. The reading of these books also had an influence on the selection of the title for his memoirs third volume. It was a reference to Otto Liman von Sander's *Five Years in Turkey*.[228] The expectations on the Turkish side were high. Besides his teaching obligations at the military academy, Mittelberger was also asked to proofread internal memoranda and Turkish service regulations. In his memoirs he depicts his initial difficulties in acculturation:

> "The peculiarities of the foreign country, the lack of knowledge of the foreign language, the mentality of the Turkish people, different from us Germans, created difficulties in the beginning of my occupation. In order to handle them I not only needed a lot of time but also a high degree of energy and strong nerves. [...] [In the classroom the] interpreter had to be familiar with the matter and mentally, above average intellect in order to quickly capture the ideas in tactics and strategy that were often not easy to grasp, and express them in his language."[229]

His familiarization phase was eased by the assistance of a personal interpreter. Mittelberger was glad that the Turkish Captain Salih [Erkuş] was at his disposal for translational tasks. From 1911 to 1913, Salih had served in a Prussian infantry regiment and thus spoke fluent German. Mittelberger and Erkuş were on good terms and stayed in contact after 1939. Even though it contributed to his workload and served the schematism of the Turkish military, the Bavarian General was the proud author of about fifty Turkish textbooks, many of which were even reprinted after his return to Germany.[230] Mittelberger also tried to stimulate the development of new Turkish service regulations, but this was not achievable:

> "German military service instructions dominated the education of the Turkish army, some of their parts were adopted literally. This situation led to misunderstandings. The spirit of the service instructions was not really captured in some cases, a quite comprehensible phenomenon. A military regulation has to have national character and has to be adopted to the

228 Mittelberger, "Wanderer in vier Welten," vol. 3, 9. Bay HStA IV Kriegsarchiv HS 2710. The last volume of his memoirs bore the subtitle "6 1/2 Jahre Türkei".

229 Mittelberger, "Wanderer in vier Welten," vol. 3, 12.

230 Mittelberger,"Wanderer in vier Welten," vol. 3, 18 and for the schematism problem also ibid., 26. See Mittelberger, *Üçüncü Sınıf Tabiye Arazi Meseleleri* [*Field Tactics Tasks for the Third Grade*], trans. Asım Eren (Istanbul: Harp Akademisi Basımevi, 1940).

peculiarities of the people. My suggestion to write Turkish weapon and combat regulations based on German principles, undertaken by a commission where also the German instructors were to be represented, was not carried out."[231]

Figure 10: Portrait of Hilmar Ritter von Mittelberger, c. 1940

Regarding the problem of the general validity of German military knowledge Mittelberger had made an important point. To take, for instance, the Turkish service regulation as a basis for the education of the infantry highlights the challenges of adaptating German values to the Turkish environment. In the Turkish regulation, there were several small adaptations to the Turkish conditions. The status of military service was elevated to a service of national honor similarly to the introduction of regulations in the Wehrmacht. The soldier's highest aim was to serve the nation's right to live and to protect its territory.[232] While the family

231 Mittelberger, "Wanderer in vier Welten," vol.3, 30.

232 However, there were semantic differences. See the German ideological term *"Lebensraum"* which referred to more than the national territory. In Turkish *"yaşadığı yurdu"* means the native country where the soldier lives. Anonymous, *Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Infanterie (A.V.I.); H. Dv. 130/1; vol 1: Leitsätze für Erziehung und Ausbildung* (Berlin: Verlag der Reichsdruckerei, 1936), 5; note the same page number in: Anonymous, *Piyade Talimnamesi (P. Ta.); vol. 1: Talim ve Ter-*

and school as the primary stages for national and patriotic education were not mentioned in the German original, they played a prominent role in the Turkish text. The role of discipline and other soldierly values in both texts were quite similar. Though, regarding the independent (*"selbständig"/"müstakil"*) thinking and decision-making process there were deficies in the Turkish daily service.[233] Through his General Staff journeys to Anatolian garrisons and daily observations in Istanbul, Mittelberger assessed the state of Turkish reforms the following way:

> "The Turk is a master of improvisation. It seemed to me that his sense for the arduous organizing according to a plan has not yet been developed. [...] Also, the awareness to bring decisions and measures of military action into the right balance of time and space needed intense facilitation."[234]

Besides his official obligations, the Bavarian General found time to dedicate himself to other activities. Mittelberger did not keep much distance from the National Socialist regime, even though his daughter later stated that her father "had not even served a day under Hitler."[235] After he had settled down in Istanbul, Mittelberger became affiliated with the local NSDAP group. In his memoirs, he claimed that he and other older Germans joined the Nazi party because some younger members caused public éclats with their uncontrolled appearance.[236] For Mittelberger, joining this right-wing circle was part of his representative duties abroad. He kept quiet about the Antisemite propaganda of the NSDAP members.[237] However, he had helped the presecuted Maximilian Braun in finding an occupation on his staff, and he appreciated the German emigrants in Istanbul, at least in hindsight:

> "Those doctors, whether 'Aryan' or only 'partially Aryan', represented the Germanness [Deutschtum], on account of their immense knowledge and abilities, much better and with more dignity than the National Socialist propagandists."[238]

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biye ve Muharebe [Infantry Regulation vol 1: Education, Training and Combat] (Istanbul: Askerî Matbaa, 1937), 5.

233 Anonymous: *Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Infanterie* and Anonymous, *Piyade Talimnamesi*; paragraph 8 in both regulations.

234 Mittelberger, "Wanderer in vier Welten," vol. 3, 28.

235 H. Mittelberger to Hans Rothfels, 22 April 1955. IfZ München ZS 679, 1.

236 Mittelberger, "Wanderer in vier Welten," vol. 3, 79.

237 Anne Dietrich, *Deutschsein in Istanbul: Nationalisierung und Orientierung in der deutschsprachigen Community von 1843–1956* (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1998), 353–357.

238 Mittelberger, "Wanderer in vier Welten," vol. 3, 82.

On the other hand, in his memoirs Mittelberger also wrote at lenght about the comparisons between Enver Pasha's Sarıkamış and Hitler's Barbarossa debacles. However, he remained silent about similar comparisons between the fate of the Ottoman Armenians and the European Jews. In his memoirs, the only incident comparable with the deportation of the Armenians was the expulsion of the Germans from Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World War.[239] This might have also been related to the surpression and refusal to accept German crimes. Another German officer in Turkish service even returned to Germany and tried to profit from the National Socialist regime during the early rearmament period. Heinrich Ritter von Füchtbauer (1879 – 1947) resigned from his position in 1934 and joined a civil engineering office in Munich. Here, he assisted in the development of a large project, the 'Midgard Snake', which was soon to be offered to the German army.[240] After the rejection of this monstrous machine by the Reichswehr and Hitler's Chancellory (Hitler's aide even refused to have a look at the plans), full of remorse, Füchtbauer returned to Turkish service the following year.

In Istanbul the work continued as before. Mittelberger received the newest field service regulations and once even ordered some military canned food for demonstration purposes.[241] In 1935, Mittelberger and his naval counterpart, Paul Wülfing von Ditten, were ordered to establish a type of German military mission in Turkey, comprised of all German instructors in Istanbul. This was not intended as a revival of the Liman von Sanders mission. Rather, this measure was to ease coordination of German interests in Turkey. Nonetheless, Mittelberger and Wülfing were ordered to keep the Turks uninformed otherwise the Ger-

239 Mittelberger, "Wanderer in vier Welten," vol. 3, 27, 64.

240 It seems that, also among Mittelberger's staff, there were people who had problems with "the right right balance of time and space". Füchtbauer's project was born out of the idea to prevent a long stalemate like on the Western front during World War I. The 'Midgard Snake' was a more than 500 meters long armored tunnel excavator machine. Its design consisted of 77 linked up single vehicles on tracks with a built-in ropebelt conveyor and was even construed to dive under the sea. Its main purpose was an underground frontal attack on the Maginot line in France and Belgium. The 'Midgard Snake' was to drill a tunnel towards the enemy positions and lay explosive charges in order to blow up the bunkers from their weakest point. The project was dismissed by the Reichswehr since Füchtbauer could not prove his idea with accurate physical calculations. Michael Ellenbogen, "Die 'Midgard-Schlange': Verstiegenheiten eines Ingenieurs," in *Gigantische Visionen: Architektur und Hochtechnologie im Nationalsozialismus* (Graz: Ares, 2006), 117 – 122; the letter of rejection to Füchtbauer ibid. 120.

241 Reichswehr Minister to the Foreign Ministry, 24 February 1935. AA-PA R 78562.

man contracts were in threat of being terminated.[242] Both officers played an influential role in Turkish politics. İsmet İnönü invited both men for consultations on sensitive political matters several times. Wülfing von Ditten contributed to the debate about the rearmament of the straits in 1935.[243] Mittelberger even prepared a plan for the Turkish invasion of Northern Syria in 1937, on French mandate territory:

> "İsmet İnönü came to Istanbul and asked me, in a secret meeting, to prepare an operational proposal for a strategic attack on the Syrian border areas with an emphasis on the important railway knot Aleppo. He also wanted to hear my opinion about the prospects of success of such an operation. When I handed the requested operational proposal over to him, I shared my conviction that the strategic raid would succeed, since the French only had limited weak forces for the defense of the Syrian territory at hand (around three regiments). However, I underlined that I could not make proposals for further developments and that I could not take the responsibility since it could not be assumed that the French would not react on such an act of aggression with a big display of power. Therefore, the question arose if Turkey wanted and could risk war with France. İsmet İnönü agreed with me and expressed the hope to persuade the state president of the danger of such an adventure."[244]

Mittelbergers expertise might have helped to shield the Republic of Turkey from the effects of another devastating war. Finally, the argument with the French government was settled by the French yielding to the Turkish annexation of the respective Hatay province in the following year.

Several British airforce instructors were hired by the Turkish General Staff in 1938. The airforce officer training section in the military academy had been established by request of Mittelberger. However, the German Aviation Ministry refused to deploy German experts to Turkey.[245] The head of the Royal Airforce mission felt that he and his men were not welcome:

> "We met these [German] officers every day at Yildiz, but seldom on our few social occasions. Although all of them were correct in their attitude to us, only a couple or so made any attempt to be friendly. They were openly disgruntled that the Turks had chosen the Brit-

242 Blomberg to Foreign Ministry for Mittelberger and Wülfing, 23 March1935. R 78562: E692368-E692373.

243 Keller to the Foreign Ministry, 6 December 1935. ADAP Series C vol. 4 – 2, 1975, 873 – 874. On a similar meeting with the German submarine experts in 1936 cf. Tekeli and İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi*, 96.

244 Mittelberger, "Der außenpolitische Weg der neuen Türkei," Bay HStA IV HS 2710, 4 – 5.

245 Mittelberger, "Wanderer in vier Welten," vol. 3, 13.

> ish to break into their preserve at Yildiz, and were only to be more disgruntled later, when they were all recalled to Germany and replaced by Turkish officers."[246]

Lee managed to persuade the head of the Turkish General Staff that the British concept of air warfare was superior to that of the Germans. However, the RAF officer also quickly realized that there was a strong pro-German fraction within the Turkish armed forces. They thus had to "break into the pro-German anti-British front to which an influential section of the senior [Turkish] military hierarchy then adhered."[247]

Mittelberger returned to Germany in late September 1939 after he had terminated his contract with the Turkish state due to "the outbreak of war".[248] Mittelberger had made this decision, even though Hitler and the German head of staff, General Walter von Brauchitsch, had demanded to keep his position. The Turkish academy commander also had no objections against Mittelberger's continued employment.[249]

So far, we can state that the German officers during the Mittelberger era were eager for Turkish approval of the superiority of their military knowledge. However, by the late 1930s, their views were no longer undisputed. In contrast to the Ottoman times, Turkish officers even challenged the German doctrine in the presence of its representatives in front of the whole class.[250]

Mittelberger was praised by his students but the Turkish military readership was aware that his explanations of German instructions "were not objective, since its author was an expert in the German military doctrine's spirit [Alman askerî doktrini ruhu]."[251]

In republican Turkey the 'German Spirit' was not regarded as unprejudiced as it had been the case in 1914. This was also due to the developments of the debate in the Turkish military press. The Germans were not able to follow those contemporary debates without the help of their personal translators. Consequently, this perspective is missing from Mittelberger's memoirs. Hence we have to take a closer look at military periodicals in the 1930s. This analysis will be restricted to the three most 'favorite' career paths among young Turkish officers:

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246 Lee, *Special Duties*, 8.

247 Lee, *Special Duties*, 9.

248 Mittelberger, "Wanderer in vier Welten," vol. 3, 101.

249 Mittelberger, "Wanderer in vier Welten," vol. 3, 102, 104.

250 Kocatürk, *Bir Subayın Anıları*, 168.

251 Sabri Sarptır, introduction to Armand Mermet, *Alman Sevk ve İdaresi: Siegfried Taktik* [*German Tactics: The Siegfried Tactic*], trans. Sabri Sarptır (Istanbul: Asker Matbaa), 1943, 1.

> "The highest demand among the military branch of arms was for the cavalry and artillery. The infantry [...] was seen as a very tiring and difficult branch. Therefore there was low demand for this arm. The other [two higher rated branches] were more technical [...] and were in great demand since they were both motorized and mounted."[252]

Preparing for Total War: The Case of Asım Eren (1935–1939)

After the reintroduction of conscription, the Wehrmacht was one of the most appealing role model for Turkish officers. Memoirs of Turkish officer writing about their internships in the Reichswehr/Wehrmacht could not be found for this study. However, there are five articles written by Captain Asım Eren (1901–1988)[253] that describe his impressions during his stay at the Wehrmacht. Several of his statements echo those of Lieutenant Mustafa in his article from 1913. The article also contains other observations about the political and military developments during the time of Eren.

For Eren, who had spent several months in the Infantry Regiment No. 9 in Potsdam, the German army was well known to every Turkish soldier because there was a long tradition of military exchange between both countries. Eren invited his readers to study this report carefully, since "in my opinion every one of our officers can find something suitable for themself."[254] Similarly to the case of Lieutnant Mustafa more than two decades before, for the Turkish observer the institution of the German company sergeant major ("*baş gedikli*"/"*Spieß*") was remarkable. At this time, in the organization of the Turkish army, the company officer continued to fulfill most of those duties.[255] This long serving German NCO was responsible for the company's administration, inner discipline and the daily conduct of service. He also compiled the daily service schedule, which was described in detail by Eren. Obviously this kind of hour-by-hour systematic, strictly organized daily routine prepared in advance was not widespread in the Turkish armed forces. Eren then outlined the Wehrmacht's daily service

252 Çelikoğlu, *Bir Darbeci Subayın Anıları*, 31.

253 After the Greco-Turkish war, Eren had been trained in the Berlin war academy. Upon his return, he served in the Turkish war academy and in the General Staff. He retired as a colonel and was a member of the national assembly from 1957 to 1965. Cf. *TBMM Albümü* [Album of the Turkish Grand National Assembly], ed. T.C. Büyük Millet Meclisi, vol 2 (Ankara: TBMM, 2010), 744, 816.

254 Asım Eren, "Alman Ordusunda Neler Gördüm; No. 1: Bir Alman Piyade Bölüğünde Bir Günün 24 Saat Nasıl Geçer" [What I Have Seen In The German Army; No.1: How 24 Hours In A German Infantry Company Are Passing By], *PM* 10–97 (1936), 102.

255 Eren, "Alman Ordusunda Neler Gördüm. No. 1," 113.

operations from reveil early in the morning to retreat (*Zapfenstreich*) in the evening. During field training, the German officers openly criticized their fellow soldiers for every mistake. This was quite different from the rather indirect way of communicating in the Turkish (military) culture. Eren was also delighted by the goose step march in front of the commander, since this way of marching had been abolished in the republican Turkish army. Personal hygiene and daily sport exercises were also praised, since they had also become a part of daily Turkish military routine. However, Eren admitted that, contrary to the Turkish situation, 99 per cent of the German recruits were able to read and write and had at least graduated primary school.[256] The strict discipline was also visible beyond the official service hours, when the soldiers left the barracks on Sundays and returned back in time for their duty.[257] In the second part of his report, he admitted that he had begun to assess everything in the Turkish army according to German standards upon his return from his one-month internship. For Eren, there were no differences between the Turkish and German military principles. The army was shaped by its own military history and national characteristics as well as sufficient funding. According to Eren, all of these conditions were fulfilled in National Socialist Germany.[258] Pointing to the Turkish armed forces, Eren stated that a lot of things had yet to be taken care of. In quite a nationalist manner, ergo in the language of his time, he then claimed that regardless of what the Western armies would achieve, the soldiers of the Turkish race would do better.[259] With regard to Turkish deficies, Eren agreed that the Turkish nation had to improve in several areas. Quite in the spirit of Carl Diem, Eren called for more attention to sports and physical education. Just like Rahmi Apak, he pleaded for an early indoctrination of the children with national values, like in Germany. In the view of the Turkish captain, the National Socialist leadership principle, which was visible in civilian sphere and army alike, also deserved more attention.[260] Just like Lieutenant Mustafa in 1913, Eren was also delighted by the Germans who could differentiate between duty and leisure time, but yet never forgot

256 Eren, "Alman Ordusunda Neler Gördüm. No. 1," 112.
257 Eren, "Alman Ordusunda Neler Gördüm. No. 1," 115.
258 Asım Eren, "Alman Ordusunda Neler Gördüm. No.2: Sistemler Arasında Fark Var Mı?" [What I have seen in the German Army. No. 2: Is There a Difference between the Systems?], *AM* 54 – 100 (1936), 149 – 152.
259 Eren, "Alman Ordusunda Neler Gördüm. No.2," 153.
260 Eren, "Alman Ordusunda Neler Gördüm. No.2," 154 – 155.

to observe discipline and punctuality.[261] Thus the Turkish nation had all the prerequisites for forming a modern army. It merely had to adapt some small things from the German system.

In his third article, Eren concentrated on his impressions from a heavy machine gun company field exercise. For this purpose, he directly quoted the speech of the German instructor (8th company of the Infantry Regiment 67) in Berlin-Spandau. In doing so, Eren intended to give a kind of compendium for Turkish drill instructors.[262]

Eren's last sentence hinted at the reality in the German infantry by quoting the company commander: "This my dear Eren is my principle. The more I make the soldiers occupied and tired the better it is for me and them!"[263] The Turkish guest held the German army in high esteem and ignored the downside of the partially unhuman drill. In some Wehrmacht infantry units, the recruits were bullied and broken down psychologically.[264] Moreover, the army ascribed to the racist policy of the National Socialist regime. Soldiers of 'Non-Aryan' decent, mainly officers, were excluded from the armed forces in 1934. Active soldiers were not allowed to marry women whose 'Aryan' pedigree was uncertain.[265] In his excitement for the German army, Eren turned a blind eye to this policy.[266]

However, these articles served as evidence of Eren's excellent knowledge of the German language and his admiration for the Wehrmacht. They were of limited practical use in Turkish barracks.[267] For the Turkish military environment, a quite different approach was proposed. Contemporary considerations what other Turkish officers thought about adequate military base training deserve a closer look. According to one officer, soldiers had to be treated with care and should

261 Eren, "Alman Ordusunda Neler Gördüm. No.2," 156 – 157. The astonishment at those lines is comparable to Lieutenant Mustafa's amazement; cf. Mustafa, "Alman Ordu'da Müşahedatım," 386 – 387.

262 Asim Eren, "Alman Ağır Makinalıtüfek Bölüğünde Bir Tatbikat Günü" [A Maneuver Day in a German Heavy Machine Gun Company], *PM* 12 – 101 (1937), 35 – 54.

263 Eren, "Alman Ağır Makinalıtüfek Bölüğünde Bir Tatbikat Günü." 54.

264 Hans Joachim Schröder, "'Man kam sich da vor wie ein Stück Dreck.' Schikane in der Militärausbildung des Dritten Reichs," in *Der Krieg des kleinen Mannes: Eine Militärgeschichte von unten*, ed. Wolfram Wette (Munich: Piper, 1992), 183 – 198.

265 Absolon, *Die Wehrmacht im Dritten Reich*, vol. 1, 154.

266 Yet "[...]it is safe to suggest that the sympathies of many Turkish officers lay with the German approach to national and military preparation, even if they did not necessarily agree with the details of the Nazi ideology." Sencer, *Order and Insecurity in Germany and Turkey*, 63.

267 See the much more practical guidance in Tevfik, "Talim ve Terbiyede Buldurma Usulü" [The 'let-the-soldier-find-out-the-right-answer-himself' Method in Training and Education], *PM* 10 – 91 (1934), 18 – 35.

slowly get used to the shouting of orders.[268] There were also more radical suggestions. A forceful language should be used to impress the farmer boys from the provinces, right from the first day of their military service. For Cavalry General Kemal, military service was a golden opportunity to indoctrinate the uneducated rural population that would disseminate its knowledge after they leave the military. The General was also not reluctant to propose fabricated religious slogans to encourage and motivate young men: "[Islamic] religion says that a soldier standing guard for one hour will be rated higher by Allah than one thousand years of ritual prayer."[269] Military virtues such as love for the nation and service, brevity, camaraderie and the refusal to desert (which was against the soldier's honour and pride; *"namus ve şeref"*), had to be inculated in the men during instruction. The republican system, with its right to vote and its duties, like the provision of education for the children, should also be mentioned. Keeping the people illiterate was seen as treason of the Ottoman sultans, since "the human being comes close to humanity by studying, by staying uneducated close to the animal."[270] The republican reforms were identified as positive, whereas General Kemal suggested seeing the dynasty of the Ottomans as enemies of the people during military instruction classes. Contrary to this view, the national savior, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, was to be praised for his deeds. The officers had to tell their fellow soldiers that in the republic everybody could be elected president: "If he works, my son and also your son can become the prime minister and even the president!"[271] Colmar von der Goltz would have certainly enjoyed the Turkish General's reference to the German concept of the 'nation in arms'. During the war against Greece, everybody, including the female part of the population had participated in the national struggle for independence. As a result, everyone should be fearless and ready for total war: "[Even] if the enemy troops, canons, strength is bigger than ours we have our God [Allah] and our belief, we will not be daunted."[272] All of those messages had to be thumped into the soldiers. Kemal concluded his article with some suggestions for basic training. As it becomes evident from this example, the Turkish army was one pillar of na-

268 Sait Ziya, "Talimcilik, Terbiyecilik" [Education, Instruction], *SM* 7 – 85 (1933), 26 – 30.

269 This sentence was obviously inspired by the Turkish saying "Bir doğru saat, yetmiş sene namazdan değerli" ("One hour of prevailing justice is more valuable than seventy years of ritual prayer"); M. Kemal [Balıkesir?], "Askere Verilecek Dersler" [Lessons for the Soldier], *SM* 7 – 91 (1933), 42.

270 M. Kemal, "Askere verilecek dersler," 47.

271 M. Kemal, "Askere Verilecek Dersler," 48.

272 M. Kemal, "Askere Verilecek Dersler," 51.

tion building in the early Republic. In this case, the applicability of German military knowledge had reached a limit.

Critical Turkish responses to Eren's article could not be found. In 1937 he published a fourth essay about the Turkish applicability of several military tactics he had witnessed during maneuvers in Germany. Eren assumed that Germany developed highly effective combined-arms armored capabilities to defeat the enemy within short time. He warned his readership to prepare the Turkish state for this kind of conflict. Eren presented the mining of the infrastructure and important strategic points as the only way to stop the fast advancing enemy with his armored spearhead. Eren gave a detailed proposal of this type of warfare and stated:

> "Dynamite, cable, machine gun and the tank canons ... those are the four interlocked corresponding means of work in the future war ... Glad is the army which prepares all of those things in its own country, in its own factories and turns the whole frontier into an impassable field of thorns!"[273]

In October 1939 Captain Asım Eren wrote a fifth article in which he compared the German and the Turkish army. According to Eren, the Turkish army had proven its superior combat value in the victorious battles of the First World War and during the war with Greece. Eren stressed that this article was no adulation of the German army: "It is not recommended to imitate the Germans one hundred per cent."[274] However, there were good things that the Turkish army could learn from the Germans. Most of the article simply repeated ideas from his second article from 1936. Eren underlined the need to form an army based on Turkish military thought, since German principles were only useful in their country of origin. Turkey had to "free itself from foreign fundamentals of leadership and from its [foreign] specialists [...]. Those spending their time imitating [foreign military culture] have to know that they will always lag behind."[275]

One of those imitators was the author of a pictorial instruction manual. Captain Salâhattin İnan had translated the German special edition of the aforementioned *Wrong!/Right!* series. The booklet was published with the consent of the

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273 Asim Eren, "Zayıf Ordular için Manialama Birlikleri Sevk ve İdarenin En Kuvvetli Vasıtalarından Biridir; Son Alman Manevralarından Alınan Dersler" [For Weak Armies: The Blocking Units are one of the strongest Means of Conduct; Lessons drawn from the last German Maneuvers], *AM* 55–106 (1937), 489–507.

274 Asım Eren, "Alman Ordusunda Talim ve Terbiye Usullerimizle Mukayesesi" [Comparison of the Training and Education Methods in the German Army with Ours], *AM* 57–115 (1939), 1039–1066.

275 Eren, "Alman Ordusunda Talim ve Terbiye Usullerimizle Mukayesesi," 1066.

Turkish General Staff and contained infanteristic lessons from the World War from the German *Kriegskunst* periodical.[276] Each combat situation was accompanied by one illustration by the military painter Herbert Knötel ('the younger'; 1893 – 1963). Whereas the 'right' side always depicted soldiers in German uniforms, the 'wrong' side concentrated on troops dressed in French style. İnan did not change anything and only added Turkish captations to the pictures. He did not even translate the pictures' speech balloons. In one picture on page 90, for example, the German *"Long live Germany!"* was left in place, only to be translated in the caption as *"Long live Turkey!"*. The booklet's degree of esteem among the Turkish officers was rather dubious even though it could help with educating the analphabets among the soldiers.

8.
Vorn ist die Hölle!
Es lebe Deutschland!
Geriye hareket eden yaralı askerler cepheye giden arkadaşlarına çesaretlerini kıracak sözler söylerse vatanına hiyanet etmis olrrlar.
(İlerisi yanıyor.)
Türk yaralı askerleri cepheye giren arkadaşlarına daima cesaret vermiye çalışırlar.
(Yaşa Türkiye)

Figure 11: 'German Spirit' par excellence: A Turkish 1938 infantry field service regulation based on a German 1930 pamphlet. Most probably the left picture referred to the panic among German troops at the West front on 8 August 1918. The 'undesired' behavior is described as follows in the left picture's caption: "If returning wounded soldiers tell discouraging words to their fellow soldiers marching to the front they commit treason against the fatherland. (The front is burning)" Therefore on the right the soldiers were instructed to behave as follows: "Wounded Turkish soldiers will always try to cheer up their fellow soldiers marching off to the front. (Long live Turkey)."

276 German original under the title *Bilderreihen Falsch!/Richtig!*, ed. Kriegskunst in Wort und Bild (Berlin: Verlag Offene Worte, 1931). Turkish translation: Salâhattin İnan, *Resimle ve Sözle Muharebe* [*Combat in Words and Pictures*] (Istanbul: Hüsnütabiat Basımevi, 1938).

It was published at a time, when the Turkish army had already begun to produce such instruction manuals for potential combat situations, including the correct behavior of soldiers during breaks and rest periods.[277] Turkish authors could include specific acts of misconduct that were more common among the Turkish forces than in the German army. One example was the order not to leave behind any waste, since in Iraq during World War One, the British cavalry had been able to find Ottoman infantry units by following the trail of garbage they left behind them.[278]

The Turkish Artillery and Cavalry in an Age of Rapid Advances in Military Technology

The Turkish army had also evaluated French wartime experiences. After the defense experience in the last phase of World War One and the war with Greece, the French view was more appealing. In the 1920s, several dozen Turkish officers were sent to France for advanced military education or short internships, in order to counter the strong sympathizers of German military thought. The report of artillery captain İsmail contained a detailed account of the battle of Verdun, including the bloody fight for the fortresses between French and German troops. The report captured the destructive potential of modern ordnance.[279] The battle remained a source of inspiration for the way large artillery operations were conducted in the Turkish artillery corps.[280] The Turkish military leadership drew other lessons from this stalemate than the French government. A Maginot line was not feasible due to the limited Turkish budget. In addition, the Turkish president himself was not convinced about this kind of warfare:

> "Let me insist that I don't believe in the benefits of such a line. [...] A force that is placed like moles under the earth, in beton tubes or in armored towers, must count as a force that is deprived from war beforehand. I do not know what else other than defeat in war can be won by annihilating one's own maneuverability."[281]

277 Bedevi, "Molalarda Er" [The Soldier during Breaks], *PM* 11–97 (1936), 52–55.
278 Bedevi, "Molalarda Er," 53.
279 İsmail, "Fransa'da Topçu Yüzbaşı İsmail Efendi'nin Raporları" [Reports of Artillery Captain İsmail Efendi in France], in *Avrupa'da Tahsilde Bulunan Zabitlerin Raporları*, ed. T.C. Erkân-ı Harbiye Ummumiye Riyaseti. Vol. 14 (Ankara: Erkân-ı Harbiye Ummumiye Matbaası, 1928), 158–161.
280 Kemal Kocer, "Yüksek Topçu Okulu: Verdün" [Verdun: An Academy for the Artillery], *TM* 17–105 (1937), 32–45.
281 Undated statement; quoted after Karal, *Atatürk'ten Düşünceler*, 114.

The Turkish artillery had to gain mobility to guarantee a flexible defense of Thrace and the Anatolian mainland. One of the first major studies on the development of the artillery since 1918 was a mere comparison of the French and German arsenal. The mixture of different canons from various countries was seen as a big obstacle to future Turkish warfare, as had become evident from the war against Greece. Supply and maintenance were difficult due to the conglomeration of all sorts of calibers and spare parts.[282] Turkey had no need for many heavy artillery units, since they were cost-intensive and the neighbor countries had no border fortifications. However, some mobile heavy artillery units could be useful in shore defense.[283] As to the conduct of modern artillery, Brigadier General Emin referred to the old Ottoman 1913 artillery regulation that had contained translations of both the German and French instructions. He was quite skeptical about the use of postwar regulations from both countries. The Turkish artillery should not follow the developments in both countries, but rather concentrate on the evaluation of its own war history:

> "We took major command lessons from the Great War and achieved our great victories with those lessons. Is there more brilliant evidence of the fact that we correctly chose our warfare practices and our service regulations? That being said, nobody can tell at all what tomorrow's war will be like."[284]

The situation was different for the mounted troops. In the opinion of Brigade General Baki [Vandemir], the age of the cavalry was not over. In crucial situations like the Marne battle in 1914, in Macedonia and in Palestine in 1918, the enemy had been able to attack and split up the Central Power's forces thanks to cavalry advances. The advantage of strong Turkish cavalry units had also been decisive in the war against Greece. Therefore the Turkish army was to keep in service at least three mounted divisions.[285] Baki clearly favoured the German Reichswehr as a role model for a cavalry field regulation: "Due to the fact that military service lasts 12 years [in the Reichswehr], this not only changed the

282 A. Besim, "Cihan Tecarübüne Göre Topçunun Teçhiz, Teslih Teşkil ve Tabiyesinde Vukua Gelen İnkilaplar ve Terakkiler" [Revolutions and Progress in the Organization, Armament, Organization and Strategy of the Artillery According to the Experiences of the World War], *TM* 5–57 (1929), 48–53; Ibid., 5–59 (1929), 2–11; Ibid., 5–60 (1929), 41–46; Ibid., 8–84 (1932), 33–47.

283 A. Besim, "Cihan Tecarübüne Göre," *TM* 5–59 (1929), 4.

284 K. Emin, "Alman ve Fransız Muharebe Usulleri, Atış Kaideleri, Aralarındaki Farklar ve Biz" [German and French Combat Customs, Fire Regulations and their Differences and We], *TM* 9–91 (1933), 15.

285 Baki, "Gelecek Harplerde Süvari (1)" [The Cavalry in Future Wars (1)], *AM* 49–79 (1931), 77.

structure of German army training and education, but we also need to examine it in more depth for our army."[286]

For this purpose, among other books, the standard work by the Reichswehr Cavalry Inspector-General, Georg Brandt (1876–1945), was translated into Turkish.[287] In a review of the book, cavalry Captain Rahmi compared the explanations of the German cavalry expert to the Turkish cavalry regulations. For the Turkish reviewer, terrain and vegetation were quite different from the areas in Germany and Central Europe. In the case of mounted reconnaissance patrols, the examples given by Brandt were unfeasible in Anatolia "[b]ecause our borders are very long. Our roads are limited and in close area to every road there are high hills with extensive commanding views."[288] Thus Turkish reconaissance squads could easily be spotted by the enemy. However, Rahmi was against Brandt's demand to dissolve the reconnaissance cavalry units because both the Turkish experience in the war against Greece and the French cavalry field regulation refuted this view.[289]

The Turkish army did not only look for assistance and advice in printed German sources. The Anatolian horse breed was small and agile and thus sufficient for the cavalry, but not strong enough for towing supply and artillery.[290] Hence in 1935 the Turkish Ministry of War intended to buy horses from Germany.[291] In the same year the Turkish Cavalry Inspector-General Mürsel Bakü announced his visit to Germany. Bakü had served in the German army with the Kassel Hussars Regiment No. 14 between 1910 and 1912.[292] The German Foreign Ministry urged the German army to welcome Bakü in order facilitate the purchase of horses. The Wehrmacht cavalry school in Hannover was encouraged to organize "a reunion with his old regiment's fellows, to whom he had lost contact over the course

286 Baki, "Gelecek Harplerde Süvari (2)" [The Cavalry in Future Wars (2)], *AM* 49–80 (1931), 228.

287 Georg Brandt, *Moderne Kavallerie: Betrachtungen über ihre Verwendung, Führung, Organisation und Ausbildung* (Berlin: Mittler, 1931). Turkish translation under the title *Asrî Süvari: İstihdami, Sevki, Teşkilatı ve Talim ve Terbiyesi Hakkında Mülahazalar.* trans. Sami Sabit. (Istanbul: Askerî Matbaa, 1932).

288 Rahmi, "Asrî Süvari Kitabı Hakkında Bazi Düşünceler" [Some Thoughts about the Book 'Modern Cavalry'], *AM* 50–87 (1932), 581.

289 Rahmi, "Asrî Süvari Kitabı Hakkında Bazi Düşünceler," 583.

290 Tekeli and İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi*, 108.

291 German cart horse breeding association to German Foreign Ministry, 28 March 1935. PA-AA R 78569, n.p.

292 Bakü's service time in the German army lasted from 15 September 1910 to 25 September 1912. Milli Savunma Bakanlığı Arşivi, Personal File Bakü Sicil No. 1316–7.

of the years."[293] Since Bakü was interested in hiring a German cavalry instructor for the Turkish army and wanted to send two Turkish cavalry officers to Hannover, this visit would require special attention. During his meeting with the German ambassador, Bakü had induldged himself in his time in Kassel:

> "[Bakü's] sincere love and admiration for Germany can only be of use for shaping the German-Turkish military relations. [..] [The commander in Hannover should] arrange a small festivity, invite old comrades of the General and show him some drill exercises. Here [in Turkey], as is well-known, he is the Inspector-General of the cavalry, not the first that comes along."[294]

Even though the German horse breeding farms could not sell many horses to Turkey due to the German rearmament program, Bakü's visit showed the high significance of the German relations with the Turkish armed forces.[295] As it has become evident through the course of this study, also in this case, the service time of Ottoman officers in the Imperial German army was one of the cornerstones of this special relationship.

In the Turkish cavalry there had also been a French instructor. Albert Tauton taught in the Turkish cavalry school at the beginning of the 1930s.[296] Towards the end of this decade, French and later also German ideas on motorization and mechanization found their way into Turkish military periodicals. The future of Turkish cavalry was discussed the following way:

> "Should we, instead of such a [conventional] cavalry, raise its effectiveness to the highest degree possible and increase the fire power, and strengthen it with motorized units and

293 Ambassador Rosenberg to the Foreign Ministry, 19 May 1935. PA-AA R78553.

294 Embassy Ankara Fabricius to the Foreign Ministry, 20 May 1935. PA-AA R78553.

295 Germany even had to purchase animals from Hungary to satisfy the growing needs. Richard L. Di Nardo, *Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism? Horses and the German Army of World War II* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 12.

296 Taton, "Süvari ve Binicilik Mektebimizde Tedris Edilmekte Olan Binicilik Derslerinden Atlayışa Müteallik Bir Bahis" [A debate about Showjumping from the Horse Riding Lessons in our Cavalry and Riding School], *SM* 8–81 (1932), 62–78 and Taton, "At Terbiyesi" [Horse Training], *SM* 7–91 (1933), 63–73. It is interesting to note that Albert Tauton pursued the work of Fritz Lauffer before 1914. The latter had witnessed the performance of the Turkish cavalry during the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin and was highly impressed. He stated in his memoirs that this proved "that the time before 1914 finally is overcome in Turkey and that the great leader of the Turks, Kemal Pasha, rootedly has changed the officer's conception of duty and education." Lauffer, "Erinnerungen an meine Kommandeurzeit," 10.

armored vehicles, with this branch of arms in every combat aspect, we will emerge victorious with historical significance."[297]

The Contemporary Armament Trend towards Mechanization and the Turkish (Armored) Cavalry

Motorization refers to the partial equipment of the infantry or cavalry units with motor vehicles as a main means of transportation. *Mechanization* means that the entire fighting power of the unit rests on the motor, that is, on the use of armoured cars and tanks. Due to the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, Germany had no tanks and armored vehicles in its arsenal and the Reichswehr had a disproportionately high number of cavalry units. Nevertheless, the Germans used the opportunity to train an able staff of officers and soldiers within the mounted units for the future use within the proposed armored corps. Preparations began thanks to the cooperation with the Soviet army in the late 1920s.[298] Yet the Reichswehr was not a role model for Turkey in the field of a modern motorized army with a strong tank force. Turkish officers also looked to the French military press for inspiration. Although in the French army the motorization of the cavalry had gained priority in the early 1930s, this policy had been restricted because of budget cuts. According to French analysts, the cavalry bound too many soldiers for tasks such as guarding horses during combat. As a consequence, cavalry squadrons required more strength to reach the same firepower as a motorized infantry unit of comparable size. Contrary to the Turkish view, the cavalry was even seen as outdated by some French debaters.[299] Nonethelss, the cavalry remained an important army branch, resulting in the creation of six partially motorized light cavalry divisions (*division légère de cavalerie*) and two armored *divisions légères mécaniques* prior to 1939. However, they were not a match for the German tank divisions in the following year.[300] The German

297 M. Rahmi Sanalan, "Büyük Harb ve İstiklâl Harbinde, Türk Ordusu İçin, Süvari Kullanılmasından Alınan Dersler" [Lessons for the Turkish Army for the Use of Cavalry drawn from the Great War and the War of Independence], *AM* 55 – 105 (1937), 311.

298 Klaus Richter, *Die feldgrauen Reiter: Die berittenen und bespannten Truppen in Reichswehr und Wehrmacht* (Stuttgart: Motorbuch, 1986), 84 – 86.

299 Pierre-Henri Delorge, "Pourquoi Avoir Gardé Une Cavalerie à Cheval (1918 – 1939)?," *Guerres Mondiales et Conflits Contemporains* 225 (2007), 27, 29 – 30.

300 Daniel Marc Segesser, "Nur keine Dummheiten: Das französische Offizierskorps und das Konzept des totalen Krieges," in *An der Schwelle zum Totalen Krieg: Die militärische Debatte über den Krieg der Zukunft, 1919 – 1939*, ed. Stig Förster (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2002), 136 – 137.

army had concentrated on the development of mobile units since the early 1920s. Even though the abolishment of the cavalry was frequently debated in the German military periodicals, the terrain conditions at the Eastern border demanded mounted troops. The Reichswehr and Wehrmacht skipped the step of creating mixed mounted, motorized and mechanized units. The German armored divisions were fully motorized, whereas the majority of the infantry and cavalry units did not have motor vehicles well into the Second World War.[301] For the aforementioned Cavalry Inspector-General Mürsel [Bakü], every country had to find its own solution, whether it was the use of a fully motorized army or a partially motorized and partially mounted army. Mürsel remarked that both, Germany and Turkey had to import motor fuel, which could paralyse the motorized army in the case of a blockade.[302] The Turkish debate, in the following years, was marked by translations from German, French, Belgian and British military periodicals. The German rearmament programme received utmost admiration, although its adaptation to Turkish conditions was not considered. The Turkish observers were well aware that Germany could not sustain a longer war in its present military state.[303] However, Turkish military periodicals did not question the German propaganda tale of the motorized Wehrmacht. As indicated above, the German industrial capacities were not sufficient to supply enough motor vehicles for military use. During the fast armament period in the 1930s, the majority of the Wehrmacht, consisting of 36 divisions, had to rely on horses. Despite all the efforts by the military and the National Socialist regime, 90 per cent of the German army was still not motorized by 1940.[304] The Turkish analysts also favored the use of animals for supply transport. This had been a valuable and well functioning system during the war against Greece; a quite logical solution for an agraricultural country. In peacetime, the supply units had to be prepared.[305] The sceptical Turkish view of the cavalry was also fuelled by lessons

301 Markus Pöhlmann, "Von Versailles nach Armageddon: Totalisierungserfahrung und Kriegserwartung in deutschen Militärzeitschriften," in *An der Schwelle zum Totalen Krieg: Die militärische Debatte über den Krieg der Zukunft, 1919 – 1939,* ed. Stig Förster (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2002), 360 – 366.

302 Mürsel [Bakü], "Süvarinin Büsbütün Motörlenmesi Hakkında Yeni Fikirler ve Tecrüberler" [New Ideas and Thoughts on the Total Motorization of the Cavalry], *SM* 7 – 91 (1933), 8.

303 S. Öge, "Motörlenmiş ve Makinalaşmış Alman Ordusunun Kıymeti Nedir?" [What is the Value of the Motorized and Mechanized German Army?], *AM* 55 – 105 (1937), 329 – 337.

304 Di Nardo, *Mechanized juggernaut*, 6 – 15; Karl-Heinz Frieser, *Blitzkrieg-Legende: Der Westfeldzug 1940*, 4th ed. (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012), 35.

305 Hüsnü Göktuğ, "Asrî Ordularda Motörlesme- Motörlü Birlikler- İkmal Nakliyatı- Motörlü ve Canlı Nakliyat İkmal Kolları (2)" [Motorization in Modern Armies: Motor Corps Units- Supply Transport- Mounted and Motorized Supply Transport Units (2)], *TM* 13 – 109 (1938), 110 – 117.

from the First World War, even though the worth of an armored spearhead was acknowledged: "Had the Germans deployed a mechanized cavalry brigade at the Western front in 1914 after the battle of Charleroi, they would have decisively forced the British to withdraw and would have conquered the region of Paris within 48 hours, without any resistance."[306]

Based on Turkish maneuver experiences in Thrace, the participants of the debate on motorization came to different conclusions. The poor Turkish road conditions limited the use of trucks at the frontline, whereas the cavalry could access any terrain. Mounted units were still needed to cover the gaps between armored and motorized units. This view by a cavalry officer concluded with references to German and French experts.[307] The essay was repudiated by a tank officer. In modern armies the cavalry had no chance in combat when it encountered an armored enemy. Thus the Turkish cavalry units had to be disbanded in the future, since tank tracks were superior to horse hooves. If Turkey was to be defended against a modern armed enemy, its own armed forces had to be equipped accordingly.[308]

Motorization of the Turkish armed forces in the 1930s was hampered mainly by two factors. Firstly, the underdeveloped infrastructure diminished the full accessibility of the whole country; a view that was also confirmed by Maximilian Braun. For the Bavarian officer, the horseback journeys of the Turkish General Staff in the Anatolian hinterland had opened his eyes: "Mountains higher than 2800 meters, deep valleys, steep small gorges and broad heathland confirmed my view. No engine is designed to endure these long roads."[309] Secondly, financial burdens prevented a massive import of motor vehicles for the army. The trucks from Germany, France, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union could only be procured in small numbers, not to speak of the even more expensive Praga

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For the nationwide registration of animals see Tekeli and İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi*, 108.

306 Celal Ergun, "Süvarinin Makineleşmesine Doğru" [Towards the Mechanization of the Cavalry], *SM* 12–102 (1937), 45. The criticism of alleged German incompetence during the First Battle of the Marne continued unabated in the Turkish military press, cf. İskora, *Türk Ordusu Kurmaylık (Erkânıharbiye) Tarihçesi*, 72.

307 Y. Cindoruk, "Süvari ile Motorlu Vasıtalar Arasında bir Tetkik" [A Study of the Cavalry and Motorized Units], *SM* 13–105 (1938), 20–21.

308 Celal Alkoç, "Süvari ile Motorlu Vasıtalar Arasında bir Tetkik Adlı Yazı Hakkında Düşüncelerim" [My Thoughts regarding the Essay 'A Study of the Cavalry and Motorized Units'], *SM* 14–107 (1938), 1–12.

309 Braun, "Ölmez Süvari" [The Immortal Cavalry], *AM* 56–108 (1938), 185.

T6 and T7 artillery towing tractors.[310] Most of the Turkish units had not more than one or two trucks: "Even though we were designated as a 'motorized anti aircraft battery', we were still not fully motorized. We had no gun-towing vehicles. Except for one Büssing truck, we had no motor vehicle in the battery."[311]

This is why the above-mentioned debates in Turkish periodicals were only a mere evaluation of things that would be feasible. In the case of the Büssing trucks, the Turkish government even had to offer payment with tobacco during the first round of negotiations.[312]

The Development of Turkish Tank Warfare

Together with other Turkish officers, the cavalry captain Tahsin [Yazıcı] was sent to the French cavalry school in Saumur in 1925. There Captain Tahsin first read postwar French evaluations about the use of armored vehicles in combination with the cavalry.[313] During Tahsin's studies in Saumur, the French army decided on the deployment of an independent tank division and on the partial motorization of the cavalry regiments.[314] Upon his return to Turkey, Tahsin served as an instructor in the cavalry school, where he also translated into Turkish the French 1926 instruction for armored cars.[315] By the end of the decade, the Turkish army began with the preparations for its first armored unit. A first experimental unit was founded in the Maltepe gunnery school after a few outdated Renault FT 17 tanks had been purchased. As a present by Kliment Voroshilov, the Soviet commissar for defense, in 1932 Turkey received eleven Russian tanks that were to form the basis of the Turkish tank force.[316] In 1934 Turkey acquired 43 BA-6 wheeled armored cars and 64 T-26B tanks from the Soviet Union. They were to form the tank bataillon of the 2nd Cavalry Division in Lüleburgaz for the defense

310 For numbers regarding Turkey see Bart Harmannus Vanderveen and Olyslager Organisation BV, *The Observer's Army Vehicles Directory to 1940* (Warne: Frederick & Company, 1974), 371–372.
311 Kocatürk, *Bir Subayın Anıları*, 103.
312 Nadolny to the German Foreign Ministry, 2 October 1930. AA-PA R78562, E692331.
313 Erhan Çifci, *Şark Cephesi'nden Kore'ye bir Türk Generali: Tahsin Yazıcı'nın Askerlik Serüveni* [A Turkish General from the East Front to Korea: Tahsin Yazıcı's Military Adventures] (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2015), 86.
314 Stéphane Ferrard, *Histoire des Blindés Français* (Paris: Argos, 2012), 48–52. On the role of the cavalry see Roberto Nayberg, "L'Emploi des Chars dans la Cavalerie Française entre 1919 et 1939," *Guerres Mondiales et Conflits Contemporains* 168 (1992), 125–141.
315 Tekeli and İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi*, 79; Çifci, *Şark Cephesi'nden Kore'ye*, 92.
316 Çifci, *Şark Cephesi'nden Kore'ye*, 102.

of Thrace.[317] Captain Tahsin became the first commander of this combined cavalry-tank unit according to the French school of thought, thereby taking a pioneer role in the Turkish armed forces.

With regard to the sources for the tactical development, the Turkish military press did not see a conflict between German and French school in the conduct of war. Carrying out operations was a matter of planning, not of chosing the right system.[318] Consequently, the Turkish army managed to build an armored branch by the use of Russian tanks, French organization and a mixture of German and other sources for its field regulations. Thereby the Turkish army avoided imitating the disadvantages of one role model, since during the 1930s, tank tactics and strategies were not yet combat proven concepts.[319] Even pro-German minded Turkish officers preferred a mixture for the creation of a Turkish way of tank warfare.[320]

German instructors also tried to have a say in the evolvement of the Turkish tank debate. The retired Bavarian Colonel, Hugo Höfl, an instructor in the infantry school, gave an introduction to modern tank warfare in his courses. His lessons included tank defence measures by infantry units. This was a typical feature of the rather theoretical approach in the Reichswehr during those years.[321] Maximilian Braun gave an overview of the combined arms warfare, the 'favorite child' of the Wehrmacht in the mid-1930s. He concentrated on the cooperation of the infantry and tanks, abstaining from references to German principles.[322]

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317 Ronald L. Tarnstrom, *Balkan Battles* (Lindsborg: Trogen Books 1998), 115.

318 Cf. the series by Sadık, "Fransız ve Alman Muharebe Usulleri Arasında Fark Var Mı?" [Is there a Difference between French and German Warfare Customs?], *AM* 50 – 87 (1932), 497 – 514; part two: Sadık, "Mevzilere Taarruz" [Attack on the Positions], *AM* 50 – 90 (1933), 292 – 295; part three: Sadık, "Müdafaa Bahsi" [The Topic of Defense], *AM* 54 – 81 (1933), 624 – 629. See also the Eren, "Alman Ordusunda Neler Gördüm (2)"; Çifci, *Şark Cephesi'nden Kore'ye*, 107.

319 For the problems of the French strategy see Henry Dutailly, "Programmes d'Armament et Structures Modernes dans l'Armée de Terre, 1935 – 1939," *Beihefte der Francia* 10 (1981), 105 – 128. For the Spanish Civil War as a testing ground for Soviet and German strategies (at this time top secret and therefore without significance for the Turkish debate), John Daley, "Soviet and German Advisors Put Doctrine To The Test: Tanks In The Siege Of Madrid," *Armor* 63 – 3 (1999), 33 – 37.

320 See the essay by General Mittelberger's interpreter Salih Erkuş, "İstikbal Harplerinde Zırhlı ve Motorlü Vasıtaların Kullanma Tarsi" [Application of Amored and Motorized Forces in Future Wars], *AM* 56 – 11 (1938), 931 – 948.

321 Höfl, "Modern Tanklar" [Modern Tanks], *PM* 7 – 74 (1932), 28 – 39. For the German debate see Markus Pöhlmann, *Der Panzer und die Mechanisierung des Krieges Eine deutsche Geschichte 1890 bis 1945* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2016), 182 – 206.

322 Braun, "Tankların Diğer Silahlarla Birlikte Calışması" [Collaboration between Tanks and other Arms Branches], trans. Celâleddin Germiyanoğlu, *AM* 54 – 101 (1936), 314 – 326.

It seems that the German instructors did not reveal all of their newly developed tactics because a future alliance was still uncertain.[323]

During the 1937 maneuvers in Thrace the first deployment of the regrouped Turkish Tank Brigade took place. The Turkish military press emphasized that an observer of the German military maneuever had praised the Turkish efforts in tank warfare and had clearly understood the political message of deterrence against any prospective invader.[324] As the range of potential enemies was extensive, the Turkish army also studied the German service regulations carefully. The Soviet army was also regarded as a big threat.[325] The region most in danger of an invasion by an enemy tank army was the wide plains of Thrace. In 1939, in this area, the Turkish General Staff feared that a possible Italian-Bulgarian coalition could wage an attack.[326] Consequently, the Turkish armored corps was strengthened by new purchases in 1940. The unit in Lüleburgaz was reduced to a small reconnaissance company in order to prevent severe losses, a reaction to the German *Blitzkrieg* concept. The armored brigade was moved to Istanbul. It was now composed of much more modern and lighter tanks, namely 16 British Vickers Mk VIB and 96 French Renault R35, together with a portion of the older Soviet equipment. A tank battalion in Diyarbakır was also formed from the latter. The delivery arrived in Turkey just four months before the German attack on France.[327]

323 Cf. in this regard the assurance of Adolf Hitler in January 1941 towards the Bulgarian ally, that an attacking Turkish tank force had to face a fierce German counter attack in Thrace: "It would be ridiculous, if the Turks imagined to procede here [in Thrace] in an aggressive manner. Germany had developed excellent attack modes based on scientific principles, and the last 'medicine of this category' even had not been published yet." Hillgruber, *Staatsmänner und Diplomaten bei Hitler*, vol. 1, 420.

324 Hamdi Turgay, "Trakya Manvralarının Yabancı Memleketlerdeki Akisleri" [Echos on the Thrace Maneuver in Foreign Countries], *TM* 13–108 (1938), 117–118.

325 See the first article in July 1939 by Kemal Koçer, "Sovyet Ordusunda Tankların ve Motorlü Birliklerin İstihdamları ve Bunlara Karşı Def ve Tard" [The Deployment of Tanks and Motorized Units in the Soviet Army and their Defense], *TM* 14–113 (1939), 1–15; followed by another essay in August: H. Ezgeç, "İtalyan, Alman, Sovyet Odularında Tankların Taaruz Şekilleri" [Tank Assault Modes in the Italian, German and Soviet Armies], *TM* 14–114 (1939), 47–53.

326 Mittelberger, "Der außenpolitische Weg der neuen Türkei," 6.

327 Tarnstrom, *Balkan Battles*, 119. During World War Two those stocks were supplemented by German and British tank deliveries in order to win Turkey for the respective side in the war. Ibid., 126–130.

Epiloge: Lessons Learned, 1939 – 1944/1945

For the German diplomats Turkey was an enthusiastic coalition partner, as the German ambassador noted: "German military virtues were held in a high esteem within the Turkish army. We thus have strong support among army circles with direct impact on politics."[328] The Turkish Foreign Minister provided several reasons why the Turkish government did favor neutrality. However, he raised Ribbentrop's hopes by claiming that "Turkey [...] would be able to sign a military alliance with Germany the very next day."[329] But the Turkish government never intended to join the war on the side of Germany although it cared to maintain good relations with the NS regime. In this regard, also former German instructors like Wülfing von Ditten agreed that the Turkish government did well not to participate in "the German desperado policy."[330] In Turkey there was a strong pro-German fraction within the military, including the head of the General Staff. These men opposed the policy stance of president İsmet İnönü: "Many army officers liked the Germans because they had been trained by them, had fought alongside them in the First Great War [sic], and continued to admire their discipline. This included Fevzi Çakmak who deeply admired them."[331]

Çakmak was careful enough to maintain good relations with the enemies of the Axis powers.[332] Other lower-ranking Turkish officers followed the early German campaigns with a mixture of enthusiasm and fear. There had been doubts since the first days of the war, when even pro-German officers had recognized the resemblance between the Turkish and the Polish armies:

> "[...][W]ith the success of the German troops [pro-German Turkish officers] urged to take side with Germany. All of us salivated [in the face of] the downthrow of other countries like playing cards in a short time scale. [...] In this manner the first operation was conducted against Poland. The Polish army, like the Turkish one, had many cavalry units, was brave and in my view was a strong army."[333]

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328 Ambassador von Keller to the Foreign Secretary of State von Weizsäcker, 17 May 1938. *ADAP Series D* vol. 5, 1953, 598.

329 Turkish Foreign Minister Menemencioğlu in a conversation with the German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop in Berlin, 7 July 1938. In: *ADAP Series D* vol. 5, 1953, 614.

330 Wülfing von Ditten, *Meine Lebenserinnerungen*, vol. I, 1st part, n.p.

331 Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943 – 1945*, 250 – 251.

332 On the negotiations between Çakmak, Gündüz and the British military leadership for a military alliance see Brock Millman, *The Ill-Made Alliance: Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1934 – 1940* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998), 294 – 299.

333 Çelikoğlu, *Bir Darbeci Subayın Anıları*, 41, 42.

Turkey would have faced a similar fate to that of these European armies. This became obvious in Hitler's threatening statements, which were intended to reassure his Bulgarian ally:

> "The Führer is of the opinion that the Turks would not dare to attack. They would know exactly that a single misconduct on their side would be enough and Constantinople would cease to exist. The undefended city would be extinguished within a short time, as it had happened in Coventry and Birmingham. In addition, militarily, they were poorly prepared. [...] He was curious to see how the Turks would attack some German tank divisions."[334]

This being the case, the Wehrmacht and its Bulgarian ally were convinced that six Bulgarian divisions and the German "[...] tank divisions and the airforce [based in Romania] keep Turkey entirely in check."[335] On the contrary, a German raid on Turkish territory could not be resisted efficiently by the inadequate Turkish forces. The British airforce instructor, Lee, agreed that neutrality was the best choice in this situation:

> "[Turkey's] cavalry and troops could not have resisted a strong armoured force for long. Once the army started to retreat to avoid break-through, it risked disaster because it could not retire intact further than the Çatalja Lines. Beyond these it would be trapped by the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmara."[336]

A repetition of the 1912 defeat would have been the outcome, but with much more severe consequences in the age of total war. In this regard, a learning process had occurred. From the Turkish political point of view, Germany was not a trustworthy ally, as it had been for parts of the Ottoman leadership in 1914. Given their experience, the Turkish staff officers distrusted German propaganda. General Asım Gündüz, Çakmak's deputy, had inside information from the Wehrmacht leadership circles: "I knew the commanders in the German army very well. We had gone to the [Berlin] war academy together and again had done our internships at the German General Staff together."[337] During a visit to Berlin in 1941, he learned from German Chief of Staff, Wilhelm Keitel, that the war against the Soviet Union was seen negatively by the Armed Forces High Com-

334 For those statements towards a Bulgarian diplomat in November and December, 1940 see Hillgruber, *Staatsmänner und Diplomaten bei Hitler*, vol. 1, 365, 383.

335 "Notes of a meeting of German and Bulgarian General staff officers," 10 February 1941, p. 8545. IfZ München MA 180 Roll 1.

336 Lee, *Special Duties*, 33.

337 Gündüz, *Hatıralarım*, 232.

mand, since it solely was binding German troops that were needed for other campaigns.

According to the memoirs of the German military attaché, Gündüz was not that reluctant to side with Germany. Gündüz told Hans Rohde openly that by siding with Italy, the German government had chosen the wrong partner and would have been far better off to ally with Turkey "and thereby maybe even would have won the war already."[338] In his memoirs, however, the Turkish General avoided such statements. Gündüz did not consider Hitler and Mussolini real military leaders because "they had not passed the rank of a sergeant."[339] The only authoritarian leader who deserved Gündüz' admiration was the Spanish dictator General Franco. He had defended his neutrality, even though he had contributed to the German war efforts with temporarily sending a volunteer division to the war against the Soviet Union. However, president İnönü and his government were careful enough to avoid such Turanist minded adventures.[340]

Germany's intentions were clear. After the fall of France, Germany intensified its plan of occupying Turkey, if needed also against the will of the Turkish government. Turkey should serve as an ally or at least a transit area for an attack on Southern Russia and the Middle Eastern British Mandates.[341] In this regard, the German High Command also relied on studies by the former Turkish military instructor, Hilmar von Mittelberger, who retrospectively held those plans for nothing more than an illusion.[342] The mountainous area was hard to cross and the motorized and mechanized German units would have faced manifold problems on their march through Anatolia. In this case, the sum of German experi-

338 Hans Rohde, *Soldat und Diplomat* (Unpublished memoirs, n.d.). BA-MA MSg 12541, 29.

339 Gündüz, *Hatıralarım*, 232.

340 On the common interests of Turanist circles and German warfare in Russia see Camilla Dawletschin-Linder: "Die turko-tatarischen sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen im Zweiten Weltkrieg im Dreiecksverhältnis zwischen deutscher Politik, turanistischen Aspirationen und türkischer Außenpolitik," *Der Islam* 80 – 1 (2003), 13 – 17.

341 For two contrafactual studies regardings those plans see John Keegan, "How Hitler Could Have Won the War: The Drive for the Middle East, 1941," in *What If? The World's Foremost Military Historians Imagine What Might Have Been; Essays*, ed. Robert Cowley (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1999), 304; John H. Gill, "Into the Caucasus: The Turkish Attack on Russia, 1942," in *Hitler Triumphant: Alternate Decisions of World War II.*, ed. Peter G. Tsouras (London: Greenhill, 2002), 164 – 166. Most of those assumptions are justified, cf. Gerhard Schreiber and Bernd Stegemann and Detlef Vogel, *Der Mittelmeerraum und Südosteuropa: Von der 'non belligeranza' Italiens bis zum Kriegseintritt der Vereinigten Staaten* (Stuttgart: DVA, 1984), 136 – 145.

342 Mittelberger, "Wanderer in vier Welten," vol. 3, 110 – 111.

ences from the past alliance with the Ottoman state prevented an invasion of the Turkish mainland.[343]

Nonetheless, the Wehrmacht was prepared for a possible operation on Turkish soil better than its predecessor forces in 1914. Maps and language guides had been prepared carefully. These textbooks were quite telling in terms of a potential similar German occupation and annihilation policy as in Central and Eastern Europe.[344]

The Turkish fear of an occupation was justified and the Turkish army began to train the mobilized troops in Guerilla tactics.[345] The fate of the divided and occupied neighbouring Iran was a warning to the Turkish public.[346] German diplomats did their best to foster pro-German sentiments in the Turkish military. During the stagnating campaign in Russia in early 1942, there was a German attempt to revive the feeling of the 'comradeship in arms'. In the Ankara embassy, Papen and his military attaché, Hans Rohde, opened an exhibition on 28 April with photographs of all German officers who had served in the Ottoman army since the days of Moltke. They had invited the main representatives of the pro-German Turkish officer's corps. The retired General Pertev Demirhan, the Ankara garrison commander, Lieutenant General Hüsnü Kilkiş and General Kâzım Orbay (as the representative of the Turkish General Staff) revelled in the memories on the past alliance.[347] The emnity with the Soviet Union was a common ground in the German-Turkish relations during those years. This became evident when the Turkish Foreign Minister supported the radical approach of the National Socialist

343 See the study on the inadequate supply routes by Carl Mühlmann, "Das Problem der rückwärtigen Verbindungen für die Kriegsführung in Vorderasien während des Weltkrieges 1914 – 1918," *Wissen und Wehr* 11 (1941), 444 – 455.

344 The explanatory notes to the map stated: "[...] Jews mainly live in Istanbul and in the other coastal cities. [...] here [in Turkey] a racial mixture has emerged, what the Turks do not like to hear." Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Kartenbeiwerk Vorderer Orient (Berlin: Generalstab des Heeres, 1941), 72. In a similar vein the dictionary only contained the entry for "Jew", and no terms for other religious groups. Obviously the German army expected the Turkish force's cooperation; cf. the sentence "When the Major will come home?"; Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, *Soldatenwörterbuch Deutsch-Türkisch für den Feldgebrauch* (Berlin: Generalstab des Heeres, 1941), 25, 8.

345 Zeki İlter, *Bir Ömür Boyu Askerlik 1919 – 1972* [A Soldier for Life, 1919 – 1972] (Istanbul: Kastaş, 2003), 30.

346 Nikolay A. Kozhanov, "The Pretexts and Reasons for the Allied Invasion of Iran in 1941," *Iranian Studies* 45 – 4 (2012), 479 – 497.

347 See the undated photograph of the opening ceremony in BA-MA MSg 2/14063. Most of the photographs of the German officers can now be found in the 'F' collection of the military museum of the Turkish armed forces in Istanbul (Askeri Müze). On this group of pro-German minded Turks see also Guttstadt, *Turkey, the Jews, and the Holocaust*, 29 – 37.

ideological war of *Weltanschauung* on the Eastern front.[348] Allegations of a prevented pro-German putsch in the summer of 1942 against the Inönü government by Germanophile civil and military circles in Turkey, followed by the presumed murder of Prime Minister İbrahim Refik Saydam, deserve further exploration based on Turkish sources.[349]

It is also interesting to note that even after this alleged putsch and after the German defeat in Stalingrad, pro-German Turkish officers had a clear favorite: "We always wish a German ultimate victory [Endsieg] against the Russians."[350] Nevertheless, the civil government adhered to its neutral politics resulting from Turkey's geostrategic position, which did not exclude good relations and trade with all parties involved in the war.[351]

In August 1944 the Turkish government broke off diplomatic relations with Germany and declared war on Germany on 23 February 1945. There were no clashes with the German occupation troops in nearby Greece.[352] General Mittelberger was partially right when he confirmed Turkish neutrality during World War Two: "Most probably only due to the fact that an army of at least one million soldiers was ready for the defense of the borders, Turkey was spared from becoming a theater of war."[353]

Conclusion

After the First World War the German and the Turkish side had used the opportunity to reflect on the past alliance. Due to inaccessible or lost archival material, national pride and considerations of personal sensivities on both sides, an absolutely open assessment was not possible. However, most studies have revealed the inadequacies of the alliance in many details. The negative image of binding oneself to another nation nurtured the Turkish aversion against seeking such an alliance in future conflicts.

348 "Germany could only solve the Russian problem if it would beat to death half of all the living Russians." Saraçoğlu in a conversation with Papen, August 1942. ADAP Serie E, vol 3, 1974, 411.
349 For the German sources regarding Hitler's war plans with Turkey and the presumed putsch see Hiltscher, *Die deutsch-türkischen Beziehungen 1940 – 42*, 136, 386 – 393, 425 – 430.
350 Colonel Asım Eren to Mittelberger, 22 August 1943. BA-MA N 40/2, n.p.
351 See on the 1942 – 1945 period Klaus Schönherr, "Die Türkei im Schatten Stalingrads. Von der 'aktiven Neutralität' zum Kriegseintritt," in *Stalingrad: Ereignis, Wirkung, Symbol*, ed. Jürgen Förster (Munich, Zürich: Piper, 1992), 397 – 415.
352 Gotthard Jäschke, *Die Türkei in den Jahren 1942 – 1951: Geschichtskalender mit Namen- und Sachregister* (Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1955), 31 – 50.
353 Mittelberger, "Der außenpolitische Weg der neuen Türkei," 12.

In the evaluation of singular combat situations, both sides showed great interest. The wartime transfer of military knowledge became visible in the evaluations of both countries. In Germany, the misreading of defensive measures in the battle of Çanakkale contributed to military failure in 1944. In Turkey, mainly Germany, together with France served as a source of reflection. Moreover, during the 1920s, a Turkish military school of thought emerged, which drew its lessons from national campaigns of the past. German military knowledge was only one among many sources, which was incorporated into Turkish military thinking.

The Turkish General Staff avoided the mistakes of the past by hiring retired German military instructors. The German staff consisted of men of an advanced age with practical experience. They worked as civilian advisors and had no say in Turkish military matters. Their military consultancy proved to be of great value for both governments, especially in the German case after 1939. Nonetheless, during the Second World War, the formerly influential German-minded Turkish officers became a marginalized and random group.

5 Conclusion

With the coup d'état in 1960, the 'Short German century in Ottoman/Turkish military reform' had come to an end. Nonetheless, the Turkish officer corps and veterans maintained a friendly attitude towards the West German Bundeswehr, not least because of the military alliance between the two countries.[1] As stated by General İlter, the long tradition of military cooperation had left a deep impact upon many officers:

> "I was taught by German instructors in the war school, infantry school and the war academy; I had been the [Turkish] military attaché in Germany and I definitely had been introduced to the German language, culture and customs and I had embraced them partially."[2]

This mixture of German active involvement and Turkish appropriated military cultural knowledge made this relationship particularly special. This transfer was by no means one-sided. The German lessons from this cooperation, to date neglected in academic research, were to have an impact on German military thinking. With regard to contemporary political tensions between Turkey and Germany, a look at the historical development of this special relationship also reveals that periods of discord between both armies were always followed by renewed cooperation.

It had been an encounter of two quite diverse military cultures. Since the 1880s officers of both armies had convened on the basis of a militarist spirit. By the reception of General Colmar von der Goltz' treatise, *The Nation in Arms,* the Ottoman army had gained hope for the defense of their hard-pressed empire. The partial appropriation of German military culture, such as maintaining order and obedience, the claim to authority and, not least, the role of the military as the guardian of political stability had left an impact on the Ottoman state and its society. Nevertheless, not all aspects of the 'German Spirit' were adjustable to Ottoman conditions. This was not only related to financial restrictions, but also to cultural differences.

The latter became evident during the period of the most intense cooperation between Germany and the Ottoman Empire from 1908 to 1918. After the 1908 revolution General von der Goltz helped the Ottoman officer corps

1 In May 1957 Pertev Demirhan, during his visit in the West German Ministry of Defense, had delivered a speech on the life of Colmar von der Goltz in Bonn's Hardthöhe. Anonymous, "Besuch von General a.D. Pertev Demirhan Pascha," *Mitteilungen der Deutsch-Türkischen Gesellschaft Bonn e. V.* 16 – 6 (1957), 7.

2 İlter, *Bir Ömür Boyu Askerlik*, 94.

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to help themselves. German assistance was not organized in the form of an official military mission, but rather a loose group of German military assistants. However, the most important measure proved to be the practice of sending Ottoman officers for intensive training to Germany, where they experienced German military standards first hand and several Ottoman officers even appropriated parts of the German *Weltanschauung*. Besides total consent regarding necessary measures there was also incredulous amazement and indirect refusal on what those Ottoman officers witnessed, as in the case of German utmost importance of duty and punctuality. In a similar manner, German officers who had witnessed Ottoman defeats in the Balkan Wars admitted that German military culture was not a solution to all Ottoman military and social problems.

Yet upon their return from Germany, these Ottoman officers were to act as bearers and transmitters of German military values. Though small in number, they also served as facilitators between the German military mission and the Ottoman officer corps from 1913 onwards. Without this crucial group of pro-German officers, the cooperation of both countries would have been less successful in terms of the achieved reforms. The First World War was certainly a turning point in the military relations of both armies. Due to the need of coalition warfare, both armies reached a high level of asymmetric institutional interdependence by the posture of German staff officers to Ottoman headquarters. This situation created resentment and discord among the Ottoman officer corps. At the end of the war, those disputes in the Caucasus even went far beyond the normal quarrels within any military coalition. The Ottoman army gained military practice and self-confidence in battle and also benefitted from German instructions about the use of state-of-the-art tactical measures. The war was lost as the Ottoman leadership, like its German ally, had failed to align its military abilities with its ambitious strategic objectives.

During the war the allies also had cooperated in another field that was to have an impact upon the Ottoman and later Turkish society. The German efforts in the military education of the youth had awakened the interest of the Ottoman military and civilian authorities. This interest was also generated by the fact that General von der Goltz had promoted the German semiofficial *Bund Jungdeutschland* (BJD) model to his fellow Ottoman officers. The German association was the German militarized version of the Boy Scout movement and focused on out-of-school physical activites, as well as patriotic indoctrination courses. Since similar Ottoman organizations had remained ineffective, the cooperation in this field was intensified by the deployment of Colonel Heinrich von Hoff to the Ottoman Ministry of War. Hoff assisted in drafting the 1916 law for a compulsory Ottoman youth organization, the *Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri* (OGD). The German col-

onel also provided advice in his numerous contributions for the OGD's periodical. Despite these efforts, the organization was not destined to succeed under the conditions of war. Nonetheless, it paved the way for a Turkish successor association of the same type, which was conceptualized with the assistance of Carl Diem in 1933. Diem, a civilian 'veteran' of the BJD movement, had developed a liking for Goltz' 'nation in arms' concept during his military service in World War I. While in the case of both the BJD and OGD, the military side dominated, the republican Turkish youth association became a civilian controlled instrument serving domestic political and subordinated military needs of the young republic. The Turkish side had entered a learning process regarding the applicability of German models and did not intend to introduce a poor and inadequate copy, but rather a genuine model derived from several foreign sources of inspiration. Nevertheless, the 1933 proposal by Carl Diem had an impact on a Turkish law in 1938.

Turkish veteran officers distanced themselves from the former German ally even though they admitted that there had been the need for German assistance in reforming the Ottoman army. A former Ottoman officer who had fought alongside the Germans in Palestine, referred to the contemporary leading nation's contributions to the Turkish nation building project, by stating that "[i]t is not our claim to [...] Germanize, but to create the ideal Turkey."[3]

For the armed forces of the republic, the German Reichswehr and Wehrmacht remained an important role model in terms of a selective appropriation of military knowledge. In addition, the Turkish military leadership expanded the circle of further sources of military inspiration. One of them was the development of a national school for military history writing in order to make use of the rich combat experiences of the 1911–1922 conflicts. Nevertheless, between 1925 and 1939 several dozen German officers served as instructors in the Turkish military academy and other higher training facilities. As a consequence of bad wartime experiences, solely retired officers were hired and they received no power of command within the Turkish armed forces. Similarly to the small numbers of Turkish officers that served in the German army during the 1920s and 1930s, these German instructors were important mediators of knowledge between both countries.

Notwithstanding, the Turkish political leadership had learned its main lesson from the past alliance with Imperial Germany and abstained from entering the Second World War on the German side. German political and military leader-

3 Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Moskova-Roma* [Moscow-Rome] (Istanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Matbaası, 1932), 19.

ship refrained from invading Turkey, most likely due to well-remembered geographical challenges in Anatolia. Ultimately, the German defeat in the defense of the Normandy beaches in 1944 revealed the German misinterpretation of the Gallipoli campaign. It was a delayed effect of the German-Ottoman alliance during World War One.

German military assistance also led to the introduction of the 'army within an army' concept in Turkey; a long-term consequence of the military cooperation between both countries. This tendency became evident especially after the Second World War. The German understanding of the army as a 'state within the state' (Otto von Lossow) contributed to the emergence of an officer corps, which saw itself as 'sui generis' and believed it derived the right to guard over the country's political stability.[4] The Prussian ideal before 1914 was the unpolitical soldier; an untenable ideal in the context of the outstanding status of the armed forces in the Wilhelmine state. This self-image crumbled due to the growing political influence of the military elite in the course of the First World War and its aftermath. However, the Turkish leadership extended the Prussian model and assigned the armed forces a distinguished role within the framework of the republican modernization project. Given this background, the repeated temporary seizure of power by the Turkish military since 1960 is the result of interior political developments in Turkey rather than a direct emulation of the Prusso-German military tradition.[5] That being said, we can no longer speak of a prevalent 'German Spirit' in the Turkish armed forces.

In conclusion, it should be mentioned that the knowledge transferred during the German-Ottoman/Turkish military cooperation was not always limited to bellicose subjects. Elsa von Kamphoevener, the daughter of the German instructor Louis von Kamphoevener (in Ottoman service between 1882 and 1909), built up a first-hand collection of Anatolian folk tales during her father's service. After the family's return to Germany, she published these tales, so far only transmitted by word of mouth, in a version adapted for German readership. During

4 For the "imperio in imperio" concept see also Hanioğlu, *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography*, 46.
5 Cf. in this regard Rinke, "Eine Pickelhaube macht noch keinen Preußen," 282–283, Sencer, *Order and Insecurity in Germany and Turkey*, 144–146. For the differences in the emergence of the Prussian and the Turkish officer corps see Ömer Laçiner, "Türk Militarizmi I" [Turkish Militarism I], in *Bir Zümre, Bir Parti: Türkiye'de Ordu*, ed. Ahmet İnsel (Istanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 2009), 16–23. For the historical development in Turkey see Dietrich Jung, "Das Primat der Militärs. Eine historisch-soziologische Analyse der politischen Rolle der türkischen Armee," *Zeitschrift für Türkeistudien* 14–1/2 (2001), 77–90. For the attempted military putsch on 15 July 2016 see Kadri Gürsel, "Turkey's Failed Coup Reveals 'Army Within An Army'," http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/turkey-coup-attempt-shows-army-within-army.html {Last Acessed on 24 November 2017}

the Second World War, she joined the German airforce troop entertainment programme. Kamphoevener's performances consisted of a classical story telling recital in the *meddah* tradition, casting a spell over her military audience.[6]

6 Elsa Sophia von Kamphoevener, *An Nachtfeuern der Karawan-Serail: Märchen und Geschichten alttürkischer Nomaden*, vol. 1 (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1988), 12–13.

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7 Bibliography

7.1 List of abbreviations

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ADAP	Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik (1918 – 1945)
AM	Askerî Mecmua
AMTK	Askerî Mecmua'nın Tarih Kısmı
ATASE	T.C. Genelkurmay Askerî Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Arşivi, Ankara
Bay HStA IV	Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Abteilung IV Kriegsarchiv, München
BA-L	Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde
BA-MA	Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv Freiburg im Breisgau
BCA	Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi, Ankara
BJD	Bund Jungdeutschland
BOA	Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul
CHF	Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası (1923 – 1935)
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (since 1935)
CUP	Commitee for Union and Progress (İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti)
DOB	DOB
DVA	Deutsche Verlags- Anstalt
Do	Dosya
Fı	Fıhrıst
Gö	Gömlek
GPDEK	Die große Politik der europäischen Kabinette 1871 – 1914
HStAS	Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart
MWB	Militär- Wochenblatt
NCO	Noncommissioned officer (Corporal's to Sergeant's rank)
NS	National Socialist (Worker's Party)
OGD	Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri
OGDM	Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri Mecmuası
PM	Piyade Mecmuası
SM	Süvari Mecmuası
TM	Topçu Mecmuası
TTK	Türk Tarih Kurumu
US NARA HD	United States National Archives, Historical Division, Headquarters United States Army Europe, 1945 – 54.

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